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SUMMARY 
In the 1990s and early 2000s lender liability for the remediation of contaminated land 
was considered the greatest environmental risk for lenders. The threat of liability from 
Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 initially drove the introduction and 
use of environmental due diligence in banks. But instances of such lender liability are 
now considered highly unlikely. 
It is because of the low risk of lender liability and the empirical knowledge gaps that 
existed in the literature basis that this research was necessary. The overarching research 
question of this thesis examines the lenders’ current perceptions of the threat of the 
environmental risks, as well as the main drivers for the use and development of 
environmental due diligence in banks. Unique interview data were collected from 
fifteen semi-structured interviews with elite banking professionals to test the research 
premise.  
There are three, primary environment-related risks. According to the banking 
respondents’ data the current environmental risk ranking is: (1) lender liability – low 
risk; (2) the indirect risks – medium risk(s); and (3) reputational risk – high risk. Thus 
reputational risk has now replaced lender liability as the greatest risk.  
The interview data further verify that banks use a range of due diligence techniques 
before and after the grant of loan finance to manage environmental risks. And further 
to this, the main driver for the continued use and development of environmental due 
diligence in banks has shifted from lender liability to reputational risk. 
Originality is assured in this thesis by the use of the interview data. The research fills 
the empirical knowledge gaps that existed in the literature basis, and has implications 
for the theory, practice and future research opportunities in a number of areas, including 
law and banking.   
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the lenders’ current perceptions of environmental 
risks and due diligence, providing an up-to-date and original contribution to the 
knowledge of the research area. It examines the research subject by analysing the 
English laws governing land pollution,1 and through the use of qualitative interview 
data. The ‘cut-off date’ for the thesis is the date upon which it was submitted, 18 
December 2014. Any reforms that have been made following the submission date will 
not be included in the analysis.  
It is noteworthy that the thesis traces the research area back twenty-five years. From a 
chronological standpoint, this was necessary because the early 1990s represents the 
time at which UK banks first began to introduce specific environmental due diligence 
techniques into their risk management frameworks. Lender liability for land pollution 
acted as the original driver for the use of environmental risk management in banks. The 
initial system that was designed to register contaminated sites in the UK was section 
143 of the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990.2 However, the section 143 
registration system was rejected, and subsequent consultation led to the introduction of 
the contaminated land regime under Part IIA of the EPA 1990.3  
                                                 
1 It is important to state that the legal system to which this thesis is directed is the English legal system. 
This is because particular chapters provide an in depth account of the English statutory and common 
laws governing land pollution. 
2 infra, ch 1, pg 76. 
3 Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990, pt IIA (hereafter, ‘Part IIA’, ‘the contaminated land regime’ 
or ‘the Part IIA regime’). 
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Lenders have a significant role to play in land redevelopment, since they provide the 
necessary funding for the remediation of contamination to take place. However, in a 
period of austerity the Coalition Government has designed and executed a political 
agenda that has adversely affected ‘brownfield land’4 redevelopment policy. Under PM 
David Cameron’s Government there has been increased focus on, inter alia, 
governmental decentralisation through localism,5 reducing ‘unnecessary regulatory 
burdens’,6 and cutting public sector funding.7 The changes that have been brought in 
by the current Government have stripped away many of the previous incentives for 
encouraging land redevelopment, and this is particularly so in relation to the UK’s 
contaminated land regime.8 This may be detrimental for future private sector 
investment in the redevelopment of affected land. 
While lending to commercial clients seeking finance for land redevelopment, banks are 
capable of incurring a number of environmental risks. The four main risks are: (1) 
lender liability; (2) the indirect risks, i.e. credit and security risks; (3) reputational risk; 
and (4) market risk.9 In response to the environmental risks lenders have introduced 
specific due diligence methods for assessing the eligibility of their borrowers.10 Recent 
interview data suggest that the main driver for the banks’ conduct of environmental due 
diligence has changed.11 Therefore, a large proportion of the previous literature on 
                                                 
4 See, Department for Communities and Local Government, National Planning Policy Framework 
(DCLG, March 2012) (hereafter, NPPF), para 111, sets out a ‘brownfield test’. 
5 V Lowndes and L Pratchett, ‘Local Governance under the Coalition Government: Austerity, Localism 
and the “Big Society”’ (2012) 38(1) Local Government Studies 21.  
6 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Better Regulation: Red Tape Challenge (gov.uk, 
no date) <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/better-regulation-red-tape-challenge> accessed 
20 August 2014. 
7 Lowndes and Pratchett (n 5) 25. 
8 EPA 1990, s 78A(2)(a)-(b). 
9 infra, ch 5, pp 221-237. 
10 infra, ch 6, pg 254. 
11 infra, ch 7, pp 291-327. 
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lender liability and environmental risk is outdated, and a knowledge gap existed in the 
empirical research surrounding the subject area. Despite the fact that the focus of the 
older writings has been primarily concerned with the direct lender liability threat posed 
to lenders by environmental law (e.g. Part IIA), this no longer reflects the perceptions 
of environmental risk currently held by the UK’s bank lending community.12 Now the 
reputational harm that may materialise from being in association with a polluting 
borrower or project is becoming an increasing concern.  
This Chapter looks at why the thesis is necessary. It outlines the research question, 
provides a synopsis of the knowledge gaps in the literature, and evaluates the current 
challenges facing contaminated land policy in the economic downturn. Once the 
necessity of the research has been summarised, a description of the research method is 
given. 
I. Research Questions 
The overarching / key research question for the thesis is: 
Have the banks’ perceptions of the threat of lender liability from environmental 
laws relating to land pollution, and the other environmental risks, changed over 
the last twenty-five years; and if so, what are currently the primary drivers for 
the use and development of environmental due diligence in loan finance 
transactions? 
                                                 
12 infra, ch 5, pp 237-248. 
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The key research question is supplemented by a number of sub-questions (below). 
Deductive reasoning was the methodological approach used to devise the key research 
question and the sub-questions. A review of the literature basis concerning 
environmental risks and Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 assisted in 
creating the specific questions that were to be tested by the empirical study. The sub-
questions are: 
1. What are the more threatening environment-related risks for the UK bank 
lending community today? 
 Does environmental legislation pose any real risk to bank lenders 
dealing with commercial customers seeking loan finance? And, if 
environmental legislation is not so significant, are there any other 
environment-related risks, i.e. environment-related risks affecting 
banks’ credit and security interests or reputations? 
 How do banks currently rank the environmental risks in relation to the 
threat that they pose to the bank? 
 How have the lenders’ perceptions of the environment-related risks 
changed over the last twenty-five years?  
2. How do lenders exercise and shape their due diligence functions to manage and 
assess the environment-related risks?  
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 What are the main due diligence techniques used by lenders to manage 
environmental risk?  
 When in the environmental due diligence process are the environmental 
risks assessed?  
 At what time in the due diligence process is the use of environmental 
due diligence most important? 
3. What are the main drivers for the use of environmental risk management in 
banks?  
 How have the drivers changed over the last twenty-five years, and are 
there other corporate social responsibility drivers?  
 What is presently driving the lenders’ use of environmental risk 
management to assess commercial clients’ eligibility?  
 What is the future of environmental due diligence in UK banks?  
The table below explains how the above sub-questions link to the chapters / sections of 
the thesis, as well as to the key research question: 
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 How Sub-question Links into 
Chapter or Section 
How Sub-question Answers the 
Key Research Question  
Sub-
question 1 
 Chapter 1 tracks the 
perception shift that has 
occurred in the literature 
basis regarding 
environmental risks, and 
provides an economic 
overview to explain why 
lender liability may now be 
seen as low risk.  
 Chapters 2, 3 and 4 illustrate 
that the current national laws 
present only a limited 
liability threat. Specifically, 
Chapter 2 provides an 
outline of Part IIA of the 
EPA; Chapter 3 deals with 
the other, miscellaneous 
laws and ‘emerging risks’; 
and Chapter 4 assesses the 
overlap between 
environmental law and 
insolvency law. 
 Chapter 5 ranks the threat of 
the environmental risks, and 
portrays that there are other 
environmental risks that can 
affect lenders and drive the 
use of their environmental 
due diligence.  
Sub-question 1 intends to: 
 Demonstrate that lender liability 
is low risk, and that 
environmental due diligence is 
now be driven by other, 
‘emerging’ environmental risks. 
 Display a contemporary ‘risk 
ranking’ of the environmental 
risks in relation to their threat of 
harm to the banks. In so doing, it 
fills the knowledge gap(s) that 
existed in the literature basis with 
empirical data. 
 Identify how the banks’ 
perceptions of the threat of 
lender liability from 
environmental legislation, as 
well as the other environmental 
risks, have changed over the last 
twenty-five years. 
 
Sub-
question 2 
 Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 
section II track the technical 
capacity for lenders to 
exercise and shape their due 
diligence to manage 
environmental risks. It does 
this by evaluating the pre- 
and post-loan due diligence 
techniques that are currently 
being used by banks.  
 Chapter 7, section III 
examines the most important 
time at which to conduct 
environmental due 
diligence, i.e. before the 
contract of loan financing.   
Sub-question 2 intends to: 
 Provide a general account of the 
practise of environmental due 
diligence in banks. This is 
necessary because, before 
analysing the drivers of due 
diligence, knowledge of the 
different due diligence 
techniques commonly used by 
banks is required.  
 Assist in understanding ‘when’ 
in the risk management process 
the use of environmental due 
diligence is the most important.  
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Sub-
question 3 
 Chapter 7, section I looks at 
the different drivers for 
environmental due diligence 
in banks. The data show how 
the lenders’ perceptions of 
the due diligence drivers 
have changed over the last 
twenty-five years. 
 Chapter 7, section IV 
discusses the continued use 
of environmental due 
diligence in banks. The data 
suggest that there is a 
definite future for this form 
of due diligence. However, 
the extent to which it will 
grow and develop is 
uncertain. 
Sub-question 3 intends to: 
 Analyse how the environmental 
due diligence drivers have 
changed over the last twenty-five 
years. It therefore aims to show 
what is currently the primary 
driver for environmental due 
diligence in banks. 
 Examine the future of due 
diligence in banks, and how this 
specific form of due diligence is 
expected to continue to develop 
and grow in response to the 
emerging environmental risks. 
 
Broadly, the areas that the thesis is concerned with are lenders’ liability and risks for 
environmental damage, and also the identification and remediation of contaminated 
land in England. The following section therefore provides a review of the literature 
concerning: (1) lender liability and environmental risk; and (2) Part IIA of the EPA 
1990.  
II. Gaps in the Existing Literature 
A literature review was undertaken in the first year of the project to gain knowledge of 
the subject area, and to establish the rationale for the research. It was necessary to 
review literature surrounding: (1) lender liability and environmental risk; and (2) Part 
IIA of the EPA 1990. There are currently knowledge gaps in the literature concerning 
these two areas: (1) the majority of the writings were written in the 1990s and 2000s, 
and the literature is therefore outdated; and (2) the research area lacks contemporary 
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empirical data. Thus, an empirical-based study became a crucial feature of this research. 
The empirical data collected can be used to compare the lenders’ current perceptions of 
environmental risks and due diligence with the writings of the past. The unique insights 
of the interviewees provide an original and up-to-date account of environmental risk 
and due diligence within twenty-first century bank lending.13  
Tracking how the writings concerning bank lending and environmental risks have 
changed over the last twenty-five years contributes to establishing and answering the 
specific research questions for the thesis. Both the overarching research question and 
sub-question 1 are answered by this section. This is because the recent literature shows 
that a shift in the perceptions of lenders has occurred, and that the liability threat from 
Part IIA and the other, national environmental laws governing land pollution issues is 
sufficiently low. The more contemporary literature shows that environmental due 
diligence in banks is currently being driven by the reputational and indirect risks that 
banks can incur during loan finance. 
A. Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
The literature on Part IIA is outdated and highly analytical. This may be because the 
risk of direct lender liability for contaminated land has existed for more than a decade, 
and has become ‘normalised’ over time. Because the majority of the literature on Part 
IIA was published just before, and around, the time when the regime was brought into 
force (early 2000s), there existed a knowledge gap in the writings. While some of the 
literature assesses the potential liability that Part IIA could have for bank lenders, a 
                                                 
13 The empirical data are mostly held in ch 7. 
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substantial part of the writing focuses on the contaminated land regime’s structure and 
operation (see below). There is also no contemporary, empirical evidence to portray the 
lenders’ current perception of Part IIA liability. Syms, for instance, conducted research 
into contaminated land for housing use in 1997.14 His research showed, amongst other 
things, ‘that traditional banks are more aware of the issues, and have appropriate 
mechanisms in place, than the building societies, or former societies which have 
converted to banks; none of the mechanisms discriminated against the redevelopment 
of contaminated land.’15 Although Syms’ research is relevant to this thesis, the 
reliability of the source can be questioned because of its age. The purpose of this thesis 
therefore is to update the research field’s knowledge of Part IIA liability by employing 
empirical data.      
The first research question suggests that environmental legislation presents no real risk 
for lenders in the UK. Evidence for this can be found in the Environment Agency’s 
(EA) 2009 Report on the progress of Part IIA from 2000 – 2007.16 The Report states 
that, out of the total number of sites so far determined, Part IIA has only remediated ten 
per cent of contaminated sites, with planning and voluntary remediation cleaning up 
the other ninety per cent of sites thus far remediated.17 Before the regime came into 
force people working in the contaminated land market wondered whether it would be 
‘a damp squib or firecracker’.18 Following the Part IIA’s introduction the regime has 
                                                 
14 P Syms, ‘The Redevelopment of Contaminated Land for Housing Use’ (1997) Housing Research 225 
<http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/h225.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
15 ibid 225. 
16 Environment Agency, Reporting the Evidence: Dealing with Contaminated Land in England and 
Wales; a review of progress from 2000-2007 with Part 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
(EA 2009) <http://a0768b4a8a31e106d8b0-
50dc802554eb38a24458b98ff72d550b.r19.cf3.rackcdn.com/geho0109bpha-e-e.pdf> accessed 3 
December 2013. 
17 ibid 6. 
18 ‘Legislative Comment: Damp squib or firecracker?’ (1995) 5(4) PELB 32. 
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been compared to ‘a monster under the bed’.19 When the contaminated land regime was 
brought into force, the literature shows that its operation was, ‘dogged by delays’, as 
local authorities found it difficult to set up inspection strategies for identifying 
contaminated land.20 Part IIA’s insufficient impact is the reason why the recent 
consultation on the contaminated land regime was held by the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), and the Welsh Government (WG), in 
December 2010. This consultation concerned the need to update the contaminated land 
regime to give it more clarity. Amongst other things, Part IIA’s statutory guidance was 
revised, and the new version was released on 6 April 2012.21 The consultation generated 
literature that sought to question whether the updated version of the regime would 
increase its effectiveness.22 In a 2013 article, Fogleman evaluates whether the changes 
that have been made to the new statutory guidance have had the effect of simplifying 
the document, or whether such changes have actually reduced the regime’s future 
application.23  
Notwithstanding the insignificant direct impact of Part IIA, there is literature to show 
how the regime has had indirect implications for a number of sectors. For example, in 
their article on the contaminated land regime’s effect upon lawyers, Lee and Vaughan 
                                                 
19 S Vaughan, ‘Policy, Practice and Pollution: A Study of Contaminated Land Remediation’ (MSc thesis, 
Cardiff University September 2008) 47. 
20 Ends, ‘Contaminated land regime dogged by delays’ (2007) Ends Report 388. See also, Ends, 
‘Councils still behind on contaminated land’ (2009) Ends Report 409.   
21 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Environmental Protection Act 1990: Part 2A – 
Contaminated Land Statutory Guidance (HM Government, 2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/223705/pb13735cont-
land-guidance.pdf> accessed 14 August 2014 (hereafter Defra 2012). 
22 See, for example: E Lees, ‘The contaminated land regime – new guidance and a new philosophy?’ 
(2012) 14(4) Env L Rev 267; Ends, ‘Revised statutory guidance on contaminated land welcome’ (2012) 
Ends Report 445; R Lee, S Sykes, A Pullman, P Davies and M Green, ‘Protecting the land from 
pollutants’ (2012) 1221 EG 86; and, M Barlow and S Tilling, ‘Changes to the contaminated land regime’ 
(2012) 199(Apr) IHL 9.   
23 V Fogleman, ‘The new statutory guidance; simplification or reducing the application of Part 2A of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990?’ (2013) 15(1) Env L Rev 47. 
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suggest that the introduction of Part IIA subsequently led to a ‘corporatisation’ effect 
to occur within the legal realm.24 They show how the regime’s enactment created a 
niche in the legal world; as a consequence, environmental law became ‘corporatised’ 
as an individual area of practice in itself.25 After reviewing Lee and Vaughan’s paper, 
it makes one wonder how significantly the Part IIA regime has affected the various 
professions that have a place in the contaminated land market. For instance, has it made 
such professions conduct due diligence to manage and assess environmental risk?26 
What sort of impact has Part IIA had upon financial institutions, specifically? This 
research offers the most up-to-date account of Part IIA’s impact, and how the banks’ 
environmental risk management teams presently perceive it as a risk.27  
What about Part IIA’s structure and operation?28 A number of journal articles and blogs 
have been highly useful for outlining Part IIA’s structure.29 Some of the literature 
suggests that the Part IIA regime’s structure is over complex,30 and, while applicable 
in theory, it creates a significant degree of ‘uncertainty’ for the under-resourced 
regulatory authorities when trying to enforce the regime in practice.31 Lawrence and 
                                                 
24 R Lee and S Vaughan, ‘The Corporatisation of Environmental Lawyers’ (2010) 17 IJLP 35. 
25 infra, ch 6. 
26 Read, for example, R Lee, ‘Local Authority Inspection Strategies for Contaminated Land: Questions 
for Due Diligence’ (2002) 3(4) Due Diligence and Risk Management 7.  
27 ibid. 
28 See, S Bell, D McGillivray and O Pedersen, Environmental Law (7th edn, OUP 2008); and R Turrell-
Clark and S Tromans, Contaminated Land (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008)).   
29 R Lee, ‘Contaminated Land – remediation and liabilities’ (1997) Mar JBL 172. See also, M Lee, ‘New 
Environmental Liabilities: The Purpose & Scope of the Contaminated Land Regime and Environmental 
Liability Directive’ (2009) 11(4) Env L Rev 264; R Lee, ‘Part one of a detailed review of the 
Contaminated Land Regime’ (Eric-group, 21 October 2011) <http://www.eric-
group.co.uk/environmental_regulation_story.php?content_id=118> accessed 6 September 2013; R Lee, 
‘Contaminated Land Regime: Inspections’ (Eric-group, 11 November 2011) <http://www.eric-
group.co.uk/environmental_regulation_story.php?content_id=181> accessed 6 September 2013; and R 
Lee, ‘Contaminated Land Regime: The Remediation Process’ (Eric-group, 21/11/2011) 
<http://www.eric-group.co.uk/environmental_regulation_story.php?content_id=184> accessed 6 
September 2013. 
30 Vaughan, ‘Policy, Practice and Pollution’ (n 19) 2. 
31 D Lawrence and R Lee, ‘Permitting Uncertainty: Owners, Occupiers and Responsibility for 
Remediation’ (2003) 66(2) Mod L Rev 261. 
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Lee state that: ‘Because the regime is new and complex there is a range of issues open 
to doubt.’32 In the more contemporary literature, this doubt has been replaced with 
criticism of the regime’s effectiveness and operational capacity.33 Part IIA has only 
generated a small amount of case law;34 and not one single case concerns a lender being 
made directly liable for their borrower’s contaminated land remediation. Hence, the 
research question states that environmental legislation has presented ‘no real direct 
threat’ for lenders based in the UK. Defra’s statutory guidance defines the two types of 
liability that may occur under the Part IIA regime as: ‘Class A’ and ‘Class B’ liability.35 
Despite presenting a limited liability risk for lenders, Part IIA liability is capable of 
being transferred during corporate transactions.36 Greenwood calls this, ‘the 
environmental transaction.’37 Thus, even though Part IIA liability is very unlikely to 
occur, lenders still remain at risk during their provision of loan finance to customers 
that own contaminated land. Literature concerning the case law on Part IIA liability 
shows how significantly costly the remediation requirements could be under the 
regime.38 In relation to the case of R (on the application of Crest Nicholson Residential 
                                                 
32 ibid 262. 
33 See, for example, E Lees, ‘Interpreting the contaminated land regime: should the “polluter” pay?’ 
(2012) 14(2) Env L Rev 98; S Vaughan, ‘Contaminated land: fit for purpose? The progress of Part 2A to 
date’ (2009) Mar Env L M 2; and S Vaughan, ‘The contaminated land regime: still suitable for use?’ 
(2010) 2 JPL 142. 
34 Lee, ‘New Environmental Liabilities’ (n 29) 264. This paper compares Part IIA of the EPA 1990 with 
Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability. In so doing, it provides a good account of some of the case 
law that Part IIA has generated. 
35 Defra 2012 (n 21), sec 7. See also, D Lawrence and R Lee, ‘Talking ‘bout my Generation: The 
Remediation Liability of Waste Producers’ (2006) 8(2) Mod L Rev 93; and D Woolley, ‘Contaminated 
land – the real world’ (2002) January JPEL 5. 
36 Read, S Sykes, ‘Contaminated land and property transactions: environmental information’ (1997) 1(4) 
Journal of Property Development 171; V Fogleman, ‘Transferring remediation liabilities in corporate 
transactions’ (2001) 13(2) ELM 83; and, GI McGregor, ‘Contamination: The Kiss of Death for a Real 
Estate Deal?’ (2003) 5(1) Environmental Practice 6.  
37 B Greenwood, ‘The environmental transaction’ (1996) JPEL 11. 
38 There is a lot of literature discussing Part IIA’s cases: V Fogleman, ‘Circular Facilities (London) Ltd 
v. Sevenoaks District Council: the meaning of “knowingly permitted” under the contaminated land 
regime’ [2005] Oct JPL 1269; M Zuckerman, ‘Too Hot to handle?’ (2006) 156 NLJ 1708; M Edwards, 
‘S78F of the EPA 1990 – appropriate person – statutory successor’ [2007] JPL 1737; R Carriage and O 
Ennis, ‘Environmental Protection Act 1990 Part 2A: where does the National Grid Gas case leave 
practitioners?’ (2007) Nov JPL 1557; J Thornton, ‘Case Comment: Contaminated land’ (2008) 20(2) 
JEL 293; J Thornton, ‘Contaminated Land – Case law Update’ (Brownfield Briefing Conference, 22 
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Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs [2010] EWHC 561 
(admin),39 Samuels notes that it provides, ‘A vivid illustration of the potential 
consequences of buying or owning contaminated land.’40 Although there is a lack of 
case law for contaminated land liability, there has nevertheless been an increased 
‘Europeanisation’41 of contaminated land policy over the last couple of years. This 
‘Europeanisation’ is a direct consequence of the Environmental Liability Directive’s42 
implementation into the various laws of EU Member States.43  
The literature on Part IIA of the EPA 1990 shows that it has presented, and presents, 
no real threat for banks. It suggests that the reason for this is because the Part IIA regime 
is under-resourced and inefficiently applied by the regulators in practice.44 However, 
there is presently a gap in the literature surrounding this area of study. This gap has 
emerged because of the absence of empirical work. This research aims to fill this gap 
                                                 
January 2008) <http://www.39essex.co.uk/docs/articles/JTH_Contaminated_Land_220108.pdf> 
accessed 6 October 2014; J Thornton, ‘Contaminated land: the latest developments’ (2009) JPL 8; A 
Wiseman, ‘Sandridge Contaminated Land Appeal’ (2009) 20(4) WL 207; D Hart, J Jolliffee and R 
Marcus, ‘Contaminated land in Corby and Sandridge: historic liabilities: Part 2: Sandridge’ (2009) 17(4) 
Env Liability 129; R Fairley, ‘Clean-up legislation’ (2010) 10 Env 113; N Rose, ‘Contaminated Land: 
Sandridge Case’ (2010) 21(3) PLC 74; ‘Case Comment: Contaminated Land – appeal against 
apportionment’ (2010) Mar Env L M 2; and C May, ‘An insidious problem’ (2010) 1012 EG 88 
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN-50221075&site=ehost-live> 
accessed 6 September 2013. 
39 This case is outlined in more detail in ch 3, pg 106. 
40 A Samuels, ‘A review of the law and practice on contaminated land’ (2012) 12 JPL 1459. 
41 A Layard, ‘The Europeanisation of Contaminated Land’ (2004) 6(6) Env L Rev 97. See also, N 
Atkinson, ‘A Legal Regime for the Clean Up of Contaminated Land: Lessons from Europe’ (1995) 4(5) 
European Environmental Law Review 141; R. Seerden and K. Deketelaere, Legal Aspects of Soil 
Pollution and Decontamination in the EU Member States and the United States (Antwerp, Intersentia 
2000); and Vaughan, ‘Policy, Practice and Pollution’ (n 19) 17. 
42 Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage. 
43 V Fogleman, ‘The Environmental Directive and its impact on English environmental law’ (2006) JPL 
1443. See also, R Lee, ‘EU proposals on environmental liability: from a private to public framework’ 
(2003) Mar JBL 180; G Winter, JH Jans, R Macrory and L Krämer, ‘Weighing up the EC Environmental 
Liability Directive’ (2008) 20(2) JEL 163; D Lawrence, ‘The new environmental liability regime: not 
only the polluter will pay’ (2009) 25(4) PN 162; and Lee, ‘New Environmental Liabilities’ (n 29) 264.  
44 Vaughan, ‘The contaminated land regime: still suitable for use?’ (n 33) 142. 
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by using the interview data to show the lenders’ present perceptions of Part IIA.45     
B. Bank Lending and the Environment 
Another knowledge gap in the literature concerns bank lending and the environment. 
Like Part IIA, the writings in this area lack empirical research. The older academic 
literature on banks and environmental risks tends to focus heavily upon the threat posed 
to lenders by direct lender liability. In, ‘the quest for the environmental equilibrium’,46 
the regulation of the environment has increased over the last twenty-five years.47 
Increased regulation in the 1990s and 2000s, initially drove environmental due 
diligence in commercial bank lending. For some, the development of environmental 
law was quite unexpected.  
‘If, say, in 1990, someone had said to me that, in a few short years, I would 
be writing a text on environmental risk, I’m sure that I would have laughed 
out loud.’48 
 As a result of the growth of environmental regulation, many environmental law 
practitioners and academics have questioned why banks should face liability and risks 
because of the environmental harm that is caused by their borrowers.49 In some 
                                                 
45 infra, chs 5, 6 and 7. 
46 A Waite, ‘The quest for environmental equilibrium’ (2005) 7 Env L Rev 35. 
47 It is noteworthy that since 2008 there have been a number of ‘major reforms’ to environmental 
regulation under the government’s ‘red tape challenge’. See, Defra, Better Regulation (n 6).  
48 P Case, Environmental risk management and corporate lending – a global perspective (Woodhead 
Publishing, Cambridge 1999) ix. 
49 See, for example, M Redman, ‘Environmental Law for Bankers and Insolvency Practitioners’ (1993) 
8(3) JIBL 85; M Fordham, ‘A Rude Awakening’ (1993) 143 NLJ 50; P Davies, ‘Lender Liability: what 
happens now?’ (1995) 14(2) IBFL 16; R Pitchford, ‘How Liable Should The Lender Be? The Case Of 
Judgment-Proof Firms And Environmental Risk’ (1995) 85(5) The American Economic Review 1171; 
JH Marks, ‘The Environmental Liability for Lenders in England: Is the Tide Coming In?’ (2001) 27 NCJ 
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respects, the allocation of lender liability to a bank for a commercial borrower’s 
environmental pollution is contrary to the polluter pays principle,50 which suggests that 
the polluter is primarily responsible for any damage that it has caused. The issues 
surrounding lender liability for environmental harm are well portrayed by Jarvis and 
Fordham:  
‘Why should “lender liability” develop? Banks do not pollute rivers. Why 
should they be responsible for the activities of their borrowers? If someone 
buys a car and kills a pedestrian the bank which provided the loan is not 
held responsible. 
Should it be enough, then, that the lender could have prevented the 
pollution, by refusing to lend or by supervising the activities of its 
borrower? What if the lender knew about the polluting process, or act? 
What if the loan office was a member of the borrower’s board, or the loan 
terms allowed it to authorise the borrower’s dealings or to collect the 
debts?’51 
Hooley goes on to suggest that the reason why lenders should be responsible for the 
activities of their borrowers is because: 
‘Lenders provide the funds that enable the polluting activity to continue and 
may have made considerable profits from that activity. Lenders have “deep 
                                                 
Int’l L & Com Reg 1; and M Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: the Financial Sector and the 
Future of the Planet (Earthscan, London 2001).  
50 Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 
51 J Jarvis and M Fordham, Lender Liability: environmental risk and debt (1st edn, Cameron May 1993) 
2. 
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pockets” and are able to meet clean-up costs. Lenders are in a good position 
to investigate and require environmental compliance from their borrowers. 
Political and economic considerations are at work here just as much as legal 
ones.’52  
Therefore, in response to Jarvis and Fordham’s questions, lender liability for 
environmental damage should be viewed as wholly different from the situation where 
a bank lends money to a borrower who kills a pedestrian in a road traffic accident (as 
above), as that is a situation which resides outside of the bank’s responsibility as a mere 
financier. However, lenders do have an increasing responsibility to protect the 
environment, as suggested by Hooley.53 By making sustainable, social and ethical 
investment choices, banks can reduce the environmental impact and harm that their 
borrowers create by requiring their customers to meet defined standards as a condition 
that is contingent to the grant and maintenance of monetary funding.  
Literature has described the banks’ risk management practices as now being ‘green’ in 
their outlook.54 The lenders’ role in the protection of the environment is so important 
                                                 
52 R Hooley, ‘Lender liability for environmental damage’ (2001) CLJUK 405.  
53 See, BJ Richardson, ‘Ethical finance in Britain: a neglected prerequisite for sustainability’ (2003) 5 
Env L Rev 109; D Sarokin and J Schulkin, ‘Environmental concerns and the business of banking’ (1991) 
74(5) Journal of Commercial Bank Lending 6; PN Grabosky, ‘Green markets: environmental regulation 
by the private sector’ (1994) 16(4) Law & Policy 419; GL Clark and T Hebb, ‘Why should they care? 
The role of institutional investors in the market for corporate global responsibility’ (2005) 37(11) 
Environment and Planning 2015; B Scholtens, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the International 
Banking Industry’ (2009) 86(2) Journal of Business Ethics 159; BJ Richardson, ‘Keeping Ethical 
Investment Ethical: Regulatory Issues for Investing for Sustainability’ (2009) 87(4) Journal of Business 
Ethics 555; and DA Lubin and DC Esty, ‘The Sustainable Imperative’ (2010) 88(5) Harvard Business 
Review. 
54 For literature on the ‘greening’ of bank lending, see: JJ Bouma, M Jeucken and L Klinkers (eds), 
Sustainable Banking: the greening of finance (Greenleaf Publishing 2001); F Studemann, ‘“Green” Bank 
Puts Principles First’ (1993) 48(8) Int Management 32; B Harvey, ‘Ethical Banking: the case of the Co-
op bank’ (1995) 14(2) Journal of Business Ethics 1005; Greenwood (n 37) 11; BJ Richardson, 
‘Environmental liability and banks: recent European developments’ (2002) JIBL 287;  
R Kerry Turner, J Powell and A Craighill, ‘Green Taxes, Waste Management and Political Economy’ 
(2003) CSERGE Working Paper WM 96-03 
<http://www.cserge.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wm_1996_03.pdf>  accessed 6 October 2014; S Hadfield-
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in the modern age of corporate financing that Richardson has suggested that the banks’ 
ability to make financial choices that are both ethical and sustainable is, ‘a neglected 
prerequisite for sustainability’.55 Egede and Lee believe that bank lending and the 
environment are, ‘inevitably inter-related.’56 Richardson agrees with this, supporting 
the argument that financial institutions play a key role in achieving sustainability.57 The 
typology of sustainable and responsible financing has been outlined by Bouma and 
Jeucken,58 who suggest that the majority of financial institutions will evolve through a 
number of stages before their financing eventually becomes ‘green’ in its outlook.59 
Within this typology, banks begin with a ‘defensive’ style of lending, and gradually 
become more sustainable as a result of growing market and societal pressures.60 In 
agreement with Bouma and Jeucken, Thompson and Cowton propose that, ‘In recent 
years, it has come to be recognised that banks’ lending operations affect, and are 
affected by, the state of the natural environment.’61 Indeed, the paradigmatic ‘greening’ 
of banking risk management practices means that it is now increasingly difficult to 
ignore the impact that the environmental law has had on the economy, and the 
institutions that form a part of the economic structure.  
                                                 
Hill, ‘The Greening of Project Finance’ (2008) Geography Compass 1058; and, T Papadopoulos, ‘The 
“Greening” of Project Finance: Is this a viable project?’ (2009) 7(1) The Icfai University Journal of 
Banking Law 8. 
55 Richardson, ‘Ethical finance in Britain’ (n 53) 109. 
56 T Egede and R Lee, ‘Bank lending and the environment: not liability but responsibility’ (2007) Nov 
JBL 868.   
57  Richardson, ‘Ethical finance in Britain’ (n 53) 109.  
58 JJ Bouma and M Jeucken, ‘The Changing Environment of Banks’ in JJ Bouma, M Jeucken and L 
Klinkers (eds), Sustainable Banking: the greening of finance (Greenleaf Publishing 2001) 26-29.  
59 ibid. 
60 ibid.  
61 P Thompson and CJ Cowton, ‘Bringing the environment into bank lending: implications for 
environmental reporting’ (2004) 36(2) The British Accounting Review 197. See also, P Thompson and 
CJ Cowton, ‘Do Codes Make a Difference? The Case of Bank Lending and the Environment’ (2000) 24 
(2) Journal of Business Ethics 165; and P Thompson, ‘Assessing the environmental risk exposure of UK 
banks’ (1998) 16(3) International Journal of Bank Marketing 129; and Hadfield-Hill (n 54) 1058. 
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What has caused this ‘greening of finance’62 to occur? The older literature suggests that 
the direct lender liability threat from environmental legislation, in the USA, initially 
drove the banks to introduce environmental due diligence into their risk management 
frameworks.63 Marks states that:  
‘During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the ebb and flow of 
legislative and judicial activity in the United States has raised important 
issues regarding the potential exposure of lenders to environmental 
liability.’64  
More specifically, the writings pin-point the origins of lender liability for 
environmental harm to the enactment of the United States of America’s Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 1980.65 The 
enactment of the CERCLA regime led to a time of great uncertainty for many US bank 
lenders.66  
‘Uncertainties and confusion pervade environmental liability standards 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
                                                 
62 Bouma et al. (n 54). 
63 Hooley (n 52) 416. Other literature which discusses the ‘American experience’ of lender liability and 
environmental risk, includes: Jarvis and Fordham (n 51); J O’Donovan, Lender Liability (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2005); M Townsend, ‘Risky Business? Assessing the Lender’s Real Environmental Risk and 
How to avoid it?’ (2006) 11 JIBFL 483.  
64 Marks (n 49) 1. See also, Fordham, ‘A Rude Awakening’ (n 49) 50. 
65 See, ‘Notes: Cleaning Up the Debris after Fleet Factors:  Lender Liability and CERCLA’s Security 
Interest Exemption’ (1990) 104 Harvard Law Review 1249. See also, AK Obermann and R Arnold, 
‘Environmental Regulation – EPA Proposed Rule Clarifying Lender Liability’ (1991) 9 JIBL 371; and 
MH Ahrens and DS Langer, ‘Lender Liability under CERCLA - Environmental risks for Lenders under 
SUPERFUND: A Refresher for the economic downturn’ (2008) 3 Bloomberg Corporate Law Journal 
482–493. 
66 infra, ch 2, pp 63-75. 
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Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). As a result, lending practices have 
become distorted.’67  
Roulac’s study, which was undertaken in America in 1993, provides empirical evidence 
to suggest that due diligence within real estate transactions became, ‘a necessary 
precondition’, because of CERCLA.68 During the 1990s, UK banks became concerned 
about the direct lender liability, which had occurred in America.69 Redman, for 
instance, states that, ‘Banks and insolvency practitioners are becoming increasingly 
aware of the implications of environmental law on their businesses.’70 In response to 
CERCLA, literature developed in the UK showing how direct lender liability for 
environmental risks was inevitably going to arise (see below). Practitioners attempted 
to demonstrate how liability may emerge for a bank that did not exercise the appropriate 
level of environmental due diligence71 within its risk management framework.72  
‘Against this background lenders are well advised to make themselves fully 
aware of the environmental factors relating to properties or assets over 
                                                 
67 MI Greenberg and DM Shaw, ‘To Lend Or Not To Lend – That Should Not Be The Question: The 
Uncertainties Of Lender Liability Under CERCLA’ (1992) 41(5) Duke Law Journal 1211. 
68 SE Roulac, ‘Environmental Due Diligence, Information Requirements and Decision Criteria’ (1993) 
8(1) The Journal of Real Estate Research 139.  
69 For a good article on environmental risk in Canada see, MH Ogilvie, ‘Enter At Your Own Risk: 
Environmental Lender Liability In Canada’ (1996) Jan JBL 94.  
70 Redman (n 49) 85. For an overview of the CERCLA regime refer to ch 2, pg 63.  
71 For literature outlining environmental risk and due diligence in banking, see, S Tromans, ‘The 
relevance of environmental law for banks’ (1990) 5(11) JIBL 433; W Blair, Banks, Liability and Risk 
(3rd edn, Informa Law 2001); and P Hood and J Virgo ed, Principles of Lender Liability (OUP 2012). 
Earlier work may also be found on this topic from the literature that was published in the United States 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 
72 See, amongst others, BF Elliot and EF Mannino, ‘Lender Liability: an emerging threat’ (1990) April 
IBFL 149; P Long and J Rhoades, ‘Is the environmental holiday over for English lenders?’ (1993) July 
International Financial Law Review 33; T Parker and E Welch, ‘A bank’s view of lender liability in 
environmental legislation’ (1993) 8(6) JIBL 217; C Keegan, ‘United States: uncertainty for lenders’ 
liability for environment’ (1995) 13(11) IBFL 111; and C Stoakes, ‘The loans that come back to haunt’ 
(1997) 335 Euromoney 34.   
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which they propose to take charges.’73  
A good account of the early concerns surrounding environmental risk and bank lending 
in the UK is given in Jarvis and Fordham’s book, Lender Liability: Environmental Risk 
and Debt (1993).74 Jarvis and Fordham offer one of the most important accounts of 
writing on bank lending and the environment for this thesis. They provide an early 
1990s perspective on lender liability for environmental issues (i.e. before the 
introduction of Part IIA of the EPA). Chapter 2 begins by making ‘A Trans-Atlantic 
Glance’ at the banks’ experiences of lender liability for environmental issues in 
America.75 This Chapter then leads on to ‘A Cross-Channel Glance’ in Chapter 3. 76  
The rest of the book outlines the national sources of law that are available for creating 
lender liability, as well as an insight into key terms and triggers of liability, and safe 
lending practices. In relation to the national sources of environmental legislation, Jarvis 
and Fordham comment:  
‘It is obvious that in order to address the question of lender liability for 
environmental harm in the UK one must start with a grasp of the parameters 
and principles of domestic environmental liability.’77  
The excerpt above explains why it is necessary for this thesis to outline the UK law 
relating to land pollution in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Placing the book into the historical 
context of the time, Jarvis and Fordham display the early fears of lender liability for 
environmental risk and debt. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of Jarvis and Fordham’s book were 
                                                 
73 J Walters, ‘Lenders and the Environment’ (1991) 135(9) Solicitors’ Journal 274, 275. 
74 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51). 
75 ibid 10. 
76 ibid 24. 
77 ibid 33. 
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designed to build upon this fear. They place significant emphasis on the likelihood and 
severity of the threat of direct lender liability. However, as there are now other 
environmental risks to consider (see below), this source is outdated, and does not reflect 
the lenders’ present perceptions of environmental liability and risk.  
The literature shows that, in the 1990s and early 2000s, there remained a primary focus 
on lenders’ primary environmental liability, and the use of risk reduction techniques.78  
‘The risk of environmental liability must be taken seriously by commercial 
lenders and their advisers.’79  
In hindsight, however, the literature on lender liability for environmental risk from this 
time can now be viewed as a scare-mongering tactic, used by practitioners to ‘fish for 
work’. This attitude is reflected in the titles of some of the journal articles that were 
published, e.g. ‘Environmental liability: a gun at the lender’s head?’80 or ‘Pollution 
liability – a financier’s nightmare?’.81 As well as direct risk, some of the early writings 
discuss the indirect environmental risks (i.e. credit and security risks) that banks may 
incur during their loan financing.82  
‘There are two main areas of risk for banks: a) The risk that the bank will 
not be repaid because the borrower’s assets are substantially depleted by 
environmental clean-up or other related costs. b) The risk that the bank 
                                                 
78 See, for instance, Blair (n 71) ch 5; and Townsend (n 63) 483.  
79 Hooley (n 52) 405. 
80 J Fordyce, J Kofman and D Tay, ‘Environmental liability: a gun at the lender’s head?’ (1990) May 
International Financial Law Review 19. 
81 ‘Pollution liability – a financier’s nightmare?’ (1990) July Newbuildings 4. 
82 Tromans (n 71) 434. 
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itself may be held liable for environmental clean-up or other related 
costs.’83   
Over the last seven or eight years, a change has occurred in the literature on lender 
liability and environmental risk. The more recent works on this topic show that, 
nowadays, the focus has shifted from the ‘traditional environmental risks’ that pose a 
threat to banks (i.e. direct liability and indirect risks) to a sudden inclusion of the 
reputational risk that banks can incur while lending to a polluting borrower, or project.84 
Egede and Lee present a contemporary exhibition of bank lending and environmental 
risk,85 as follows:  
 Direct lender liability;  
 Credit risk;  
 Security risk;  
 Insolvency; and 
 Project risk.86  
This presentation of risk is wholly different to Jarvis and Fordham’s book, and shows 
how perceptions have changed towards environmental risk over time. Contrary to the 
                                                 
83 R Griffith, ‘New liabilities for the banker in England’ (1993) 4 IBLJ 435. 
84 Egede and Lee (n 56) 868.   
85 ibid. 
86 ibid. 
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older works, today, direct lender liability is viewed as the least likely risk to materialise 
in commercial lending practices.87 Egede and Lee believe that, ‘This is a remote 
prospect both under the UK and European law.’88 In response to the old perception 
concerning environmental lender liability, they propose that:  
‘For the last ten years, those involved in corporate finance have been more 
concerned about environmental costs and liabilities. But there has been a 
feeling that these would arrive with some big bang, and the fact that this 
has not happened has given way, at times, to complacency.’89  
Egede and Lee’s observation suggests that direct lender liability is not the sole driver 
for the lenders’ use of environmental due diligence.90 Now the literature emphasises 
how the banks’ fear of gaining a bad reputation, by way of being associated with 
environmentally damaging clients, is increasingly becoming the main driving force for 
the conduct of environmental due diligence in banks.91 In a paper on the Equator 
Principles (EP), and social rights, Clayton advises that:  
‘The rights affected in domestic banking tend to be of a micro nature in that 
only one person or organisation is affected. In the arena of international 
banking, the social rights that are affected are of a macro nature affecting 
many thousands of individuals.’92  
                                                 
87 ibid. 
88 ibid 875. 
89 ibid 868.  
90 ibid 875. 
91 ibid 880-883. 
92 N Clayton, ‘Equator Principles and Social Rights: incomplete protection in a self-regulatory world’ 
(2009) 11(3) Env L Rev 173. For other literature on the Equator Principles, read, PQ Watchman, A 
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The threats presented in project finance truly provide support to the argument which 
suggests that there has been an increased focus on environmental, social and ethical 
risk management in financial institutions.93 It also shows how non-financial risks in 
banking have undergone an increased ‘globalisation’ over the last couple of years.94 
The EP are further explored in Chapter 7.95    
There is a small amount of literature concerning environmental insurance as a means 
of managing and mitigating the environmental risks that may occur during lenders’ 
corporate transactions. The literature shows that specific environmental insurance 
policies initially formed in America,96 but the use of environmental insurance has also 
become a feature within the UK’s financial market.97 Sykes, in a paper on the use of 
environmental insurance in the UK, states that the intervention of insurance in 
transactions between vendors, purchasers and lenders of environmentally suspect land 
can be viewed as a solution of risk reduction.98 Data in Chapter 4 provide a 
                                                 
Delfino and J Addison, ‘EP 2: the revised Equator Principles: why hard-nosed bankers are facing soft 
law principles’ (2007) 1(85) Law & Fin Mkt Rev 85; B Scholtens and L Dam, ‘Banking on the Equator. 
Are Banks that Adopted the Equator Principles Different from Non-adopters?’ (2007) 35(8) World 
Development 1307; A Hardenbrook, ‘The Equator Principles: The Private Sector’s Attempt at 
Environmental Responsibility’ (2007) 40(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transitional Law 197; C Wright and 
A Rwabizambuga, ‘Institutional Pressures, Corporate Reputation, and Voluntary Codes of Conduct’ 
(2006) 111(1) Business and Society Review 89-117; OF Amalric, ‘The Equator Principles: A Step 
Towards Sustainability?’ (2005) Center for Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability Working Paper 
No 01/05 <http://www.nachhaltigkeit.info/media/1317385761phpOHcawW.pdf> accessed 6 October 
2014.; BJ Richardson, ‘The Equator Principles: The Voluntary Approach to Environmentally Sustainable 
Finance’ (2005) 14(11) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 280; and JM Conley and CA 
Williams, ‘Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?: The Equator Principles’ (2011) 33(4) 
Law and Policy 542.   
93 Egede and Lee (n 56) 880. 
94 AE Boyle, ‘Globalising Environmental Liabilty: The Interplay of National and International Law’ 
(2005) 17 JEL 1.  
95 infra, ch 7, pg 313. 
96 R Rodger, ‘Pollution – Construction of an insurance policy’ [1995] 12 Int ILR 253; MF Doling, ‘An 
Overview of the Exxon Valdez Insurance Cover Dispute’ [1997] 10 Int ILR 313; and DL Elkind, 
‘Insurance Coverage for Asbestos Claims Against Foreign Corporations’ [1997] 10 Int ILR 310 
97 S Sykes, ‘Environmental insurance solutions as a means of facilitating transactions involving 
contaminated land and environmentally suspect land’ (1999) Mar Env L Rev 27, 35. See also, Redman 
(n 49) 85; J Lipton, ‘Insurance for Environmental Liability: Some Policy Issues’ (1998) 6(6) Int ILR 
188; and VA Jenkins, ‘Environmental Impairment Liability in Europe’ (1999) July JBL 378.  
98 Sykes, ‘Environmental insurance solutions’ (n 97) 35.  
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contemporary perspective of environmental insurance’s effectiveness as a tool for 
reducing risk. 
III. Why is the research necessary now? Challenges to 
Contaminated Land Policy 
In 1998, the Labour Government introduced a sixty per cent ‘national target’ for new 
house building to take place on brownfield land.99 From 1995-2010, 36,680 ha of 
brownfield land was redeveloped.100 Without a ‘brownfield first approach’,101 it is 
estimated that, ‘an area of countryside at least seven times the size of Southampton 
(Southampton City Council’s area is 19 square miles) would have been lost to 
housing.’102 However, because of the economic downturn, the current Government has 
introduced extensive budget cuts to save money. Considering the current age of 
austerity, this section assesses why the research is necessary by analysing the reductions 
in government funding for encouraging contaminated land clean-up. It argues that the 
recent changes will not only impede the effort to remediate contaminated land but will 
also have a detrimental effect upon greenfield land, private sector investment in the 
brownfield, and the micro-economics of some of the most deprived parts of the UK.  
Identifying the challenges currently facing contaminated land policy is necessary for 
answering the overarching research question and sub-question 1. This section of the 
                                                 
99 Lawrence and Lee, ‘Permitting Uncertainty’ (n 31) 261. See also, Department for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, Planning for the Communities of the Future: A White Paper (DETR 1998).   
100 Campaign to Protect Rural England, ‘Building in a small island? Why we still need a brownfield first 
approach’ (Green Balance, Nov 2011) 5. 
<file:///C:/Users/Lloyd/Downloads/Building_in_a_small_island.pdf> accessed 20 August 2014. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid. 
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chapter links to the research question and sub-question by demonstrating how 
contaminated land redevelopment has been significantly weakened by the Coalition 
Government’s policies in a period of austerity. Thus, it provides an explanation for why 
the banks’ perceptions of the environmental risks have changed, and expresses how 
other things must now be driving environmental due diligence in lending institutions.    
A. Cabernet’s A-B-C Model, and Incentives for Land Redevelopment 
After Lehman’s collapse, in 2008, the world has witnessed one of the worst global 
economic depressions since the Wall Street Crash of 1929.103 In the UK, the 
government has, in many ways, made land redevelopment economically unviable due 
to legal reform, and reduced financial support for driving clean-up activities. In order 
for intervention to take place on some of the more problematic sites, economic 
incentives are needed to ‘break the blight’, and encourage the development of Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs).104 Savini et al. suggest that large-scale development 
projects are often driven by a ‘supply-oriented attitude’.105 They further state that, 
because of the economic downturn, an ‘investment dilemma’ has occurred.106 As noted 
above, there has been a declining trend in the availability of public sector funding for 
contaminated land identification and remediation.107 If the private sector also fails to 
                                                 
103 C Irvine, ‘Lehman Brother collapse: How it compares with recent history’ Daily Telegraph (London, 
15 September 2008) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/2964405/Lehman-Brothers-
collapse-How-it-compares-with-recent-history.html> accessed 2 December 2013.  
104 ‘What are Public Private Partnerships?’ (BBC News, 12 February 2003) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1518523.stm> accessed 14 August 2014. 
105 F Savini, W Salet and S Majoor, ‘Dilemmas of planning: Intervention, regulation, and investment’ 
(2014) Planning Theory 1, 11 – 12. 
106 ibid 12. 
107 M Perella, ‘Funding cuts could seriously harm contaminated land clean-up efforts’ (edieWaste, 14 
July 2011) <http://www.edie.net/news/5/Funding-cuts-could-seriously-harm-contaminated-land-clean-
up-efforts/20390/> accessed 2 December 2013. See also, S Spear, ‘Contaminated land cuts not assessed’     
(Environmental Health News, 22 January 2014) <http://www.ehn-
online.com/news/article.aspx?id=10714> accessed 14 August 2014. For cuts to other environmental 
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engage in land redevelopment projects because of the inherent risks that are accredited 
to such sites, then it would seem that England’s contaminated land heritage will remain 
wholly intact for some time to come. The primary problem with trying to encourage the 
remediation of contaminated land is that such land can become an unprofitable project 
for developers. 108  
The Concerted Action on Brownfield and Economic Regeneration Network (Cabernet) 
has created a conceptual model to portray the economic viability of different 
redevelopment projects. In the model, economic viability is measured by the profit 
made from the land value after reclamation costs have been paid. The Network 
describes the model as the A-B-C model; 109 it is used to categorise brownfield sites. 
Under the model, “A” sites are labelled as ‘Self-developing Sites’.110 They are described 
as ‘self-developing’ because such sites have very little remediation requirements, and 
are therefore the most profitable to develop.111 The private sector supplies the primary 
source of funding for “A” sites, as a result of their economic viability potential.112 “B” 
sites are called ‘Potential Development Sites’,113 because, while they may not be as 
profitable as “A” sites, there is still a good margin for developers to make a little profit, 
                                                 
areas, see, D Carrington, ‘Hundreds of flood defence schemes unbuilt due to budget cuts’ The Guardian 
(14 July 2012) <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jul/14/flood-defence-schemes-unbuilt 
accessed 14 August 2014> accessed 14 August 2014; R Edwards, ‘Air pollution monitoring stations face 
closure as government looks to cut costs’ The Guardian (London, 22 August 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/aug/22/air-pollution-monitoring-stations-shut> 
accessed 14 August 2014; and, ‘MPs concerned over environmental budget cuts’ (BBC News, 7 January 
2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-25623157> accessed 14 August 2014. 
108 BJ Richardson, ‘Economic Instruments in EU Environmental Law Reform: Is the UK Government 
“Sending the Right Signals”’ (2002) 3 European Journal of Law Reform 427, 437. See also, J Steele, 
‘Remedies and Remediation: Foundational Issues in Environmental Liability’ (1995) 58 (5) Mod L Rev 
1. 
109 U Ferber et al., ‘Sustainable Brownfield Regeneration: CABERNET Network Report’ (University of 
Nottingham, 2006) 43 <www.cabernet.org.uk/resourcefs/427.pdf>   accessed on 2 December 2013.  
110 ibid 44. 
111 ibid. 
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or break even, from the land value.114 Cabernet suggests that these sites are usually 
funded through public-private co-operation.115 Finally, “C” sites are described as 
‘Reserve Sites’, and projects taken on within these sites will normally lead to the 
developer making a loss.116 Therefore, it is of no surprise that private sector developers 
usually tend to avoid investing in “C” sites. The presence of “C” sites helps to explain 
how property blight occurs. Cabernet says that it is usually in “C” sites that economic 
incentives are most widely used.117 The public sector tries to draw in private interest 
with economic incentives in order to regenerate the more onerous “C” sites. What is 
problematic in trying to promote the development of “C” sites is that they are extremely 
undesirable to developers and investors, alike. Their undesirability comes from the 
financial loss that could be suffered if the remediation costs are more than the land 
value when the project is completed. This is why public sector support is essential for 
land redevelopment.  
After looking at Cabernet’s conceptual model, it is clear why developers need to be 
attracted to brownfield land redevelopment through economic incentives, etc. In a paper 
concerning the development and use of fiscal incentives for brownfield land 
remediation, Thornton et al. stipulate that:  
‘Brownfields are often not economically competitive for regeneration 
compared with Greenfield sites without public intervention. The economic, 
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environmental and social barriers present at the site frequently hinder 
returning brownfields to beneficial use.’118 
They go on to outline the three primary incentives for encouraging brownfield land 
clean-up across Europe (i.e. ‘direct funding’, ‘indirect funding’ and ‘legal 
incentives’).119 The two primary economic clean-up methods assessed by this research 
are: (1) government funding; and, (2) taxation. It is important to discuss the recent 
decline in these two types of economic incentives, because it clearly shows why the 
research is necessary now.  
B. Government Funding and Restructuring  
Research into the redevelopment of contaminated land for housing use found that, 
‘There was a widespread belief amongst the general public, financial institutions, 
developers and estate agents that government should take the lead in securing the re-
use of contaminated land.’120 Thus, reduced Government support for contaminated land 
clean-up will inevitably lead to fewer determinations under Part IIA, and an increased 
work-load for the planning system.121 Since 2008, there has been a significant emphasis 
on ‘localism’, and the decentralisation of power into the hands of local communities.122 
Consequently, changes have been made to England’s planning policy guidance (where 
the old PPGs and PPSs were replaced by a consolidated planning policy framework: 
                                                 
118 G Thornton et al., ‘The challenge of sustainability: incentives for brownfield regeneration in Europe’ 
(2007) 10(2) Environmental Science and Policy 116. 
119 ibid 118.  
120 Syms (n 14) 225.  
121 A James, ‘Are changes in DEFRA funding impacting on planning applications?’ (Envirep.co.uk, no 
date) <http://esinternational.com/news/defra-funding-impact-planning-applications/> accessed 14 
August 2014. 
122 Lowndes and Pratchett (n 5) 21. 
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the NPPF),123 the contaminated land regime, and the funding of regional government,124 
etc. While on the surface these changes may appear to be a devolution of power, and a 
means to reduce bureaucratic decision-making, 125 upon closer inspection the move 
from regionalism to localism has not proved beneficial for contaminated land 
redevelopment policy.126 This is so because there is now less funding for contaminated 
land investigation.   
1. Cutting Government Funding 
Government funding for contaminated land remediation is available at both national 
and European levels.127 At the national level, government subsidy comes from a number 
of sources, while at the European level Member States can request backing for 
contaminated land clean-up from the EU Structural Funds.128 One of the main funding 
programmes for local authorities in identifying and remediating contaminated land was 
the EA’s Contaminated Land Capital Projects (CLCP) Programme (also known as ‘the 
Capital Grants Scheme’).129 The Programme helped local authorities to ‘cover capital 
costs’130 related to contaminated land clean-up, and fulfil their statutory duties under 
                                                 
123 infra, ch 2, pg 122. 
124 See, Department for Communities and Local Government, Localism Bill: abolition of the regional 
planning tier and introduction of the Duty to Cooperate: Impact assessment (DCLG, January 2011) 8 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6046/1829659.pdf> 
accessed 14 August 2014. 
125 O Dutton, ‘The practical implications of the Localism Act 2011’ (Local Government Lawyer, 9 
January 2013) 
<http://www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12753%
3Athe-practical-implications-of-the-localism-act-2011&catid=59%3Agovernance-a-risk-
articles&Itemid=27> accessed 14 August 2014. 
126 ‘The Localism Act – Two Years On’ (Local Government Lawyer, December 2013) 
<http://www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/images/Localism%20Act%20Survey.pdf> accessed 14 
August 2014. 
127 Thornton et al., ‘The challenge of sustainability’ (n 118) 118. 
128 ibid. 
129 Environment Agency, ‘Contaminated Land Capital Programme’ (EA, no date) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140328084622/http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/research/planning/121220.aspx> accessed 14 August 2014. 
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Part IIA.131 Welsh CLCP was abolished in 2010.132 After being cut from £19.9 million 
to £4.35 million in 2011,133 on 1 April 2014, England’s CLCP was closed,134 and a 
contingency fund of £500,000 made available for local authorities to bid upon for a 
period of three years.135 CLCP will cease to exist in England from 1 April 2017.136 
Without the Programme, fewer determinations will now be made under the 
contaminated land regime.137 Again, this is because of the cuts that have been made to 
the funding for identifying and remediating contaminated land. 
2. Cutting Regional Development 
Many of the regional mechanisms (e.g. regional assemblies/leadership boards, regional 
spatial strategies (RSSs), and the regional development agencies (RDAs)) that were set 
up to encourage brownfield development under Labour have now been abolished in the 
move towards localism.138 A brief account of the impact that the abolition of the RDAs 
will have to sustainable development is provided in this section. 
The Regional Development Agencies Act 1998139 was brought into force to allow the 
creation of England’s nine Development Agencies.140 In total, eight RDAs began 
                                                 
131 ibid. 
132 ‘Local Authority Contaminated Land Capital Funding Slashed’ (Whitemoss Environmental Solutions, 
3 May 2011) http://www.whitemosstreatment.co.uk/blog/?p=48 accessed 14 August 2014. 
133 ibid. 
134 Environment Agency ‘Contaminated Land Capital Programme’ (n 129). 
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137 S Spear, ‘Contaminated land regime axed’ (Environmental Health News, 11 December 2013) 
<http://www.ehn-online.com/news/article.aspx?id=10566> accessed 14 August 2014. 
138 M Sandford, ‘The abolition of regional government’ (SN/PC/05842, 27 March 2013) 4-7 
<file:///C:/Users/Lloyd/Downloads/SN05842.pdf> accessed 14 August 2014. 
139 Regional Development Agencies Act (RDAA) 1998 (now repealed). 
140 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Closing the RDAs: Lessons from the RDA Transition 
and Closure Programme (BIS, July 2012) 12 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121212135622/http://bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/economic
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functioning on 1 April 1999.141 The London Development Agency (LDA) started 
operating later in July 2000.142 The underlying purposes of the Development Agencies 
were highlighted in section 4 of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998 (now 
repealed). In relation to brownfield clean-up, the RDAs two most important duties 
were:  
Section 4(1)(a): 
‘to further the economic development and the regeneration of its area.’143 
And, section 4(1)(e):  
‘to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development in the United 
Kingdom where it is relevant in its area to do so.’144 
Thus, the RDAs were pivotal for generating sustainable development in their regional 
districts. However, on 31 March 2012, the RDAs were abolished under section 30 of 
the Public Bodies Act 2011.145 Section 191 of the Localism Act 2012 wound up the 
LDA.146 The RDAs and LDA have now been replaced by Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPs).147 LEPs are said to only partially endorse some of the objectives that were 
                                                 
141 ibid. 
142 ibid. 
143 RDAA 1998, s 4(1)(a). 
144 ibid, s 4(1)(e). 
145 Public Bodies Act 2011, s 30. 
146 Localism Act 2012, s 191. 
147 Her Majesty’s Government, ‘Local Government: realising every place’s potential’ (HM Government, 
28 October 2010) 39 
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found in Part 1 of the 1998 Act, 148 and have been described as a form of ‘re-
centralisation in disguise’.149 The effectiveness of the LEPs in driving redevelopment 
projects is yet uncertain. What is apparent, however, is that the revocation of the 
Development Agencies has had a significant impact on the micro-economies of the 
English regions, and represents a huge blow for sustainable development in England. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers undertook a study of the economic benefits that the RDAs 
and the LDA generated. The study held that, ‘every £1 of RDA spend will add £4.50 to 
regional GVA [gross value added].’150 Without this support, many of the most blighted 
regions will now lose the necessary economic funding that they desperately need in a 
period of austerity. 
C. Taxation 
Green taxation is ‘rapidly evolving’ as a global trend.151  However, as with government 
funding, the different forms of tax relief that were/are available for the redevelopers of 
land affected by contamination have been affected by the government’s cost-cutting 
agenda. Without some of the previous tax reliefs, it will no longer be financially viable 
                                                 
148  G Bentley, D Bailey and J Shutt, ‘From RDA to LEP: A New Localism? Case Examples of West 
Midlands and Yorkshire’ (2010) 25 Local Economy 535. 
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150 Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Impact of RDA Spending – National 
Report – Volume 1 – Main Report (Berr, March 2009) 22 <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file50735.pdf> 
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to redevelop contaminated land. Again, this further informs the interviewees’ 
perceptions of risk in later chapters.   
1. The Landfill Tax 
The landfill tax is a form of taxation that is applied to the disposal of waste at landfill.152 
Upon being brought into force, Part III of the Finance Act 1996153 (and the Landfill Tax 
Regulations 1996)154 created a weight-based, as opposed to an ad valorem, system of 
taxation for the disposal of waste to landfill sites.155 This taxation was levied to decrease 
reliance on depositing waste at landfill,156 and to encourage the use of the greener forms 
of waste management.157 The landfill tax, which used to be administered through the 
direction of the Commissioners of Custom and Excise,158 is charged to the ‘landfill site 
operator’159 on the disposal of waste at landfill.160 There are presently two rates that are 
imposed:161 (1) the ‘lower rate’;162 and, (2) the ‘standard rate’.163 Upon being brought 
into force, the Finance Act 1996 added a number of ‘exceptions’ to the rate of tax, 
                                                 
152 Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, ‘Landfill Tax’ (HMRC, no date), para 1. 
<http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pag
eLabel=pageExcise_ShowContent&id=HMCE_CL_001206&propertyType=document> accessed 12 
December 2013. 
153 Finance Act 1996. 
154 Landfill Tax Regulations 1996, SI 1996/1527. 
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December 2013.   
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whereby certain activities were excluded from payment of the fiscal charge. One of the 
qualifying activities for this exclusion was the deposit at landfill of any material that is 
generated through the development, or conservation, of contaminated sites.164 In order 
to be eligible for exemption, the developer had to apply for a section 43B certificate.165 
However, the last date to obtain the section 43B certificate was in 2008.166 This 
exclusion no longer applies, and all existing section 43B certificates were terminated 
in 2012.167  
Now that landfill tax exemption no longer applies to contaminated material, developers 
will be less willing to regenerate such land. This could lead to an increase in orphan 
sites, and the fly tipping of contaminated waste around the UK. Removing the landfill 
tax exemption has further reduced the threat of direct liability under Part IIA. The 
revocation may have financial repercussions for developers, which may generate 
indirect and reputational risks for banks that have provided funding for contaminated 
land clean-up.  
2. Land Remediation Relief 
‘A carrot rather than stick’168 policy can be found in the tax incentive that currently 
offers economic relief from the costs of the remediation of contaminated land.169 The 
policy, which was introduced by Schedules 22 and 23 of the Finance Act 2001,170 
                                                 
164 Finance Act 1996, s 43A(1). 
165 ibid, s 43B. 
166 The Landfill Tax (Material from Contaminated Land) (Phasing out of Exemption) Order 2008, SI 
2008/2669. 
167 ibid.   
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implements a subsidy allowing companies to make a deduction of one hundred and fifty 
per cent for capital and revenue expenditure (fifty per cent for qualifying expenditure) 
incurred within the accounting period through contaminated land remediation. It is 
called Land Remediation Relief (LRR),171 and encourages companies to participate in 
the reclamation of many of the UK’s most blighted sites. In order to apply for 
‘qualifying land remediation expenditure’172 there are a number of conditions that must 
first be met. The law states that the remediation must be conducted on land that is in a 
contaminated state.173 Also, a company, or an individual acting on the company’s 
behalf, must apply for the deduction – individuals and partnerships are not included as 
a qualifying person for relief.174 It is also an important requisite that the company 
applying for funding must not have been the creator of the contamination.175 Finally, 
the fiscal relief does not allow for the expenditure to be subsidised.176 If all of these 
conditions are met, the company must elect for the tax deduction within two years of 
the accounting period in which remediation began.177 Under the scheme, when a 
company remediates contaminated land, and makes a loss, the government allows it to 
apply for a tax credit of up to sixteen per cent, claiming back any losses incurred.178  
This tax credit has been created to put a safety net under the development of 
environmentally contaminated and suspect sites, thus reducing risk.  
                                                 
171 Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, ‘Land Remediation Relief: contents’ (HMRC, no date)  
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/cirdmanual/cird60050.htm> accessed 2 December 2013.  
172 Finance Act 2001, s 2(1). 
173 ibid, s 2(2). 
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There was a period when it seemed that LRR, too, would be ‘phased out’ in the 
government’s effort to cut funding.179 However, LRR will now remain as a result of the 
responses that were made to the consultation concerning, ‘the abolition of 36 tax 
reliefs.’180 The Treasury’s report on the abolition of tax relief suggests that, 
‘approximately 1,300 companies a year claim this relief costing the Exchequer around 
£40 million’.181 The document goes on to state that, ‘Respondents argued that removing 
this relief would affect the regeneration of uneconomic brownfield sites … [and] … 
would make a significant number of their planned projects financially unviable.’182 
Unviable sites will inevitably have adverse financial consequences for borrowers, 
which will consequently impact upon lenders. Respondents also claimed that this 
incentive was needed, because of the abolition of the landfill exemption for 
contaminated materials. The overall response to the revocation of LRR produced a 
favourable result in the end. The Government agreed that abolishing LRR and the 
landfill exemption would, ‘exacerbate financial pressures’, which would risk, 
‘undermining the Government’s plans to support the housing and construction 
sectors.’183  
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IV. Research Method 
This section outlines how the ‘social research’184 was conducted, i.e. it describes the 
research method that was used to collect data. During October 2012 – January 2013, 
the researcher undertook fifteen semi-structured interviews with professionals with 
knowledge of environmental risk management in banks. The interview data collected 
are primarily presented in the last three chapters of this thesis. This chapter therefore 
offers an essential link to the following chapters. The structure of this section is as 
follows: first, the research’s funding and collaboration is outlined; secondly, a 
description of the interviewing technique (i.e. semi-structured interviewing) is given; 
thirdly, the transcription and analysis of the data is assessed; and, finally, the chapter 
highlights the ethics consideration within the empirical study.   
A. Funding and Collaboration 
The Knowledge Economy Skills Scholarship (KESS) supported this research. KESS is 
‘a major European Convergence Programme’,185 which is funded by European Social 
Funds (ESF). KESS projects are described as: ‘collaborative Doctoral and Research 
Masters awards in Welsh Universities, jointly sponsored by partners who are based in 
the Convergence areas of Wales.’186 Ashfield Solutions, the partnership company to 
this project, jointly funded this PhD research. Ashfield’s head office is based within the 
convergence area of Rhondda Cynon Taf (RCT). The company provides independent 
                                                 
184 A Bryman, Social Research Methods (OUP 2012) 4. 
185 KESS, ‘Knowledge Economy Skills Scholarships (KESS)’ (KESS website, no date) 
<http://www.higherskillswales.co.uk/kess/> accessed 29 September 2014. 
186 Cardiff University, ‘Knowledge Economy Skills Scholarships (KESS) at Cardiff University’ (Cardiff 
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land, waste and water advice across a number of different sectors, including banking.187 
It is important to mention the source of the research’s funding, and the researcher’s 
collaboration with the external partner, as this governed, in part, the choice of research 
subject. KESS projects are specific to ‘an area of interest for the company partner.’188 
For Ashfield, the area of interest was lender liability for environmental damage, as 
banking is a major sector in which Ashfield works. Consequently, the company wanted 
to be a part of research, which contributes original data to the knowledge of this area. 
The researcher had to understand and meet, both, the expectations of KESS, and the 
partnership company. The following section describes the research method used to 
collect empirical data, i.e. semi-structured interviewing. 
B. Semi-structured Interviewing 
Rapely describes interviewing as, ‘The central resource through which contemporary 
social science engages with issues that concern it.’189 Social research methodology can 
be divided into qualitative and quantitative techniques.190 However, some academics 
advocate the use of ‘mixed-methods’ approaches,191 which is also known as 
‘triangulation’.192 For this project, the qualitative technique of semi-structured 
                                                 
187 Ashfield Solutions’ website: <http://www.ashfieldsolutions.com/> accessed 9 December 2014. 
188 KESS, ‘KESS – Quick Facts for Students’ (KESS website, no date) 
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interviewing was used as the empirical research method to collect data. The 
researcher’s reasons for using this interviewing technique are now outlined. 
1. Why Use Semi-structured Interviews? 
The reason for setting up the semi-structured interviews was to gain an up-to-date 
understanding of the effect that the specific environmental risks have had on financial 
institutions’ risk management frameworks. The data also provide the research with 
original knowledge of the research area.  
So, why was semi-structured interviewing chosen over other methods of interview 
research? A deductive approach was used to establish the research questions for the 
thesis. Qualitative research obtains, ‘descriptions of the life world of the 
interviewee.’193 It was apparent that this type of interviewing style would allow the 
greatest insight into the subject area. Also, there are relatively few research methods 
that allow the same degree of social interaction between the researcher and his or her 
interviewees.194 This leads Warren to suggest that, ‘The purpose of most qualitative 
interviewing is to derive interpretation, not facts or laws, from respondents talk.’195  
Structured interviewing was reviewed as a possible research method, although it did 
not appear as efficient for this project as the semi-structured interview style. A 
structured interview is categorised as a quantitative technique,196 as the interview 
questions are closed, and do not allow much room for the interviewee to deviate on 
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tangents when answering the questions.197 This technique is more concerned about the 
collection of data, as opposed to the opinions of the interviewees.198 In comparison to 
structured interviewing, the qualitative interview is more of ‘an interaction between an 
interviewer and respondent’.199 It is essentially a ‘conversation’, which is guided by the 
interviewer.200  
Unstructured interviews are also a possible technique for data collection;201 however, 
such an interviewing style was too flexible for this project. This form of interviewing 
allows such a wide degree of discretion for the participants when answering questions 
that it seemed difficult to formulate a transcript that would be of sufficient use at the 
analysis stage. The researcher felt that the semi-structured interview creates, over all 
the other methods, a unique relationship between the interviewer and their interviewees. 
Bude neatly depicts the interviewer-interviewee relationship as:  
‘A fellow traveler on a train journey to whom one tells one’s entire life 
history. The limited nature of the contact seems to be a condition for the 
extraordinary truthfulness of this relationship.’202 
Now that the reasons for choosing semi-structured interviews as a research method have 
been noted, the next section assesses the research strategy and sampling technique used 
to collect interview data. 
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2. Research Strategy and Sampling Technique 
In his book, Kvale suggests that a qualitative interview study should consist of seven 
primary stages: (1) Thematizing; (2) Designing; (3) Interviewing; (4) Transcribing; (5) 
Analyzing; (6) Verifying; and, (7) Reporting.203 Kvale’s seven stages were followed 
throughout this empirical study. While the data sample purposively targeted bankers 
specialising in environmental risk management, not all participants to the study were 
bankers. The participants to this empirical research project comprise: twelve bankers, 
two environmental consultants, and an environmental insurance specialist. The 
opinions of the environmental consultants and environmental insurance specialist were 
relevant to the research questions. They had experience of the banking sector so that 
the researcher can justify including such participants within the data sample.  
The bankers that participated in the research project came from a variety of banks (i.e. 
high street clearing and investment banks). All participants were chosen under the non-
probability sampling technique that is commonly termed as ‘snowball sampling’.204 
Bryman describes snowball sampling as:  
‘a sampling technique in which the researcher initially samples a small 
group of people relevant to the research questions, and these sampled 
participants propose other participants who have had the experience or 
characteristics relevant to the research.’205  
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As described above, ‘snowball sampling’ allows researchers to use an initial subject to 
obtain further contacts.206 In relation to the snowballing technique, Heckathorn 
commented in a paper that, ‘This nonprobability form of snowball sampling became a 
widely employed method in qualitative research on hard-to-reach populations.’207 
Biernacki and Waldorf believe that this sampling technique improves the ‘social 
visibility’ of target populations.208 The researcher’s primary task in this project was to 
conduct interviews in a hard-to-reach, small sample population, consisting of elite 
professionals. The snowballing technique allowed the researcher to use the 
interviewees’ contact lists to identify other subjects quickly and effectively. 
Participants therefore acted as ‘gatekeepers’209  within the study; their knowledge and 
network of colleagues held the key for broadening the data sample. However, having a 
small sample in addition to using the snowball technique is subject to limitations (see 
the limitations’ section below). 
3. Gaining Access210 
All interview research is capable of having access issues.211 In this study distance 
inhibited the researcher’s ability to conduct face-to-face interviews with all of the 
interview respondents. The interviewees worked in the banks’ Head Quarters, in 
financial centres on both sides of the Atlantic. Accordingly, it was necessary to conduct 
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some of the interviews over the telephone, and through the use of video conferencing 
software (i.e. Skype). Gaining access was surprisingly difficult at the beginning of the 
research, as it was challenging to find interviewees. To overcome this difficulty, the 
researcher drafted a table of twenty-nine financial institutions (this table also included 
the various interview candidates), which had knowledge that was relevant to the 
research. This process was aided by the use of contacts that the researcher met in the 
project’s first year. However, the most invaluable source for gathering potential data 
subjects was the Internet (the individual institutions’ websites, LinkedIn, etc.). When 
the candidate list was completed, a strategy for contact was implemented. This strategy 
consisted of sending letters, emailing, and ‘cold calling’ the people on the contact list. 
While the latter proved the most ineffective strategy for establishing contact with 
participants, sending emails was by far the most successful. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that email was the fastest means of accessing the data sample. The 
biggest problem with emails was that it was sometimes difficult to get potential 
participants’ email addresses. Also, some of the people contacted took a long time to 
respond, and many were unwilling to participate because of confidentiality concerns, 
and more urgent business commitments. In some cases bureaucracy was a problem, as 
consent was needed from both the company, as well as the interview participant.  
4. The Project’s Topic Guide and Interviews 
The empirical study consisted of fifteen semi-structured interviews with elite banking 
and other professionals, with knowledge and understanding of the research area. In 
accordance with the confidentiality requirements of the study, specific individuals or 
organisations cannot be identified in any part of the thesis or other related publications. 
It is nevertheless necessary, since the interview subjects’ data make the work original, 
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to display some generic information about the respondents at the time when the 
interviews were conducted; this ultimately supports the conclusions that are made in 
the thesis. The interviewees and organisations that took part in the empirical study are 
conspicuous because of the use of specific titles to describe job positions. 
Confidentiality is however assured in the thesis by the grant of anonymity, and the use 
of generic labelling. For example, in the table below specific job titles, which may lead 
to the identification of individual persons or organisations, are replaced with more 
general headings, i.e. ‘Consultant’, ‘Senior Manager’ or ‘Director’.  
Respondent Country Base 
 
Level of Seniority Employment 
 
Respondent 1 London, UK Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 2 London, UK Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
Respondent 3 London, UK Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 4 London, UK Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 5 New York, USA Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 6 Toronto, CAN Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 7 London, UK Senior Consultant Consultancy, 
Environmental 
Risk 
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Respondent 8 Amsterdam, NL Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 9 London, UK Senior Manger Insurance, 
Environmental 
 
Respondent 10 London, UK Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 11 London, UK Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 12 London, UK Senior Manager Consultancy, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 13 Zürich, CH Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 14 Zürich, CH Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
Respondent 15 Manchester, UK Senior Manager Banking, 
Environmental 
Risk 
 
 
It was necessary to confine the boundaries of the research. To do this, the researcher 
set a ‘cut off point’ for the maximum amount of interviews at fifteen. In any case, this 
number of interviews is representative of the sample population, since it is small in 
nature. Interviews were held face-to-face,212 or by telephone.213 One interview was 
conducted through Skype. It took a period of four months to find, conduct and 
transcribe the interviews. The first interview was held on 4 October 2012; the last took 
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place on 28 January 2013. While ‘setting up the interview’,214 the potential interview 
participant that had been found was asked, by phone or email, whether they would be 
willing to agree to take part in an interview for the research project. An electronic 
device recorded all of the interviews. All interviewees were given the opportunity to 
decline the use of the electronic recording device. Every contact that agreed to 
participate in an interview also permitted the use of the recorder. With elite 
interviewees, this could be, as Rubin and Rubin suggest, because, ‘people like to talk 
about themselves: they enjoy the sociability of a long discussion and are pleased that 
somebody is interested in them.’215 Once the fifteen interviews had been completed, the 
transcription and analysis process continued until the end of April 2013.  
Before the interviews were undertaken, the researcher drafted an interview guide that 
accords to the flexible approach that is to be taken during semi-structured 
interviewing.216 The interview guide used is included in an appendix to this thesis.217 
With regards to the use of an interview guide, Bryman notes:  
‘The idea of an interview guide is much less specific than the notion of a 
structured interview schedule … What is crucial is that the questioning 
allows interviewers to glean the ways in which research participants view 
their social world and that there is flexibility in the conduct of the 
interviews.’218  
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The guide that was used was short, and only served to act as a ‘memory prompt’.219 
Interviewees were permitted to deviate from the interview guide, so long as the 
deviation was both useful and relevant to the research project. Within this study, the 
researcher began each interview with an opening question. This question was often 
general, and easy to answer. For example, ‘Could you please state your name and 
position in the company?’ or, ‘Generally, what do you think about environmental risk 
and due diligence in modern banking practices?’ Although the student worked from an 
interview guide, the same sorts of questions and answers appeared. Despite this, no 
interview transcript was exactly the same.  
5. The Limitations of Semi-structured Interviewing 
This methodology section has shown that there are many advantages with using semi-
structured interviewing as a research method. That being said, semi-structured 
interviewing also has limitations. Common criticisms of this interview technique 
suggest that the method is often too subjective, and that the findings are very difficult 
to replicate.220 Thus, one may argue that qualitative data may not always present a true 
depiction of the existing social phenomena since another interviewer, who is influenced 
by different values, could produce wholly different results.221  
Semi-structured interviewing is, compared to some quantitative techniques, viewed as 
a flexible interview style. However, too much flexibility can be quite onerous. Some 
interviewers may attempt to lead interviewees (although indirectly) to the answer they 
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want, as opposed to obtaining the participant’s own view on the subject matter. 
Alternatively, there is the fear that the interviewee will take too much control over the 
interview and disrupt its flow. That is why a good interview guide is important. 
The snowball sampling technique was used to obtain interviewees. As a result of the 
data sample for this project being small and hard-to-reach (i.e. elite banking 
professionals working in a sufficiently closed setting), the snowballing technique was 
the logical choice for obtaining interview subjects. However, using snowball sampling 
to collect interview data from a small sample population can be subject to limitations. 
The primary issue is that the reliability of the findings is capable of being brought into 
question as a result of the possibility of biased data.222 The initial interview subjects 
that were asked to share their contacts are likely to have referred only their close friends 
and colleagues. It is to be expected that the members of such a close-knit social network 
are of a shared opinion on a number of matters, and represent only a small section of 
the research sample. Snowball sampling can therefore lead to biased data because the 
different opinions that can exist in a population of potential interview participants may 
not have been fully considered. Biernacki and Waldorf note this particular issue with 
snowball sampling in their paper: ‘Or will the exclusive use of the method yield a biased 
sample by revealing only those cases discovered through existing social networks?’223  
Despite snowball sampling’s likelihood of producing biased data, when interviewing 
elites it is often difficult to obtain a large number of interviewees with the desired 
knowledge and understanding of the research topics. Moreover, it may be argued that 
conducting only a small number of elite interviews should not reduce the data’s ability 
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to provide a valid insight. Adler and Adler believe that, ‘Moving up, a small number of 
cases, or subjects, may be extremely valuable and represent adequate numbers for a 
research project.’224 They go on to suggest that, ‘This is especially true for studying 
hidden or hard to access populations such as deviants or elites. Here, a relatively few 
people, such as between six and a dozen, may offer us insights’.225 In light of Alder and 
Adler’s comments on snowball sampling and small sample populations, the researcher 
finds that the amount of interviews that were conducted have provided: (1) sufficient 
coverage of the sample population; and (2) a valid insight into the lenders’ current 
attitudes towards environmental risks and due diligence in banks.  
Another primary risk with ‘snowball sampling’ is that access issues can easily prohibit 
contact with the data sample.226 The main limitation that the researcher found when 
using this method was that it placed too much reliance upon the researcher’s ability to 
build a good rapport with the interviewees.227 Asking an interview participant for their 
contact list puts pressure on the interviewer-interviewee relationship. To resolve this, 
the researcher asked politely in a follow up ‘thank you’ email to the participant whether 
they would be willing to provide the names and email addresses of any persons they 
think may be interested in the research project. This approach was successful with the 
majority of participants.   
Finally, the use of the digital recorder could also be described as a limitation to this 
qualitative study. Even though digitally recording an interview is highly beneficial for 
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the interviewer, there is evidence to suggest that the use of recording equipment may 
have an impact upon the interviewee. Warren, for instance, raises this point:  
‘But does the respondent remain basically unaffected by this? Not only 
might turning on a tape recorder alter the ensuing conversation, creating a 
particular context for what is said, but the meanings of audio- or 
videotaping may be different to different respondents’.228  
The adverse impact that a recorder may have upon an interviewee may be particularly 
so with elites, who have their careers and companies’ reputations to think about. In this 
study, some of the subject areas on the topic list (e.g. ‘How much contaminated land 
the bank has in its possession?’) made specific interviewees put up a ‘corporate front’ 
in order to protect their interests. Different types of interview questions were deployed 
in order to overcome this limitation.      
C. Transcription and Analysis 
Following Kvale’s fourth stage of qualitative interviewing,229 once an interview had 
been completed, the recording of the conversation was transcribed, verbatim. When all 
the interviews had been transcribed, the transcripts were posted out to the participants 
for corrections; following this, a thematic analysis of the interview data was undertaken. 
Transcripts can be coded manually, or through the use of computer-aided qualitative 
data analysis software (CAQDAS),230 e.g. NVivo.231 The empirical research undertaken 
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in this circumstance did not generate such high volumes of information that justified 
the use of computer-aided coding. Thus, the data were coded manually, since it was 
fairly easy for the researcher to assess the data by memory, and incorporate sections of 
the interview transcripts throughout the thesis. Kvale describes this process as, ‘a 
deconstruction of the interview text.’232  
Coding categories were created to assist the analysis process. Explaining the basis on 
which the coding for the results was carried out is necessary for linking the data to the 
conclusions that are made within the thesis. The information in this section appears in 
the ‘research findings’ section of Chapter 8, the concluding chapter; and, to a lesser 
extent, Chapter 7, which contains more empirical data than any other chapter in the 
thesis. The categories were drawn deductively by the use of the individual sub-
questions. Different coloured highlighters were used to identify relevant data: 
Sub-question Coding Category  
SQ 1: What are the more threatening environment-related 
risks for the UK bank lending community today? 
 
Green 
SQ 2: How do lenders exercise and shape their due diligence 
functions to manage and assess the environment-related risks? 
 
Blue 
SQ 3: What are the main drivers for the use of environmental 
risk management in banks? 
 
Yellow 
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Data relating to the sub-questions’ individual bullet points were highlighted in the 
generic coding colours (as above), and then further underlined with different coloured 
writing pens:  
Sub-question / Point Coding Category Underline 
SQ 1, Point 1 Green Blue 
SQ 1, Point 2 Green Red 
SQ 1, Point 3 Green Black 
SQ 2, Point 1 Blue Blue 
SQ 2, Point 2 Blue Red 
SQ 2, Point 3 Blue Black 
SQ 3, Point 1 Yellow Blue 
SQ 3, Point 2 Yellow Red 
SQ 3, Point 3 Yellow Black 
 
Hence, a green highlighter with red underline coded any data that were relevant to sub-
question 1, point 2 (i.e. ‘How do banks currently rank the environmental risks in 
relation to the threat that they pose to the banks?’), and so on. When all the data had 
been coded in accordance with the categories listed above, it was then possible to 
undertake a thematic analysis of the coded data. Page 245 of this thesis, for instance, 
shows some of the coded data that were relevant for answering sub-question 1, point 2. 
Respondent 10 said in interview, ‘Okay, well the risks are many. The two biggest ones 
are reputational risk and credit risk.’ In addition, Respondent 13 stated, ‘Currently, I 
would rate reputational risk higher than… well… first – reputational risk, secondly – 
credit risk, thirdly – liability and market risk.’ It can therefore be deduced from this 
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data set that the lending community presently ranks reputational risk and the indirect 
risks as more threatening environmental risks than lender liability.  
D. Ethics Consideration 
This qualitative study was submitted to Cardiff University’s ethics committee for 
approval. Such approval is necessary before any empirical research involving human 
subjects can be undertaken. For this particular study, ethical issues were not too 
troublesome, and the qualitative research received the committee’s endorsement. 
For Kvale, interviewing is a moral enterprise that is, ‘saturated with moral and ethical 
issues.’233 He further adds that, ‘Ethical problems in interview research arise 
particularly because of the complexities of researching private lives and placing 
accounts in the public arena.’234 Kvale portrays ‘the interview’ as more than just a 
conversation between persons, suggesting that such an experience transcends the 
moral-philosophical realm known as ethics.235 In order to reduce the threat of incurring 
ethical issues within a project, a piece of empirical research should take into account 
Diener and Crandall’s four questions: 
 Is there harm to participants? 
 Is there a lack of informed consent? 
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 Is there an invasion of privacy? 
 Is deception involved? 236 
Kimmel rightly believes that ethics considerations reside, according to their threat of 
harm, in a typology.237 He states that the obvious parties that could incur harm are the 
interview participants.238 Furthermore, the researcher must also consider things like the 
project’s impact upon society, as well as the body of knowledge to which the work will 
finally be attributed.239  
The empirical study for this project dealt with interviewing elites,240 i.e. bankers and 
other educated professionals. The researcher was careful not to harm the participants 
that took part in the interviews. He was aware that the ‘private lives’ of the different 
participants would be exhibited within the ‘public arena’: specific extracts of the 
interview transcripts are made publically available by the thesis.241 Due to the high-
powered careers of the interviewees, confidentiality and informed consent were 
important to consider. It was crucial that an interviewee would not face repercussions 
with their employer or clients because of something that they had said in interview. In 
order to limit harm to interviewees, the researcher did four things:  
 Granted each participant anonymity; 
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 Stored data in a safe way, and according to the law;  
 Sent the interview transcript to the participant (once transcribed); and, 
 Drafted a consent form. 
Anonymity remains an important feature of this research. In no part of the thesis is it 
possible to identify individual persons or organisations. This is assured in the 
referencing of interview extracts. Throughout this thesis, an ‘R’ preceded by a number, 
references individual participants. Accordingly, ‘R10’ would be used to reference an 
extract from Respondent 10’s interview transcript, and so on.     
All ‘personal data’ collected within this study have been stored pursuant to the eight 
principles of data protection set out within the Data Protection Act 1998.242 The 
sensitive data have been placed onto a memory stick, and written in word documents 
(as a result of the transcripts). These sources of storage are encrypted, and only the 
researcher has access to the passcodes.   
To further protect participants from undue harm, interviewees were sent a copy of their 
interview transcripts. Upon receipt of the draft transcript, amendments and corrections 
could be made by the interviewee. If a banking respondent was unhappy about what 
they said in a particular section of the interview, they had the opportunity to delete the 
section from the document. A few interviewees felt it necessary to remove large 
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sections of text from their interview transcripts. The majority of the respondents made 
minor corrections to clarify some of the points made within the text.  
Before each interview, the researcher sent the participant the necessary pro forma 
documentation, including: (1) the information sheet; (2) a consent form; (3) the research 
hypothesis; and, (4) the topic guide. The information sheet provided a general tour d’ 
horizon of the researcher’s contact details, and the research project. The consent form 
was drafted in order to ensure that the participant’s participation in the research project 
was done on a voluntary basis, and, by signing the consent form, the participant had 
expressly agreed that they had engaged in the project on the basis of the assurances of 
confidentiality given to them, and under their own free will. The final two documents 
were created to aid the researcher during the interview. All of the documents listed in 
this section are appended.243 
The researcher strongly believes that the measures that have been taken within this 
empirical study have successfully helped to reduce the threat of unethical conduct from 
materialising within the study.   
V. Structure 
Chapters 2 – 4 outline the legal basis for environmental risk in commercial bank 
lending. While Chapter 2 focuses specifically on the Part IIA regime, Chapter 3 
provides an account of the more miscellaneous environmental liabilities, in addition to 
the emerging liabilities, that are likely to impact lenders’ business operations. Chapter 
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4 looks at the environmental issues that may arise for lenders during a client’s corporate 
insolvency. These chapters provide a contemporary account of the various UK 
environmental laws and regulations that are likely to create risks for lenders and 
borrowers. These chapters are more doctrinal and legally technical than any other part 
of this thesis, providing an essential procedural component for this work.  
Chapters 5 – 7 present the main research findings from the semi-structured interviews. 
Chapter 5 assesses the environmental risks. The risks are defined and ranked according 
to the interview data’s analysis. Chapters 6 and 7 look at the banks’ environmental due 
diligence techniques. Chapter 7 presents the interview data. The interviewees’ insights 
are unique, and provide an original contribution to the research area.    
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It discusses the research findings, and the implications 
and future research opportunities that have been created because of the study. Finally, 
a potential solution is provided for circumventing the use of direct lender liability as a 
means of remediating suspect land.    
The references and appendices are held at the end of the thesis. While the references 
show the various types of literature that have been analysed over the last three years, 
the appendices hold some important documents, which further expand upon the 
methodological approach.  For example, Appendix 1 shows a copy of the email that 
was circulated to the various environmental risk management teams in order to request 
an interview.244 
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VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined why the research is necessary by looking at the gaps in the 
literature basis, and the economic challenges currently facing the UK’s contaminated 
land policy. It also presented an overview of the empirical research method. The 
methods section demonstrated how the interview data – which provides an original 
contribution to the knowledge of the research field – were collected, transcribed and 
analysed. The next chapter (Chapter 2) evaluates lender liability for historic 
contaminated land. 
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Chapter 2: 
Lender Liability and Historical Land Contamination – 
Part IIA of the EPA 1990 
 
An overview of the lender liability threat from historic land pollution is provided in this 
chapter. First, lender liability for contaminated sites under America’s Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C., 
section 9601 et seq. is discussed.245 Secondly, the chapter looks at the UK’s 
contaminated land regime, introduced in 2000 by Part IIA of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990.246  
The chapter provides an essential legal component for the thesis, since a detailed 
account of the contaminated land regime is provided. Chapter 2’s relevance can be 
attributed to the fact that it offers a legal understanding for why a paradigm shift in the 
banks’ perceptions of the environmental risks has occurred. It therefore answers the 
overarching research question and sub-question 1, which ask about the threat of the 
environmental risks, and whether environmental legislation presents any real risk for 
banks.      
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I. Historic Land Contamination in the United States 
A. Introduction 
It is necessary to analyse the United States’ environmental lender liability because, as 
Jarvis and Fordham suggest: 
‘The US provides the furthest developed illustration of primary lender 
liability. American lenders have found themselves responsible for clean-up 
costs arising from the polluting activities of their borrowers.’ 247    
Following Jarvis and Fordham’s reasoning, UK lenders began to use the USA as a 
‘template’ in order to create and develop their own risk management strategies for 
reducing the threat of lender liability from specific environmental legislation (e.g. Part 
IIA of the EPA 1990). The empirical data show that, today, US bank lenders continue 
to take a strict liability-based approach to characterising environmental risk.248 This is 
different to the environmental due diligence methods used in European banks.249 The 
stricter use of environmental due diligence in American banks may be as a direct result 
of CERCLA, and the need for companies to disclose their environmental information.  
R5: We would look at how the company’s involvement is translated into 
costs. Going back to the accounting rules that I mentioned upfront in the 
liability, if a company has Superfund sites, they must disclose that amount 
on their financial statements, because they tend to be material; unless, you 
                                                 
247 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 10. 
248 infra, ch 7, pg 327.  
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have a .001 responsibility for a site that will take $100 million to clean up, 
it may not be a material amount. Generally, companies in the US, especially 
the public companies, they do a 10K, or 20F if they are a foreign filer, will 
disclose.250 
When introduced, CERCLA caused a fear of lender liability to spread throughout the 
US bank lending community. Now, however, it seems that the American lenders are 
turning their attention to potential liabilities that may be incurred through funding 
businesses that operate in emerging markets. 
R5: What I am being to look at more closely are things that could be 
construed as a potential Superfund site overseas in an emerging economy; 
so if we are dealing with a Chinese company or Indonesian company uhm 
that has been known to dump its waste or store it an unhealthy and unsafe 
way, we can very well assume that, at some point, that is going to have to 
be resolved and it might be quite expensive to do so.251  
 The following section provides an overview of the CERCLA regime. It also serves as 
an introduction to later discussion on Part IIA of the EPA 1990.   
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B. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Original Secured Creditor 
Exemption252 
The US Congress passed CERCLA in 1980. CERCLA introduced a regime that was 
largely designed to respond to abandoned hazardous waste sites situated throughout the 
US. The regime aims to reduce the threat that contaminated land posed to human health. 
CERCLA’s creation was driven by, inter alia, the site at Niagara Falls, N.Y., which 
was used by the Hooker Chemical Company to dump toxic waste for twenty-five years 
(i.e. the Love Canal site).253 CERCLA initially relied on a superfund that was used for 
remediation purposes until, on 30 September 1994, Congress did not re-authorise the 
provision of CERCLA that allowed the fund to be replenished annually by an industrial 
levy. Superfund has since been funded by annual appropriations by the US Congress. 
Liability under the regime is strict and retrospective and there are four ‘potentially 
responsible parties’ (hereafter, PRPs) that could be held liable for the remediation of 
hazardous waste.254 Accordingly, an ‘owner and operator255 of a vessel or a facility’ is 
capable of incurring clean-up costs as a PRP under CERCLA.256 The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), the administrator of CERCLA,257 can 
                                                 
252 Since 1980, the ‘secured creditor exemption’ has been amended by judicial interpretation and 
legislative reforms. Thus, this section uses the ‘original secured creditor exemption’ to describe the one 
that was initially drafted into CERCLA in 1980. 
253 For a good overview of the ‘Love Canal Tragedy’, see EC Beck, ‘The Love Canal Tragedy’ (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency website, no date) <http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/love-canal-
tragedy> accessed 31 August 2014. 
254 42 U.S.C. s 9607(a). 
255 ibid, s 9601(20)(i)-(iii). 
256 ibid, s 9607(a)(1). 
257 ibid, s 9601(2). 
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order PRPs to undertake clean-up operations,258 or conduct remediation works itself 
and recover the costs incurred.259 Remediation costs are determined on the basis of the 
particular vessel or facility that created the damage.260 Remediation costs for facilities 
are unlimited.261 Also, if the President262 determines that a source of hazardous 
substances may be an ‘imminent and substantial endangerment’263 to society or the 
environment then the US EPA issues an order to prevent the harm from materialising.264 
Despite its use, ‘imminent and substantial endangerment’ is not defined in any section 
of CERCLA, and, instead, needs to be explained through its use in other legislation and 
CERCLA case law. In the case of the United States v Northeastern Pharm & Chem Co, 
579 F Supp 823 (WD Mo 1984), the court stated that the term ‘imminent and substantial 
endangerment’ should be assessed through, ‘a case-by-case assessment of the 
relationship between the magnitude of risk and harm arising from the presence of the 
hazardous waste.’265 
Any violation of an order may result in a $37,500 fine per day,266 which may be issued 
until the violation’s discontinuation.267 To limit the scope of CERCLA’s liability, 
Congress drafted an exemption into the law (i.e. ‘the secured creditor exemption’).268 
                                                 
258 ibid, ss 9604 and 9606. 
259 ibid, s 9607(a)(4)(A). 
260 ibid, s 9607(c)(1)(A)-(D).  
261 ibid, s 9607(c)(1)(C). 
262 Pursuant to section 9615: ‘The President is authorized to delegate and assign any duties or powers 
imposed upon or assigned to him and to promulgate any regulations necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this subchapter.’ The President’s power is thus normally delegated to the administrator of CERCLA, 
the US EPA. 
263 See R Zimmerman, Governmental Management of Chemical Risk: Regulatory Processes for 
Environmental Health (Lewis Publishers 1990) 266. 
264 42 U.S.C. §9606(a). 
265 United States v Northeastern Pharm & Chem Co, 579 F Supp 823, 846 (WD Mo 1984). 
266 United States Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Updated Penalty Matrix for CERCLA Section 
106(b)(1) Civil Penalty Policy’ (United States Environmental Protection Agency website, 17 July 2009) 
<http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-10/documents/106-matrix-rev-09.pdf> accessed 10 
September 2015. 
267 42 U.S.C. s 9606(b)(1). 
268 ibid, s 9601(20)(E). 
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This excluded liability as an ‘owner or operator’ if, ‘without participating in the 
management of a vessel or a facility, a person holds indicia of ownership primarily to 
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.’269 This exclusion provided secured 
creditors with a ‘safe harbour’ from remediation liability under CERCLA.270  
1. Judicial Interpretation of the Original Secured Creditor Exemption  
Following CERCLA’s introduction, the judiciary attempted to clarify the meaning of 
the secured creditor exemption (above).  However, the courts differed in their 
determinations of the exemption and, it may be argued, skewed the intent of the 
legislator. The section below analyses two cases which provide opposing judicial 
interpretations of CERCLA’s original secured creditor exemption. It begins with the 
case of United States v Mirabile (1985) 15 Envtl L Rep. 20994.271  
1.1. United States v Mirabile  
The District Court in United States v Mirabile (1985)272 had to determine the US EPA’s 
ability to allocate liability to financiers of an ‘owner or operator’ of a CERCLA site.273 
Turco, a paint manufacturing company, was identified as a PRP by the US EPA.274 The 
company was pursued by the EPA for the payment of remediation costs.275 During its 
                                                 
269 ibid. 
270 Ahrens and Langer (n 65) 483. 
271 United States v Mirabile (1985)15 Envtl L Rep 20994. See also, In re T.P. Long Chemical, Co. 45 
Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), where BancOhio was not held liable under section 104(a) of 
CERCLA [at 288] for foreclosing on contaminated property. 
272 Mirabile (n 271). 
273 ibid, 20,993. See also, MJ Cobb, ‘Where Will It End? Increased Risks to Lenders Under CERCLA 
Secured Creditor Exemption Law’ (1991) 40 Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law 249, 252. 
274 Mirabile (n 271), 20,993. 
275 Cobb (n 273) 252. 
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operations, the American Bank and Trust (ABT) Company and the Mellon Bank 
financed Turco.276 Later, the company became insolvent, applying for bankruptcy277 
under Chapter 11. But this action was dismissed,278 and ABT foreclosed its 
securities.279 The legal title of Turco’s site was assigned to the Mirabiles, following 
ABT’s successful bid at a sheriff’s sale.280 While all parties (i.e. the ABT, the Mellon 
Bank and the Mirabiles) were considered to be PRPs by the US EPA, this analysis will 
focus on ABT’s position as a mortgagee in possession. ABT argued that it was simply 
following its normal procedure in the situation where a borrower is unable to service 
its loan agreement.281 The bank claimed that it could not be made liable because it had 
only an equitable interest (i.e. it did not possess any legal title to the property, nor had 
it participated in managing the company).282 The court ruled that a bank which ‘merely 
foreclosed on the property after all operations had ceased and thereafter took prudent 
and routine steps to secure the property’283 could not be classed as a PRP under 
CERCLA. Therefore, the court decided that the process of foreclosure does not qualify 
as an activity that could be held as ‘participating in the management’,284 as this would 
require, at the very least, the bank’s ‘day-to-day’ involvement in the management of a 
facility or a vessel.285  
Mirabile offered a favourable judgment for secured creditors in the US. The court 
clearly understood the problems that lender liability can cause (e.g. a fear to lend 
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money) and did not want to limit the applicability of the secured creditor exemption. 
However, the judgment in Mirabile was not followed in the case of United States v 
Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986),286 which was heard a 
year later. In that case, Maryland Bank & Trust Co. (MG & T) was held liable under 
CERCLA for the remediation costs incurred by the US EPA. Cobb suggests that, 
‘Although the finding appeared to reject the holding in Mirabile, in reality it did not do 
so.’287  The secured creditor exemption only applied to persons that hold a secured 
interest at the time of clean-up.288 The facts of Maryland state that MG & T held a 
mortgage on the contaminated property on 16 December 1980 and foreclosed in 
1981.289 However, MG & T purchased the contaminated site at a foreclosure sale on 15 
May 1982,290 becoming a former mortgagee and waiving the right to rely on the 
exemption.291 By becoming a former mortgagee the facts of this case are ‘fact 
specific’292 in comparison to Mirabile. Jarvis and Fordham describe the judgment in 
Maryland Bank & Trust Co. (1986) 293 as, ‘the first real suggestion that Mirabile might 
[have been] too favourable to lenders.’294 It is difficult to agree with them on this point; 
and the judicial decision in United States v Fleet Factors (1990) 901 F .2d 1550 shows 
why. This case is outlined below. 
                                                 
286 S Alvarez, ‘Taming the Environmental Protection Agency: Lender Liability in the Aftermath of 
Kelley v EPA’ (1995-1996) 3 Hastings W-Nw J Envt’l L & Pol’y 465. Alvarez makes a useful distinction 
between the Mirabile and Maryland cases (e.g. in Mirabile the bank did not acquire title, whereas in 
Maryland the bank did). Thus, Alvarez suggests that a different interpretation of the secured creditor 
exemption had to be taken by the Maryland court. 
287 Cobb (n 273) 255. 
288 United States v Maryland Bank & Trust Co 632 F Supp 573 (D Md 1986) 579. 
289 ibid. 
290 ibid. 
291 ibid. 
292 Cobb (n 273) 255. 
293 Maryland (n 288) 579. 
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1.2. United States v Fleet Factors  
Following the court’s ruling in United States v Fleet Factors Corp, 724 F Supp 955, 
960 (SD Ga 1988)295 (‘Fleet I’), the US Court of Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit heard 
the appeal in the case of United States v Fleet Factors Corp (1990) 901 F 2d 1550 
(‘Fleet II’).296 In Fleet, the court was asked to determine the extent to which a lender 
might be excluded from liability under CERCLA’s secured-creditor exemption.  
The facts of the case were as follows: A factoring agreement was made between 
Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), a textile facility, and Fleet Factors Corp. (the factoring 
company) in 1976.297 Under this agreement, Fleet Factors advanced funds against the 
assignment of SPW’s accounts receivable.298 Fleet acquired a secured interest in SPW’s 
facility and its ‘equipment, inventory and fixtures’, as collateral under the agreement.299 
In 1979, SPW filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11,300 but the factoring agreement 
continued under court order.301 Fleet ceased to advance funds to the company in 1981 
and, on 27 February 1981, SPW entered into bankruptcy proceedings.302 Fleet 
continued to factor SPW’s accounts receivable during this time.303 Following SPW’s 
liquidation in December 1981,304 Fleet foreclosed on some of its securities in May 
1982.305 On 22 June 1982, Fleet held an auction, selling off some of the collateral.306 It 
                                                 
295 United States v Fleet Factors Corp, 724 F Supp 955, 960 (SD Ga 1988).  
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300 ibid. 
301 ibid. 
302 ibid. 
303 ibid. 
304 ibid. 
305 ibid. 
306 ibid. 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
69 
also contracted for the removal of the unsold property, leaving the site ‘broom clean’.307 
Upon the US EPA’s inspection of the property, on 20 January 1984, seven hundred 
drums of toxic substances were identified on the site.308 Each drum contained 55 gallons 
of toxic waste. There was also a substantial amount of asbestos based material 
discovered on the land (estimates based it at around 40 lorry loads).309 The US EPA, in 
pursuance of its statutory duties under CERCLA, remediated the site.310 With 
remediation costs reaching around $400,000,311 the Agency then demanded repayment 
from the parties who, in their determination, had caused the pollution.312 The US EPA 
believed that responsibility for clean-up should be left with, amongst others, the 
factoring company, Fleet Factors.  
In an interlocutory appeal brought by Fleet Factors (Fleet Factors I), the district court 
ruled that, despite the secured creditor exemption, ‘Fleet’s activities at the facility might 
rise to the level of participation in management sufficient to impose liability.’313 On 
appeal, Fleet Factors II distinguished Mirabile on control grounds,314 formulating its 
own conception of what is meant by ‘indicia of ownership’. The court held that: ‘a 
secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is 
sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal 
decisions if it so chose.’315 Thus, if a lender had the ‘capacity to influence the financial 
management’316 of their borrowers’ activities upon the land, the secured creditor 
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exemption cannot be relied upon to exclude liability.317 Such an interpretation meant 
that a lender could incur liability for remediation costs even with minimum control in 
its borrowers’ affairs.318  
This decision is a classic demonstration of where the judiciary has decided the case in 
order to make the party with the ‘deepest pockets’ liable for clean-up. The judgment 
created, what became known as, ‘the CERCLA dilemma’ for American lenders.319 
Lenders were unaware as to what type of relationship they should have with their clients 
in order to avoid liability. Following the decision in Fleet, the banks’ role in both 
lending and taking security was undefined.320 Giving financial assistance in a market 
of undeterminable liability became a frightening prospect for all financial 
organisations.321  
Nevertheless, in spite of the ‘deep pockets’ argument, some believed that Fleet Factors 
II took the most environmentally favourable approach. The Eleventh Circuit court 
suggested how the Fleet Factors decision was made to, ‘encourage creditors to 
investigate thoroughly…and…will encourage them to monitor the hazardous waste 
treatment systems.’ 322 Certainly, Fleet’s ruling made lenders more aware of the risks 
that can be incurred during their lending to borrowers with contaminated land. It was 
also one of the initial drivers for the introduction of environmental risk management in 
banks.  
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I: So, if we move on to question seven now. Has the implementation of 
environmental regulation affected both lenders and borrowers? 
R5: Yes, I would say very strongly so and in the US we saw this in the early 
70’s with the Clean Air and the Clean Water Act, and then we saw it again 
with Superfund and Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) and then obviously 
the phase 1’s where there was not only an awareness of the environmental 
issues, but a requirement that the documentation be prepared. 323 
Fleet also showed how the strict application of lender liability for environmental 
damage can be problematic. Lenders have an ‘emerging role’ in strengthening 
environmental law and policy.324 In hindsight, it is apparent that the decision in Fleet 
Factors II was not good for sustainable development or the remediation of polluted 
land. Essentially, the ruling in Fleet Factors II created a fear to lend; and banks became 
uncertain as to the relationship that they should have with their borrowers.325 
C. The Secured Creditor Exemption Following the Decision in Fleet 
Factors 
The case of In re Bergsoe Metal Corp 910 F 2d 668 (9th Cir 1990) challenged the 
decision in Fleet.326 In Bergsoe, the court held that ‘participates in the management’ 
means ‘actual participation’,327 and rejected the ‘capacity to influence test’ outlined in 
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Fleet.328 The problem with Bergsoe, however, was that it did not clearly outline the 
types of activities that are, and are not, covered by the secured creditor exemption.329 
So, although Bergsoe marked a return to the reasoning in Mirabile, the matter of the 
exemption’s application still remained unresolved.330 However, in 1992, the US EPA 
created The Lender Liability Rules331 to remove the ambiguity surrounding the 
exemption. The Rules sought to give advice to lenders on the liability criteria within 
CERCLA.332 However, uncertainty established itself once again as the Rules were 
rejected in the case of Kelley v Environmental Protection Agency (1994) 15 F 3d 1100 
(DC Cir 1994).333 In the case of Kelley, the court ruled that the US EPA, which created 
a regulation (the Lender Liability Rules) that limited lender liability under CERCLA, 
lacked the ‘statutory authority to restrict by regulation private rights of action arising 
under the statute.’334 In Alvarez’s opinion, the decision in Kelley made CERCLA 
appear as, ‘a giant bear of environmental regulation’, which was, both, ‘clumsy and 
inefficient.’335  
Two years after the ruling in Kelley, CERCLA was amended by the Asset Conservation, 
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act 1996, Pub L No 104-208, 110 
Stat 3009-462.336 This is also known as the ‘Lender Liability Act 1996’. The Lender 
Liability Act introduced reforms that aimed to clarify the scope of the secured creditor 
exemption following the decision in Fleet Factors II. For example, the Act of 1996 
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revoked the ‘capacity to influence’ test at 42 U.S.C. section 9601(20)(F)(i)(II).337 With 
regards to liability as an ‘owner or operator’, the 1996 Reforms stated that, ‘The term 
“owner or operator” does not include a person that is a lender that, without participating 
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect 
the security interest of the person in the vessel or facility.’338 And pursuant to section 
9601(20)(E), ‘…“owner or operator” does not include a person that is a lender339 that 
did not participate in management of a vessel or facility prior to foreclosure.’340 The 
1996 amendments established clearer boundaries for activities that do, and do not, 
include ‘participates in management’.341 According to 42 U.S.C. section 
9601(20)(F)(iii), ‘performing an act or failing to act prior to the time at which a security 
interest is created in a vessel or facility’ is not ‘participating in management’.342 
Sometimes a lender is unable to rely on the protection of the secured creditor 
exemption. However, there is a limitation on liability for any person that can engage 
specific statutory defences under section 9607(b)343 or is a ‘bona fide prospective 
purchaser’ of land.344 It is true that the 1996 Reforms added a great deal more 
transparency to CERCLA’s secured creditor exemption.345 This is evidenced by the 
answer that one respondent, who currently works for a prestigious American investment 
                                                 
337 See, 42 U.S.C. s 9601(20)(F)(i)(II). Section (F) expressly states that: ‘For purposes of subparagraph 
(E)— (i) the term “participate in management” means— 
(I) means actually participating in the management or operational affairs of a vessel or facility; and 
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338 42 U.S.C. s 9601(20)(E)(i). 
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bank, gave in interview. When asked about the CERCLA regime, the respondent said 
that the threat of direct lender liability was: 
R5: Not as big as it was in the 80’s! Only because, in the early 80’s, it 
[CERCLA] was surfacing, cataloguing and identifying all of the sites and 
then going after the companies. So there was a flurry of legal activity going 
on towards these companies; there was a lot of fear amongst these 
companies… and rightly so… if they found a label with their name on it, 
they would be dragged into the litigation and that’s exactly how they did 
it… right… because the whole point was that the government was going to 
pay up front for the clean-up and then go after the “potentially responsible 
parties” for recompense for that. Then it quietened down. There isn’t much 
activity right now, as far as the initial identification and lawsuit; but there 
is a lot of money being paid by companies to remediate. Although some of 
these sites will take decades to clean-up, and some of them are quite public 
and quite well known.346 
Now that the US’s experience of lender liability for historic contaminated land has been 
discussed, the next section analyses the position in the UK. This analysis focuses upon 
the contaminated land regime under Part IIA of the EPA 1990.  
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II. Historic Land Contamination in the United Kingdom 
A. Introduction 
The UK’s industrial revolution began in the latter part of the eighteenth century. While 
the burgeoning heavy industry created economic prosperity and infrastructural 
improvements, it also led to a dangerous amount of pollution to reside in many areas of 
the UK. Even today, these previously industrialised spaces still pose a risk to human 
health and affect the environment, etc.347 However, the amount of land affected by 
contamination is currently uncertain. For the purpose of this thesis ‘land affected by 
contamination’ shall refer to any land that has not yet been identified by the 
contaminated land regime, is in the process of remediation or cannot be determined 
under Part IIA’s definition and risk-based assessment. Alternatively, ‘contaminated 
land’ refers to any land that has already been determined by the contaminated land 
regime. In a 2002 Environment Agency (EA) Report it was estimated that around 
100,000 sites may have been impacted by previous industrial activities.348 On the other 
hand, a more recent 2009 Report states that there could be c. 325,000 sites (or 300,000 
hectares of land) of potentially contaminated land situated throughout the UK.349  
So, what has been done to remediate such a problematic heritage? Initially, the UK 
relied upon the common law, and a number of statutory regimes, to deal with any 
contaminating substances that were present within land.350 The singular use of the 
existing legal framework was a questionable method for dealing with the legacy 
                                                 
347 See, The Claimants appearing on the Register of the Corby Group Litigation v Corby District Council 
[2009] EWHC 1944 (TCC).  
348 Environment Agency, Dealing with contaminated land in England - Progress in 2002 with 
implementing the Part IIA regime (EA, 2002) 2. 
349 Environment Agency, Reporting the Evidence (n 16) 26. 
350 infra, ch 3. 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
76 
problem.351 Consequently, the government at the time proposed that a regulatory 
regime was needed in order to enforce the identification and remediation of 
contaminated land.  
The initial idea was to create a system that would publicly register contaminated sites 
under section 143 of the EPA 1990. However, in 1993, the then Secretary of State 
(Michael Howard) rejected this proposal.352 After the publication of the influential 
consultation paper, Paying for Our Past (1994),353 Part IIA was inserted into the EPA 
1990 by virtue of section 57 of the Environment Act (EA) 1995.354 Part IIA brought 
into force the contaminated land regime355 for England.356 Part IIA was based on a 
statutory nuisance model and provided a definition for ‘contaminated land’.357 The 
impact of Part IIA’s enactment within the financial sector was quite substantial. The 
UK’s lending community came to realise that this legislation may present a liability 
risk to both themselves and their clients. Upon Part IIA’s implementation, lending 
institutions were concerned that they would be made liable, because they were 
considered to have ‘deep pockets’ and could afford to pay for large remediation costs. 
The general consensus was that the US’s experiences with lender liability under 
CERCLA might become a reality in Britain.358 The next section provides an overview 
of the UK’s contaminated land regime. It gives a detailed analysis of the contaminated 
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land regime’s objectives and structure, regulatory duties, liability, and remediation 
requirements. 
B. The Contaminated Land Regime359 
Part IIA is the environmental law that is most likely to create direct liability for 
lenders based in the UK. Hood states: 
‘The critical issue for a lender, in environmental matters, is the extent to 
which it will be liable for the costs of cleaning-up land which is found to 
be contaminated.’ 360   
Given the nature and aims of this thesis, it is essential that Part IIA of the EPA 1990 is 
evaluated in detail. This will provide the necessary information for understanding the 
research findings. As discussed above, the Part IIA regime was implemented in order 
to deal with the United Kingdom’s significant legacy of ‘contaminated land’.361 In 
theory, the regime hangs treacherously over mortgagees, like the sword that was placed 
above Damocles.362 While suspended, it remains ready to deliver the fatal blow. In 
reality, however, the sword is blunt and incapable of much damage because of the 
regime’s ineffective enforcement and complex structure. Part IIA’s weaknesses can be 
attributed to the current Government’s political agenda and the fact that the regime’s 
primary regulators (i.e. the local authorities and the EA) are operating in an increasingly 
difficult economic environment. Consequently, the regulators have insufficient 
                                                 
359 It is essential to point out that this thesis is discussing the contaminated land regime in England only.  
360 Hood (n 71) para 13.01. 
361 EPA 1990, s 78A(2). 
362 MT Cicero, Tusculan Disputations (AE Douglas ed, Aris & Phillips 1985). 
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resources to fulfil their statutory duties under Part IIA; and, as a result, determination 
figures under the Part IIA regime are at a remarkably low level. The following sections 
outline the contaminated land regime in greater detail. 
1. The Overarching Objectives and Structure of Part IIA of the EPA 1990  
Part IIA’s objectives include: 
 ‘To identify and remove unacceptable risks to human health and the 
environment; 
 To seek to ensure that contaminated land is made suitable for its current use; 
and 
 To seek to ensure that the burdens faced by individuals, companies and society 
as a whole are proportionate, manageable and compatible with the principles of 
sustainable development.’363 
The contaminated land regime is based on a ‘tiered structure’ of legislation.364 The 
primary source of legislative authority – Part IIA – was introduced to create the goals 
and expectations of the regime. The regime’s hierarchy is as follows: (1) Part IIA of 
the EPA 1990; (2) The Contaminated Land Regulations 2006 (amended); (3) the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ (Defra) Statutory Guidance; and 
                                                 
363  Defra 2012 (n 21) para 1.4. 
364 Vaughan, ‘Policy, Practice and Pollution’ (n 19) 2-3. See also, L Etherington, ‘Statutory Nuisance 
and ‘Hybrid Orders’: ‘True Crime’ Stories?’ (2012) 33(3) Statute Law Review 390. 
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(4) the Environment Agency’s (EA) Scientific and Technical Advice and Procedural 
Guides.365 These sources are now considered individually. 
1.1.Part IIA of the EPA 1990 
Part IIA was inserted into the EPA 1990 by section 57 of the Environment Act 1995366 
and introduced the contaminated land regime into law. It is the statute that grants legal 
validity to the regime, setting out the intention and will of Parliament. Part IIA provides, 
amongst other things, a definition of contaminated land and summarises the statutory 
duties of the regulators. 
1.2.The Contaminated Land Regulations (‘the Regulations’) 
The Contaminated Land (England) Regulations 2006367 (as amended by the 
Contaminated Land (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2012)368 were passed to 
define the meaning of ‘special sites’.369 The Regulations also provide a framework for 
the content of ‘remediation notices’,370 including the appeals’ process that can be taken 
by the recipient of such a notice.371  
 
                                                 
365 ibid. 
366 Environment Act 1995, s 57. 
367 The Contaminated Land Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1379.  
368 The Contaminated Land (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2006/1380. See also, The Contaminated 
Land (Wales) Regulations 2012, SI 2006/2989.  
369 EPA 1990, s 78C(3). 
370 ibid, s 78E(1). 
371 Contaminated Land (England and Wales) Regulations 2006, reg 4. 
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1.3.The Statutory Guidance (‘the guidance’) 
The statutory guidance is an extremely important asset for the contaminated land 
regime. The guidance ‘establishes a legal framework for dealing with contaminated 
land in England … [and] … is intended to explain how local authorities should 
implement the regime.’372 It is therefore the source of ‘fleshier’ information that is 
relied upon by the regulators of the Part IIA regime. In 2012, Defra’s contaminated land 
statutory guidance (Circular 01/2006)373 was revised. This was done in an effort to 
refine the regime as a means of providing more clarity for the regulators.374 As a result 
a number of cosmetic changes have been made, e.g. cutting size of the document down, 
putting it in a more readable format, separating radioactive contaminants into another 
document to avoid confusion and highlighting the aims of the regime up-front. Despite 
the revision, the guidance remains largely the same.375 As well as cosmetic changes, a 
number of amendments have been made. For example, the term ‘pollutant linkage’ has 
now been changed to ‘contaminant linkage’.376 Also, the definition and assessment of 
‘significant harm’377 and ‘significant possibility of significant harm’ (SPOSH)378 have 
been modified. With regards to the pollution of controlled waters, the earlier threshold 
for water was ‘any pollution of water’, and now the threshold has been changed to the 
‘significant pollution of controlled waters’, or a ‘significant possibility of significant 
pollution of controlled waters’.379 It will be interesting to see how the recent changes 
will affect the regime’s operation in the future. Raising the threshold for the pollution 
                                                 
372 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 1. 
373 See, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Circular 01/2006 Environmental 
Protection Act 1990: Part 2A – Contaminated Land (Defra, 2006).  
374 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 2. 
375 For a good discussion of the recent changes see, Fogleman, ‘The new statutory guidance’ (n 23) 47. 
376 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 3.8. 
377 ibid, para 4.9. 
378 ibid. 
379 ibid, paras 4.34 - 4.46. 
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of controlled waters may mean that it is more difficult to determine liability under Part 
IIA. 
1.4. Scientific and Technical Advice and Procedural Guides  
The contaminated land regime is also supplemented by scientific and technical advice 
and procedural guides. This information aids local authorities, expanding on the 
statutory guidance. A good example of such advice can be found in The Contaminated 
Land Inspection Strategies - Technical Advice for Local Authorities (2004),380 which 
helps local authorities create and utilise inspection strategies to deal with contaminated 
land in their areas.  
2. The Definition of ‘Contaminated Land’ and Regulatory Duties 
2.1. The Definition of ‘Contaminated Land’ 
Section 78A(2) of the EPA defines ‘contaminated land’ as: 
‘… any land which appears to the local authority in whose area it is situated 
to be in such a condition, by reason of substances in, on or under the land, 
that; 
a) significant harm is being caused or there is a significant possibility of such 
harm being caused; or 
                                                 
380 Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and Environment Agency, Contaminated 
Land Inspection Strategies: Technical Advice for Local Authorities (DETR and EA, June 2004).  
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b) significant pollution of controlled waters is being caused or there is a 
significant possibility of such pollution being caused.’381 
Lee has described the section 78A(2) definition as ‘bare’ with many of the central issues 
being ‘spelled out in statutory guidance’.382 Despite being ‘bare’, the section underlines 
a number of the most important points about the contaminated land regime. First, it 
describes how ‘contaminated land’ is different from land that is merely ‘affected by 
contamination’. It is possible that significantly harmful substances383 are present in, on 
or under land but do not pose a significant risk that is capable of determination under 
Part IIA. Secondly, in order for a substance to be considered as ‘harmful’, the harm 
must reach the threshold of being ‘significant’ in its effect upon the health of living 
organisms and/or an ecological system.384 Finally, section 78A(2) shows that local 
authorities have a statutory duty to inspect its area for contamination. The specific 
duties of the local authorities are highlighted in the following section. 
2.2. Inspection, Determination and Registration Duties 
By virtue of section 78B(1) of the EPA:  
‘Every local authority shall cause its area to be inspected from time to time 
for the purpose of - (a) identifying contaminated land; and (b) of enabling 
                                                 
381 EPA 1990, s 78A(2). 
382  Lee, ‘New Environmental Liabilities’ (n 29) 264. 
383 EPA 1990, s 78A(9): ‘… “substance” means any natural or artificial substance, whether in solid or 
liquid form or in the form of a gas or vapour.’ 
384 ibid, s. 78A(4): ‘harm to the health of living organisms or other interference with the ecological 
systems of which they form part and, in the case of man, includes harm to his property.’ 
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the authority to decide whether any such land is required to be designated 
as a special site.’385  
Local authorities should take a strategic approach to the inspection of land.386 The 
inspection should be rational, ordered and efficient in reflecting local circumstances387 
and prioritising the higher risk sites.388 The guidance states that, to help identify and 
collect information about contaminated land in their areas, local authorities must 
prepare written inspection strategies,389 which are to be kept under periodic review at 
least every five years.390 In 2002, it was shown that ninety four per cent of the local 
authorities had created such a strategy.391 By March 2007, ‘all 375 local authorities’ in 
England and Wales had a strategy in place.392  
Under section 78C of the EPA 1990, the enforcing authority has a duty to identify and 
designate any special sites in its area.393 Special sites are defined in section 78A(3) of 
the EPA as: ‘Any contaminated land – (a) which has been designated as such by virtue 
of section 78C(7) or 78D(6); and (b) whose designation as such has not been terminated 
by the appropriate Agency under section 78Q(4).’394 For the purposes of Part IIA, the 
‘appropriate Agency’ refers to the Environment Agency (EA) in relation to England.395 
If land is a special site, the Agency may ‘adopt’ the remediation notice.396 Before 
making the decision that a site is ‘special’, enforcing authorities may take the advice of 
                                                 
385 EPA 1990, s 78B (1); Defra 2012 (n 21) para 2.1. 
386 ibid, para 2.3. 
387 ibid, paras 2.3 – 2.6. 
388 ibid, paras 2.7 – 2.8. 
389 ibid, para 2.4. 
390 ibid, para 2.5. 
391 Environment Agency, Dealing with contaminated land in England (n 348) 13. 
392 Environment Agency, Reporting the Evidence (n 16) 6. 
393 EPA 1990, s. 78C(1). 
394 ibid, s. 78A(3). 
395 ibid, s. 78A(9)(a). 
396 ibid, s 78Q(1). 
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the EA.397 Equally, if the EA believes that a site requires designation as a special site, 
it will alert the local authority by notice and deal with the area accordingly.398 If the 
local authority gives notice about a potential special site and the Agency declines to 
accept the notice, the decision may be referred to the Secretary of State who will decide 
the case on the facts presented by both parties.399 The situations where referral to the 
EA should take place are listed at Regulation 2(1)(a)-(h). The list includes, inter alia: 
 Land affecting controlled waters (further aided by Regulation 3 and Schedule 
1). 
 Land within a nuclear site. 
 Land owned or occupied by or on behalf of the Secretary of State.400 
The sites in the list are ‘special’ because the EA, and not the local authority, is deemed 
to possess the necessary expertise to deal with such sites. The EA’s expertise is required 
since such sites could be a great deal more harmful than in ordinary circumstances. For 
example, land affecting a controlled water401 source provides a pathway that may carry 
a contaminant and caused significant harm to a number of receptors.402 Thus, it is 
                                                 
397 ibid, s 78C(3). 
398 ibid, s 78C(4). 
399 ibid, s 78C(10). 
400 Contaminated Land (England and Wales) Regulations 2006 (as amended), reg 2. 
401 EPA 1990, s. 78F(9): ‘“controlled waters”— (a) in relation to England and Wales, has the same 
meaning as in Part III of the Water Resources Act 1991 except that “ground waters” does not include 
waters contained in underground strata but above the saturation zone; and (b) in relation to Scotland, has 
the same meaning as in section 30A of the Control of Pollution Act 1974.’ 
402 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 4. 
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important that local authorities understand the definition of a special site and are able 
to identify and refer such sites to the appropriate Agency.  
Pursuant to section 78E(1) of the EPA it is the duty of the enforcing authority to require 
remediation of contaminated land.403 The authority must serve a ‘remediation notice’404 
on each person who is an appropriate person to the contamination.405 Regulation 4(2) 
suggests that, ‘A remediation notice must explain — 
a. That a person on whom it is served has a right of appeal against the notice under 
section 78L; 
b. How, within what period and on what grounds an appeal may be made; and 
c. That a notice is suspended, where an appeal is duly made, until the final 
determination or abandonment of the appeal.’406 
The various grounds for appeal are outlined in Regulation 7(1)(a)-(s). However, even 
if a person has a ground for appeal, the Secretary of State (SoS) can dismiss an action 
that has no ‘material value’.407 Remediation under the contaminated land regime is 
further discussed later in the chapter.  
Finally, local authorities must maintain a register containing information about 
contaminated land in their areas.408 Such information can include the service of 
                                                 
403 EPA 1990, s 78E. 
404 ibid, s 78E(1). 
405 Contaminated Land (England and Wales) Regulations 2006 (as amended), reg 4(2). 
406 ibid, reg 4(2)(a)-(c). 
407 ibid, reg 7(3). 
408 EPA 1990, s 78R. 
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remediation notices409 and/or convictions under section 78M of the EPA.410 The 
registers must be made readily available for any members of the public who wish to 
receive the information.411 The information is made publicly accessible under the 
Environmental Information Regulations 2004,412 and these are carved out of the 
Freedom of Information Act 2007413 because of the need to ensure the effective 
transposition of the European Directive 2003/4/EC on Public Access to Environmental 
Information.414 For the purposes of Part IIA, no information is to be contained in the 
register that impacts the interests of national security415 or is regarded as confidential 
information.416  
 
3. Risk Assessment 
‘Risk’, according to the statutory guidance, means a combination of: 
a) ‘the likelihood that harm, or pollution of water, will occur as a result of 
contaminants in, on or under the land; and 
b) the scale and seriousness of such harm or pollution if it did occur.’417 
                                                 
409 ibid, s 78R(1)(a).  
410 ibid, s 78R(1)(k). 
411 ibid, s 78R(8)(a)-(b).  
412 Environmental Information Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3391. 
413 Freedom of Information Act 2007. 
414 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 January 2003 on public 
access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC [2003] OJ L141/26. 
415 EPA 1990, s 78S.  
416 ibid, s 78T. 
417 Defra 2012 (n 21), para 3.1. 
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The local authority should consider the risk in relation to the ‘current use’ of the land.418 
In so doing, it should act in accordance with the guidance,419 which suggests that, ‘The 
local authority has the sole responsibility for determining whether any land appears to 
be contaminated land.’420 The revised guidance only applies to non-radioactive 
contamination.421 The ‘four grounds of determination’ are discussed below.  
3.1. The Four Grounds of Determination 
The statutory guidance outlines the four grounds for determination. 422  They include:  
a) ‘Significant harm is being caused to a human, or relevant non-human, receptor; 
or 
b) There is a significant possibility of significant of such harm being caused to a 
human, or relevant non-human, receptor; or 
c) Significant pollution of controlled waters is being caused; or 
d) There is a significant possibility of such pollution being caused.’423 
When making a determination that land is contaminated, there is now a presumption 
that the land is ‘innocent until proven guilty’.424 If a site is identified as contaminated 
                                                 
418 ibid, para 3.5(a) – (e).  
419 EPA 1990, s 78A(2); Defra 2012 (n 21) para 5.1. 
420 Defra 2012 (n 21), paras 5.5 – 5.6. 
421 ibid, para 5.6. 
422 ibid, para 5.5. 
423 ibid, para 5.6. 
424 ibid, paras 5.2 – 5.4. 
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for the purposes of section 78A(1) and (2), a notice of such determination shall be given 
to: ‘(a) the appropriate Agency; (b) the owner of land; (c) any person who appears to 
the authority to be in occupation of the whole or any part of the land; and, (d) each 
person who appears to the authority to be an appropriate person.’425  
Local authorities are now under a legal obligation to complete a ‘risk summary’ of any 
land that poses a risk within their area.426 Before a site can be determined as 
contaminated, the authority must show that a ‘risk of harm’ exists. While the definition 
of ‘risk’ has been outlined above, ‘harm’ is defined by section 78A(4) of the EPA as, 
‘harm to the health of living organisms or other interference with the ecological systems 
of which they form part.’427 A risk will be present when the local authority can prove 
that a ‘pathway’ exists between a ‘contaminant’ and a ‘receptor’.428 This chain of events 
is described by the guidance as a ‘contaminant linkage’.429 The guidance emphasises 
the need for the local authority to take a staged approach to this risk assessment.430 It 
suggests that the current use of the land should be inspected with preliminary 
investigations first (e.g. a desk-based study).431 There are also a number of technical 
and scientific guides that can be used in the preliminary assessment of the risk of harm 
(soil guideline values (SGVs), toxicology (TOX) reports, and generic assessment 
criteria (GACs), etc.). Following the preliminary risk assessment, if there is evidence 
                                                 
425 EPA 1990, s78B(3)(a)-(d); Defra 2012 (n 21), para 5.14. 
426 ibid, paras 3.33 – 3.36. 
427 EPA 1990, s 78A(4). 
428 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 3.8: (a) ‘A “contaminant” is a substance which is in, on or under the land and 
which has the potential to cause significant harm to a relevant receptor, or to cause significant pollution 
of controlled waters; (b) A “receptor” is something that could be adversely affected by a contaminant, 
for example a person, an organism, an ecosystem, property, or controlled waters; and, (c) a “pathway” is 
a route by which a receptor is or might be affected by contamination.’ 
429 ibid, para 3.9. 
430 ibid, para 3.12. 
431 ibid, paras 3.5 - 3.7.  
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of contamination that poses an unacceptable risk, a more detailed inspection should be 
undertaken432 (i.e. a Phase II Risk Assessment).  
3.1.1. Significant Harm to Human Health 
The classification of what harm should be identified as ‘significant’ is delegated by Part 
IIA for the statutory guidance to determine.433 The guidance states that, ‘In all cases the 
harm should be directly attributed to the effects of contaminants … on the body(ies) of 
the person(s) concerned.’434 Local authorities’ determinations of the existence of 
contaminated land should be based on the ‘appropriate scientific and technical 
assessment of all the relevant evidence.’435  Some health effects should always be 
considered to constitute significant harm, i.e.:436  
‘death; life threatening diseases (e.g. cancers); other diseases likely to have 
serious impacts on health; serious injury; birth defects; and impairment of 
reproductive functions.’437  
Other effects may also be considered, but these are dependent upon the authority’s 
determination.438 They include: 
‘physical injury; gastrointestinal disturbances; respiratory tract effects; 
cardio-vascular effects; central nervous system effects; skin ailments; 
                                                 
432 ibid, para 3.13. 
433 EPA 1990, s 78A(5). 
434 Defra 2012 (n 21), para 4.3. 
435 ibid, para 4.4. 
436 ibid, para 4.5. 
437 ibid. 
438 ibid. 
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effects on organs such as the liver or kidneys; or a wide range of other health 
impacts.’439  
The ‘seriousness of harm’ should be considered by the authority in deciding 
significant harm. And the authority’s consideration should include, ‘the impact 
on the health and quality of life, of any person suffering the harm; and the scale 
of the harm.’ 440 If harm is occurring and it is not significant, the guidance states 
that the authority should consider whether a SPOSH exists: ‘For example, this 
might be the case if there is evidence that the harm may be a precursor to, or 
indicative or symptomatic of, a more serious form of harm, or that repeated 
episodes of minor harm (e.g. repeated skin ailments) might lead to more serious 
harm in the longer term.’441 
3.1.2. Significant Possibility of Significant Harm to Human Health  
The statutory guidance advises that before deciding whether or not a SPOSH exists, the 
local authority must first understand the ‘possibility of significant harm’ (POSH). 
POSH as it applies to human health means: ‘the risk posed by one or more relevant 
contaminant linkage(s) relating to the land.’442 It comprises:  
‘(a) The estimated likelihood that significant harm might occur to an 
identified receptor, taking account of the current use of the land in question; 
(b) The estimated impact if the significant harm did occur i.e. the nature of 
                                                 
439 ibid, para 4.6. 
440 ibid.  
441 ibid, para 4.7.  
442 ibid. 
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the harm, the seriousness of the harm to any person who might suffer it, and 
(where relevant) the extent of the harm in terms of how many people might 
suffer it.’ 443  
This decreases the likelihood of invalid risk assessment. This assessment can be based 
on ‘the possible future risk if a more sensitive receptor moved onto to land’.444 The 
timescale of the risk’s manifestation must also be highlighted.445 The local authority 
making the determination should use the statutory guidance’s categorisation of SPOSH 
to human health.446  There are four categories,447 including:  
Category 1 
 
Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
Local authorities 
should assume that 
SPOSH exists if there 
is ‘an unacceptably 
high probability, 
supported by robust 
science-based 
evidence that 
significant harm 
would occur if no 
action is taken to stop 
it.’448 The statutory 
guidance emphasises 
the need for the 
enforcing authority to 
take into account 
similar cases during 
Where ‘there is a 
strong case for 
considering the risks 
from the land are of 
sufficient concern’, 
land should be 
deemed as Category 
2.450 This may be the 
case even if there is 
no or little evidence 
to support the 
determination.451 The 
local authority 
should act on a 
‘precautionary 
basis’, including the 
When there is not ‘a 
strong case’ of 
SPOSH as with 
Category 1, land 
should be determined 
as a Category 3 site.  
This categorisation 
includes land that is 
‘high risk’, but Part 
IIA intervention is 
unnecessary.453 
The guidance 
suggests that 
simply because 
land is considered 
low risk, the local 
authority should 
not assume that 
SPOSH does not 
exist.454 An 
example of a 
Category 4 site is, 
amongst other 
things:455 ‘Land 
where no relevant 
contaminant 
linkage has been 
established.’456 
                                                 
443 ibid, para 4.9. [at para. 4.11]. 
444 ibid, para 4.13. 
445 ibid, para 4.14. 
446 ibid, para 4.17. 
447 ibid, paras 4.19 – 4.25. 
448 ibid, 4.19. 
450 ibid, para 4.25(a). 
451 ibid. 
453 ibid, para 4.25(b). 
454 ibid, para 4.21. 
455 ibid, para 4.21(a)-(d). 
456 ibid, para 4.21(a). 
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their risk 
assessment.449 
opinions of 
experts.452    
 
This categorisation may be theoretically feasible but practically problematic, because 
local authorities are likely to find it difficult to distinguish between Categories 2 and 
3.457 However, the guidance provides local authorities with advice when deciding 
whether land falls into Category 2 or Category 3.458 If the local authority is still 
undecided, it should place the land into Category 3.459 
3.1.3. Significant Harm and Significant Possibility of Significant Harm to Non-
human receptors 
When determining harm to non-human receptors, local authorities are advised to refer 
to Tables 1 and 2 of the statutory guidance.460 According to the guidance ‘non-human 
receptors’461  include ‘ecological system effects’ and ‘property effects’.462 Ecological 
system effects concerns ‘any ecological system, or living organism forming part of such 
a system.’463 For example, a site of special scientific interest would be considered a 
relevant receptor.464 Significant harm to an ecological system would include, etc., 
‘harm which results in an irreversible adverse change… in the functioning of the 
ecological system’.465 SPOSH to ecological systems includes, inter alia, ‘significant 
                                                 
449 ibid. 
452 ibid. 
457 ibid. 
458 ibid, paras 4.26 – 4.28. 
459 ibid, para 4.29. 
460 ibid, para 4.30. 
461 ibid.  
462 ibid, sec 4.3 (Tables 1 and 2). 
463 ibid, sec 4.3 (Table 1) 24. 
464 ibid. 
465 ibid. 
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harm of that description is more likely than not to result from the contaminant linkage 
in question’.466 
The other non-human receptor under the regime is ‘property’.467 The first form of 
property listed in Table 2 can be in the form of crops, livestock, wild animals subject 
to shooting or fishing rights etc.468 An example of harm that is considered significant 
is, ‘For crops, a substantial diminution in yield or other substantial loss in their value 
resulting from death, disease or other physical damage.’469 SPOSH to this form of 
receptor is determined, ‘where the local authority considers that significant harm is 
more likely than not to result from the contaminant linkage in question, taking into 
account the relevant information for that type of contaminant linkage, particularly in 
relation to the ecotoxicological effects of the contaminant.’470 The second form of 
property can be in the form of buildings. Table 2 states that, ‘For this purpose, 
“building” means any structure or erection, and any part of a building including any 
part below ground level, but does not include plant or machinery comprised in a 
building, or buried services such as sewers, water pipes or electricity cables.’471 In this 
case ‘structural damage, substantial damage or substantial interference’ are considered, 
amongst others, to be forms of significant harm. SPOSH to buildings is similar to 
SPOSH to the first form of property.472 However, instead of assessing the 
ecotoxicological effects, the local authority must take into account ‘… the expected 
                                                 
466 ibid. 
467 ibid, sec 4.3 (Table 2). 
468 ibid. 
469 ibid.  
470 ibid. 
471 ibid.  
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economic life of the building (or in the case of a scheduled Ancient Monument the 
foreseeable future).’473 
3.1.4. Significant pollution of controlled waters is being caused 
The publication of the new guidance coincided with the bringing into force of section 
86 of the Water Act (WA) 2003474 (see, ‘the Water Act 2003 (Commencement No 11) 
Order 2012’).475 When brought into force section 86 of the WA 2003 subsequently 
amended the definition of ‘contaminated land’.476 As a result of section 86, the pollution 
of controlled waters must be ‘significant’ before appropriate persons can be 
determined.477 The test for determining this is, ‘the entry into controlled waters of any 
poisonous, noxious or polluting matter or any solid waste matter; or that they have 
already entered the waters and are likely to do so again.’478 An example that the 
statutory guidance gives of a ‘significant pollution of controlled waters’ is any pollution 
that is equivalent to ‘environmental damage’479 under the Environmental Damage 
(Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009.480 
3.1.5. Significant possibility of significant pollution of controlled waters 
The significant possibility of significant pollution of controlled waters is defined as ‘the 
estimated likelihood that significant pollution of controlled waters might occur.’481 The 
                                                 
473 ibid. 
474 Water Act 2003. 
475 Water Act 2003 (Commencement No. 11) Order 2012. 
476 Water Act 2003, s 86. 
477 Defra 2012 (n 21), para 5.6(c). 
478 ibid, para 4.41(a) – (c). 
479 Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/153, reg 4. 
480 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 4.38(a). See also, 4.38(b) – (d). 
481 ibid, para 4.43. 
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local authority is advised by the guidance to understand whether the ‘possibility of 
significant pollution of controlled waters’ might occur. Following this, the significant 
possibility of significant pollution of controlled waters is assessed through a ‘positive 
legal test’.482 Paragraph 4.44 of the guidance states, ‘… the test the authority needs 
reasonable to believe that there is a significant possibility of such pollution, rather than 
to demonstrate that there is not.’483 As with SPOSH, there are four categories, ranging 
from a Category 1 site to a Category 4 site.484 They are outlined in a boxed table below. 
Category 1 
 
Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
This category 
covers the 
situation where 
there is ‘a strong 
and compelling 
case’ that the 
significant 
pollution of 
controlled waters 
exists.485  
Land is placed into this 
category where ‘the 
strength of the evidence’ 
does not suggest a 
Category 1 site,486 but the 
risks are of a sufficient 
concern on the basis of 
‘available scientific and 
expert evidence’.487 The 
local authority should act 
on a ‘precautionary 
basis’.488 
 
Sites that do not 
meet the tests for 
Categories 1 and 
2,489 and where 
regulatory 
intervention is 
‘not 
warranted’,490 fall 
into this category.  
 
In this case the 
land presents 
either no risk or 
the level of risk 
would be 
considerably 
low491 (e.g. no 
contaminant 
linkage has 
been 
established).492 
 
  
                                                 
482 ibid, para 4.44. 
483 ibid. 
484 ibid, para 4.46(a) – (d). 
485 ibid, para 4.46(a). 
486 ibid, para 4.46(b)(i). 
487 ibid, para 4.46(b)(ii). 
488 ibid. 
489 ibid, para 4.46(c). 
490 ibid. 
491 ibid. 
492 ibid, para 4.46(d). 
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The next section evaluates the types, and triggers, of liability that may be incurred under 
Part IIA of the EPA 1990. 
4. Liability 
Like CERCLA, liability under the contaminated land regime is strict and retrospective. 
Section 78F of the EPA enforces Part IIA liability. A bank with a significant degree of 
control over or possession of contaminated land is capable of incurring liability for the 
remediation costs as an ‘appropriate person’. According to section 78F(9) of the EPA, 
an appropriate person is the person who must, ‘bear responsibility for anything which 
is to be done by way of remediation in any particular case.’493 Liability is to be allocated 
by the local authority to any appropriate persons associated with the contaminated 
land.494 There are two classifications of appropriate persons.495 First, section 78F(2) of 
the EPA suggests that liability will be allocated to: 
‘ … any person, or any of the persons, who caused or knowingly permitted 
the substances, or any of the substances, by reason of which the 
contaminated land in question is such land to be in, on or under that land is 
an appropriate person.’ 496   
The statutory guidance describes this as ‘Class A’ liability.497 Secondly, section 78F(4) 
of the EPA states that:  
                                                 
493 EPA 1990, s 78A(9). 
494 ibid, s 78F(1). 
495 ibid, s 78F; Defra 2012 (n 21) sec 7. 
496 ibid, s. 78F(2). 
497 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 7.3(a). 
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‘If no person has, after reasonable inquiry, been found who is by virtue of 
subsection (2) above an appropriate person to bear responsibility for the 
things which are to be done by way of remediation, the owner or occupier 
for the time being of the contaminated land in question is an appropriate 
person.’498   
The second type of person to bear responsibility for remediation is described as a ‘Class 
B’ appropriate person.499 It is important to note that the ‘Class A’ and ‘Class B’ 
categorisations are not in any provision of Part IIA itself; such terminology is a product 
of the statutory guidance. The two types of liability will now be presented in more detail 
below. 
4.1. Class A Liability 
The phrase ‘to cause or knowingly permit’ is widely used in environmental law.500 It 
can be found governing offences relating to the pollution of controlled waters contrary 
to an environmental permit made in accordance with the Environmental Permitting 
(England and Wales) Regulations 2010 (as amended)501 etc. Despite the extensive use 
of the phrase ‘to cause or knowingly permit’, there is still a great deal of ‘uncertainty’ 
surrounding its meaning.502 Although there is little judicial comment on how the trigger 
terms apply to Part IIA, previous cases concerning water pollution offences503 can 
                                                 
498 EPA 1990, s 78F(4). 
499 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 7.3(a). 
500 Lawrence and Lee ‘Permitting Uncertainty’ (n 31) 261-263. See also, Egede and Lee (n 56) 875. 
501 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/675, regs 38(1) and 12(1). 
See also, N Parpworth, ‘Who may be liable for an offence contrary to s. 85 for the Water Resources Act 
1991? (2009) JPL 294. In is noteworthy that in section 33(1)(a) of the EPA 1990 it is ‘knowingly cause’. 
502 Lawrence and Lee ‘Permitting Uncertainty’ (n 31) 261. 
503 Water Resources Act 1991, s 85; and Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951, s 2(1). 
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nevertheless be relied upon to help define the use of the triggers in the environmental 
context.  
4.1.1. ‘Causes’ Pollution 
In Alphacell v Woodward [1972] AC 824504 Lord Wilberforce gave his interpretation 
of ‘to cause or knowingly permit’ environmental pollution,505 stating:  
‘causing, which must involve some active operation or chain of operations 
involving as the result the pollution of the stream; knowingly permitting, 
which involves a failure to prevent the pollution, which failure, however, 
must be accompanied by knowledge.’506 
 
Lord Salmon also suggested in Alphacell that the test for determining the offence of 
‘causing’ pollution ‘is essentially a practical question of fact which can best be 
answered by ordinary common sense’.507 Liability for ‘causing’ is determined by a 
‘positive act’,508 which does not need to be the ‘immediate cause’ of the pollution509 
and is to be applied strictly.510 While it is unlikely that a bank would be found liable for 
‘causing’ pollution,511 such lender liability may be possible where a bank has a 
                                                 
504 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824. 
505 ibid, 834 (Lord Wilberforce). 
506 ibid. 
507 ibid 847 (Lord Salmon). See also, Alphacell (n 504) 834 (Lord Wilberforce). 
508 cf Price v Cromack [1975] 1 WLR 988; and Wychavon District Council v National Rivers Authority 
[1993] 1 WLR 125 with National Rivers Authority v Yorkshire Water Services Ltd [1995] 1 AC 444. 
509 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Cars Co. (1999) 2 AC 22, 28 
(Lord Hoffman). See also, Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1994) [1995] 1 W.L.R. 599, 615 (Lord 
Taylor of Gosforth C.J.). 
510 Alphacell (n 504) 824; R (ota of Crest Nicholson Residential Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (2010) EWHC 561(Admin).  
511 Egede and Lee (n 56) 876. 
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significant participation in a borrower’s affairs e.g. as a ‘non-executive director’ or a 
‘shadow director’.512  
4.1.2. ‘Knowingly Permits’ Pollution 
Following Lord Wilberforce in Alphacell, the term ‘knowingly permits’ refers to a 
person with knowledge and a position of control failing to prevent pollution from 
occurring.513 ‘Causing’ is a strict liability offence and does not require the proof of a 
defendant’s knowledge of the illegal act. In order to secure a conviction for ‘knowingly 
permitting’ pollution, the prosecution must prove the defendant’s mens rea.514 This has 
been determined within the area of the criminal law that concerns the unlawful 
possession and transportation of drugs and other dangerous substances.515 In R v 
Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567 a merchant shipman was charged with being knowingly 
involved in a fraudulent evasion of the prohibition of the importation of cannabis, 
contrary to section 304(b) of the Customs and Excise Act 1952.516 Widgery LJ held that 
the word ‘knowingly’ for the purposes of section 304(b) concerned knowing that a 
fraudulent evasion in respect of goods is taking place, and that ‘it is sufficient to justify 
conviction, even if he does not know precisely what goods are being imported.’517 In 
the case of Westminster County Council v Croyalgrange Ltd and Another [1986] 1 
WLR 674 the court ruled that the word knowingly was a ‘necessary ingredient’ of the 
                                                 
512 See, In re a Company No 00996 of 1979 (1980) Ch 138; and Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd, Re, The Times, 
Feb 19, 1992. cf Tridos Bank NV v Dobbs [2004] EWHC 845 (Ch). 
513 Alphacell (n 504) 834 (Lord Wilberforce). 
514 EA Martin (ed), Oxford Dictionary of Law (4th edn, OUP 1997) 290: ‘mens rea [Latin: a guilty mind] 
The state of mind that the prosecution must prove a defendant to have had at the time of committing the 
crime in order to secure a conviction.’ 
515 Regina v Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567. See also, Regina v Ellis & Street (1987) 84 Cr App R 235; and 
Regina v Hullam [1957] 1 QB 569. 
516 Regina v Hussain (n 509) 570D (Widgery LJ). 
517 ibid, 572A-B. 
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offence of using any premises as a sex establishment contrary to Schedule 3, paragraph 
20(a) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982.518 Thus, in 
Croyalgrange’s case ‘knowledge’ constitutes ‘actual knowledge’ of the offence. The 
meaning of ‘knowledge’ was considered within the environmental context in the case 
of Ashcroft v Cambro Waste Products Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 1349.519 Ashcroft concerned 
a deposit of waste in breach of a waste licence made pursuant to section 3 of the Control 
of Pollution Act 1973.520 The court in Ashcroft ruled that, while it was necessary for 
the prosecution to show that the deposit had been ‘knowingly permitted’, proof of 
knowledge of the breach of condition was unnecessary.521 Ashcroft’s interpretation of 
‘knowingly permitted’ was applied to unlawful deposits of waste contrary to section 33 
of the EPA 1990 in Shanks & McEwan (Teesside) Ltd v Environment Agency [1999] 
QB 333,522  and recently considered in the case of Walker & Son (Hauliers) Ltd v 
Environment Agency [2014] EWCA Crim 100.523 In Walker & Son, the court had to 
determine the meaning of ‘knowingly permits’ under Regulation 38(1) of the 
Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2007,524 ruling that 
knowledge of a breach of condition was not required under the Regulations.525  
 
The case of Circular Facilities (London) Ltd v Sevenoaks District Council [2005] 
EWHC 865 assessed the term ‘knowingly permitted’ in relation to section 78F(9) of 
the EPA. Circular Facilities deals specifically with the meaning of ‘knowledge’ for the 
                                                 
518 ibid, 683 (Lord Bridge of Harwich). 
519 Ashcroft v Cambro Waste Products Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 1349. 
520 ibid. 
521 ibid, 1355 (Boreham J). cf Westminster CC v Croyalgrange [1986] 1 WLR 674.  
522 Shanks & McEwan (Teesside) Ltd v Environment Agency [1999] QB 333 (Mance J). 
523 Walker & Son (Hauliers) Ltd v Environment Agency [2014] EWCA Crim 100. 
524 ibid, para 1. 
525 ibid, para 26. 
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purposes of section 78F of the EPA 1990. However, it is unnecessary to outline this 
case here, as this chapter returns to it below.526  
 
The trigger term ‘knowingly permitted’ is a lender liability risk for UK banks.527 This 
is because lenders are capable of collecting the necessary ‘knowledge’ of the 
contamination during their pre- and post-loan due diligence.528 For example, Egede and 
Lee state that, ‘It may be sufficient that a bank has available to it considerable elements 
of control in the covenants of a loan agreement, and is armed with the knowledge of 
environmental shortfalls on the part of the borrower company.’529 Now the trigger terms 
under Part IIA have been evaluated, three of the most significant cases surrounding 
Class A liability are discussed.    
4.1.3. Judicial Interpretation of Class A Liability under Part IIA 
Part IIA of the EPA has generated only a limited number of cases concerning its 
application and operation. Nevertheless, there are three primary cases that are necessary 
to analyse. The section begins with Circular Facilities (London) Ltd v Sevenoaks 
District Council [2005] EWHC 865. 
4.1.3.1. Circular Facilities (London) Ltd v Sevenoaks District Council  
In the case of Circular Facilities v Sevenoaks District Council 530 the High Court 
evaluated an appeal to a remediation notice issued under Part IIA of the EPA 1990. The 
                                                 
526 See overleaf. 
527 Egede and Lee (n 56) 877.  
528 ibid. 
529 ibid. 
530 Circular Facilities v Sevenoaks District Council [2005] EWHC 865 (Admin). 
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case concerned contamination on the site of former brickworks. The facts state that in 
February 1965 Mr Kinchen−Goldsmith, the owner of the site in question, was granted 
planning permission to infill clay pits with inert material e.g. “builders’ rubble”.531 
Kinchen–Goldsmith was granted permission for development in August 1977;532 but 
this was transferred to a Mr and Mrs Scott in 1978.533 On 7 July 1978 the site was 
investigated and five trial pits were dug by JCB digger to a level of 3.2 metres.534 The 
findings of the investigation were reported on 14 July 1978.535 The results of the soil 
investigation report showed that all of the pits had, as well as the inert fill material, 
‘black organic matter’ held within them.536 Pit 3 also had ‘water entering excavation at 
this level and gases bubbling through it.’537 In February 1978 Mr Scott made a further 
planning application.538 The investigation report recommended that ‘piled foundations’ 
were needed on the land.539 A company called Frankipile Ltd was tendered to install 
seventy-two piles at the site.540 However, on 12 November 1979 the land was 
transferred to Circular Facilities Ltd (CFL).541 In March 1980 Frankipile and the 
Council’s building control officer were on the site to inspect the ‘sinking piles and the 
adequacy of the foundations.’542 CFL gave the soil investigation report to the building 
control officer.543 In April 1980 the piling for the houses began544 and the last house 
sold in 1985.545 Despite selling the land, Mr Scott continued to have an active role in 
                                                 
531 ibid, para 8 (Mr Justice Newman). 
532 ibid. 
533 ibid. 
534 ibid, para 9. 
535 ibid. 
536 ibid. 
537 ibid. 
538 ibid, para 10. 
539 ibid, para 11. 
540 ibid, para 12. 
541 ibid, para 13. 
542 ibid. 
543 ibid. 
544 ibid, para 14. 
545 ibid, para 15. 
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the development process.546 The Council believed that CFL knowingly permitted there 
to be a substance contrary to section 78F(9) of the EPA, since ‘the presence of the 
organic material had given rise to the presence of gases as a result of a chemical reaction 
or biological process’.547 Newman J stated that: 
 
‘The difficulties to which this case gave rise relate not so much to questions 
arising in connection with the legislation, but with the difficulties of 
establishing facts, capable of giving rise to a conclusion that the requisite 
knowledge was held by CFL, at a date some twenty years prior to it being 
determined that the land was contaminated. A particular evidential 
difficulty arose because Mr Scott is dead.’548 
 
In the Magistrates’ hearing549 the district judge ruled that exclusion test 6 of the 
statutory guidance excluded Mr Scott and the previous land owner from Class A 
liability.550 The guidance allows exemption from Class A liability for those who would 
otherwise be liable, ‘solely because of the subsequent introduction by others of the 
relevant pathways or receptors (as defined in Section 3) in the significant contaminant 
linkage.’551 Ross states that, ‘The judge had no doubts about what this guidance 
implied. Mr Scott and the previous landowner had both allowed tipping on the site, but 
were excluded from liability by test 6. It was Circular Facilities which had introduced 
the pathways and receptors to create the pollutant linkage, and as such it was the 
                                                 
546 ibid, para 19. 
547 ibid, para 16. 
548 ibid, para 18. 
549 ibid. This case is unreported. 
550 K Ross, ‘Contaminated land – where are we now?’ (2007) 52(9) JLSS 52, 53. 
551 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 7.57. 
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appropriate person under s 78F.’552 On appeal Newman J had to determine, inter alia, 
whether CFL could have been said to have knowledge of the contamination. In his 
judgment he held that: ‘there is no basis for limiting the ambit of the section to exclude 
responsibility to those who do not know of the potentiality for the chemical reaction or 
biological process… The knowledge of the substance is taken to be the knowledge of 
the substance generated by the process.’553  
This case demonstrates how severely Part IIA’s liability can be applied. It shows how 
the thread holding the sword of liability is susceptible to change and may not always 
remain as strong as it is today. Circular Facilities shows that acquiring too much 
knowledge (whether expressed or implied) when undertaking environmental due 
diligence, may result in Class A liability as an appropriate person under section 78F of 
the EPA. However, lenders are excluded from Class A liability under Exclusion Test 1 
of the statutory guidance.554 This test excludes a person that provides financial 
assistance from incurring liability for causing or knowingly permitting 
contamination.555  
4.1.3.2. R (on the application of Crest Nicholson Residential Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs  
In R (on the application of Crest Nicholson Residential Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2010] EWHC 561 (Admin)556 Crest Nicholson 
Residential Ltd (CN) applied under section 78L of the EPA 1990 to bring judicial 
                                                 
552 Ross (n 550) 53. 
553 Circular Facilities (n 530), para 43. 
554 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 7.38. 
555 ibid. 
556 Crest Nicholson (n 510). This is also known as ‘the Sandridge’ case. 
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review proceedings to challenge a remediation notice making it the appropriate person 
to bear remedial costs for contaminated land.557 Section 78L of the EPA 1990 states 
that, ‘A person on whom a remediation notice is served may, within the period of 
twenty-one days beginning with the day on which the notice is served, appeal against 
the notice.’558 The notice was issued on 22 July 2009559 by the Secretary of State560 and 
related to contamination identified at the site of St Leonard’s Court, Sandridge, 
Hertfordshire.561 It outlined the ‘assessment actions’ and ‘interim remedial treatment 
actions’ to be carried out by CN.562 The land in question had bromide and bromate in 
the soil.563 The substances also entered a local water course,564 contaminating a chalk 
aquifer and affecting the business of Veolia Water Central Ltd (the local water supplier) 
and Thames Water Utilities Ltd (the local sewage company).565 The facts state that 
‘from the 1950s to about 1980’ the site was used by Redland Minerals Ltd (RM) for 
chemical production.566 Work was carried out in buildings that were built upon ‘hard 
standing’ and ‘sump holes’ were used to collect the bromide and bromate ‘generated 
by the chemical processes’.567 In September 1983 RM sold the site to CN for 
development.568 CN commenced ‘some preliminary preparatory work on the Site’ in 
1984, demolishing the existing buildings and breaking up the hard standing.569 Some 
                                                 
557 ibid, para 1 (Mr Justice Sales). 
558 EPA 1990, s 78L(1).  
559 Crest Nicholson (n 510), para 1. The remediation notice was first issued in 2005 and was revised. 
560 ibid. 
561 ibid. 
562 ibid, para 3. 
563 ibid, para 2. 
564 ibid. 
565 ibid, para 3. 
566 ibid, para 4. 
567 ibid.  
568 ibid, para 5. 
569 ibid, para 6. 
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two and a half years later the development of St Leonard’s Court began in 1986.570 In 
his judgment Sales J says that: 
‘In that two-and-a-half year period the site was left exposed to the elements. 
The removal of buildings and broken up hard standing meant that rain had 
a greater effect in washing the bromide and bromate down into the soil than 
would otherwise have been the case.’571    
In 1986 CN excavated the land, finding vague traces of bromide in the soil and water 
table.572 However, the levels of this chemical appeared to be in small quantities at the 
shallow depth inspected (1 – 1.5 metres).573 The remediation works undertaken by CN 
were ‘too shallow’574 and allowed the bromide and bromate to leach into the ground 
water. The residential area of St. Leonard’s Court is in fact sitting on top of ‘the largest 
groundwater contamination plume in Europe.’ 575 CN sold the land in 1987.576 The case 
was referred to the EA as a ‘special site’ in 2002 under section 78E of the EPA.577 In 
2005 a remediation notice was served identifying RM and CN as appropriate persons.578 
RM and CN used their section 78L right to appeal the decision of the Secretary of 
State,579 who referred the matter to a planning inspector ‘to hold an inquiry and 
report’.580 The significance of this case lies in the fact that the inspector and Secretary 
                                                 
570 ibid. 
571 ibid, para 7 
572 ibid, para 8. 
573 ibid. 
574 ibid, para 8. 
575 S Sykes, ‘Groundwater Pollution Appeal: Major polluted site - Part IIA appeal’ (Eric-group, 4 January 
2010) <http://www.eric-group.co.uk/environmental_regulation_story.php?content_id=154>  accessed 
17 June 2013.  
576 Crest Nicholson (n 510) para 10. 
577 ibid, 14. 
578 ibid, 17. 
579 EPA 1990, s 78L(1). 
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of State found CN and RM jointly liable for the contamination plume.581 Remediation 
liability was allocated by the Secretary of State as follows: (1) bromate pollution – 
eighty five per cent to RM and fifteen per cent to CN; and (2) bromide pollution – forty 
five per cent to RM and fifty five per cent to CN.582 Sales J upheld the inspector’s report 
and dismissed the appeal for permission.583  
It is important that lenders consider the decision in Crest, since it shows that the 
contaminated land regime is retrospective (i.e. the pollution occurred before the 
regulatory regime was brought into force but still fell under the regulatory regime). 
Importantly, RM had acquired the company which had originally operated the site. 
However, they had quit the site by the time of the acquisition. This case also shows the 
limits of ‘Exclusion Test 3’ (i.e. the ‘Sold with Information’ test),584 as the Secretary 
of State held that it did not apply to RM’s case. 
4.1.3.3. R (on the application of National Grid Gas plc (formerly Transco plc)) v 
Environment Agency  
R (on the application of National Grid Gas plc (formerly Transco plc)) v Environment 
Agency [2007] UKHL 30 concerned whether Class A liability under section 78F of the 
EPA is directly transferable to statutory successors-in-title. The successor-in-title in this 
case was National Grid Gas plc (Forbes J referred to it by its previous name, 
Transco).585 The facts state that the EA had remediated a site at Bawtry, Doncaster.586 
                                                 
581 Sykes, ‘Groundwater Pollution Appeal: Major polluted site’ (n 575). 
582 ibid 
583 Crest Nicholson (n 510), para 33. 
584 infra, pg 113. 
585 R (on the application of National Grid Gas plc (formerly Transco plc)) v Environment Agency [2006] 
EWHC 1083 (Admin) para 1 (Forbes J). 
586 R (on the application of National Grid Gas plc (formerly Transco plc)) v Environment Agency [2007] 
UKHL 23 1728F (Lord Scott of Foscote). 
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The site was first developed and operated on by the Bawtry and District Gas Company 
(B&DGC) from 1912 until 1 January 1931, when it amalgamated with the South 
Yorkshire & Derbyshire Gas Company (SY&DGC).587 In 1948 ownership of the site 
was transferred to the East Midlands Gas Board (EMGB) as a consequence of the 
nationalisation of the gas industry.588 According to section 17(1) of the Gas Act 1948, 
‘all property, rights, liabilities and obligations which, immediately before such date … 
were property, rights, liabilities and obligations of an undertaker to whom this Part of 
this Act applies.’589 There were also a number of other statutory transfers through 
successive Gas Acts.590 Gas production continued on the site until 1965 and the site 
was later sold to Kenton Homes Ltd and then purchased by Kenneth Jackson Ltd in 
1966. Eleven properties were built upon the site. After one resident discovered a coal 
tar pit in their garden,591 Doncaster MBC designated the area as a ‘special site’ in 
2003.592 The EA undertook remediation works and served a remediation notice593 onto 
Transco in order to recover the costs it had incurred.594 The EA initially identified a 
number of potential appropriate persons in its inspection: (i) The Gas Industry (various 
companies), (ii) Kenton Homes Ltd, (iii) Kenneth Jackson Ltd, (iv) the Ministry of 
Defence, (v) the Local Planning Authority and (vi) subsequent owners and occupiers.595 
However, Kenton Homes Ltd and Kenneth Jackson Ltd were liquidated596 and there 
was no evidence that the MoD was an appropriate person.597 If Transco was not a Class 
A appropriate person, then the eleven residents would have to incur the remediation 
                                                 
587 ibid 1784A. 
588 Transco 2006 (n 585) para 21 (Forbes J). See also, section 17(1) of the Gas Act 1948. 
589 ibid, para 22. 
590 ibid, paras 23-24. 
591 ibid, para 33. This occurred in October 2001. 
592 ibid, para 34. 
593 EPA 1990, s 78N(3)(e). 
594 Transco 2006 (n 585) para 44 (Forbes J). 
595 ibid, para 39. 
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costs as ‘one liability group’ as the current owners and occupiers of the site.598 The EA 
argued that Transco was the Class A appropriate person to bear the clean-up costs of 
the site. The Agency believed that Transco had inherited the liabilities of its 
predecessors through statutory transfer.599 The potentially ambiguous language in this 
case was the term ‘appropriate person’, as found in section 78F of the EPA. Forbes J, 
sitting in the High Court, took a purposive interpretation, agreeing with the argument 
presented by the EA. The High Court ruled that the word ‘appropriate person’ in section 
78F(2) of the EPA should be construed as to include statutory successors.600 Through 
the use of Pepper v Hart (1993) AC 593, Forbes J was able to refer to Hansard in order 
to express the ‘will and intention’ of Parliament in relation to the word ‘person’ in 
section 78F of the EPA.601 He stated that, ‘the term “person” must be read and construed 
in its proper context in accordance with Parliament’s intention, that this requires a 
construction that is not limited to normal concepts of strict legal personality.’602 
Following the High Court’s judgment the case was ‘leap-frogged’ to the House of 
Lords,603 where the High Court’s decision was overruled.604 The Law Lords believed 
that the High Court’s construction of the word ‘person’ for the purposes of section 78F 
was ‘nonsensical’.605 It was found that the statutory language used in section 78F did 
not warrant recourse to Hansard.606 Lord Scott of Foscote, who gave the leading 
judgment in the case, believed that the High Court’s decision made ‘a quite impossible 
construction to place on the uncomplicated and easily understandable statutory 
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language.’607 The House of Lords’ judgment stated that the ‘polluter should pay’ for 
causing or knowingly permitting contamination, although their Lordships did not agree 
that successors-in-title fell within the meaning of a Class A appropriate person.608 Thus, 
the appeal was allowed609 and the Agency’s decision was quashed.610 
Hart suggests that the reason why Forbes J may have been so eager to extend the 
boundaries of liability in the Transco case is because, ‘Issues of statutory succession 
would directly affect approximately 2000 gasworks, which are notorious for giving rise 
to serious contamination problems.’611 The costs associated with cleaning-up former 
gas works are usually high. Also, many of the sites are abandoned and the clean-up 
costs are quite often paid by the public sector. In Transco, Forbes J tried to shift the 
blame onto the statutory successor of the B&DG, the SCY&DGC and the EMGC, the 
original polluters. This was intended to place the burden of remediation costs onto the 
private sector. Forbes J’s decision shows a hint of the reasoning that was taken by the 
Eleventh Circuit Court in Fleet Factors II. If the House of Lords had not interpreted 
section 78F of EPA literally, overruling the High Court’s initial purposive 
interpretation, then this could have meant that Class A liability would have extended to 
persons that were not the original polluters. Lord Neuberger stated in his judgment, 
‘However, there are also arguments against extending the concept of “the polluter” 
beyond the original polluter, for instance to entities which happen to have acquired the 
whole or part of the business of a polluter.’612 Thornton also suggests that Transco, 
while not dealing with the issue directly, shows how the EA can include ‘property 
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developers within an initial group of potential class A appropriate persons’ as persons 
that knowingly permitted the pollution.613 Further to this Thornton suggests that a 
lender was originally included in the liability group as a knowingly permitter,614 but 
‘the Agency excluded the company on the basis the lender liability exclusion 
applied.’615 
4.1.4. The 6 Class A Exclusion Tests 
There are six tests that exclude Class A liability under Part IIA of the EPA.616 However, 
the exemptions should not be applied if all of the members of the liability group are 
excluded by applying the tests.617 The following six tests are applied sequentially: 
 Excluded Activities618  
  Payments for Remediation619 
 Sold with Information620  
                                                 
613 Thornton, ‘Contaminated land: the latest developments’ (n 38) 11. 
614 ibid, 13. 
615 ibid. 
616 Defra 2012 (n 21) paras 7.38 – 7.61. 
617 ibid, para 7.32(c). 
618 ibid, para 7.38 – 7.39. 
619 ibid, para 7.40:“The purpose of this test is to exclude from liability those who have already, in effect, 
met the irresponsibilities by making certain kinds of payment to some other member of the liability 
group, which would have been sufficient to pay for adequate remediation”. 
620 ibid, paras 7.46 – 7.50: As the name suggests, when someone who is a Class A appropriate person, 
because they have either caused or knowingly permitted the substances to be in, on or under the land, 
but has sold the land to a person, bone fide, with the information of the land’s presence of contamination 
then the liability for the contamination is left to the purchaser. 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
112 
 Changes to the Substances621 
  Escaped Substances622  
 Introduction of Pathways or Receptors623 
For the purposes of this thesis, only three tests will be analysed in any amount of depth. 
These exclusions are most likely to apply to lenders that deal with suspect land during 
the course of their commercial loan financing. The three exclusion tests are:  
4.1.4.1. ‘Excluded Activities’  
The guidance gives a number of circumstances in which a specific activity may be 
regarded as ‘excluded’ from the remit of Class A liability. The activities are, ‘ones 
which, in the Government’s view, carry such limited responsibility (if any) that 
exclusion would be justified.’624 The excluded activities include things such as, ‘the 
providing (or withholding) of financial assistance to another person (whether or not the 
other person is a member of the liability group).’625 This test is vitally important to 
banks. This is because the exemption does not say that a bank could never cause or 
knowingly permit pollution, but, rather, that insofar as this may result from providing 
or withholding finance, they have the benefit of the first exemption. Therefore, there is 
no absolute guarantee that a bank is excluded from liability.  
                                                 
621 ibid, paras 7.51 – 7.53. 
622 ibid, paras 7.45 – 7.56. 
623 ibid, paras 7.57 – 7.61. 
624 ibid, para 7.38. 
625 ibid, para 7.39(a). 
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4.1.4.2. ‘Sold with information’ 
Where, prior to the sale becoming legally binding, land is sold to a buyer at arms’ 
length, and the buyer is provided with information that makes them reasonably aware 
about the presence of contamination in, on or under the land, without any 
misrepresentation or fraud, then Class A liability will be excluded to the seller of that 
land.626 This exclusion only applies where the seller no longer retains interest or rights 
over the estate after the sale of the freehold estate or long lease.627 
4.1.4.3. ‘Introduction of pathways or receptors’ 
Paragraph 7.58 of the statutory guidance suggests that a person will be excluded where, 
‘The effect of later actions has been to introduce the pathway or receptor which form 
part of the significant contaminant linkage in question.’628 Thus, if the relevant action 
or omission of others causes the introduction of new pathways or receptors to land, and 
that action or omission causes a significant contaminant linkage to materialise, Test 6 
may be used as exclusion to Class A liability.629 The application of this test was 
evaluated in the Circular Facilities case, as above.630   
4.2. Class B Liability 
It is the case with many environmental laws that if the person that caused or knowingly 
permitted pollution cannot be found,631 liability will then be transferred to the current 
                                                 
626 ibid, para 7.47. 
627 Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen (n 28) 612. 
628 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 7.58(d). 
629 ibid, para 7.57. 
630 Circular Facilities (n 530).  
631 e.g. EPA 1990, ss 59 and 78F(4). See also, O’Donovan (n 63) 604.  
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owner or occupier of the land632 (i.e. Class B liability).633 Having a ‘registered charge’ 
(e.g. a mortgage) over property is unlikely to lead to Class B liability, since it ‘does not 
confer ownership on the mortgagee.’634  Westminster City Council v Haymarket 
Publishing [1981] 1 WLR 677 concerned whether a mortgagee that is not ‘in 
possession’ could be made liable under section 17A of the General Rate Act 1967 as 
the ‘person entitled to possession’. Lord Denning believed that unless a borrower took 
possession through the receipt of rents or by foreclosure, it could not be liable as the 
person that is entitled to possession.635 However, banks are capable of incurring liability 
for environmental damage as a ‘mortgagee in possession’ of environmentally suspect 
property.636 Upon a mortgagor’s default or when the mortgage money becomes due, 
there are two ways in which a mortgagee may ‘take possession’ of property;637 by the 
receipt of rents638 (i.e. the mortgagor’s equity of redemption)639 or by physically 
foreclosing the property.640 In relation to the receipt of rents Bowen LJ in Noyes v 
Pollock (1886) 32 Ch D 53 emphasised that merely taking rents is not enough to incur 
liability: ‘He may take rents; that is not enough unless he takes the rent in such a way 
to take upon himself, and out of the hands of the mortgagor, the business and duty of 
collecting and being diligent.’641 The power to possess property can be conferred by 
law or through an expressed provision in the mortgage deed.642 Section 101 of the Law 
of Property Act 1925 outlines the ‘powers incidental to estate or interest of 
                                                 
632 ibid. 
633 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 7.3(a). 
634 Southern Water Authority v Nature Conservancy Council [1992] 1 WLR 775. See also, O’Donovan 
(n 63) 605. 
635 Westminster City Council v Haymarket Publishing [1981] 1 WLR 677, 680 (Lord Denning). 
636 Hooley (n 52) 413.  
637 O’Donovan (n 63) 605. 
638 See, Noyes v Pollock (1886) 32 Ch D 53 (Bowen LJ). See also, Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 131.       
639 O’Donovan (n 63) 605. 
640 ibid, 553. 
641 Noyes (n 638) 64. 
642 ibid. 
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mortgagee’.643 Section 101(1)(i) confers a power upon mortgagees (as if it were written 
into the mortgage deed) allowing it to take possession and sell property when the 
mortgage money is due.644 A mortgagee or an agent of the mortgagee may also enter 
the property physically645 under specific provision of the mortgage deed.646 When 
borrowers default on their mortgage repayments, it is standard practice for a secured 
creditor to physically foreclose upon the estate in order to secure their investments.647 
Taking physical possession of property is the most likely way that a mortgagee will 
incur liability for remediation costs as a Class B appropriate person under Part IIA.648 
O’Donovan states that, ‘Foreclosure involves the extinguishment of the mortgagor’s 
equity of redemption, leaving the mortgagee as the absolute owner of the property.’649 
The common law has developed its own stance on what is meant by the phrase, ‘being 
in possession [or control]’ of property.650 Generally, a mortgagee in possession of the 
property is deemed to have sufficient ‘control’ to incur liability as an owner or 
occupier.651 This can be seen in a pre-Part IIA case. Following the foreclosure of a 
borrower’s contaminated property, Midland Bank was served with a remediation notice 
by the local authority, as it was identified as the occupier of the land. It was required to 
clean-up of over 13,000 contaminated tyres that were deposited on the land during its 
borrower’s ownership.652 It is important to make it clear that, in this case, Midland Bank 
                                                 
643 Law of Property Act 1925, s 101. 
644 ibid, s 101(1)(i). 
645 O’Donovan (n 63) 553. 
646 ibid. 
647 ibid. 
648 Egede and Lee (n 56) 876. 
649 O’Donovan (n 63) 605. 
650 Hooley (n 52) 413. 
651 See, Westminster City Council (n 635) 680 (Lord Denning); and Maguire v Leigh-on-Sea UDC (1906) 
95 LT 319. However cf Solomons v Gertzenstein [1954] 2 QB 243; and Midland Bank v Conway 1 WLR 
1165. 
652 Devonshire WRA v Roberts Warren & Snow (1995) 7 ELM 105. See also, R Lee, ‘Contaminated Land 
and Secured Lending: Midland Bank Clean Up’ (1995) 14(1) International Banking and Financial Law 
1. 
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was held liable under Part II of the EPA, which concerns offences relating to waste; 
this was not, therefore, a Part IIA case.  In order to assess Class B liability further, the 
individual terms of ‘owner’ and ‘occupier’ are discussed below.  
4.2.1. Liability as an ‘Owner’ 
The definition of the term ‘owner’, according to section 78A(9) of the EPA, is: 
‘a person (other than a mortgagee not in possession) who, whether in his 
own right or as trustee for any other person, is entitled to receive the rack 
rent of the land, or where the land is not let at a rack rent, would be so 
entitled if it were so let.’653   
After reviewing the American understanding of environmental lender liability, it is 
apparent that section 78A(9) of the EPA resembles the ‘secured-creditor’ exemption in 
42 U.S.C. section 9601(20)(a). This definition excludes ‘a person other than a 
mortgagee not in possession’ from being determined as a Class B appropriate person. 
This phrase was created to protect mortgagees. It means that if the bank does not take 
possession of its secured interests, it cannot be found liable for the remediation costs of 
contamination in, on or under land. While this definition of owner offers some 
protection to lenders, it does not represent a legally binding exemption for secured 
creditors as at 42 U.S.C. section 9601(20)(E) of CERCLA. The extent to which liability 
can attach to lenders by virtue of being a mortgagee in possession of land is so far 
undefined under Part IIA. For example, are there some activities that do not fall within 
                                                 
653 EPA 1990, s 78(9). 
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the definition’s exception? Hood suggests that, ‘Under English law, a difference 
between a charge and a mortgage is that the former does not require possession.’654 He 
goes on to state that:  
‘Whilst a floating charge under English law has been described as ‘a 
floating mortgage’, it is suggested that the exception created in the 
definition of ‘owner’ for a person other than a mortgagee not in possession, 
is not, on the face of it, wide enough to include a floating charge.’ 655  
Hood demonstrates that lenders are not totally free from Class B liability under Part 
IIA. There are some forms of ownership that do not fall within the meaning of a 
‘mortgagee not in possession’. Nevertheless, Part IIA liability can be prevented when 
recovering secured assets e.g. through the appointment of insolvency practitioners.656 
The next section looks at liability as an ‘occupier’ of land.  
4.2.2. Liability as an ‘Occupier’ 
The term ‘occupier’ is undefined within any section of the EPA 1990.657 However, there 
are a number of statutory and common law sources (e.g. the Occupiers’ Liability Act 
1957 and the tort of nuisance), which have attempted to shed light on the term’s 
meaning.658 To be classed as an occupier of land some sort of ‘possession or control’ is 
needed (see below). It is necessary, therefore, to look at a person’s degree of lawful 
                                                 
654 Hood (n 71) para 13.64. 
655 ibid, para 13.65. 
656 infra, ch 4. 
657 Hooley (n 52) 413. 
658 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 129. 
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assertion over the premises.659 Jarvis and Fordham categorise three different judicial 
approaches that have been used to analyse liability as an ‘occupier’.660 The different 
approaches derive largely from two cases.661 They describe the first category as ‘the 
anti-analogy principle’ (i.e. that the definition does not depend upon the perfect analogy 
of what an occupier must be, but instead must be decided on the facts of the particular 
case in question).662 This principle is based upon the approach that was taken by Lord 
Mustill in Southern Water Authority v Nature Conservancy Council [1992] 1 WLR 
775663 and by Lord Denning in the case of Wheat v E Lacon & Co. Ltd [1966] 1 All ER 
582.664 The second approach to what constitutes an ‘occupier’ is described as ‘the 
control approach’.665 This relies on the control and/or possession that a legal person has 
over the property.666 A classic example of the ‘control’ approach can be found in Wheat 
v Lacon,667 where the House of Lords had to decide whether two defendants could be 
described as ‘occupiers’ under the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. It was held that in 
order to be classed as an occupier under the Act of 1957, the defendant must have ‘a 
sufficient degree of control over the premises’.668 The case of Harris v Birkenhead 
[1976] 1 WLR 279 went further than Wheat v Lacon by suggesting that ‘possession’ 
can be found by showing that a person has a legal title to the property.669  Jarvis and 
Fordham label the final approach taken by the judiciary as ‘the comprehensive and 
                                                 
659 Marks (n 49) 16. 
660 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 145-155. 
661 ibid. Jarvis and Fordham use Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] 1 All ER 552 and Southern Water 
Authority (n 634) to describe the three approaches that the courts may use to identify occupation of 
property.  
662 ibid, 146-147. 
663 Southern Water Authority (n 634) 781 (Lord Mustill). 
664 Wheat (n 661) 577 (Lord Denning).  
665 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 148-149. 
666 ibid 149. Jarvis and Fordham outline the cases relating to the control approach, as: Wheat (n 661); R 
v Mogford [1970] 1 WLR 988; and R v Tao [1977] QB 141. 
667 Wheat (n 661). 
668 ibid, 578 (Lord Denning). See also, Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 148. 
669 Harris v Birkenhead [1976] 1 WLR 279. 
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stable relationship approach’.670 This approach was again developed from Lord 
Mustill’s judgment in Southern Water Authority v Nature Conservancy Council [1992] 
1 WLR 775.671 In Southern Water, his Lordship decided that the factor that determines 
whether a person is an occupier is whether they can be regarded as being in a 
‘comprehensive and stable relationship’ with the property.672 Now that the Part IIA 
regime’s liability has been considered, the chapter will go on to outline the system of 
remediation under the contaminated land regime. 
5. Remediation673 
Section 78A(7) of the EPA 1990 defines ‘remediation’ as:  
‘(a) the doing of anything for the purpose of assessing the condition of – (i) 
the contaminated land in question; or (ii) any controlled waters affected by 
that land; or (iii) any land adjoining or adjacent to that land; (b) the doing 
of any works, the carrying out of any operations or the taking of any steps 
in relation to any such land for the purpose – (i) of preventing or 
minimising, or remedying or mitigating the effects of, any significant harm 
(or significant pollution of controlled waters), by reason of which the 
contaminated land is such land; or (ii) of restoring the land or waters to their 
former state; or (c) the making of subsequent inspections from time to time 
                                                 
670 Southern Water Authority (n 634) 775. 
671 ibid. 
672 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 149. 
673 For a good outline of the remediation process under Part IIA see Lee, ‘Contaminated Land Regime: 
The Remediation Process’ (n 29).  
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for the purpose of keeping under review the condition of the land or waters.’ 
674 
After determination, the guidance recommends that the local authority should consider 
the necessary remediation that needs to be carried out on the land in order to remove 
the risks posed by contaminant linkages.675 A number of remediation techniques can be 
used on their own or sequentially,676 as long as it constitutes the Best Practicable 
Technique (‘BPT’) for cleaning-up the site.677 The statutory guidance says that: 
‘The broad aim of remediation should be:  
a) to remove identified significant contaminant linkages; and 
b) to take reasonable measures to remedy the harm or pollution that has 
been caused.’678 
Before serving a remediation notice section 78H(5)(a) – (d) of Part IIA should be 
considered by the enforcing authority.679 This section outlines circumstances where it 
is not necessary for the enforcing authority to serve a remediation notice: for example, 
‘if the authority is satisfied that appropriate things are being, or will be, done by way 
of remediation without the service of a remediation notice on that person.’680 The 
authority is also not obliged to serve a remediation notice where section 78N of the 
                                                 
674 EPA 1990, s 78A(7). See also, Defra 2012 (n 21) para. 6.1. 
675 Defra 2012 (n 21) para 6.3. 
676 ibid, paras 6.6 -6.7. 
677 ibid, para 6.22. 
678 ibid, para 6.5. 
679 EPA 1990, s 78H(5)(a)-(d). 
680 ibid, s 78H(5)(b). 
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EPA applies.681 Section 78N outlines the powers of the local authorities to carry out 
remediation.682 The authority can undertake remediation works and then recover the 
reasonable costs incurred from appropriate persons.683 This provision reflects the 
statutory powers of the US EPA under CERCLA. In order to recover costs, the authority 
must issue a ‘charging notice’ specifying the fee owed and the rate of interest.684 The 
charge may be paid either by instalments or in one lump sum.685 Like the remediation 
notice, a charging notice may be appealed within a period of twenty-one days of it being 
served.686 The county court that carries out the appeal may confirm the notice’s validity 
without modification, affirm the decision but with a modification or reject the decision 
completely.687 Local authorities must have regard to the ‘financial circumstances of 
those concerned’688 including under section 78P(2) of the EPA ‘to any hardship which 
the recovery may cause to the person from whom the cost is recoverable.’689 Before 
serving a remediation notice, ‘the enforcing authority shall reasonably endeavour to 
consult – (a) the person on whom the notice is to be served; (b) the owner of any land 
which the notice relates; (c) any person who appears to that authority to be in occupation 
of the whole or any part of the land; and (d) any person of such other description as 
may be prescribed.’690 The remediation notice highlights the required remedial action 
or remediation scheme for clean-up.691 It must also apportion the liability and apply the 
relevant exclusion tests that are available to limit liability.692 When a remediation notice 
                                                 
681 ibid, s 78H(5)(d). 
682 ibid, s 78N(1). 
683 ibid, s 78P(1). 
684 EPA 1990, s. 78P(5). 
685 ibid, s 78P(12). 
686 ibid, s 78P(8). 
687 ibid, s 78P(9), (a)-(c). 
688 EPA 1990, s 78P(2)(a); Defra 2012 (n 21), para 7.26. 
689 ibid. 
690 EPA 1990, s 78H(1)(a)-(d). 
691 Defra 2012 (n 21), para 6.3. 
692 EPA 1990, s 78E(1). 
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is served, the person that receives the notice reserves their statutory right to appeal the 
decision.693 Section 78L(1) of the EPA states that the appellate authority may either 
quash694 or affirm the remediation notice.695 Failure to comply with a remediation 
notice is a criminal offence.696 Prosecution upon summary conviction may lead to a fine 
not exceeding Level 5 on the standard scale.697 However, if the authority feels that a 
Level 5 fine would be an ‘ineffectual remedy’, the case may be taken to the High Court 
‘for the purposes of securing compliance with the remediation notice.’698 The local 
authority may also ask for a ‘remediation statement’.699 According to section 78H(7) of 
the EPA, the ‘remediation statement’ is used to record the progress of the remediation 
works.700 Section 78H(9) of the EPA states that if a remediation statement is ignored 
or completed insufficiently, the enforcing authority dealing with the site may recover 
costs from the person.701  
6. The Contaminated Land Regime and the System of Land Use 
Planning  
Planning permission is needed before any type ‘development’702 can take place.703 
Permission may be granted by, amongst other things, a development order704 or by a 
local planning authority (LPA)705 upon a successful application to the Secretary of State 
                                                 
693 ibid, s 78L. 
694 ibid, s 78L(1)(a). 
695 ibid, s 78L(1)(b). 
696 ibid, s 78M(1). 
697 ibid, s 78M(3). 
698 ibid, s 78M(6). 
699 ibid, s 78H(7). 
700 ibid, s 78H(7). See also, Lee, ‘Contaminated land - remediation and liabilities' (n 29) 172. 
701 EPA 1990, s 78H(8). 
702 Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 55. See also, Planning Act 2008, s 32. 
703 ibid, s 57. 
704 ibid, s 58(a). 
705 ibid, s 58(b). 
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for the Environment or LPA for the grant of planning permission.706 Any 
‘environmental effects’ that may stem from a development must be considered where 
the Secretary of State makes provision for such effects to be considered.707 Planning 
decisions are said to be ‘linked’ with environmental protection.708 Thornton, for 
instance, suggests that, ‘Environmental impact assessments (EIA)709 tend to be viewed 
as the cross-over point between environmental and planning law and are an important 
feature of planning control.’710 When dealing with a planning application LPAs must 
have regard to any ‘material considerations’ in the development plan.711 In Gateshead 
MBC v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] Env LR 37712 planning 
permission for a clinical waste incinerator was refused by the planning authority 
because of its potential to create environmental impacts. On appeal to the Secretary of 
State for the Environment, planning permission was granted on the basis that the 
Pollution Inspectorate would monitor the incinerator’s emissions. The legal issue for 
the court to determine was whether the Secretary of State was justified in delegating 
planning responsibilities to the Pollution Inspectorate. Glidewell LJ ruled that the 
Secretary of State was justified in assigning responsibility as it was within the 
Inspectorate’s powers to deal with the task given to it.713 Similarly, in Newport County 
Borough Council v Secretary of State for Wales & Browning Ferris Environmental 
                                                 
706 ibid, s 62. 
707 ibid, s 71A; NPPF (n 4) paras 109 – 125. 
708 J Thornton, ‘“Mind the gap”: a note on the boundaries between environmental and planning law’ 
(2008) 5 JPL 609. 
709 Council Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects 
on the environment (EIA Directive) [1985] OJ L 175, 40-48 as amended by 97/11/EC and 2003/35/EC. 
See also, Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (England and Wales) 
Regulations, SI 1999/293. 
710 Thornton, ‘“Mind the gap”’ (n 708) 612. 
711 TCPA 1990, s 70(2); s 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (PCPA) 2004. See also, 
NPPF (n 4) 27.  
712 Gateshead MBC v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] Env LR 37. See also R v Bolton 
MBC ex p Kirkman [1998] Env LR 719. See also, Thornton ‘“Mind the gap”’ (n 708) 10.  
713 ibid, 50 (Glidewell LJ). See also, Newport County Borough Council v Secretary of State for Wales & 
Browning Ferris Environmental Services Limited [1998] JPL 377.  
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Services Limited [1998] JPL 377714 Hutchison and Aldous LJs held that refusal for 
planning permission must be objectively justified and therefore decided against an 
inspector’s decision to refuse planning permission for a chemical treatment works 
because of a ‘genuine public perception of danger’.715 However, in Hopkins 
Developments Ltd v First Secretary of State [2006] EWHC 2823 the court ruled in 
favour of an inspector’s decision to refuse planning permission for a concrete plant on 
the grounds that the dust generated from the plant would be an inappropriate use of the 
land.716 Thornton suggests that the reason why this decision may have been different 
from Gateshead MBC is, ‘explained by the fact that the concern in question related to 
dust, which is a less specialised environmental issue than air quality.’717 
The planning system has been so successful in enforcing contaminated land clean-up 
that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether Part IIA or the planning system is 
the primary mechanism for driving contaminated land remediation.718 Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that what has been achieved through planning and voluntary 
remediation has been assisted by the fallback powers of local authorities to use Part 
IIA.  The planning policy guidance has recently been subject to revision. Planning 
Policy Statement 23 (PPS 23)719 (now revoked) used to complement the Part IIA regime 
by seeking to achieve the contaminated land regime’s objectives through land use 
planning. PPS 23 allowed the discovery of contamination on a development site in 
England to be categorised as a ‘material planning consideration’, and thereby subject 
                                                 
714 Newport (n 713). 
715 ibid, 181 (Hutchinson LJ) and 184 (Aldous LJ). cf the dissenting judgment of Staughton LJ. 
716 Hopkins Developments Ltd v First Secretary of State [2007] Env LR 14, 15 (Mr George Bartlett QC). 
717 Thornton, ‘“Mind the gap”’ (n 708) 611. 
718 See M Purdue, ‘The Relationship between Development Control and Specialist Pollution Controls: 
Which is the tail and which the dog?’ [1999] JPL 585. 
719 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, ‘Planning Policy Statement 23: Planning and Pollution Control’ 
(ODPM 2004). 
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to remediation through the planning system.720 Lenders should be aware that PPS 23 
has now been consolidated into the newly created National Planning Policy Framework 
(NPPF), as is the case with the other Policy Statements (PSs) on planning. The draft 
NPPF was a topic of much contention. Ecological and political activists saw it as a 
possible threat to the protection of England’s rural countryside. When introduced two 
years ago, the NPPF replaced the one-thousand four-hundred pages of planning 
guidance with one consolidated document of fifty-eight pages. In accordance with the 
NPPF, local people and their accountable councils can ‘produce their own distinctive 
local and neighbourhood plans, which reflect the needs and priorities of their local 
communities.’721 In relation to contaminated land, paragraph 121 of the NPPF states: 
‘after remediation as a minimum, land should not be capable of being 
determined as contaminated land under Part IIA of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990;’722  
Considering the fact that the Government’s core policies and principles concerning land 
pollution and planning were once outlined in an entire planning policy guidance (PPS 
23), paragraph 121 provides little assurance that the new Framework will be more 
effective at identifying and remediating land that is affected by contamination. Through 
the NPPF the Government’s needs are served. It is clearly evident that sustainability 
has been replaced by economic considerations. For example, the ‘presumption in favour 
of sustainable development’ at paragraph 14 of the NPPF is contentious and may be 
accused of putting England’s green spaces at risk of development. Since 2012 there 
                                                 
720 ibid. See also, Gateshead (n 712). 
721 NPPF (n 4), para 1. 
722 ibid, para 121. 
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have been a number of cases regarding the application of paragraph 14. In William 
Davis Ltd v SSCLG [2013] EWHC 3058 (Admin) Lang J held that paragraph 14 of the 
NPPF only applies to sustainable development,723 since, ‘It would be contrary to the 
fundamental principles of NPFF if the presumption in favour of development in 
paragraph 14 applied equally to sustainable and non-sustainable development.’724 
However, Lang J’s decision was recently rejected by the Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government,725 who stated that ‘the weight of High Court 
authority runs contrary to Lang J’s view.’726 By refusing to follow William Davis Ltd’s 
interpretation of paragraph 14 ‘more than 1,000 homes’727 will now be built in 
Droitwich. What is more distressing is that since the NPPF was introduced, ‘Only a 
minority of (27%) local authorities outside London are setting local targets for the re-
use of brownfield land in their area.’728 There is also uncertainty as to the impact that 
the Localism Act 2011729 will have upon the new planning framework. The Localism 
Act 2011 removes regional strategies,730 allowing new rights and powers to be 
localised.731 For example, there is now a community right to challenge planning 
                                                 
723 William Davis Ltd v SSCLG [2013] EWHC 3058 (Admin) para 37 (Lang J). 
724 ibid. 
725 H Stephens, Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (The Planning 
Inspectorate, 6 June 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/328158/Recovered_ap
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n_DC___refs2199085_and_2199426__2_July_2014_.pdf> accessed 11 September 2014. 
726 ibid, para 3.31. See, Stratford on Avon District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government [2013] EWHC 2074 (Admin); Tewkesbury Borough Council v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government and others [2013] EWHC 286 (Admin); and Anita Colman v 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and others [2013] EWHC 1138 (Admin). 
727 C Bywater, ‘Droitwich appeals: uncertainty over the presumption in favour of sustainable 
development’ (Lexology, 24 July 2014) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6e5e8b37-
a88b-4914-98b5-158b87d061b9> accessed 11 September 2014.  
728 Campaign to Protect Rural England, ‘Community Control or Countryside Chaos? The effect of the 
National Planning Policy Framework two years on’ (CPRE, March 2014) 18 
<file:///C:/Users/Lloyd/Downloads/NPPF_two_years_on.pdf> accessed11 September 2014.  
729 Localism Act 2011. 
730 ibid, s 109. 
731 ibid, pt 5. See also, Department for Communities and Local Government, A plain English guide to 
the Localism Act (DCLG, November 2011) 8. 
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decisions.732 Despite having more powers, there is uncertainty as to how LPAs should 
exercise their new responsibilities.733 As discussed in Chapter 1, removing regional 
government may be harmful for sustainable development in England’s regions.734 As 
with Part IIA, the recent changes to the system of land use planning show how the 
Coalition Government has created policy to encourage short-term economic gains, 
allowing the wrong type of property development to take place.  
7. The Success of the Contaminated Land Regime  
This section evaluates the success of the contaminated land regime so far. It provides 
an essential link to later chapters, explaining why lenders consider direct lender liability 
to be low risk to their commercial loan financing. Measuring the success of the regime 
is difficult because the exact amount of contaminated land in need of remediation is 
currently unknown. Nevertheless, the EA is placed under a statutory requirement to 
‘prepare and publish reports on the state of contaminated land.’735 The contaminated 
land regime’s progress was first outlined in 2002 by the EA.736 However, a more up-
to-date account of Part IIA’s success was released by the EA in 2009. Reporting the 
Evidence (2009)737 evaluates the progress of Part IIA from its implementation on 1 
April 2000 up to 31 March 2007.738 By 2007, 781 contaminated sites (which included 
35 ‘special sites’) had been determined and inspected by local authorities throughout 
England and Wales.739 Of the 781 sites determined, the 2009 report states that only 144 
                                                 
732 ibid. 
733 See, Tewkesbury (n 726), paras 49-52 (Males J); and R (Daws Hill Neighbourhood Forum) v Wycombe 
District Council and others [2013] EWHC 513 (Admin). 
734 infra, ch 1, pg 31. 
735 EPA 1990, s 78U. 
736 Environment Agency, Dealing with contaminated land in England (n 348).  
737 Environment Agency, Reporting the Evidence (n 16). 
738 ibid 1. 
739 ibid 8.  
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have been fully remediated.740 The fact that only 144 sites have been remediated out of 
a total of 781 is unsurprising since the remediation of contaminated land can be 
expensive. In March 2007, total remediation was priced at £20.5 million, amounting to 
an average payment of around £250,000 per hectare of remediation undertaken.741 The 
2009 Report shows that land contamination is being dealt with primarily through the 
system of land use planning and voluntary remediation.742 Nevertheless, according to 
the Report, only around ten per cent of all contaminated land determinations were 
remediated under the Part IIA regime.743 Also up until March 2007 local authorities had 
only averaged a ten per cent inspection rate for their areas;744 this figure is much lower 
than expected.745 In their interview, Respondent 3 suggested that the reason why Part 
IIA has made so few determinations is because of the ineffective resource allocation 
amongst the regime’s regulators. Their excerpt from the interview follows:  
R3: Absolutely… you know… and I think… to be honest… part of the 
problem is the regulators, like the EA are often in quite a weak position. It 
is actually a big deal for them to get approval internally to enforce some of 
these laws because it costs the Agency money and the outcome is not 
certain. They could lose the case, or, for whatever reason, they could put 
money into trying to prosecute it and they may come off worse. There’s [sic] 
so many other things they could be prosecuting, which are like “slam dunk” 
cases… you know… they know they’ll get convictions… they could go after 
                                                 
740 ibid 14. 
741 Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Welsh Assembly, Summary of the responses 
to the consultation on changes to the Contaminated Land Regime under Part 2A of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990: 21 December 2010 - 15 March 2011 (Defra and WA, 2010). 
742 Environment Agency, Reporting the Evidence (n 16) 3. 
743 ibid 5. 
744 ibid. 
745 ibid. 
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the easy ones, or they could go after one where there’s no precedent and 
they might get their fingers burnt. And the EA these days, with all the cut 
backs, is under a lot of budgetary pressure. So I’m sure that, internally, it’s 
quite difficult for EA inspectors to get approval to proceed with the legal 
cases; and I think that is a lot of the reason why some of these theoretical 
exposures never materialise because it’s the Regulator that has to drive it; 
and it will either be… you know… the EA for special sites, or it’ll be the 
local authorities. And the local authorities are even in a worse position 
because they don’t have: (a) the technical competence internally to actually 
form a judgment on whether or not they have a good case; (b) they don’t 
have money to put it into consultancy to get the data they need to actually 
decide if there is a significant threat of significant harm; and (c) they have 
even less money to actually launch a legal challenge against some quite big 
organisations, potentially. So the law’s there and probably the 
environmental contamination situations are there, but there’s no push from 
the regulators to actually force through these. I think that in the US it is 
completely different… you know… because people will force through an 
opportunity to make money and they will use whatever means they can to 
get lawyers in. 746 
This interview extract confirms the regulators’ ‘weak position’ to enforce the 
contaminated land regime. It ties in with the economic overview given in Chapter 1.747 
That chapter showed that, in a period of austerity, the identification and remediation of 
contaminated land has been severely affected by the Coalition Government’s reduce 
                                                 
746 Interview with Respondent 3. 
747 Refer to ch 1, pp 25-38. 
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red tape initiative, and cuts in public sector funding. Local authorities and the 
Environment Agency are often unable to carry out their objectives under the regulatory 
regime because they lack the necessary financial support that is required to inspect a 
site for the presence of contamination in, on or under the land. Phase II risk 
assessment748 takes time, and, depending upon the site, can come at a considerable cost. 
Phase II work is inevitably going to be impacted by the recent changes that have been 
made to contaminated land policy. Ultimately, the regulators’ position has been 
significantly affected by the current Government’s initiatives for securing short-term 
economic growth in an age of austerity.     
III. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has outlined, in detail, the regulatory regime for identifying 
and remediating historic contaminated land in the UK. The chapter began with an 
analysis of CERCLA, which was brought into force to deal with the US’s abandoned 
hazardous waste sites. Both the pre- and post-1996 interpretations of the ‘secured 
creditor exemption’ were discussed. It is clear that the American banks’ experience of 
lender liability under CERCLA is not be the same as Part IIA and UK lenders. 
Nevertheless, it was necessary to write about CERCLA in this chapter. The US 
experience of lender liability in the 1980s was mentioned, on several occasions, in the 
interview data, and in the interests of clarity, a brief overview of CERCLA was 
required. Following an evaluation of CERCLA, the chapter then went on to assess the 
situation in the UK. In order to analyse the current direct lender liability threat to UK 
banks, it was essential to outline the contaminated land regime under Part IIA of the 
                                                 
748 infra, ch 6, pg 266. 
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EPA. Such a detailed consideration of Part IIA is important, as this chapter provides an 
important grounding for later discussion of the interview data. The next chapter 
(Chapter 3) looks at a number of other laws that are designed to regulate land and water 
pollution.      
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Chapter 3:  
Lender Liability, Current Pollution and Emerging Risks 
  
There are a number of ‘overlapping controls’749 for the prevention and remediation of 
land pollution. For example, Tromans states that: 
‘ … there is plenty in existing and proposed environmental law, both in case 
law and statute, to give the banking and lending industry cause to sit back, 
think hard, and perhaps revise some of its traditional attitudes as to the 
relevance of environmental matters.’ 750 
This chapter (Chapter 3) reviews the miscellaneous bodies of law that pose a risk to 
lenders. As with Chapter 2, this chapter relates to the part of the overarching research 
question which concerns how the banks’ perceptions of the threat of lender liability, as 
well as the other environmental risks, have changed over the last twenty-five years. It 
does this by outlining the statutory and common laws governing current land pollution 
issues, and demonstrating the low lender liability risk that presently exists. The chapter 
is also, therefore, highly relevant for answering sub-question 1, point 1, as that question 
evaluates the extent to which environmental legislation poses a ‘real risk’ for banks. 
The ‘common law sources’ that are evaluated, include: 
 Nuisance 
                                                 
749 Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen (n 28) 586. 
750 Tromans (n 71) 433. 
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 The rule in Rylands v Fletcher751  
 Negligence 
Following an analysis of the ‘toxic torts’, the chapter then outlines national, statutory 
sources of law that regulate activities on land, and may create environment-related risks 
for lenders. The statutory laws analysed include: 
 Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009752 
 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010753 
 Part II of the EPA 1990754 
 Part III of the EPA 1990755 
 Water Resources Act 1991756 
 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981757 
To conclude, this chapter presents the ‘emerging environmental risks’ for banks 
according to the unique insights of the banking respondents. Thus, sub-question 1, point 
                                                 
751 John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v Thomas Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330.  
752 Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/153. 
753 Environmental Permitting (England & Wales) Regulations (EPR) 2010, SI 2010/675. 
754 Environmental Protection Act 1990, pt II. 
755 ibid, pt III. 
756 Water Resources Act 1991. 
757 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. 
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3 also links into this chapter; the legal analysis shows that the emphasis of 
environmental risk management in banks is changing – issues surrounding land 
pollution are gradually being replaced by other, more pressing concerns.  
I. The Common Law 
The common law may be used as a way to remedy a site subject to contamination. This 
section of the chapter provides an overview of nuisance and negligence (the ‘toxic 
torts’), looking at how the torts apply in the environmental context.  
A. Nuisance  
In the nineteenth century, nuisance was used to respond to the increasing pollution that 
was generated as a by-product of the burgeoning industrial activity undertaken during 
that period.758 As a result, it has now become an established environmental remedy.759 
Ultimately, the tort of nuisance is a balancing act that attempts to assess the property 
rights that exist between two parties by applying the legal maxim of sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas.760 The classic vignette used to illustrate this type of tortious action 
in an environmental legal claim is where a factory has emitted a noxious vapour into 
the ambient air, and that act then affects a neighbouring residential area.761 Thus, a 
nuisance related action demands the court to weigh up Party A’s ability to reasonably 
                                                 
758 See, JF Brenner, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution’ (1974) 3 J Leg Stud 403-408; and JPS 
McLaren, ‘Nuisance law and the industrial revolution – some lessons from social history’ (1983) 3(2) 
OJLS 155. 
759 WVH Rogers (ed), Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (18th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2010).  
760 Martin (n 514) 432. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas is translated into, ‘So use your own property 
as not to injure your neighbour’s.’  
761 See, The Directors, etc. of the St Helen’s Smelting Company v William Tipping [1865] 11 ER 1483. 
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utilise his or her land, with Party B’s right to protect and enjoy the land to which they 
hold title.762 The law of nuisance is currently in a state of uncertainty. The traditional 
land lawyer might argue that the common law of nuisance has lost the conventional, 
medieval values that it once possessed.763 However, the boundaries of nuisance have 
become blurred by the encroachment of negligence and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 
Brenner states that nuisance has been skewed by judicial activity in the nineteenth 
century, where industrial expansion and economic influences reduced the use of 
‘environmental torts’ by the judiciary.764   
Newark considers that nuisance is a purely proprietary based tort. He believes that the 
‘boundaries’ of nuisance should be limited only to persons with a legal interest to the 
property being affected by the nuisance. On the other hand Lee suggests that private 
nuisance can be categorised into three groups: (1) a fault-based tort (overlaps with 
negligence in cases involving third party damage and Acts of God); (2) strict liability;765 
and (3) amenity harm. 766 She believes that the ‘classic’ nuisance case is one that deals 
with ‘amenity’ problems, i.e. ‘an interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.’ 
Despite the recent dissention that has occurred within this area, things have swung back 
in Newark’s direction.  
                                                 
762 Ronald Coase, the environmental economist, used toxic tort cases to advance his thesis on social cost. 
Read, R Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. For an 
alternative theory to Coase theorem, see, AC Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th edn, London, 
Macmillian and Co 1920). See also, D Campbell, ‘Of Coase and Corn: A (Sort of) Defence of Private 
Nuisance’ (2000) 63(2) MLR 197-215. 
763 FH Newark, ‘The Boundaries of Nuisance’ (1949) 65 LQR 480.  
764 Brenner (n 758) 403. 
765 Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather [1994] 1 All ER. 
766 M Lee, ‘What is private nuisance?’ (2003) LQR 298. 
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Common law nuisance is also being undermined by the codification of this field of law 
into the EPA 1990.767 There are currently four different types of nuisance that may pose 
a risk to land: (1) private nuisance; (2) public nuisance; (3) statutory nuisance; and (4) 
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher.768 As this section of the thesis outlines common law 
nuisance, statutory nuisance is evaluated with the statutory sources.  
1. Private Nuisance 
A private nuisance can be described as, ‘an unlawful interference with a person’s use 
or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it.’769 Case law suggests 
that a private nuisance can exist in three forms: (1) encroachment on a neighbour’s 
land; (2) direct physical injury to the land; and (3) interference with the enjoyment of 
the land (also known as ‘amenity’ or ‘sensibility’ cases).770 Judicial interpretation has 
suggested that the types of interferences that fit within these categories are ‘protean’ in 
nature. In Sedleigh-Denfield v O’ Callaghan et al. [1940] AC 880, Lord Wright states 
that, ‘It is impossible to give any precise or universal formula, but it may be broadly 
said that a useful test is perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of 
mankind living in society… The forms which nuisance may take are protean.’ 771  
 
Environmentally damaging activities in a claim for private nuisance can include such 
things as: noxious smells and gaseous vapours,772 encroaching vegetation,773 
                                                 
767 EPA 1990, pt III. 
768 Rylands (n 751). 
769 Read v Lyons [1945] KB 216, 236. 
770 See, St Helen’s (n 761) and Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] UKHL 14. 
771 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’ Callaghan et al [1940] AC 880, 903 (Lord Wright). 
772 Some examples of smells and gases being categorised as a nuisance are: Aldred’s case, 77 Eng Rep 
816, 9 Co. Rep 576 (KB 1611); Bliss v Hall (1838) 4 Bing NC 183; Walter v Selfe (1852) 19 LTOS 308; 
Bamford v Turnley [1962] 3 B&S 67; St Helen’s (n 761); and Dennis v MoD [2003] Env LR 34. 
773 Solloway v Hampshire County Council (1981) 79 LGR 449. 
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vibrations,774 water pollution775 and flooding,776 oil pollution,777 and damage by both 
dust778 and silt,779 etc.780 It is worth mentioning here that two recent decisions 
concerning group litigation for substantial and unreasonable interference with property 
may have established a precedent for further group actions to be taken in private 
nuisance.781 Private nuisance has also recently been considered in the Coventry v 
Lawrence (2014) case,782 which is discussed in the common law remedies section later 
on in this chapter.783  It is necessary to look at the areas of nuisance that may become a 
concern for lenders during their loan financing. This section focuses primarily on the 
liability that can be incurred under the triggers of ‘causing’, and ‘continuing’ and 
‘adopting’ a nuisance.  
 
With regards to causing a nuisance, the activity creating the nuisance needs to be 
unreasonable, and interfere with a person’s interest to land.784 Damage  to land is an 
important consideration for the court to assess when determining the land’s 
reasonableness of use.785 The damage in question must affect a proprietary interest to 
                                                 
774 Rushmer v Polsue & Alfieri Ltd (1906) Ch D 234); and Halsey v Esso Petroleum [1961] 1 WLR 683. 
775 Cambridge Water (n 765). 
776 Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd. [2003] UKHL 66. 
777 Halsey (n  774) 683. 
778 Hunter (n 770) 14. 
779 Jan de Nul Products UK (Ltd) v AXA Royal Belge SA [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 583. 
780 Rogers (n 759), ch 14. 
781 Barr & Ors v Biffa Waste Services (2011) EWHC 1003 (TCC); (2012) EWCA Civ 312; and Anslow 
v Norton Aluminium Ltd (2012) EWHC 2610. See also, R Lee, ‘Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd – 
Environmental permits as a defence in nuisance (Eric-group, 13 September 2011) 
<http://www.ericgroup.co.uk/environmental_regulation_story.php?content_id=265> accessed 12 June 
2013. 
782 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2011] EWHC 360 (QB); [2012] EWCA Civ 26; [2014] 
UKSC 13; [2014] UKSC 46. 
783 infra, pg 149. 
784 Read (n 769) 236. 
785 Merlin v British Nuclear Fuels plc [1990] 2 QB 557; Blue Circle Industries plc v Ministry of Defence 
[1998] 2 All ER 385; and Magnohard Ltd v United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) [2004] 
Env LR 19. See also, Coventry and others (Respondents) v Lawrence and another (Appellants) [2014] 
UKSC 13 (Lord Neuberger). 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
138 
the land,786 and, when making its determination, the court will take the character and 
locality of the area, in which the interference takes place, into consideration. In St 
Helen’s Smelting Company v William Tipping [1865] UKHL J81,787 Lord Westbury LC 
suggested that a nuisance is dependent ‘greatly on the circumstances of the place where 
the thing complained of actually occurs.’ 788  Similarly, in Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 
LR 11 Ch D 852789 the court held that the locality’s particular character can be taken 
into account when deciding whether activities on the land are “reasonable”. Thesiger 
LJ famously said that, ‘What would be a Nuisance in Belgravia Square would not 
necessarily be so in Bermondsey.’790 As well as the locality in which the nuisance takes 
place, judicial reasoning has also shown that the extent and duration of a nuisance are 
also relevant. Consequently the duration of the interfering event must be continual in 
its effect; 791  however there have been exceptions to this general requirement.792  
 
It is highly unlikely that a lender would be found liable for actually causing a nuisance; 
this is because of the banks’ distant role as a loan financier. Lender liability may, 
however, attach to a lender that ‘continues’ or ‘adopts’ a nuisance. For example, 
liability may materialise for a lender that owns or occupies property that creates a 
nuisance. In a nuisance related action, the law states that it is the occupier’s duty to 
protect their land from interfering with neighbouring properties. This is an axiom based 
upon the principle outlined in the case of Leakey and Others v National Trust for Places 
                                                 
786 Read (n 763); Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141; Hunter (n 770) 684; cf. Khorasandjian v Bush 
[1993] QB 727. 
787 St Helen’s (n 761) 81. 
788 ibid (Lord Westbury LC). cf Rushmer (n 774); and Coventry 2014 (n 785). 
789 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) LR 11 Ch D 852. 
790 ibid (Thesiger LJ). 
791 See Bolton v Stone [1951] 1 All ER 1078; and De Keyser’s Royal Hotel v Spicer Bros. Ltd (1914) 30 
TLR 257).   
792 See British Celenese Ltd v AH Hunt (Capacitors) (1969) 2 All ER 1253; Thompson-Schwab v Costaki 
[1956] 1 All ER 652; and Colour Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK plc [2009] EWHC 540 (Comm). 
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of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1980] QB 485.793 In Leakey, the National Trust 
(i.e. the landowner) knew that their land, a large mound, was unstable and threatened 
neighbouring properties.794 The neighbours alerted the landowner to the danger, 
following a number of minor falls.795 It did not take responsibility for the land, and, 
after a dry summer, a large land slide occurred, causing damage to the neighbouring 
properties.796 Proceedings were brought in nuisance for an order for abatement and 
damages.797 The Court of Appeal held that an owner or occupier has a duty ‘to do that 
which is reasonable798 in all the circumstances’799 to prevent the risk of injury or 
damage.800 Megaw LJ stated, ‘On the facts of the present case, the defendants had 
knowledge. They failed to take reasonable steps to bring the nuisance to an end.’801  
 
Case law has shown that the Leakey principle can apply to flooding caused by the 
natural movement of water, and that a person’s responsibility for preventing flooding 
is of a continuous nature.802 As a result of the Leakey principle, the historic attitude 
towards flooding has now changed. In accordance with land drainage rights it is 
generally accepted that a person upon higher ground has no duty to provide water to 
any properties situated below.803 However, if a property upon higher ground 
                                                 
793 Leakey and Others v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1980] QB 485. 
Affirmed by the Privy Council’s decision in Goldman v Hargrave [1967] AC 645. 
794 ibid, 485. 
795 ibid. 
796 ibid. 
797 ibid, 486. 
798 For further reference to what the judiciary have determined as “reasonable” within all the 
circumstances, see, Wandsworth London Borough Council v Railtrack plc [2001] Env LR 441; Green v 
Somerleton [2003] EWCA Civ 198; and Marcic (n 776) 25. 
799 Leakey (n 793) 524 (Megaw LJ) and Goldman (n 793). See also, Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen (n 
28) 372. 
800 Leakey (n 793) 489. 
801 ibid, 498.  
802 See, Pemberton v Bright [1960] 1 All ER 792; and Bybrook Barn Garden Centre Ltd v Kent County 
Council [2001] BLR 55 
803 M Barlow, ‘Legal Responsibility for Flooding’ (4th CIWEM Annual Conference “Emerging 
Environmental Issues and Future Challenges”, 12-14 Sept 2006). 
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‘intentionally’ or ‘unreasonably’ causes flooding to the lower plains, the owner(s) of 
the land will be unable to apply the common enemy principle, and could be made liable 
under the Leakey principle through an action in private nuisance.804 Cole defines the 
common enemy principle or rule as, ‘Specifically, the common enemy doctrine permits 
landowners to alter surface water flows with impunity for resulting damages to 
neighbouring properties.’805   
 
The Leakey principle leads to the so-called ‘measured duty of care’ rule, which 
originates from the case of Goldman v Hargrave [1967] AC 645.806 This rule refers to 
the situation where an owner of property has not caused the nuisance, but, nonetheless, 
has knowledge807 of it, and fails to do all that is reasonable in order to abate it.808 
Owners and occupiers of land have a duty to keep their property in a way that it will 
not harm others.809 In the opening paragraph of Sedleigh Denfield v O’Callaghan 
[1940] AC 880,810 it states that: 
‘An occupier of land ‘continues’ a nuisance if, with knowledge or presumed 
knowledge of its existence, he fails to take reasonable means to bring it to 
                                                 
804 See, Whalley v Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co (1884) 7 CB 515; and Greenock Corp. v 
Caledonian Railway Co [1917] AC 556. 
805 DH Cole, ‘Liability Rules For Surface Water Drainage: A Simple Economic Analysis’ (1990) 12(1) 
Geo Mason UL Rev 35 
<http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1863&context=facpub> accessed 
11 June 2014. For a UK case relating to this issue, see, Arscott v The Coal Authority [2005] Env L Rev 
6, 27. 
806 Goldman (n 793). 
807 cf the dissenting judgment in Job Edwards Ltd v The Company of Proprietors of the Birmingham 
Navigations [1924] 1 KB 341, 353-362 (Scrutton LJ).  
808 D Quinn, ‘Measuring the “measured duty” in a nuisance claim’ (Lyons Davidson Solicitors, 14 
November 2012) <http://www.lyonsdavidson.co.uk/news/3555/measuring-the-measured-duty> 
accessed 20 November 2013. 
809 Leakey (n 793); Holbeck Hall Hotel v Scarborough Borough Council [2000] 2 All ER 705. 
810  Sedleigh-Denfield (n 771) 880. 
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an end when he has ample time to do so; and he ‘adopts’ it if he makes any 
use of the erection or artificial structure which constitutes the nuisance.’ 811  
In Sedleigh’s case, a trespasser placed a pipe for carrying off rainwater upon an 
occupier’s land without their knowledge or consent.812 However, the occupier of the 
land became aware of the pipe through their servants.813 On becoming aware of its 
existence, the occupier continued to use the pipe, and a grill was fitted to prevent leaves 
blocking the conduit during times of heavy rainfall.814 Subsequently, the grill caused a 
blockage, and allowed the inundation of water upon a neighbour’s property.815 The 
House of Lords held that the respondents had knowledge of the pipe on their land, and 
were responsible for the damage caused.816 Lord Atkin stated that, ‘It seems to me clear 
that if a man permits an offensive thing on his premises to continue to offend, that is if 
he knows that it is operating offensively, is able to prevent it and omits to prevent it he 
is permitting the nuisance to continue; in other words he is continuing it.’817 The ratio 
in Sedleigh Denfield was recently followed in the case of Octavia Hill Housing Trust v 
Brumby [2010] EWHC 1793 (QB).818 In that case Mackay J allowed a claim in nuisance 
against a landlord that possessed a constructive knowledge of nuisance and failed to 
abate the interference from occurring.819  
                                                 
811 ibid. 
812 ibid. 
813 ibid. 
814 ibid. 
815 ibid. 
816 ibid, para 897 (Lord Atkin).  
817 ibid. 
818 Octavia Hill Housing Trust v Brumby [2010] EWHC 1793 (QB) (Mackay J). 
819 ibid, para 16 (Mackay J). 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
142 
In the environmental context, the measured duty rule was considered in the case of 
Anthony and Others v The Coal Authority [2005] EWHC 1654 (QB).820 Anthony 
concerned a burning coal tip, which was ablaze for a period of three years, and 
unreasonably affected a neighbouring community’s use and enjoyment of their land, as 
well as reducing visibility on the M4 motorway.821 The court in Anthony held that the 
Coal Authority had ‘failed in the circumstances to take reasonable steps to abate the 
nuisance’,822 and was liable in private nuisance.823 Case law concerning the measured 
duty of care may be especially relevant for lenders, because it is possible for a bank to 
own suspect land that causes interference with neighbouring properties. Even if the 
bank did not create the nuisance that causes the interference, if it has knowledge of the 
harm that has or is being caused, and has taken possession of the property, it has a duty 
to reasonably prevent or abate the nuisance, or face liability by being in breach of the 
measured duty rule. Similarly, where an injunction to abate a nuisance and/or an order 
for damages is served on a company who has a loan from a bank, indirect and 
reputational risks may be created for the lender. For instance, an injunction may restrict 
a borrower’s business operations etc., resulting in credit risk for the bank (see ‘Common 
Law Remedies’ section).  
2. Public Nuisance 
                                                 
820 Anthony and Ors v The Coal Authority [2005] EWHC 1654 (QB). 
821 ibid, paras 2-8 (Pitchford J). For an overview of this case, see: R Lee, ‘Case Study – Brynlliw Colliery: 
Anthony & Ors v Coal Authority’ (Eric-group, no date) 
<http://www.environmentlaw.org.uk/rte.asp?id=44> accessed 20 November 2013. See also, ‘Families 
win fire tip legal fight’ (BBC News, 11 August 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/south_west/4141926.stm> accessed 20 November 2013. 
822 Anthony (n 820), para 162 (Pitchford J). 
823 ibid, paras 163-167 (Pitchford J). 
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Public nuisance can exist as both a criminal offence824 brought under a relator action 
by the Attorney General, or as a tort action by a number of individuals who have 
suffered damage. The standard definition of a public nuisance can be found in the 
judgments of Romer and Denning LLJs in the case of the Attorney-General v PYA 
Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169. Denning LJ, as he was then called, suggested that: 
‘The classic statement of the difference is that a public nuisance affects Her 
Majesty’s subjects generally, whereas a private nuisance only affects 
particular individuals … [and] … is so widespread in its range or so 
indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be reasonable to expect one 
person to take proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it, but 
that it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at large.’825 
Public nuisance can allow liability to be allocated even where the claimant has no 
private right to the land. It is noteworthy that in the Corby Litigation case, whether a 
person with no legal right to the land could be made liable was a point that was left 
open by the court in an action preliminary to the main case.826 As with private nuisance, 
in order for a claim to be actionable in public nuisance, the damage must be ‘reasonably 
                                                 
824 Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2012) ch 31, para 
31-40:‘Public nuisance is an offence at common law. A person is guilty of a public nuisance (also known 
as common nuisance), who (a) does an act not warranted by law, or (b) omits to discharge a legal duty, 
if the effect of the act or omission is to endanger the life, health, property, or comfort of the public, or to 
obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects.’ 
825 Attorney-General v PYA Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169, 190-191 (Denning LJ). However, see the opinion, 
albeit obiter, of Lord Roger in R v Rimmington; R v Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63, para 44 (Lord Roger). 
826 Corby Group Litigation (n 347). See also, Tate & Lyle v Greater London Council [1983] 2 AC 509. 
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foreseeable’.827 A great deal of uncertainty surrounds this tortious action,828 and the 
necessity of its future use has therefore been brought into question.829  
It is very unlikely that a bank would incur liability in public nuisance. Nevertheless, if 
a bank forecloses upon its securities, it may be held liable for continuing or adopting a 
public nuisance as a mortgagee in possession. It may be possible (and this also applies 
to private nuisance) for lender liability to transfer to the mortgagee when allowing 
equity of redemption,830 and, instead of physically foreclosing the property, rent is 
collected as a form of repayment for the loan. However, in order for this to happen, the 
mortgagee must have a significant degree of participation in its mortgagor’s business 
affairs. Environment-related risks for lenders are far more likely to occur in the situation 
where the borrower’s business efficacy is impacted by a court order etc., and the bank 
suffers exposure from indirect and reputational risks as a consequence.  
3. The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher  
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher is a part of nuisance.831 As with continuing or adopting 
a nuisance under the Leakey principle, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher may also create 
lender liability for a mortgagee in possession of land that causes damage to surrounding 
property. In the case of Rylands the defendant commissioned the construction of a 
                                                 
827 The Wagon Mound No 1 [1961] AC 388 and Cambridge Water (n 765). See also, C Gearty, ‘The 
Place of Private Nuisance in a Modern Law of Torts’ (1989) 48(2) CJL 214. 
828 J Pointing, ‘Beyond Highway 61 Revisited?’ (2011) 13(1) Env L Rev 25. 
829 JR Spencer, ‘Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination’ (1989) CLJ 55; and R v Rimmington; R v 
Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63. 
830 Martin (n 514) 167. ‘Equity of Redemption’ is defined as: ‘The rights of a mortgagor over his 
mortgaged property, particularly the right to redeem the property. This right of redemption allows a 
mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property at any time on payment of principal, interest, and costs, 
even after the contractual date of redemption, as stated in the mortgaged deed, has passed.’ 
831 Fletcher v Rylands and Horrocks (1865) 159 ER 737. 
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reservoir on their land for the storage and keeping of water.832 A competent engineer, 
and competent contractors, were employed to carry out the work.833 Upon excavating 
the land, five vertical mine shafts were discovered at the base of the dam.834 The 
contractors filled the shafts with the surrounding soil, as neither the defendant, nor the 
contractors, had knowledge that the shafts led to old coal workings, which entered into 
a neighbour’s colliery.835 When water was released into the dam, it escaped down one 
of the mineshafts, and, ‘by means of the underground communications, into the 
plaintiff's colliery, and flooded it.’836 In the first instance, the court ruled that the 
defendant was not liable for the damage caused to the neighbour’s property.837 This 
decision was reversed on appeal. In his judgment Blackburn J838 suggested: 
‘We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own 
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps839 there anything likely 
to do mischief to if it escapes,840 must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does 
not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural 
consequence841 of its escape.’842  
On further appeal to the House of Lords, the decision in the Court of the Exchequer 
Chamber was affirmed.843 Later judicial reasoning, however, has emphasised that in 
                                                 
832 ibid. 
833 ibid. 
834 ibid. 
835 ibid. 
836 ibid. 
837 ibid. 
838 Rylands v Fletcher and Another (1865-66) LR 1 Ex 265, 279 (Blackburn J). 
839 Giles v Walker [1890] 24 QBD 656. 
840 Ponting v Noakes (1849) 2 QB 281. 
841 Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, para 9 (Lord Bingham). 
842 Rylands (n 838) 279 (Blackburn J). 
843 Rylands (n 751) 340 (Lord Cairns). Lord Cairns suggested that, ‘My Lords, in that opinion, I must 
say I entirely concur. Therefore, I have to move your Lordships that the judgment of the Court of 
Exchequer Chamber be affirmed, and that the present appeal be dismissed with costs.’ 
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order for a claim under the rule in Rylands to succeed, it must be shown that that there 
was a ‘non-natural’ use of the land,844 which must also be ‘extraordinary’ in its effect.845 
But, the rule in Rylands is unlikely to create lender liability for the bank that provides 
financial assistance. That being said, if a mortgagee is in possession of land which 
‘collects and keeps anything there that is likely to do mischief’, and an escape occurs, 
damaging neighbouring property, in theory lender liability may materialise. However, 
this is unlikely to happen in practice. Indeed, case law concerning Rylands’ application 
has invoked discussion as to whether the rule still serves as useful purpose. For 
example, in Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 
61,846 the House of Lords held that water which leaked from an underground gas pipe, 
accumulated, and caused an embankment to slip, was not deemed to be an 
‘extraordinary event’ capable of invoking the rule’s use. In Transco, Lord Bingham 
stated that, while it was necessary to retain the rule in Rylands, its application has 
nevertheless been reduced over the last few years.847 The case of Stannard (t/a Wyvern 
Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248848 concerned the accidental spread of fire, which 
subsequently caused damage to a neighbour’s property. At paragraph 53 of his 
judgment, Etherton LJ suggested that: 
‘Firstly, in the light of the comprehensive review of the Rylands v 
Fletcher principle in Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 61, 
[2004] 2 AC 251, I do not consider that the facts of the present case satisfy 
the basic requirement of the Rylands v Fletcher principle that there must 
                                                 
844 Transco plc v Stockport MBC (n 835) 
845 Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263; and Transco (n 835). 
846 Transco plc v Stockport MBC (n 835). 
847 ibid, para 13.  
848 Stannard (t/a Wyvern Tyres) v Gore [2012] EWCA Civ 1248. 
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have been an escape of something which the defendant has brought onto 
his or her land.’849  
Therefore, like private and public nuisance, if Rylands is going to affect a bank, it is 
most likely going to be through the impact that it has to a client, and the indirect and 
reputational risks that are created for the mortgagee, to which the mortgage money is 
owed.  
B. Negligence 
Nuisance is the tort that is most commonly used to remedy environmental issues. In the 
alternative to nuisance, it may be possible to make a claim in negligence. Negligence 
is very rarely used over nuisance in environmental claims; on the other hand, Jarvis and 
Fordham suggest that negligence, ‘can readily be treated as an avenue for civil liability 
supplemental to nuisance and Rylands v Fletcher.’850 It therefore bears relevance within 
this chapter. 
The modern tort of negligence is thought to have been created by Lord Atkin’s 
‘neighbour principle’, which was developed in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson 
[1932] AC 562.851 In that case Lord Atkin opined: 
‘The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not 
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question “Who is my neighbour?” 
receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
                                                 
849 ibid, para 53 (Etherton LJ). See also the decision of Ward LJ at paras 22 and 23. 
850 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 38. 
851 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562; cf Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 1 All ER 568. 
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omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your 
neighbour.’852 
When establishing legal causation, it must first be proven that the tortfeasor has 
breached a duty owed to the claimant, and ‘but for’ the defendant’s actions the damage 
would not have materialised.853 This is commonly known as ‘the chain of causation’. 
The chain of causation may be broken by a novus actus interveniens (‘new intervening 
act’); and an intervening act is assessed by a test of foreseeability. The chain of 
causation can also be established where two or more successive or concurrent causes 
enable a claim in negligence for a material contribution to the injury854 or risk.855 This 
has been shown in a number of cases concerning work related injuries, which are caused 
by employers’ unreasonable protection of their employees from harmful substances, 
like asbestos.856  
Establishing a causal link for an environmental claim in negligence is a difficult 
prospect.857 And a mortgagee would not incur lender liability unless it actively 
participates in its mortgagor’s business, or was a mortgagee in possession of property, 
that breached the duty of care owed to others. Much more likely are the indirect and 
reputational risks for the bank, being triggered by a mortgagor’s negligent conduct. For 
instance, a borrower that is ordered to pay damages to injured claimants in negligence 
                                                 
852 ibid, 580 (Lord Atkin). 
853 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital [1969] 1 QB 428. 
854 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1959] AC 613. 
855 McGee v National Coal Board [1979] 3 All ER 1008; Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002] 
3 WLR 89; and Barker v Corus (UK) plc [2006] UKHL 20. 
856 Fairchild (n 849) 89 
857 However, see the case of Corby Group Litigation (n 347), where the court found a causal link between 
a local authority’s negligence remediation techniques and the birth defects amongst the children within 
the residential community. For a good journal paper concerning this case, see, R Lee, ‘Old iron: birth 
defects and the Corby steelworks’ reclamation’ (2009) 25 PN 174.   
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may default on the mortgage repayment, resulting in credit risk for the bank. Also, 
reputational risk can be significant. Persons that injure others as a result of negligent 
conduct often receive widespread public scrutiny. A bank associated with such persons 
may also be subject to negative press.  
C. Common Law Remedies 
There are two primary remedies in the common law. First, a claimant may wish to 
procure an injunction that the interfering activity be stopped.858 This type of remedy is 
more likely to occur within a nuisance related claim.859 Wade and Forsyth suggest that, 
‘The injunction is the standard remedy of private law for forbidding the commission of 
some unlawful act e.g. a tort or breach of contract.’860 If a borrower is served with an 
injunction which limits its capacity to operate efficiently, it is more likely that credit 
risk will materialise for the bank. Secondly, an order may be made for the recompense 
of any damages that were made ex delicto.861 Case law has shown that damages can be 
assessed for any direct harm to the property caused by the nuisance.862 While the 
accuracy of assessing damages for property is questionable, a diminution in the 
property’s value will nevertheless be considered when evaluating quantum.863 A 
borrower that is forced to pay damages is a credit risk for the bank to which money is 
owed.  
 
                                                 
858 W Wade and C Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th edn, OUP 2010) 474. 
859 ibid. 
860 ibid. 
861 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co. [1895] 1 Ch 287; Anslow (n 781) (McKenna J); and 
Coventry 2014 (n 785). 
862 For instance, see the contrasting decisions of the courts in the following cases: Blue Circle (n 785) 
385; and Magnohard (n 785) 19. 
863 Hunter (n 770) 684.  
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The ability to award damages instead of an injunction was recently considered, inter 
alia, in the case of Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2011] EWHC 360 
(QB); [2012] EWCA Civ 26; [2014] UKSC 13; [2014] UKSC 46.864 In this case, the 
court had to determine whether motor sports activities had created noise nuisance, 
notwithstanding the fact that the activities had received permission from the planning 
authority, and that the interference was caused by the claimant coming to the nuisance. 
More specifically, in 1975 C was granted planning permission to build a motor sports 
stadium. Further to this, a certificate of lawful use was issued for stock car racing in 
1997. M also leased a nearby track (situated at the rear of the stadium) for motor sports 
and in 1992 temporary planning permission was granted. M received permanent 
planning permission in 2002, although this was subject to limitations. In 2006 L bought 
a residential property close to the motor sports arena. In December 2007 an abatement 
notice was served following an investigation by the local council. The abatement works 
were subsequently completed in January 2009. Another notice was served in August 
2009. Proceedings were issued by L, claiming that a noise related nuisance had been 
created by C and M. However, C and M argued that there was no nuisance because of 
the grant of planning permission and that the character of the locality had changed 
because of their activities. 
 
In the High Court, Seymour J issued an injunction that the activity generating the noise 
be restricted to designated levels at permitted hours of the day.865 However, the 
injunction was stayed as the appellants’ house had been badly damaged in a fire.866 C 
                                                 
864 Coventry (n 782). In fact this case covered a number of important aspects surrounding nuisance law, 
including acquiring the right to commit a nuisance through prescription, the defence of “coming to a 
nuisance”, locality and the relevance of planning permission.  
865 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2011] EWHC 360 (QB), para 245 (Seymour J). 
866 ibid. 
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and M appealed the High Court’s decision, which was reversed by Jackson LJ in the 
Court of Appeal.867 In the Supreme Court868 L’s appeal was allowed in a unanimous 
decision that was led by Lord Neuberger. Amongst other things, their Lordships 
determined, ‘the approach to be adopted by a court when deciding whether to grant an 
injunction to restrain a nuisance being committed, or whether to award damages 
instead, and the relevance of planning permission to that issue.’869 In relation to this 
particular legal issue, the court held that the ‘mechanical application’870 of the four tests 
for the award of damages laid down by A L Smith LJ in Shelfer v City of London 
Electric Lighting Co. [1895] 1 Ch 287871 was wrong in principle.872 Lord Neuberger, 
who gave the leading judgment in this case, suggested that, ‘The court’s power to award 
damages in lieu of an injunction involves a classic exercise of discretion, which should 
not, as a matter of principle, be fettered.’873 Also, it was held that a court may refuse an 
injunction where planning permission authorises an activity.874 The court decided that 
a nuisance existed,875 and the respondents had not acquired a right to commit nuisance 
by prescription.876 The Supreme Court restored the previous order for a noise-limiting 
injunction by Seymour J.877 Damages were also awarded under the High Court’s 
order;878 the order directed C and M to pay sixty per cent of L’s costs.879 The Supreme 
Court’s judgment is significant because it may indeed remove the courts’ mechanical 
application to the award of damages in lieu of an injunction, clearing the way for a more 
                                                 
867 Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2012] EWCA Civ 26, para 76 (Jackson LJ).  
868 Coventry 2014 (n 785). 
869 ibid, para 6. 
870 ibid, para 119.  
871 Shelfer (n 861) 287 (AL Smith LJ). 
872 Coventry 2014 (n 785), para 119 (Lord Neuberger).  
873 ibid, para 120. 
874 ibid, para 125. 
875 ibid, para 6. 
876 ibid, para 143. 
877 ibid, para 148.  
878 ibid, paras 151-152. 
879 ibid. 
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‘flexible’ approach.880 To clarify some of the issues arising from the Supreme Court’s 
decision, a further judgment was handed down by the Supreme Court in Coventry and 
others (Respondents) v Lawrence and another (Appellants) [2014] UKSC 46. There 
were four issues that the Supreme Court had to address.881 The court ruled that the 
injunction should not take effect until the residential property is restored,882 and that 
there should be a delay before the parties can apply to vary the injunction.883 The 
Supreme Court also had to determine whether the landlord was also liable to the 
appellants in nuisance.884 Lord Neuberger held that in order for a claim against the 
landlord to succeed, ‘it must be based on their ‘active’ or ‘direct’ participation.’885 In 
this case Lord Neuberger (with whom Lord Clarke and Lord Sumption agreed) did not 
consider the landlord to have ‘authorised’ or ‘participated’ in the nuisance.886 
Nevertheless, the potential for landlords to incur liability in nuisance is interesting. A 
bank may be considered a ‘landlord’ if a mortgagor defaults on its loan repayment, and 
the mortgagee requests the receipt of rents (instead of physical foreclosure) as a form 
of repayment. If, during the course of the repayment, the mortgagor creates a nuisance, 
and the mortgagee is deemed to have authorised the activity that created the nuisance 
through its degree of control over the mortgagor, liability could be transferred to the 
bank in nuisance. The fourth issue for the court to address was whether the level of the 
                                                 
880 R Biela and S Moore, ‘Coventry v Lawrence: more flexibility about awarding damages over an 
injunction’ (Nabarro, 25 March 2014) 
<http://www.nabarro.com/insight/briefings/2014/march/coventry-v-lawrence-more-flexibility-about-
awarding-damages-over-an-injunction/> accessed 1 June 2014. For a good summary of the case, see also, 
‘The Supreme Court Makes Fundamental Changes To The Laws Of Nuisance’ (Burges Salmon, March 
2014) < http://www.burges-
salmon.com/practices/environment/environmental_litigation/publications/fundamental_change_to_law
_of_nuisance_coventry_v_lawrence.pdf> accessed 1 June 2014.  
881 Coventry and others (Respondents) v Lawrence and another (Appellants) [2014] UKSC 46, paras 3-
4 (Lord Neuberger). 
882 ibid, paras 6-7. 
883 ibid, para 8. 
884 ibid, para 15. 
885 ibid, para 18. 
886 ibid, para 30 (Lord Neuberger); cf para 66, 69 (Lord Carnwarth, with whom Lord Mance agreed). 
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costs that the judge’s order required the respondents to pay (i.e. sixty per cent of the 
appellants’ costs) infringed the right to a fair trial under article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).887 Lord Neuberger suggested that the case 
should be re-listed, as, in light of the Strasbourg court judgments, ‘it may be that the 
respondents are right in their contention that their liability for costs.’888  
 
Now that the common law has been assessed, the next section outlines different 
statutory sources of law that may create environment-related risks for lenders who own, 
or have borrowers that own, suspect land. 
II. Statute 
This section begins by looking at the liability regime under the Environmental Damage 
(Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009.889  
A.  Directive 2004/35/EC as transposed by the Environmental Damage 
(Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009  
A lender may be capable of incurring liability as an ‘operator’ or ‘owner’ of land under 
Directive 2004/35/EC890 (hereafter, ‘the Environmental Liability Directive’, ‘the 
Directive’ or, more colloquially, ‘the ELD’), which was transposed into England on 1 
                                                 
887 ibid, para 38. 
888 ibid, para 41. 
889 Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage. 
890 ibid. 
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March 2009.891 The ELD’s transposing legislation, the Environmental Damage 
(Prevention and Remediation) Regulations (EDR) 2009,892 are considered in this 
section. The ELD’s primary purpose is to establish a European-wide framework of 
liability based on the polluter pays principle.893 This framework is designed to prevent 
and remedy the occurrence of any ‘environmental damage’894 caused by operators’ 
occupational activities895 throughout the EU.896 The ELD states that ‘damage’ means, 
‘a measurable adverse change in a natural resource or measurable impairment of a 
natural resource service which may occur directly or indirectly.’897 According to article 
2(6) an ‘operator’ is: 
‘any natural or legal, private or public person who operates or controls the 
occupational activity or, where this is provided for in national legislation, 
to whom decisive economic power over the technical functioning of such 
an activity has been delegated, including the holder of a permit or 
authorisation for such an activity or the person registering or notifying such 
an activity.’898 
If a borrower’s operation is capable of being categorised as an ‘occupation activity’899 
under the ELD, this should trigger the lenders’ use of environmental due diligence. 
‘Occupational activity’ is defined as, ‘any activity carried out in the course of an 
                                                 
891 Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations (EDR) 2009, SI 2009/153, reg 
1(1).  
892 ibid. 
893 Directive 2004/35/EC, art 1. 
894 ibid, art 2(1)(a)-(c): ‘environmental damage’ includes damage done to protected species and natural 
habitats, water resources and land.  
895 ibid, art 2(7); EDR 2009, reg 2(1). 
896 ibid, art 1. 
897 ibid, art 2(2). 
898 ibid, art 2(6); EDR 2009, reg 2(1). 
899 ibid, art 2(7).  
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economic activity, a business or an undertaking, irrespectively of its private or public, 
profit or non-profit character.’900  The scope of the ELD’s liability is dependent upon 
the type of occupational activity that creates damage, or the threat of damage.901 
Liability can be determined strictly,902 or by an assessment of an operator’s fault or 
negligence.903 The ELD’s liability also applies to ‘multiple party causation’.904 There 
are two types of operational activity under the ELD:  
 If the occupational activity is classified as ‘dangerous’ and is therefore listed as 
an Annex III operation, the liability scheme is applied strictly.905 Activities 
referred to in Annex III include such things as a waste management operation 
subject to licence or registration,906 all discharges into the inland surface water 
requiring prior authorisation,907 all discharges of substances into groundwater 
which require prior authorisation,908 etc.909  Borrowers working in annexed 
operations must be closely monitored by banks.910  
 Alternatively, if an occupation is not listed within Annex III an operator may 
still incur liability.911 In that situation the assessment of damage will be based 
                                                 
900 ibid. 
901 ibid, art 3. 
902 ibid, art 3(1)(a). 
903 ibid, art 3(1)(b). 
904 ibid, art 9. 
905 ibid, art 3(1)(a). 
906 ibid, ann 3(2).  
907 ibid, ann 3(3). 
908 ibid, ann 3(4). 
909 See also, EDR 2009, sch 2. 
910 e.g. the IPPC Directive. 
911 Directive 2004/35/EC, art 3(1)(b). 
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upon an analysis of the operator’s fault or negligence in relation to the damage 
to protected species and natural habitats or the imminent threat of damage.912  
In relation to the UK, ‘environmental damage’ includes damage to: (1) protected 
species or natural habitats,913 or a site of special scientific interest;914 (2) surface or 
groundwater;915 or (3) land.916  The ‘enforcing authorities’ are enforced either under the 
Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2007, if the damage is 
caused by an installation etc. requiring an environmental permit;917 or, if such a permit 
is not required, an enforcing authority is an authority listed in the table at Regulation 
11 of the Environmental Damage Regulations 2009.918 ‘Operators’ may be liable to 
take preventative action where environmental damage has not occurred, but there is an 
imminent threat of such damage.919 In this case the operator must ‘take all practical 
steps to prevent the damage’,920 and ‘notify all relevant details to the enforcing 
authority’.921 The ELD has a number of enforcement provisions which are, what 
Fogleman describes as, ‘self-executing’. She explains that this means that they, ‘impose 
a direct duty on an operator not only to notify a competent authority of the imminent 
threat of, or actual, damage but also to carry out preventive or remedial works.’ The 
enforcing authority may serve a remediation notice922 on the operator.923 On the other 
hand, action may be taken by the enforcing authority instead of the operator.924 Where 
                                                 
912 ibid. 
913 EDR 2009, reg 2(1) defines ‘natural habitat’. 
914 ibid, reg 4(1)(a); sch 1. 
915 ibid, reg 4(1)(b) and (4); reg 2(1) defines ‘groundwater’. 
916 ibid, reg 4(1)(c) and (5). 
917 ibid, reg 10. 
918 ibid, reg 11. 
919 Directive 2004/35/EC, art 5(1); EDR 2009, regs 13-16. 
920 EDR 2009, reg 13(1)(a). 
921 ibid, reg 13(1)(b). 
922 ibid, reg 20. 
923 ibid, reg 13(2). 
924 ibid, reg 15(a)-(c) and reg 23. 
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environmental damage has already occurred, remedial action is therefore necessary.925 
It is for the enforcing authority to decide whether ‘environmental damage’ has 
occurred.926 According to regulation 27, the enforcing authority may also recover costs, 
by way of a charge on the premises, from a person who is the ‘owner’927 of the 
premises.928 A person who receives a notice reserves the right to appeal against the 
notification of the liability to remediate,929 or to the notification of the remediation 
notice,930 to the Secretary of State. An operator served with a remediation notice has a 
period of twenty-eight days from when it was first served to appeal the decision.931 The 
procedure for appeal is outlined in Schedule 5 of the 2009 Regulations.932 Regulation 
21(5) says that the appeal may be approved, quashed or varied by the Secretary of State 
or the relevant appointed person, and the final decision must be notified to the operator 
in writing.933 A person guilty of an offence upon summary conviction may incur a fine 
not exceeding the statutory maximum, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding three 
months, or both.934 On conviction in the Crown Court, a person found guilty can expect 
a fine, or a term of imprisonment for a maximum of two years, or both. A body 
corporate may also receive penalties where it is proven guilty of committing an offence. 
Regulation 34(2) states: ‘Where a body corporate is guilty of an offence…and that 
offence is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or have 
been attributable to any neglect on the part of – (a) any director, manager, secretary or 
                                                 
925 ibid, art 6(1); and pt 3. 
926 ibid, reg 17 and reg 21. 
927 ibid, reg 27(9). 
928 ibid, reg 27. 
929 ibid, reg 19. 
930 ibid, reg 21. 
931 ibid, reg 21. 
932 ibid, sch 5. 
933 ibid, reg 21(5). 
934 ibid, reg 34(1)(a). 
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other similar person; or (b) any person who was purporting to act in any such 
capacity.’935  
When acting instead of the operator, the enforcing authority may recover all ‘reasonable 
costs’ incurred from the operator.936 The framework for remediation is outlined in 
Annex II of the Directive. In accordance with the ELD, remediation can take a number 
of different forms. If the environmental damage has taken place on land, the 
remediation threshold requires the site be cleaned to such a degree that the site no longer 
has an adverse impact on human health.937 Conversely, if the damage has occurred to 
water or protected species or habitats, the remediation threshold requires that the 
damage is remediated ‘to its baseline condition.’938 The ELD enforces three possible 
remediation objectives for damage to water or protected species or natural habitats. The 
remediation objectives that can be implemented include: primary remediation, 
complementary remediation and compensatory remediation.939   
The European Commission’s (EC’s) 2010 Report940 on the effectiveness of the regime 
took into account the transposition process during its deliberations. The EC’s findings 
suggest that the ELD has been so far ineffective; and that the ELD’s slow rate of 
transposition into Member States is evidence of this.941 The allocation of liability under 
the ELD has proven difficult to determine in some cases of environmental damage.942 
                                                 
935 ibid, reg 34(2).  
936 ibid, reg 24. 
937 Directive 2004/35/EC, Annex II. 
938 ibid, Annex II. 
939 ibid, s 1(a)-(d).  
940 Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Under Article 14(2) of Directive 2004/35/EC on 
the environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (COM 
2010) 581. 
941 ibid, 4-5. 
942 P Cameron, ‘Liability for catastrophic risk in the oil and gas industry’ (2012) IELR 207. 
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And this is particularly so in relation to occupational activities affecting the marine 
environment e.g. oil works.943 With regards to the ELD, Respondent 1 said: 
R1: I sat on the working group for the ELD and, again, it’s like … well if 
you’re in Spain you have to take out insurance because it’s mandated, but 
in the UK … I mean … Well I’ll ask you, how many cases have you come 
across where they’ve [banks] been taken to court? 
I: I can’t think of one off hand! 
R1: There you go! The thing was, we’d say, “How many sites do you think 
this is going to impact?” and I think it was sort of under 20, because it’s a 
risk. And if you’re one of those twenty you wish you had insurance, but 
when you’re looking at it, does the bank put in the policy to impact all of 
our customers on the basis of this legislation? No! Because on a portfolio 
basis, where we deal with tens of thousands of properties a year, it’s not a 
portfolio risk!944 
Despite the ELD’s slow transposition into the national legal frameworks of the 
European Member States,945 the Directive has created risks for companies operating in 
certain areas. This section argues that the ELD has heightened the likelihood of banks 
incurring environment-related risks during their corporate financing. For example, 
Richardson believes that, while unlikely, lenders may incur liability as operators since 
                                                 
943 ibid. In this article Cameron discusses the effect that the Macondo oil spill has had on various liability 
laws relating to marine protection. 
944 Interview with Respondent 1. 
945 Winter et al. (n 43) 175. 
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the ELD does not specifically exclude secured creditors from being held liable as an 
operator. He advises: 
‘It would appear that liability would extend to a lender only if it was 
considered by the authorities to be “a person that directs the operation or 
activity”. This suggests a form of participation in the management of a 
business rather than merely having the formal capacity to influence 
operations.’946  
In order for operator liability to attach to a lender, it would be necessary to show that 
the bank had ‘participated in the management’ of the borrower’s business affairs. The 
degree of the bank’s participation which is necessary to attract liability is yet uncertain. 
This may occur, for example, if the bank advises its client during its due diligence and 
thereby falls within the meaning of ‘shadow director’ as defined by section 251(1) of 
the Company Act 2006, i.e. ‘a person in accordance with whose directions or 
instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act.’947 The lender liability 
for environmental damage which occurred in America under the CERCLA regime 
showed that liability for environmental issues might materialise where a lender merely 
participates in the management or business affairs of one of its borrowers. This type of 
risk is different to liability for owning or occupying land, as liability may be 
apportioned without the bank’s exercise of security over property. The primary 
consequence of being a shadow director is that the bank may be found liable as a 
                                                 
946 Richardson, ‘Environmental liability and banks’ (n 54) 287. 
947 Company Act 2006, s 251(1). See also, Insolvency Act 1986, s 251; and Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, s 22(5).  
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director of the company,948 which is what O’Donovan describes as ‘Lender Liability 
for Honest Intermeddling’.949  
However, it must be remembered that while a bank may obtain a significant amount of 
control through its conduct of due diligence, liability is unlikely to occur simply by 
providing financial assistance and carrying out due diligence as a loan financier. 
Although the term ‘owner’ is referenced under the ELD, only the operator may be 
primarily liable for environmental damage. Nevertheless, pursuant to regulation 27 if 
the enforcing authority has paid to prevent or remediate the environmental damage, it 
may recover any costs incurred from the owner of the premises.950 Therefore, the bank 
that has taken security, becoming a mortgagee in possession, could be made to pay the 
costs of remediating environmental damage as an owner of the premises.951 According 
to the Environmental Damage Regulations 2009 an ‘owner’ means, ‘a person (other 
than a mortgagee not in possession).’952 For the enforcing authority to charge the 
remediation costs to a bank, it must be shown that the mortgagee holds a position of 
‘possession’ over the premises. A bank that does not enforce its securities by physically 
foreclosing the property (i.e. a mortgagee not in possession) is not capable of being 
fixed with a charge for remediating environmental damage.953 
As well as primary liability as an operator, or being charge with the costs of remediation 
as an owner (which are both unlikely to occur), there are also the indirect and 
reputational risks to think about. The ELD, and its transposing legislation, has placed 
                                                 
948 In re a Company (No 005009 of 1987), ex parte Copp and Another [1989] BCLC 13, 20 (Knox J). 
949 O’Donovan (n 63) 488. 
950 EDR 2009, reg 27. 
951 ibid. 
952 ibid, reg 27(9). 
953 ibid. 
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increased pressure on businesses throughout Europe to report and clean-up 
environmental damage. If a customer of the bank is required to prevent or remediate 
environmental damage, the likelihood of the bank incurring credit and/or security risks 
inevitably increases. For instance, the borrower may default on its loan repayment or 
the value of the bank’s secured assets may depreciate because of the damage. On top 
of that, being associated with a client whose operations are likely to cause or have 
caused environmental damage, could result in reputational harm by association for the 
bank. This links later discussion in Chapter 7, which analyses banks’ environmental 
due diligence and high risk clients.954  
It is noteworthy that because of the ELD banks may have a possible duty to report to 
the competent authority when charging land, where the due diligence suggests ongoing 
contamination. The above assertion is made because, although unlikely, banks can incur 
operator liability, as discussed above. Although the amount of control that is required 
to incur operator liability is uncertain, knowledge of environmental damage (or threat 
of) gathered from the conduct of due diligence may lead to the bank being classed as 
an operator, and liable for remediation costs. Reporting the environmental damage to 
the competent authority should act to reduce the bank’s prospects of incurring primary 
liability under the ELD. When reporting, the bank must emphasise that its knowledge 
of the damage was generated through its ordinary and prudent exercise of due diligence, 
and that the bank is not a participant in its borrower’s business. Bearing in mind the 
importance of corporate social responsibility in modern business practices, even if the 
bank is not classified as an operator, it is a question for moot whether it should still 
report any environmental issues that it finds during its due diligence. The problem with 
                                                 
954 infra, ch 7, pg 290. 
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reporting is that it may not be in the best interest of banks, as this is likely to increase 
future credit and security risks. However, under some regulatory regimes, if a bank 
omits to report environmental incidents to the appropriate authorities, it could be held 
liable as a person that ‘knowingly permitted’ the pollution to take place.955  
Following the discussion of the ELD, the next section looks at the Environmental 
Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010. 
B. Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 
The environmental risks that lenders can incur have increased because of environmental 
licensing. The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010956 
consolidated a number of the previous licensing regimes for regulating environmentally 
harmful activities957 into one e.g. Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations 
2000,958 Part II of the EPA 1990959 and the Waste Management Licensing Regulations 
1994,960 and the Groundwater Regulations 2009.961 The Regulations require an 
‘operator’962 of a ‘regulated facility’963 to obtain an ‘environmental permit’964 from the 
‘regulator’.965 According to regulation 7: 
                                                 
955 EPA 1990, s 78F(2). 
956 Environmental Permitting (England & Wales) Regulations (EPR) 2010, SI 2010/675.  
957 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Environmental Permitting Guidance: Core 
Guidance – For the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 (Defra, March 
2013), para 1.1. 
958 Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/1973 (as amended). 
959 EPA 1990, pt II. 
960 Waste Management Licensing Regulations 1994, SI 1994/1056. 
961 Groundwater (England and Wales) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/2902. 
962 EPR 2010, reg 7.  
963 ibid, reg  
964 ibid, regs 13-14. 
965 ibid,  regs 32-33. 
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‘… “an operator”, in relation to a regulated facility, means— (a) the person 
who has control over the operation of the regulated facility, (b) if the 
regulated facility has not yet been put into operation, the person who will 
have control over the regulated facility when it is put into operation, or (c) 
if a regulated facility authorised by an environmental permit ceases to be in 
operation, the person who holds the environmental permit.’ 
There are nine classes of regulated facility requiring an ‘environmental permit’ under 
the Regulations,966 such as: an installation,967 a mobile plant,968 a waste operation,969 a 
water discharge activity,970 and a groundwater activity.971 The regulator has a duty to 
periodically review environmental permits and inspect regulated facilities.972 A ‘risk-
based approach to compliance assessment’ should be taken.973 It is the operator’s 
responsibility to ensure that the regulated facility does not cause pollution of the 
environment and harm to human health.974 If the regulator believes that ‘an operator 
has contravened, is contravening, or is likely to contravene an environmental permit 
condition’ it may serve an enforcement notice975 or suspension notice976 on the operator 
of the facility. There are a number of offences under the Regulations.977 For example, 
a person that operates a regulated facility without an environmental permit,978 or fails 
to comply with an environment permit condition commits an offence under regulation 
                                                 
966 Defra 2013 (n 944), para 3.5. 
967 EPR 2010, reg 8(1)(a). See also, EPR 2010, sch 1. 
968 ibid, reg 8(1)(b). 
969 ibid, reg 8(1)(c). 
970 ibid, reg 8(1)(f). 
971 ibid, reg 8(1)(g). 
972 ibid, reg 34(2). 
973 Defra 2013 (n 944), para 11.2. 
974 ibid, para 11.3. 
975 EPR 2010, reg 36. 
976 ibid, reg 37. 
977 ibid, reg 38. 
978 ibid, reg 38(1). 
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38.979 A person guilty of an offence under regulation 38 is liable to a penalty.980 The 
Regulations say that a person otherwise guilty of an offence has a defence if they 
committed the contravention in an emergency, and only did so in order to avoid danger 
or harm to human health.981 Where the regulator considers there to be a risk of ‘serious 
pollution’, it has the power to take the necessary steps for the pollution to be prevented 
or remedied.982 The costs can be recovered from the operator of the facility.983  
Considering the heightened demand to ‘permit’ operations through a system of 
environmental licensing, and the consequences of acting contrary to such a system, it 
is important that the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010 are included within 
this analysis. It is very unlikely that a lender would incur direct liability as an ‘operator’ 
of a regulated facility. However, regulation 7(a) states that an operator is the person 
that has ‘control’ over the operation of the regulated activity.984 If a lender has a 
significant degree of participation in the management of its borrower’s business 
activities, there is a chance that it may be held to have the sufficient control that is 
necessary to be classed as an operator. As with the laws outlined above, the indirect 
and reputational risks are much more of an issue when lending to a customer of a 
permitted operation. While environmental licensing systems are necessary to prevent 
and remedy any environmental harm that may be caused by regulated operations, the 
need to comply with the conditions of a permit has put increased pressure on some 
business sectors. Liability for committing an offence under the Regulations can result 
in penalties for an operator, which can force a business to enter insolvency proceedings. 
                                                 
979 ibid, reg 38(2). 
980 ibid, reg 39. 
981 ibid, reg 40(1). 
982 ibid, reg 57(1). 
983 ibid, reg 57(4). 
984 ibid, reg 7(a). 
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A borrower in insolvency heightens the probability of credit risk for its lender. This 
also leads to the question of, what happens to the environmental licence if an operator 
becomes insolvent? While this is dealt with in detail in Chapter 4, the licence may 
remain attached to the land as ‘onerous property’.985 The value of land that has an 
onerous licence attached to it may depreciate, resulting in a security risk for creditors. 
Thus, the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010 have heightened the likelihood 
of credit and security risks (not lender liability) for banks. 
C. Part II of the EPA 1990 
Part II of the EPA has now been largely replaced by the Environmental Permitting 
(England and Wales) Regulations 2010. Nevertheless, Part II is still the main legislative 
source covering offences relating to unlawful deposits etc. of controlled waste.986 This 
section shall look at the risks posed to lenders by the criminal, civil and clean-up 
liability under Part II.  
Criminal offences for waste fall under section 33 of the EPA 1990. There are three 
primary ways in which liability may materialise under section 33(1), including:  
 ‘Deposit controlled waste or extractive waste, or knowingly cause or knowingly 
permit controlled waste or extractive waste to be deposited in or on any land 
unless an environmental permit authorising the deposit is in force and the 
                                                 
985 infra, ch 4, pp 208-219. 
986 For a good overview of Part II of the EPA 1990 see Lawrence and Lee, ‘Talking ‘bout my generation’ 
(n 35) 97-106. 
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deposit is in accordance with the licence;  
 Submit controlled waste, or knowingly cause or knowingly permit controlled 
waste to be submitted, to any listed operation (other than an operation within 
subsection (1)(a)) that— (i) is carried out in or on any land, or by means of any 
mobile plant, and (ii) is not carried out under and in accordance with an 
environmental permit; and 
 Treat, keep or dispose of controlled waste or extractive waste in a manner likely 
to cause pollution of the environment or harm to human health.’987  
Any person that contravenes section 33(1) shall commit an offence.988 Liability on 
summary conviction for an offence under this section may lead to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding twelve months,989 or a fine not exceeding £50,000.990 On 
conviction on indictment, the person that committed the offence may serve a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding five years, a fine, or both.991 Section 33(9) states that, ‘a 
person (other than the establishment or undertaking)’,992 may also incur liability. If such 
a person is found guilty on indictable conviction, the court may award a fine.993 A 
person liable to an offence under section 33(1) (or section 63 (2) of the EPA 1990 for 
‘waste other than controlled waste’) can be forced to compensate the victim for their 
loss by way of an award of damages.994 It shall be a defence to show that the offence 
                                                 
987 EPA 1990, s 33(1). 
988 ibid, s 33(6). 
989 ibid, s 33(7)(a). 
990 ibid, s 33(7)(b). 
991 ibid, s 33(8)(b). 
992 ibid, s 33(9). 
993 ibid, s 33(9)(b). 
994 ibid, s 73(6). 
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was committed under the exercise of reasonable due diligence, or that the unlawful 
deposit was done in the interests of safety.995 An unlawful deposit of waste may also 
generate civil liability, as a consequence of a breach of statutory duty, for responsible 
parties.996 Section 33B allows the enforcement of clean-up costs where an offence has 
been committed under section 33(1) of the EPA, or regulations 38(1) and 38(12) of the 
Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010 (as amended). Criminal liability under 
section 33(1)(a) of the EPA 1990 does not apply to any of the operations listed in 
Schedule 25 to the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010.997 If a person’s land 
causes pollution without the occupier being at fault, the person to which liability is 
allocated may be able to claim back the money from the person that originally deposited 
the waste under section 130(1)(a) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 
2000.998 This section limits payment to £5,000.999  Also, ‘any person who imports, 
produces, carries, keeps, treats or disposes of controlled waste’, has a duty of care in 
respect to that waste.1000 Under section 34 of the EPA, the waste producer is under a 
statutory duty of care to assign the waste to a registered waste carrier, who must also 
exercise their section 34 obligation. Breaching section 34 could lead to an unlimited 
fine in the Crown Court.1001 With regards to criminal liability under section 33, asset 
recovery must also be considered, as it is now widely used in waste cases. According 
to the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002, which established the Asset Recovery 
Agency,1002 any financial benefit obtained by criminal conduct can be recovered from 
convicted defendants by the court’s service of a confiscation order.1003 If this happens 
                                                 
995 ibid, s 33 (7)(a)-(c). 
996 ibid, s 73(6).  
997 EPR 2010, reg 68(2). 
998 EPA 1990, s 33B(2). 
999 ibid, s 33B(5). 
1000 ibid, s 34(1). 
1001 ibid, s 34(6). 
1002 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, pt I. 
1003 EPA 1990, pt II. 
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to a borrower, this will ultimately heighten the likelihood of the bank suffering credit 
risk on the loan. There is also the possibility of harmful reputational damage from being 
associated with a client that is convicted of criminal conduct.  
Under section 59(1), if controlled waste has been deposited in contravention to section 
33(1) [or Regulation 12 of the Environmental Permitting Regulations], the 
Environment Agency or waste collection authority may require the occupier, by notice, 
to remove the waste or to take steps to eliminate or reduce the deposit’s 
consequences.1004 Also, section 59ZA of the EPA 1990 states that the waste regulation, 
or waste collection authority, may require the owner of land to comply with the 
requirements outlined in section 59 of the EPA. The authority will issue a notice onto 
the owner where a deposit of waste is made in contravention to section 33 [or 
Regulation 12] and there is no occupier of the land or the authority would incur an 
unreasonable expense in order for the occupier to be found.1005 A person issued with a 
notice to remove the waste must do so within a period of twenty-one days from when 
the notice was first served.1006 The notice may be appealed to the magistrates’ court 
also within this period.1007 And the magistrates may quash the authority’s decision.1008 
By virtue of section 59(7), the waste regulation or collection authority reserves the right 
to remove, or eliminated the threat of, the waste deposited in or on the land.1009 The 
authority shall be entitled to recover any costs incurred by the works from either the 
occupier, or any person that deposited or knowingly caused or knowingly permitted the 
deposit upon the land.1010 If the occupier proves that, ‘he neither made nor knowingly 
                                                 
1004 ibid, s 59(1)(a)-(b).  
1005 ibid, s 59ZA. 
1006 ibid, s 59(1)(a). 
1007 ibid, s 59(2). 
1008 ibid, s 59(3)(a)-(b). 
1009 ibid, s 59(7)(a)-(c). 
1010 ibid, s 59(8)(a)-(b). 
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caused nor knowingly permitted the deposit of waste’, the recovery of costs by the 
authority is not justified under the EPA 1990.1011 When waste is removed by an 
authority, ‘it shall belong to that authority’.1012 This means that the occupier’s duty of 
care to that waste under section 34 of the EPA is extinguished by the act of removal.    
Following the discussion above, lender liability is capable of materialising under Part 
II of the EPA. Part II of the EPA has been largely replaced by a number of legislative 
sources e.g. the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010. Before Part IIA of the 
EPA was brought into force in 2000 and 2001, Part II was the primary legislative source 
for contaminated land clean-up. Today Part II and Part IIA share a working relationship. 
Part IIA deals solely with historic contaminated land; on the other hand Part II covers 
recent unlawful deposits of waste. Thus, the two regimes complement each other. While 
lender liability for an unlawful deposit of waste (etc.) is unlikely, liability may attach 
to a mortgagee in possession of land. This happened in Devon Waste Regulation 
Authority v Midland Bank plc (Unreported) (Mag Ct) (1995) 8(9) Insolv Int. 75 (‘the 
Midland Bank case’), where Midland Bank was charged under Part II of the EPA 1990 
(which was the statutory provision that was used before the enactment of Part IIA) for 
the remediation of contaminated tyres that were found on the site by the local authority. 
Lender liability, as witnessed in the case of Midland Bank, is quite severe should it 
materialise. However, today, it is an unlikely outcome, as the environmental risk 
management frameworks in banks would not allow foreclosure unless there is good 
evidence to show that the land is profitable.1013 If waste is found on land, and the land 
                                                 
1011 ibid, s 59(8)(a). 
1012 ibid, s 59(9). 
1013 infra chs 6 and 7. 
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is determined an unprofitable investment, the bank would simply walk away from the 
property, rendering it terra nulla.1014  
Increased regulatory pressures for waste management are beginning to affect the 
economic efficacy of business operations; and this is especially so for small to medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) working within the waste industry.1015 In relation to this issue, 
Egede and Lee stress that:  
‘The scrap metal industry was brought clearly within the realm of waste 
regulation for the first time in 1994, and the impact on that sector is still 
being felt as slowly the regulatory noose tightens.’ 1016   
For banks, ‘the tightening of the regulatory noose’ has heightened their likelihood of 
sustaining credit and security risks because of their borrowers’ non-compliance with 
the law.1017 One respondent, who works for one of the UK’s major, clearing banks, 
stated that: 
R1: We have had a lot of problems with waste transfer stations, when they 
go bust, because, when they go bust, for the previous 6 months, they open 
their doors and everyone comes in and dumps their waste in, and they 
shut the doors. You can’t sell that site without removing the waste. So that 
                                                 
1014 ibid. 
1015 Lawrence and Lee, ‘Talking ‘bout my Generation’ (n 35) 93.  
1016 Egede and Lee (n 56) 869-870. 
1017 ibid. 
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has an impact both on value and saleability, as well as because you 
wouldn’t want to be taking possession of that sort of property. 1018  
Also, the waste hierarchy encourages agents within the waste cycle to adopt more 
sustainable forms of waste management before depositing waste at landfill.1019 This 
was done in order to develop sustainable methods of waste recovery by making 
unsustainable processes (like landfilling) increasingly more difficult to use.1020 Landfill 
Directive 1999/31/EC1021 and Council Decision 2003/33/EC1022 aim to encourage the 
use of more sustainable forms of waste management by banning certain substances 
from landfill. The Directive encourages the categorisation of waste (see Waste 
Assessment Criteria (WAC))1023 and prevents the co-disposal of non-hazardous1024 and 
hazardous waste1025 at the same site.1026 Furthermore, in 2012, all section 43B 
certificates, which allowed contaminated material exemption from landfill tax, were 
revoked.1027 This now means that developers will make less profit from their 
contaminated sites, increasing the likelihood of lenders suffering credit risk on their 
loans. If waste from contaminated sites is deemed as ‘hazardous’ under Annexes I, II, 
                                                 
1018 Interview with Respondent 1. 
1019 See, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Guidance on applying the waste 
hierarchy (Defra, June 2011) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69403/pb13530-waste-
hierarchy-guidance.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
1020 ibid, para 1.1.  
1021 Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste OJ L 182, 16/07/1999 P. 
0001 – 0019. 
1022 Council Decision of 19 December 2002 establishing criteria and procedures for the acceptance of 
waste at landfills pursuant to Article 16 of and Annex II to Directive 1999/31/EC. 
1023 Environment Agency, Waste acceptance at landfills: Guidance on waste acceptance procedures and 
criteria (EA November 2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/296422/geho1110btew
-e-e.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
1024 ibid, paras 5.1 – 5.2. 
1025 ibid, paras 6.1 – 6.5.  
1026 ibid. 
1027 Finance Act 1996, pt III.  
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
173 
or III of the Hazardous Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2005,1028 the consignee 
must send the waste to a landfill site that is registered to deal with hazardous 
substances.1029 This will come at a further expense1030 to developers, due to the need to 
transport the waste to the appropriate operating facility. In Wales, for example, there 
are no ‘commercial hazardous waste landfill sites’,1031 so any substance that is 
recovered from a redevelopment project, and is classed as hazardous, needs to be sent 
to England for disposal. Although this thesis is concerned primarily with the English 
legal system, the reference to the lack of hazardous waste sites in Wales nevertheless 
strengthens the argument that increased regulatory activity during an economic 
depression has not had a favourable effect on reducing the mortgagees’ indirect risks 
from projects concerning land redevelopment.  It is quite clear that waste regulation has 
made loan financing to borrowers that operate in the waste sector a much riskier and 
less profitable enterprise. 
D. Part III of the EPA 1990 
Part III of the EPA 19901032 provides a regulatory regime for nuisance in the UK. While 
the codification of this area has impacted upon the use of common law nuisance, it is 
now quicker and easier to apply nuisance in practice. However, in Barr & Ors v Biffa 
                                                 
1028 Hazardous Waste (England & Wales) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/894 (as amended by Hazardous 
Waste (England & Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/507). 
1029 ibid, anns I, II, and III. 
1030 According to one report the median costs of hazardous waste gate fees in 2013 ranged from £35 - 
£56, depending upon the hazardous waste code of the substance(s) being deposited. Please see, WRAP, 
‘Comparing the costs of alternative waste treatment options: Gate fees report 2013’ (WRAP, no date) 
<http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/Gate_Fees_Report_2013_h%20(2).pdf> accessed 2 June 
2014. The gate fees, which are rather more costly for hazardous waste than other forms of waste, can be 
increased further when one considers removal and transportation costs. 
1031 Environment Agency, ‘Hazardous Waste in Wales’ (EA no date) <http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/research/library/data/98052.aspx> accessed 23 July 2012. 
1032 EPA 1990, pt III. 
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Waste Services Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 312 Carnwarth LJ specified that, ‘I continue to 
believe that the applicable law of nuisance is relatively straightforward, and that the 
19th century principles for the most part remain valid.’1033  
Section 79(1) of the EPA lists activities that can give rise to a statutory nuisance.1034 It 
includes such things as, ‘any premises in such a state as to be prejudicial to health or a 
nuisance’,1035 ‘smoke emitted from premises so as to be prejudicial to health or a 
nuisance’,1036 and, ‘any accumulation or deposit which is prejudicial to health or a 
nuisance’.1037 Pursuant to Part III, every local authority is under a duty to inspect its 
area from time to time for any statutory nuisances.1038 Where a person living in the 
authority’s area makes a complaint of statutory nuisance, the authority must ‘take such 
steps as are reasonably practicable to investigate the complaint.’1039 If a nuisance exists, 
or is likely to occur or recur, the local authority will serve an abatement notice onto any 
responsible parties.1040 This notice may require the interference’s prohibition,1041 and 
could also outline works that are necessary to inhibit the activity’s further unreasonable 
affect.1042 At first instance, the local authority will attempt to identify the person 
responsible for causing the nuisance.1043 If the persons responsible for the nuisance 
cannot be found, the abatement notice is to be served onto the current owner or occupier 
                                                 
1033 Barr & Ors v Biffa Waste Services Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 312, para 44 (Carnwarth LJ). cf M 
Stallworthy, ‘Environmental liability and the impact of statutory authority’ (2003) J Env L 3. See also 
the recent case of Coventry and others (Respondents) v Lawrence and another (Appellants) [2014] 
UKSC 46 supports this argument. 
1034 EPA 1990, s 79(1). 
1035 ibid, s 79(1)(a). 
1036 ibid, s 79(1)(b). 
1037 ibid, s 79(1)(d). 
1038 ibid, s 79(1).  
1039 ibid. 
1040 ibid, s 80(1). 
1041 ibid, s 80(1)(a). 
1042 ibid, s 80(1)(b). 
1043 ibid, s 80(2)(a). 
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of the land.1044 A person that is served with a notice may appeal the decision within a 
period of twenty-one days from the date upon which it is first served.1045 Failure to 
comply with the statutory notice is a criminal offence,1046 which may result in a fixed 
penalty notice.1047 It will be a defence to show that the best practical means were used 
to prevent the creation of the nuisance,1048 or that the defendant has a reasonable excuse 
for the non-compliance.1049 Expenses can be recovered from the owner by a charge on 
the land,1050 with the possibility of paying by instalments.1051 Any persons aggrieved 
by a statutory nuisance may, by way of summary application to the magistrates’ court, 
request that an order be made for the nuisance’s abatement,1052 or to prevent its 
recurrence.1053 If the magistrates are satisfied that a nuisance exists, or is likely to exist 
if an activity is not abated, an order will be granted under section 82 at the instance of 
the applicant.1054 Section 82 also states that, where the person responsible for the 
nuisance cannot be found, proceedings shall be brought against the current owner of 
the premises.1055  
A number of risks can emerge for a bank because of an abatement notice under Part III. 
Direct liability may be incurred if the bank is identified as the person responsible for 
causing a statutory nuisance by the local authority. However, unless the bank has a 
significant amount of control or participation in the activity that creates the nuisance, 
                                                 
1044 ibid, s 80(2)(c). 
1045 ibid, s 80(3). 
1046 ibid, s 80(4). 
1047 ibid, ss 80(4A) and 80(ZA). 
1048 ibid, s 80(7). 
1049 See, Lambert Flat Management Ltd v Lomas [1981] 1 WLR 898, DC. 
1050 EPA 1990, s 81A. 
1051 ibid, s 81B. 
1052 ibid, s 82(2)(a). 
1053 ibid, s 82(2)(b). 
1054 ibid. 
1055 ibid, s 82(4)(b). 
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this risk is unlikely to materialise. Nevertheless, as sections 80, 81A, and 82 show, 
where the person responsible for the nuisance cannot be found, proceedings may be 
brought against the owner of the facility. Thus, a mortgagee in possession of property 
causing a nuisance may incur lender liability under Part III. While the risk of lender 
liability for statutory nuisance is low, the indirect and reputational risks should be seen 
as much more of a threat. With regards to credit and security risks, an abatement notice 
could confine the operational hours of a business, creating credit risk. As mentioned 
earlier, the court in Coventry v Lawrence (2012)1056 ordered an injunction to limit the 
operational hours of a motorsports stadium. Also, any bank that is associated with a 
client or property that is causing a nuisance may be at risk of reputational harm.   
E. Water Resources Act 1991 
Section 161 of the Water Resources Act 1991 confers upon the EA a statutory power 
that enables it to undertake any anti-pollution works and operations that it deems 
necessary. The EA may recover any expenses reasonably incurred from the person(s) 
who either caused or knowingly permitted the polluting matter to enter or be present in 
any controlled waters.1057 Correspondingly, the EA could also require other persons to 
carry out anti-pollution works by issuing a section 161A works notice.1058 The notice 
can be appealed within twenty-one days from service to the Secretary of State,1059 and 
the non-compliance with a notification constitutes an offence.1060  
                                                 
1056 Coventry (n 782). 
1057 Water Resources Act 1991, s 161(3)(a)-(b). 
1058 ibid, s 161A. 
1059 ibid, s 161C. 
1060 ibid, s 161D. 
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Thus, a section 161A works notice may be served on a mortgagee in possession, 
resulting in lender liability. Alternatively, if a mortgagor is forced to pay for the anti-
pollution works, credit risk could be incurred by the mortgagee.  
F. Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 
Conservation law can restrict the use of an area that is regarded as a ‘special interest’ 
because of its flora, fauna, geology, etc. There are many laws which regulate and protect 
habitats or specified species e.g. the Habitats Directive 1992/43/EEC1061 and the Wild 
Birds Directive 1979.1062 However, one of the most notable national laws for 
conserving the natural environment can be seen in the Wildlife and Countryside Act 
(WCA) 1981.1063 The 1981 Act has created risks for lenders that own or occupy, or 
have borrowers that own or occupy, land. It is, therefore, necessary to mention the 
WCA in this section of the chapter. So, how may the WCA 1981 restrict the use of land, 
creating risks for lenders? First, owners and occupiers of land that is a ‘habitat’ may 
face direct liability if they breach specific statutory duties by conducting regulated 
operations without the required consent. For example, section 28 of the WCA 
establishes ‘sites of special scientific interests’ (SSSIs), which are sites that Natural 
England considers to be, ‘a special interest by reason of any of its flora, fauna, or 
geological or physiographical features.’1064 When designating an SSSI, Natural 
England is under a duty to notify, inter alia, ‘every owner or occupier to any of that 
                                                 
1061 Council Directive 1992/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora OJ L 206 , 22/07/1992 P. 0007 – 0050. 
1062 Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the 
conservation of wild birds OJ L 20, 26.01.2010, 7–25. 
1063 Wildlife and Countryside Act (WCA) 1981. 
1064 WCA 1981, s 28. 
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land of the designation.’1065 The duties of owners and occupiers in relation to SSSIs are 
set out in the section 28E of the WCA.1066 It states that, ‘the owner or occupier of any 
land included in a site of special scientific interest shall not, while the notification under 
section 28(1)(b) remains in force, carry out, or cause or permit to be carried out, on that 
land, any operation specified in the notification.’1067 Liability under this section is 
subject to specific exceptions,1068 and the conditions may be withdrawn or modified by 
Natural England.1069 If a person breaches section 28(1) of the WCA, they commit an 
offence.1070 A person guilty of such an offence may be liable to a fine not exceeding 
£20,000 on summary conviction, or a fine on indictable conviction.1071 On the one hand, 
this restriction may impact the value of land, causing security risk for the bank that 
secures the property under the mortgage. On the other hand, if a borrower commits an 
offence under the WCA 1981, prospects of the repayment of the loan may be lost, 
resulting in a credit risk. While less likely, if a bank forecloses upon the property, 
becoming a mortgagee in possession, it may incur any fines as an owner or occupier 
under section 28 of the WCA. 
Although the designation of land as a habitat is capable of creating risks for the bank, 
invasive ecological species have also proven significantly problematic. It has been 
calculated that the annual cost to deal with Japanese knotweed in Britain was £165 
million in 2013-2014.1072 Knotweed reduces land value, and is difficult to remediate. 
                                                 
1065 ibid. 
1066 ibid, s 28E. 
1067 ibid, s 28E. 
1068 ibid, s 28E(1)(a)-(b). 
1069 ibid, s 28E(6)(a)-(b). 
1070 ibid, s 28P(1). 
1071 ibid. 
1072 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Invasive non-native species: Fourteenth 
Report of Session 2013-2014 (HC 913, 16 April 2014) 11 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvaud/913/913.pdf> accessed 18 
September 2014.  
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Lenders are aware of the risks that can materialise where Japanese knotweed is present 
on land. For example, Respondent 2 said in interview: 
R2: Yeah, it’s like a big weed and they grow up to eight feet tall and they’re 
really hard to remove, uhm, I mean one way is to try and burn it, and then 
you’re stuck with the roots and then they go up. They’re so hardy that they 
start to break into foundations and they are a real problem on sites. I mean 
bio-diversity is a big thing in development sites, because they need it to 
determine the archaeology, and it may stop development, and that can 
cause delays.1073 
Japanese knotweed’s hardy rhizome means that it is a difficult plant to kill. Knotweed 
is capable of causing damage to property, and, as a consequence, will depreciate the 
value of any land that it is situated upon. While it is not illegal for knotweed to be 
situated on a piece of land, it is an invasive species, and, under section 14(2) of the 
WCA 1981, a person will commit a criminal offence if, ‘they plant or otherwise cause 
[Japanese knotweed] to grow in the wild.’1074A person guilty of an offence shall, on 
summary conviction, be liable to a maximum period of six months imprisonment, or a 
£40,000 fine, or both.1075 Upon indictable conviction the prison sentence may increase 
to two years, or an unlimited fine may be awarded, or both.1076 Failure to lawfully 
dispose of Japanese knotweed could lead to liability under Part II of the EPA 1990, as 
the plant is a ‘controlled waste’.1077 By being a controlled waste Japanese knotweed 
                                                 
1073 Interview with Respondent 2. 
1074 WCA 1981, s 14(2). 
1075 ibid. 
1076 ibid. 
1077 EPA 1990, s 34. 
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must be disposed of in accordance with the appropriate waste legislation. A failure to 
do so could amount as a contravention of sections 33 and 34 of the EPA (see section 
on waste). Its excavation requires compliance with the permitting system and must be 
sent to a licensed site and buried at a depth of five metres. Persons within the waste 
transfer chain must apply the waste hierarchy and have a duty to comply with the 
Environmental Permitting (Duty of Care) Regulations 1991.1078 
Banks are not likely to be fixed with direct liability for Japanese knotweed under the 
WCA 1981 or section 34 of the EPA 1990. Nevertheless, there are the indirect and 
reputational risks to consider. The Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors’ (RICS) 
information pamphlet on, Japanese Knotweed and Residential Property (2012)1079 
stated that, ‘In the last few years this uneasy relationship with the plant became more 
than a problem when some lenders reviewed their policies. A number of loans on 
properties were declined.’1080 The Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) and Building 
Societies’ Association (BSA) have shown that there is a general reluctance throughout 
the lending community to grant mortgages to properties subject to Japanese 
knotweed.1081 And this reluctance has emerged because of the credit and security risks 
that attach to land where Japanese knotweed is present.  
 
                                                 
1078 Environmental Permitting (Duty of Care) Regulations 1991. 
1079 Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, ‘Japanese Knotweed and Residential Property’ (RICS, 2012) 
<http://www.rics.org/uk/knowledge/professional-guidance/information-papers/japanese-knotweed-and-
residential-property-1st-edition/> accessed 7 October 2014.  
1080  ibid 3 
1081 ibid. See also, R Gray, ‘Mortgages refused over invasive weed’ Daily Telegraph (London, 13 March 
2010) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/property/propertynews/7436431/Mortgages-refused-over-invasive-
weed.html> accessed 15 September 2014. 
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III. Emerging Risks  
The sources of law discussed in this chapter regulate pollution, or activities which can 
lead to pollution, on land. The data show that lenders have become used to mitigating 
land pollution risks during their conduct of pre- and post-loan due diligence.1082 This 
section assesses, what may be termed as, ‘the emerging legal liabilities’ for lenders 
operating in the UK, i.e. climate change and flooding. While issues relating to climate 
change and flooding have been around for quite some time, the interview data suggest 
that these two risks are overtaking land pollution as the main legislative threat for 
financial institutions.     
A. Climate Change 
Despite being a difficult issue to address, legal controls have been developed at 
international, European, and national levels in order to tackle climate change. In the 
UK, for example, section 1 of the Climate Change Act 20081083 establishes a duty for 
the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is 
lower than the 1990 baseline.1084 Banks, like everyone else, are concerned about the 
future implications that climate change will have. From the data, it is apparent that 
lenders are beginning to question how the banking structure, and financial transactions, 
will respond to the long-term risk exposure caused by the changing climate. When 
asked about future environmental risks for lenders, one respondent stated that: 
                                                 
1082 Refer to chs 7 and 8. 
1083 Climate Change Act 2008. 
1084 ibid, s 1(1)-(2). 
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R11: And the other one that we have not touched on is climate change. How 
do financial institutions get a handle on the longer-term risk exposure? At 
the moment, it is challenging understanding how the nuances of 
environmental regulation will change; but change they will. You’ve just got 
to accept that there is a relatively material level of change there. The 
challenge is that we know that there is more demand for disclosure from 
investors and from civil society; from banks’ responses to climate change… 
and a lot of those are taking the short-term – “Do you finance carbon 
intensive projects?” – starts right now… But actually there will be a point 
in time where the question is: What is the aggregate carbon exposure, or 
climate change exposure, of all of your loan portfolio, which goes back to 
the point I made earlier around reporting scopes and understanding 
financed emissions; but it has to be done in a lot more sophisticated 
manner; and it is not just about emissions – which is a crude way of 
capturing the exposure – but around how a client prepares for the potential 
impacts of climate change. I think it is an in issue that society is trying to 
deal with at the moment, and there are a lot of interesting cognitive studies 
into actually why we are taking so long to come up with the mechanism to 
address this. It is the next frontier! Not just how you respond, internally, 
within your organisation; but how do you engage with clients and discuss. 
There we are where we were with environmental risk management twenty 
years ago.1085 
                                                 
1085 Interview with Respondent 11. 
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Climate change, like land pollution twenty-five years ago, is a growing threat to 
commercial loan financing; and this is particularly so for industries that have a high 
aggregate carbon exposure. The threat of climate change raises a number of pertinent 
questions in relation to the future of environmental risk management practices in banks. 
For example, will lenders be forced, in the near future, to measure the climate change 
exposure of their individual loan portfolios? How will the relationship between lenders 
and their clients operating in high risk areas change (if at all)? Will banks be made 
accountable for their borrowers’ polluting operations? How will environmental due 
diligence change? Is it possible for climate change to affect land value?  
There are a number of legislative initiatives that regulate activities which may increase 
the rate of climate change. Industrial sectors that are likely to harm the environment 
have been placed under increased pressure to comply. For example, the climate change 
levy, which was brought into force by Part II of the Finance Act 20001086 (as 
amended),1087 taxes ‘polluting commodities’,1088 i.e. electricity, natural gas, liquid 
petroleum gas, and coal, lignite and coke.1089 Also, the EU Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) has now begun its third phase of operation (2013 – 2020), and currently regulates 
the air emission of more than 11,000 power stations and industrial plants in more than 
thirty-one countries.1090 Europe’s ‘cap and trade’ system was introduced by Directive 
2004/101/EC,1091 and imposed into the UK by the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
                                                 
1086 Finance Act 2000, pt II. 
1087 Finance Act 2006. 
1088 Finance Act 2000, pt V. 
1089 ibid. 
1090 European Commission, ‘The Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)’ (European Commission, 4 
January 2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm> accessed 12 June 2013.  
1091 Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, 18–23. 
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Scheme Regulations 2012.1092 The cap and trade system operates by capping emissions 
levels through the appointment of allowances per each individual installation.1093 
Emissions now have a value; and surplus allowances are a commodity that may be 
purchased by installations that exceed their annual emissions cap.1094 Essentially the 
ETS is a green method for reducing carbon emissions through economic 
competition.1095 While the ETS is a good idea in theory, the low carbon price has meant 
that it has little effect in practice.  
As well as heavy industry, SMEs and homeowners are also being affected by the 
introduction of climate change legislation. The ‘Green Deal’,1096 for instance, is a 
government initiative to encourage the reduction of carbon emission through energy 
efficiency.1097 However, “Green Deal loans”1098 may be detrimental for the financial 
community. The CML’s website portrays that such a loan remains as, ‘a charge on the 
property for which future owners become responsible.’1099 The article also suggests that 
if a lender goes into possession of a property, ‘it may be liable for continuing 
payments.’1100 The CML states that having such a charge over the land will ultimately 
make selling the property more difficult, reducing its value and marketability. 
                                                 
1092 ibid. 
1093 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Regulations 2012, SI 2012/3038 (as amended). 
1094 European Commission (n 1090). 
1095 ibid. 
1096 Energy Act 2011, pt 1. 
1097 Green Deal Initiative, ‘What is the Green Deal?’ (Green Deal Initiative website, no date) 
<http://www.greendealinitiative.co.uk/> accessed 17 August 2012. 
1098 ‘The Green Deal Explained’ (Which? no date) <http://www.which.co.uk/energy/creating-an-energy-
saving-home/guides/the-green-deal-explained/what-is-the-green-deal/>  accessed 19 September 2014. 
The websites states that, ‘Green Deal loans are repaid through your electricity bill. The way the deal 
differs from a standard loan is that the repayments you'll make on the loan will (in theory at least) be 
covered by the energy bill savings you make from having the energy-saving home improvements 
installed. This system is known as the 'Golden Rule' - you should not pay back more in loan repayments 
than you are saving on your energy bill.’ 
1099 Council of Mortgage Lenders, ‘Lenders respond to Green Deal proposals’ (CML, 1-17 January 2012) 
<http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/publications/newsandviews/105/391#> accessed 12 June 2013. 
1100 ibid.  
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Nevertheless, the Green Deal has not had a significant impact, and has been described 
as a ‘failure’.1101 
Lender liability is not really an issue under climate change legislation. Nevertheless, 
the different initiatives listed above show a general theme; that legislative compliance 
is placing all types of borrowers under pressure, and this is increasing indirect and 
reputational risks for the bank lending community. And this must be taken into account 
by banks, because it is likely that their exercise of due diligence is going to change in 
order to consider their clients’ roles in global warming. In the future, it will not be 
enough to simply ask “Is this site contaminated?” and “What will it take to remediate 
it?” Indeed, environmental due diligence may develop to such an extent that it will be 
necessary for banks to calculate the aggregate carbon exposure of individual loan 
portfolios.  
B. Flooding 
The second ‘emerging environmental risk’ for banks, according to the data, is flood 
risk.  
R2: Well I don’t know if you’ve taken flooding into consideration? 
I: Yes, I’ve done a bit on that. 
                                                 
1101 E Gosden, ‘Green Deal energy efficiency scheme a “disappointing failure”’ Daily Telegraph 
(London, 15 September 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/11095359/Green-Deal-energy-
efficiency-scheme-a-disappointing-failure.html> accessed 19 September 2014. 
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R1: So, if a property gets flooded then it loses its value and they [the 
borrower] become unable to pay the loan back. So that’s assessment – 
desktop study – assessment! And, obviously, the insurance is getting higher 
and higher on that, so that’s going to impact people.1102 
The two main types of flooding are pluvial inundation (damage caused by heavy 
rainfall) or fluvial inundation (damage caused by rivers or seas).1103 Flooding has 
increased over the last few years, and the EA has suggested that over 5.5 million (or 
one in six properties) are currently at risk across England and Wales.1104 
Notwithstanding the fact that much has been done since Sir Michael Pitt’s review of 
flood management in 2007,1105 the natural occurrence of water inundation has proven 
difficult to control, as witnessed by the series of floods that have occurred repeatedly 
over the last few years. Consequently, the National Planning Policy Framework1106 
suggests that, ‘inappropriate development in areas at risk of flooding should be avoided 
by directing development away.’1107 This is not a good prospect for the local economies 
of the high-risk zones, or for businesses that are already situated within such zones. 
Respondent 13, who works for a bank in Switzerland, believes that, along with climate 
change, flooding could become a serious threat to both land value and businesses in the 
UK.  
                                                 
1102 Interview with Respondent 2. 
1103 AS Chen, S Djordjević, J Leandro and DA Savić, ‘An analysis of the combined consequences of 
pluvial and fluvial flooding’ (2010) 62(7) Water Sci Technol 1491. 
1104 Environment Agency, ‘How to Manage Flood Risks’ (EA no date) <http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/floods/31666.aspx>  accessed 12 June 2013. 
1105 M Pitt ‘Learning lessons from the 2007 floods: an independent review by Sir Michael Pitt’ (The 
Cabinet Office 2008) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittre
view/_/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/flooding_review/pitt_review_full%20pdf.pdf> 
accessed 12 June 2013 
1106 NPPF (n 4). 
1107 ibid, para 100. 
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R13: Well in the UK it could be in flood areas [talking about emerging 
environmental risks].1108 
On 23 May 2013 the Law Society issued a Practice Note on flood risk for solicitors 
involved in property transactions.1109 The Practice Note states: 
‘Flooding is a growing risk for British property. Aside from physical 
damage caused by floods, if a property is at risk of flooding it may be 
difficult to: 
 obtain a mortgage 
 obtain suitable insurance cover, or 
 sell the property. 
This is likely to affect the value of the property.’1110 
In relation to the advice that a solicitor should give when acting for a lender in 
conveyancing transactions, the Law Society recommends:  
‘You may have additional obligations when acting for lenders. Lenders are 
increasingly likely to investigate the potential flood risk of prospective 
security either as part of their valuation process or by searching. Lenders 
                                                 
1108 Interview with Respondent 13. 
1109 The Law Society, Flood Risk (The Law Society, 23 May 2014) 
<http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/flood-risk/> (accessed 28 November 2013). 
1110 ibid, para. 1.2.  
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may impose additional requirements in their instructions to you as a result 
of their investigations.’1111 
Rather than being fearful of being made liable under a specific law, the Practice Note 
implies that banks are becoming more concerned about the indirect risks that may 
emerge from flooding. And indeed lenders should be concerned. The Association of 
British Insurers’ (ABI) website states that, ‘The wettest winter on record [2013] is likely 
to result in £446 million being paid in insurance claims to customers whose homes, 
businesses, and vehicles were flooded – the equivalent of £6.7 million a day - according 
to updated figures.’1112 Insurance companies have become increasingly reluctant to 
grant cover to properties within high risk flood areas. This is problematic for borrowers, 
since, ‘Mortgage providers and other lenders expect you to have building insurance in 
place to cover any property against which you secure a loan. Being unable to secure an 
insurance policy could have implications for your mortgage and could make it more 
difficult to sell your property.’1113 After the floods in 2000, an agreement called ‘the 
Statement of Principles’ (SoP) was set up between the ABI, the Government, and 
lending institutions. The agreement committed insurers to provide reasonable cover for 
people based within high-risk flood areas. This agreement allowed the property market 
to remain competitive, and prevented the on-set of property blight. For lenders, it 
offered a great deal of certainty in assessing the risks within areas prone to flooding. 
After the floods of 2007, the ABI stated that the agreement would not be renewed, and 
would come to an end in 2013. If another agreement was not made, two hundred 
                                                 
1111 ibid, para. 4.2. 
1112 Association of British Insurers, ‘£6.7 million a day in insurance claims from customers hit by the 
recent flooding’ (ABI, 13 November 2014) <https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2014/03/6-7-
million-a-day-in-insurance-claims-from-customers-hit-by-the-recent-flooding> accessed 18 September 
2014. 
1113 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Obtaining flood insurance in high risk areas 
(Defra, July 2012) 4. 
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thousand homes would be without the appropriate insurance cover.1114 The decision to 
dissolve the SoP created a great deal of uncertainty for lenders. An article on the CML’s 
website suggested that, ‘Uncertainty about the future cost and availability of insurance 
may affect the ability to sell or obtain a mortgage on a property.’1115  The article goes 
on to stipulate that many properties situated within high risk areas could become 
unsalable on the open market and restricted to cash buyers.1116 Also, persons who own 
properties in areas considered high-risk will be unable to obtain or renew their 
mortgage, which ‘may affect the ability of the borrower to continue to meet future 
mortgage commitments, and the lender’s assessment of the affordability of the 
loan. Uncertainty about the extent to which premiums may rise may make affordability 
difficult to assess.’1117 If no further agreement was made after the SoP, some owners 
within these areas would have to obtain an insurance policy through a specialist broker, 
leading to the payment of high premium costs for their cover. This would create credit 
and security risks for bank lenders, as the difficulty in obtaining the appropriate 
insurance will, ‘add to the problems that the market has and may have implications for 
the value of properties against which loans are secured.’1118 Even though the SoP has 
now been repealed in its entirety, the agreement shall be replaced with ‘Flood Re’. 
According to the ABI, Flood Re is:  
                                                 
1114 ‘“200,000 homes ‘at flooding risk’” (BBC News; Business, 31 January 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16794696> accessed 13 August 2012. 
1115 Council of Mortgage Lenders, ‘Market needs confidence on flooding insurance’ (CML; News and 
Views, 2 May 2012) <http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/publications/newsandviews/112/420> accessed 13 
August 2012. 
1116 ibid.  
1117 ibid.  
1118 ibid. 
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‘a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) on how to develop a not-for-
profit scheme - Flood Re - that would ensure flood insurance remains 
widely affordable and available.’1119 
Flood Re is expected to come into operation by the end of 2015.1120 When it does, it 
will aim to protect the ability for properties in high risk flood areas to obtain the 
necessary insurance by generating money through ‘capped premiums’, which are set as 
a levy on Council Tax.1121 Flood Re has already proved controversial.1122 For example, 
the scheme is expected to affect many buy-to-let landlords. Gray, reporting for The 
Financial Times, states that: ‘Tens of thousands of buy-to-let landlords face a huge rise 
in insurance premiums due to government plans to exclude rented homes from its long-
awaited flood insurance subsidy fund.’1123 Also, Flood Re did not initially provide 
cover to, ‘Homes in the highest Council Tax bank H in England’.1124 Fortunately later 
amendments to the scheme now means that homes in the highest tax band will be 
covered.1125 In response to this amendment, the Chairman of the ABI, Paul Evans, said: 
‘this is a great result that will ensure continued access to affordable insurance for all 
who were previously covered by our voluntary statement of principles.’1126 Even so, 
                                                 
1119 Association of British Insurers, ‘The Future of Flood Insurance: What you need to know about Flood 
Re’ (ABI website, 27 June 2013) <https://www.abi.org.uk/Insurance-and-savings/Topics-and-
issues/Flooding/Government-and-insurance-industry-flood-agreement/The-Future-of-Flood-Insurance> 
accessed 28 November 2013.  
1120 ibid. 
1121 ibid. 
1122 ibid. 
1123 A Gray, ‘Buy-to-let landlords fear losing insurance’ Financial Times (London, 22 January 2014) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d982dc4-82b5-11e3-8119-00144feab7de.html#axzz38OO7Tm3R>    
accessed 24 July 2014. 
1124 ibid. 
1125 S Christie, ‘Flood insurance scheme is expanded to include riverside mansions’ The Telegraph 
(London, 18 December 2014) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/insurance/11301860/Flood-insurance-scheme-is-
expanded-to-include-riverside-mansions.html> accessed 20 July 2015; and Association of British 
Insurers, ‘All systems go for Flood Re’ (ABI website, 18 December 2014) 
<https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-releases/2014/12/All-systems-go-for-Flood-Re> accessed 20 July 
2015. 
1126 S Christie, ‘Flood insurance scheme is expanded to include riverside mansions’ (ibid). 
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there is still uncertainty as to how effective this state-funded insurance scheme will be 
for providing cover to properties based in high risk flood areas. Thus flood risk remains 
to be an ‘emerging environmental risk’ which is capable of impacting upon the lender-
borrower relationship; it is significant not for lender liability, but for the prospective 
indirect risks that it can create for financial institutions operating in the UK. 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter of the thesis has outlined miscellaneous bodies of law that may create 
environment-related risks for lenders. From reviewing the different sources of national 
law, it is clear that lender liability for environmental damage is a relatively low risk for 
UK lenders. Nevertheless, the credit, security, and reputational risks are more of a 
threat. There are also ‘emerging risks’, i.e. climate change and flooding, which are 
overtaking land pollution as the primary legislative risk for banks. Indeed, the future of 
environmental due diligence in commercial lending practices is likely to grow and 
develop to respond to the new threats. 
The next chapter (Chapter 4) analyses the overlap between insolvency law and specific 
environmental regulatory regimes for preventing pollution.  
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Chapter 4: 
Environmental Law and Insolvency  
Today, compliance with environmental law and regulation is one of a range of factors 
that businesses need to consider in their reasonable exercise of due diligence. There are 
a number of environmental laws, both common law and statute, that can create risks for 
both lenders and borrowers.1127 Barlow believes that, ‘As the array of environmental 
issues that are addressed through legislation and case law has increased, there has been 
an escalation in the range of, and exposure to, environmental liabilities for which a 
company may be accountable.’1128 If a borrower creates pollution, being then 
accountable to remediate that pollution, it may default on the repayment of the loan 
owed to the bank, and become insolvent. Following a borrower’s insolvency, the bank 
may exercise its securities in order to recover its debt.1129 Jarvis and Fordham suggest 
that, ‘This is really just one part of the responsible borrower’s monitoring function: the 
all-important question of when to call in the loan, but it gives rise to questions about 
whether and how to collect the debt.’1130  
This chapter demonstrates why lenders are relatively unconcerned by the lender 
liability threat that may be incurred under environmental law following a borrower’s 
insolvency. The chapter therefore assists in answering the overarching research 
question and sub-question 1. As with the previous two chapters, it shows how the laws 
                                                 
1127 cf Defra, Better Regulation (n 6).  
1128 M Barlow, ‘Insolvency: the environmental perspective’ (TheIn-HouseLawyer.co.uk, 10 June 2009) 
<http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/environment/7350-insolvency-the-environmental-
perspective> accessed 20 September 2014.  
1129 O’Donovan (n 63) 551. 
1130 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 77. 
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relating to environmental protection are currently low risk to lenders; and this explains 
why the lenders’ perceptions of the risks have changed over the last twenty-five years. 
The chapter also provides strong evidence for why post-loan due diligence is a wholly 
necessary feature in the banks’ environmental risk management. As a consequence it 
can be linked to sub-question 2, which asks how lenders ‘exercise and shape’ there due 
diligence functions. The chapter does three things: 
 It evaluates the definition of insolvency; 
 It outlines different remedies that are available for lenders when ‘taking 
security’; and finally 
 It shows how environmental legislation is currently conceding ground against 
more established legal regimes, like insolvency.   
The first two sections of this chapter provide the background knowledge that is 
necessary for understanding the later discussion. The third section is most important; it 
highlights how the old regulatory regime for granting licences to waste operators1131 
(now replaced by the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 
2010)1132 was significantly weakened in a number of judicial decisions, which ruled 
that insolvency law trumps the ability of the waste regulatory authority to deny the 
surrender of a waste management licence. Broadly, judgments of the courts in this area 
have further weakened environmental law in the opinions of the banks (as well as other 
                                                 
1131 EPA 1990, pt II. 
1132 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/675 (as amended). Part 
II of the EPA 1990 and the Regulations are outlined, in detail, in Chapter 3. 
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stakeholders), and represent yet another blow for the redevelopment of environmentally 
suspect land situated throughout the United Kingdom. The following section considers 
the definition of insolvency. 
I. The Definition of ‘Insolvency’ 
‘Insolvency’ is defined in section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986.1133 There are two 
types of insolvency.1134 The first is called ‘cash flow insolvency’,1135 which will 
emerge, ‘if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay 
its debts as they fall due.’1136 And ‘debts’ should include both the future and current 
debts of a company.1137 A company can be wound-up either by the court, or through 
creditors’ actions. When a company is wound-up by the court, it is called ‘compulsory 
liquidation’.1138 In accordance with section 123(1)(a) of the 1986 Act, a creditor that is 
owed a sum of, or exceeding, £750, may serve a written notice to request that repayment 
be made by the borrower.1139 If the borrower fails to repay the debt within three weeks, 
they will be classified as insolvent.1140 Such an inability to pay debts may indeed be 
induced by the obligation to remediate pollution (etc.) that was created by the company 
during the course of its operations. As well as compulsory liquidation, there is also 
‘voluntary liquidation’ to consider here. If a company is unable to pay its debts as they 
fall due, or a winding-up resolution is passed by the company directors,1141 it is within 
                                                 
1133 Insolvency Act 1986, s 123. 
1134 ibid, s 123(1). 
1135 ibid. 
1136 ibid, s 123(1)(e). 
1137 In re Cheyne Finance plc (In Receivership) (No. 2) [2008] Bus LR 1562, para 54 (Briggs J). 
1138 Companies House, ‘Liquidation and Insolvency’ (Companies House, February 2014) 18 
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/about/pdf/gpo8.pdf accessed 24 July 2014. 
1139 Insolvency Act 1986, s 123(1)(a). 
1140 ibid.  
1141 Companies Act 2006, s 283(1): ‘A special resolution of the members (or of a class of members) of a 
company means a resolution passed by a majority of not less than 75%.’ 
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the creditors’ rights to wind-up the company voluntarily.1142 This is achieved in a 
creditors’ meeting, which usually takes place fourteen days after the passing of the 
special resolution. During this meeting the creditors can question the company directors 
on the company’s failure, and/or cast a vote on whether to appoint a liquidator.1143 Once 
appointed, the liquidator will act to wind-up the company, and liquidate any assets 
owed to the creditors.1144   
By virtue of section 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986, a company may also be classed 
as insolvent where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that, ‘the value of the 
company’s assets is less than the amount of its liabilities, taking into account its 
contingent and prospective liabilities.’1145 This is referred to as ‘balance sheet’ 
insolvency. Significant environmental liabilities could cause a company’s balance sheet 
to show that the company’s assets are less than the amount of its liabilities. If leniency 
is permitted, balance sheet insolvency could be used as an escape route for borrowers 
that cause environmental damage, and do not wish to take on their contingent and 
prospective liabilities. The Court of Appeal has taken a narrow interpretation of balance 
sheet insolvency. Following the case of BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail 
[2011] EWCA Civ 227,1146 before the court provides their satisfaction of a company’s 
insolvency, it must first make sure that the debtor has passed ‘the point of no return’.1147 
This is the test to be applied prior to declaring that the debtor is not able to repay the 
loan. Environmental liabilities may, in some cases, overshadow the assets of some 
companies; however, this does not always mean that the debtor company has no funds 
                                                 
1142 Companies House (n 1125) 15. 
1143 ibid, 16. 
1144 ibid. 
1145 Insolvency Act 1986, s 123(2). 
1146 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail [2011] EWCA Civ 227. 
1147 ibid, para 48 (Lord Neuberger MR). 
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left to effectively remediate the pollution that it has caused. The strict test in BNY 
should prevent companies from opting out of any remediation costs that they are liable 
to pay.  
Balance sheet insolvency has also allowed the escalation of a new phenomenon, 
‘phoenix companies’ (i.e. where the debtor company is wound up, and from its ashes 
another, almost identical company arises, free from any liability or debt).1148 In order 
to prevent the creation of phoenix companies, section 216 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
places a restriction on the re-use of a company’s name by a director, or shadow 
director,1149 at any time in the period of twelve months following the company’s 
liquidation.1150 If a director, or shadow director, breaches this section, they are liable to 
a term of imprisonment, a fine, or both.1151  
The case of Anslow v Norton Aluminium Ltd [2012] EWHC 26101152 is particularly 
important to mention in this section. Anslow concerned a group litigation order for 
claims for damages in respect of a private nuisance created by an aluminium foundry. 
The claimants were awarded damages totalling £1.2 million.1153 However, in an effort 
to try and avoid the judgment, the owner put the company into administration. A 
personal costs order was then issued against the company’s managing director,1154 such 
an order was later held to be pari passu with other unsecured debts.1155 Anslow 
                                                 
1148 C Nyombi, ‘Lifting the veil of incorporation under common law and statute’ (2014) Int JLM 66, 74. 
See also, Thorne v Silverleaf (1994) BCC 109. 
1149 Companies Act 2006, s 251; and Insolvency Act 1986, s 251. 
1150 Insolvency Act 1986, s 216(1). 
1151 ibid, s 216(4). 
1152 Anslow (n 781) 2610. 
1153 S Tromans, ‘Environmental cases to watch’ (Lexology, 3 February 2014) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=56a5da3f-73a4-4685-9cdf-cc4f6aae8f9b> accessed 22 
September 2014.   
1154 ibid.   
1155 Bloom v Pensions Regulator [2013] UKSC 52. 
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demonstrates how corporate liquidation will not be tolerated as a means to by-pass 
liability for environmental damage.  
II. Taking Security 
A loan is capable of being ‘called in’ on the demand of the mortgagee.1156 In the event 
of default, the mortgagee, or an agent acting on its behalf, may peaceably1157 enter into 
possession of the mortgaged property through foreclosure, or by collecting rents from 
the mortgagor.1158 The power to take possession is found in Schedule 1 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, for example.1159 However, a lender of a second charge mortgage 
is required to obtain a court order before possession is taken.1160 In the environmental 
context, physical foreclosure is quite ineffective, and ‘rarely used’ by lenders as a 
means of taking security.1161 This is because, as shown in the previous two chapters, 
the mortgagee could incur principal liability as an owner or occupier of property that is 
subject to environmental issues.1162  
Secondly, a mortgagee, or a receiver appointed by the mortgagee, may exercise its 
power of sale as a way of repaying the mortgage.1163 This power can derive under the 
Law of Property Act 1925,1164 or through specific provisions held within the mortgage 
                                                 
1156 Lloyds Bank plc v Lampert [1999] 1 All ER (Comm.) 161. See also, O’Donovan (n 63) 546. 
1157 Ropaigealach v Barclays Bank plc CA [1999] 4 All ER 235. 
1158 O’Donovan (n 63) 544. 
1159 Insolvency Act 1986, sch 1. However, cf AJA 1970, s 36. 
1160 Consumer Credit Act 1974, s 126. See also, Ropaigealach (n 1157) 235. 
1161 O’Donovan (n 63) 544. 
1162 Take, for example, the Midland Bank case, where the bank was held liable under Part II of the EPA 
1990. See, Devonshire WRA (n 652).  
1163 O’Donovan (n 63) 544. See also, Bank of Baroda v Panessar [1987] 1 Ch 335, 346 for where a loan 
condition is breached. 
1164 Law of Property Act 1925, s 121. 
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document.1165 There is no duty for the mortgagee to exercise its power of sale over the 
mortgaged securities ‘at any particular time or at all.’1166 Hood suggests that, ‘One 
reason why a delay in selling a secured asset is not a breach of the mortgagee’s duties 
to the mortgagor, is because nothing has happened to the actual secured asset: it still 
exists as before, albeit that its value may have decreased (or increased).’1167 
Nevertheless, the mortgagee owes an equitable duty to its mortgagor to take reasonable 
care to obtain the proper price.1168 Also, with regards to the receiver, ‘he is under no 
liability to the mortgagor unless he acts in bad faith or fails to take reasonable steps to 
obtain a proper price at the relevant time.’1169  
When a mortgagor is in default, the mortgagee may ‘appoint a receiver or manager1170 
or an administrative receiver1171 to collect the secured property, carry on the 
mortgagor’s business and sell the secured property.’1172 The person appointed to act 
must be a qualified ‘insolvency practitioner’.1173 There are two types of insolvency 
practitioner that may be appointed: (1) administrative receivers;1174 and (2) Law of 
Property Act (LPA) receivers.1175 The difference between these two receivers can be 
identified by their source of appointment. Administrative receivers are appointed by 
virtue of specific terms and conditions held within a mortgage document; they are also 
                                                 
1165 O’Donovan (n 63) 569-570. 
1166 China and South Sea Bank Ltd v Tan [1990] 1 AC 536, 545 (Lord Templeman). However, there are 
statutory exceptions, see, Law of Property Act 1925, s 91(2). 
1167 Hood (n 71) 532. 
1168 Cuckmere Brick Co Ltd v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] 1 Ch 949, 967 (Cross LJ). See also, Standard 
Chartered Bank Ltd v Walker [1982] 1 WLR 1410. Further to this read, O’Donovan (n 63) 573.   
1169 Silven Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2004] 1 WLR 997, 1002 (Lightman J). 
1170 Insolvency Act 1986, s 29(1). 
1171 ibid, s 29(2). 
1172 O’Donovan (n 63) 544. 
1173 Insolvency Act 1986, s 390. 
1174 ibid, s 29. 
1175 Law of Property Act, s 109. 
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known as ‘fixed charged receivers’.1176 Alternatively, LPA receivers are, as the name 
suggests, appointed under the Law of Property Act 1925.1177 The administrative 
receiver ‘is deemed to be the company’s agent’ under section 44(1) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986.1178 Liability will not be transferred to the lender while the receiver acts as 
agent of the company. However, if a lender controls or otherwise directs the receiver’s 
activities, liability may be transferred to the bank that acts in such a capacity.1179 
According to the ratio established in the case of Standard Chartered Bank v Walker 
[1982] 1 WLR 1410, CA (Eng),1180 even though the receiver is the agent of the 
mortgagor, a mortgagee that interferes with the receivership may be ‘liable for the 
receiver’s conduct’,1181 as the receiver becomes a de facto agent of the lender.1182 
However, the agency relationship is ‘something of a fiction’,1183 since its ‘primary duty 
is to try to bring about the situation where the secured debt is repaid.’1184 When 
appointed, the administrative receiver takes over the management of the debtor 
company1185 ‘with a view of either selling: (i) the business (or part of it) as a going 
concern, or (ii) the assets, caught by the floating charge.’1186 Bryce suggests that: ‘In 
the cases where they may be exercising some management control then they are 
                                                 
1176 A Salata, ‘Fixed charged receivership – ironing out lender and borrower misconceptions’ (Corporate 
Rescue and Insolvency, June 2012) 80 <http://www.jordensalata.com/articles/CRI_Jun_F4_Salata.pdf> 
accessed 9 April 2014. 
1177 Law of Property Act 1925, s 109. 
1178 Insolvency Act 1986, s 44(1). See also, Gosling v Gaskell [1987] AC 575 HL. 
1179 M Edwards, ‘Insolvency practitioners and environmental law’ (2010) 57 Env Law 5.  
1180 Standard Chartered (n 1168). 
1181 Hood (n 71) 574. 
1182 ibid. See also, Standard Chartered Bank (n 1168); Medforth v Blake [2000] Ch 86, 95 (Sir Richard 
Scott VC); Silven Properties (n 1169); and O’Donovan (n 63) 577. 
1183 Hood (n 71) 569. 
1184 ibid, 563. See also, Silven Properties (n 1169).  
1185 Moss Steamship Co Ltd v Whitney [1912] AC 254, 263. 
1186 Hood (n 71) 564. 
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obviously vulnerable under certain offences but generally they are not personally 
liable.’1187  
Because insolvency practitioners, when appointed, are deemed to act as the agent of the 
mortgagor, and are sometimes exempt from personal liability under specific statutes, 
lenders are less likely to incur liability when using receivers to take security and repay 
their debt. For example, insolvency practitioners are excluded from personal liability 
under Part IIA of the EPA, i.e. section 78X(3) of the EPA 1990 states that, ‘persons 
that act in the relevant capacity’, are exempt from personal liability, and from being 
found guilty of an offence under section 78M of the EPA 1990. Nevertheless, Egede 
and Lee suggest:  
‘Insolvency practitioners also need to exercise caution. The turn of the 
century saw a rash of cases in which insolvency practitioners were fixed 
with holding waste licences that constituted burdens upon rather than 
benefits to the companies with which they were dealing1188… Although the 
receiver will act as agent of the company, this does not guarantee freedom 
from personal liability for environmental offences which occur or continue 
during the receiver's time in the company. Nor is the position of the receiver 
or, for that matter, the lender clear at the point at which the company goes 
into liquidation.’1189 
                                                 
1187 A Bryce, ‘Environmental liability: practical issues for lenders’ (1992) 7(4) JIBL 131, 135.  
1188 This is discussed in the next section. 
1189 Egede and Lee (n 56) 877-879.  
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Insolvency within the United Kingdom has become, in many respects, ‘Americanised’ 
by the implementation of the Enterprise Act 2002.1190 Now the proceedings involved 
in an insolvency claim are more in line with the United States’ Chapter 11 procedure. 
The adoption of the Chapter 11 procedure, in the USA, largely came about in order to 
protect companies from, for lack of a better word, ‘hostile’ leverage buyouts (LBOs), 
i.e. ‘corporate raids’, ‘greenmailing’ and ‘hostile takeovers’, which became a lucrative 
activity for some of the United States’ private-equity companies during the 1980s. 
Thus, despite the fact that companies are still being wound up all of the time, the option 
of recovery must at least be visited before the liquidator permits the sequestration of an 
insolvent company’s assets to recompense for its secured creditors’ debts. The Act of 
2002 therefore provides other avenues to take when companies fall into trouble. 
Nevertheless, it would seem that, at times of a borrower’s insolvency, most banks 
would prefer liquidation as opposed to recovery options. In interview, Respondent 3 
said: 
I: Do banks often use the practitioners then, as a sort of middleman? 
R3: Well, yeah, I mean the banks often end up having to appoint insolvency 
practitioners. Yeah, but they, frankly, not here, but my experience with 
other banks is that they would prefer that no money be spent on stuff that 
wasn’t flowing back to them. What the banks want in insolvency is to get 
paid as much as possible, and I never got the sense that the banks which 
appointed us were ever interested in protecting people or the environment. 
                                                 
1190 Enterprise Act 2002, pt 10. See also, S Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 
2002’ (2004) 67(2) MLR 247; J Armour, A Hsu and A Walters, ‘Corporate Insolvency in the United 
Kingdom: The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2008) 5(2) European Company and Financial Law 
Review 148.  
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It was often that our insolvency practitioner would say, “Look, I’m 
personally liable here, I have to do this because I am the officer of the court, 
and I have to protect myself etc., etc., so tough s**t!” But I know that the 
banks were p****d off because they wanted as much money as they could 
get for themselves as possible. In those cases, I didn’t get the sense that the 
banks were particularly accepting, you know, they didn’t really 
acknowledge those types of responsibilities. Without mentioning any 
names… but yeah… it was a bit of an eye opener at times.1191 
The next section analyses the conflict that has emerged between environmental and 
insolvency laws. It adds strength to the argument that environmental law poses an 
insignificant direct risk to the financial institutions based in the UK.    
III. ‘Colliding Statutes’1192 
In Re Wilmott Trading Co Ltd (No. 2) [2000] BCC 321,1193 Neuberger J, referring to 
the EPA 1990 (the previous law governing waste management licences) and the 
Insolvency Act 1986, suggested that, ‘This is a difficult area of the law, where one has 
two colliding statutes’. This section discusses these statutes, and the conflict that has 
emerged between them. 
                                                 
1191 Interview with Respondent 3. 
1192 Re Wilmott Trading Co Ltd (No 2) [2000] BCC 321, 330 (Neuberger J).  
1193 ibid. 
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Environmental law has come into conflict with the law on insolvency. In relation to this 
issue, one banking respondent said: 
I: I suppose the law sometimes conflicts. 
R1: Yes, with insolvency! We get involved when they disclaim it [e.g. 
property] as onerous. That’s a big issue in insolvency! A big environmental 
issue! 
I: Yes, there are a couple of cases with waste management licences, and 
whether they can disclaim that as ‘onerous property’. 
R1: Yes, waste management is quite tricky because of its nature. You’ve got 
to be ‘fit and proper’, and you’ve got to be able to hold a licence. So, yes, 
it’s a difficult one! What we do in the banks is put environmental risk into 
practice. And because we take a non-technical view, we are able to sign a 
lot of cases off. And because I work in recoveries, we know where we lose 
money. 
I: So, even high risk can be profitable? 
R1: Exactly!
1194 
Following the above discussion with respondent 1, this section evaluates, specifically, 
the overlap that has occurred between waste management and insolvency. Having an 
                                                 
1194 Interview with Respondent 1. Brackets added. 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
204 
onerous charge on property could have a number of implications for lenders. Land that 
has a licence attached to it, for instance, will decrease the estate’s value, because of the 
onus that it causes for a future purchaser. This creates security risk for a mortgagee to 
which the mortgage money is owed. By becoming the owner or occupier of the site, the 
lender is at risk of adopting any liabilities that are attached to the land, including an 
onerous environmental licence. This is why lenders will appoint a receiver to manage 
and sell the property of a mortgagor in default (as described above). To maximise its 
creditors’ interests, the receiver may disclaim any property that it considers to be 
‘onerous’.1195 However, this ability has directly conflicted with the regulatory 
authority’s power to surrender licences that it issues under specific environmental 
regulation.1196 The following section outlines the law, and the judiciary’s interpretation 
of the law.  
A. The Power to Disclaim ‘Onerous Property’ 
Section 178(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 states:  
‘the liquidator may, by the giving of the prescribed notice, disclaim any 
onerous property and may do so notwithstanding that he has taken 
possession of it, endeavoured to sell it, or otherwise exercised rights of 
ownership in relation to it.’1197  
                                                 
1195 Insolvency Act 1986, s 178. 
1196 EPA 1990, s 35(11). 
1197 Insolvency Act 1986, s 178(2). 
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In order for section 178 to apply, the liquidator must first establish whether the asset is 
capable of being disclaimed as ‘onerous property’.1198 Only ‘property’ pursuant to the 
definition in section 436 of the 1986 Act1199 can be disclaimed as ‘onerous’, namely:  
‘“Property” includes money, goods, things in action, land and every 
description of property wherever situated and also obligations and every 
description of interest, whether present or future or vested or contingent, 
arising out of, or incidental to, property.’1200 
Regulators have suggested that a licence is not property, but merely a form of personal 
permission to conduct an activity.1201 The courts have taken a broad interpretation of 
this definition of property,1202 and case law has included a ‘waste management licence’ 
as property under the definition in section 436.1203 As a general provision, section 178 
of the 1986 Act appoints liquidators for the winding up of a company.1204 And onerous 
property, according to section 178(3), is identifiable as any unprofitable contract,1205 
and/or any other property of the company that is unsalable or readily saleable and may 
give rise to a liability for the payment of money or the performance of any other onerous 
act.1206  
                                                 
1198 ibid, s 436. 
1199 ibid. 
1200 Insolvency Act 1986, s 436. 
1201 See the Environment Agency’s submissions in Official Receiver (as Liquidator of Celtic Extraction 
Ltd and Bluestone Chemicals Ltd) v Environment Agency [2001] Ch 475; and Environment Agency v 
Hillridge Ltd [2003] EWHC 3023 (Ch). 
1202 Paramount Airways Ltd., re, [1990] B.C.C. 130, 148 (Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C). See also, 
Suwalsky, re [1928] B & CR 142. 
1203 See for example: Mineral Resources, re, [1999] 1 All ER 746 (Neuberger J); Celtic Extraction (n 
1201); and Hillridge (n 1201). While all of these cases agreed that a waste management licence should 
be classed as property, they differed in their opinions of whether such a provision is wholly disclaimable. 
1204 EPA 1990, s 178. 
1205 Insolvency Act 1986, s 178(3)(a).  
1206 ibid, s 178(3)(b). 
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B.  The Waste Management Licence 
It is important to note from the outset that the old licensing regime that issued waste 
management licences under the EPA 1990 has now been replaced by the Environmental 
Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010.1207 The Regulations have 
consolidated a number of the old systems of licensing into one. A more in depth outline 
of the Regulations can be found in Chapter 3.1208 Briefly, the Regulations have replaced 
waste management licences with environmental permits. While an operator of a facility 
may apply for a single site permit,1209 the Regulations also authorise the consolidation 
of a number of environmental permits.1210 Thus, it is possible for the same operator to 
be authorised by more than one environmental permit,1211 or a facility’s ‘old permits’ 
can be replace with a single environmental permit,1212 etc. It is yet unknown whether 
an environmental permit can be disclaimed in the same way as a waste management 
licence. This is largely because receivers may no longer be able to disclaim the whole 
of a consolidated permit. All the same, it is important to evaluate the old system of 
licensing under the EPA 1990, since this area provides judicial dialogue to suggest that 
environmental law does not present a significant direct risk to lenders during an 
insolvency scenario.  
 Section 35(1) of the EPA 1990 defines a ‘waste management licence’ as follows: 
                                                 
1207 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/675. 
1208 Refer to ch 3, pg 163. 
1209 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/675, reg 17. 
1210 ibid, reg 18. 
1211 ibid, reg 18(1). 
1212 ibid, reg 18(2). 
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‘A waste management licence is a licence granted by a waste regulation 
authority authorising the treatment, keeping or disposal of any specified 
description of controlled waste in or on specified land or the treatment or 
disposal of any specified description of controlled waste by means of 
specified mobile plant.’ 1213 
This licence was created, therefore, to regulate the activities of waste operators, and to 
limit any environmental damage that may be caused during their work with controlled 
waste. Pursuant to section 35(11) of the EPA, ‘A licence shall continue in force until… 
it is revoked entirely by the waste regulation authority under section 38 below or it is 
surrendered or its surrender is accepted under section 39 below.’1214 An example of 
where a waste management licence could be revoked was where it appeared to the 
regulatory authority, ‘that the holder of the licence has ceased to be a fit and proper 
person by reason of his having been convicted of a relevant offence.’1215 A licence 
could only be surrendered if the regulating authority that granted the licence accepted 
its surrender,1216 and transferred by the waste regulatory authority where, upon 
application to the authority, the licensee’s transfer was accepted by the regulatory 
authority.1217  
The issues surrounding the conflict that occurred between section 35 of the EPA and 
section 178 of the Insolvency Act have been settled in the courts. Some of the case law 
is outlined below. 
                                                 
1213 EPA 1990, s 35(1). 
1214 ibid, s 35(11). 
1215 ibid, s 38(1)(a). 
1216 ibid, s 39(1). 
1217 ibid, s 40(2). 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
208 
C. Case Law 
Before the EPA 1990 was in force, the creditors’ interests were, without doubt, the main 
priority of the liquidators during the winding up of the company. Now public interest 
and reputational concerns dictate that the environment should also be taken into account 
in such proceedings.1218 This has led to a conflict to arise between the two opposing 
regimes. Shelbourn suggests: 
‘Recent case law has greatly diminished the strength of the powers 
Parliament originally gave to regulators under Part III of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 to secure the long-term maintenance of waste sites, 
particularly landfills.’1219 
Bankers are aware of the conflict that has emerged between the two overlapping legal 
areas. In relation to this issue, Respondent 3 suggested that:  
R3: There’s conflict between the Enterprise Act, [respondent meant 
Insolvency Act here] which controls corporate insolvency, and 
environmental protection legislation. A company can go bust, and disclaim 
its permit as onerous property, and say, “We’re bust! We don’t need to do 
all of the stuff that it says in the permit!” And the Agency goes mad when 
                                                 
1218 B Mamutse and V Fogleman, ‘Improving the treatment of environmental claims in insolvency’ 
(2013) 5 JBL 486.  
1219 C Shelbourn, ‘Waste management sites, insolvency and long term financial provisions – the story 
continues…’ (2004) Jun JPL 697, 707. 
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that happens because it means that they end up having to manage these 
sites.1220  
The interviewee then went on to reference a ‘test case’: 
R3: Well, there was some test case where the Environment Agency went 
after the insolvency practitioner; it was like the administrator, and tried to 
get the company to pay. So, they won the first case, and then it was 
appealed, and I think they lost it on the second hearing, or whatever. So, I 
think the Agency didn’t come out on top of that one either, but, essentially, 
I think the decision was that the Enterprise Act, or insolvency legislation, 
trumps the Environmental Protection Act. I think that that appears to be the 
case at the moment. 1221 
The judiciary has attempted to address the extent to which a liquidator, by virtue of the 
powers conferred upon it under the Insolvency Act 1986, can disclaim a waste 
management licence, which is made in accordance with Part II of the EPA 1990, as 
‘onerous property’.1222 Prez and Keay suggest that this issue represents more than a 
legal moot point.1223 It is ‘a conflict of public interest’,1224 which is increasingly 
dictating that the environment should also now be considered when a company falls 
into insolvency, and leaves environmental issues post mortem.  
                                                 
1220 Interview with Respondent 3. Brackets added. 
1221 ibid. 
1222 For a definition of ‘onerous property’, see, Insolvency Act 1986, s178(3). For a definition of 
‘property’, see, Insolvency Act 1986, s 436. 
1223 P De Prez and A Keay, ‘Insolvency and environmental principles: a case study in a conflict of public 
interests’ (2001) 3(2) Env L Rev 90 
1224 ibid. See also, A Keay, ‘Insolvency Law: a matter of public interest?’ (2000) 51 NILQ 509. 
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1.  Re Mineral Resources Ltd 1225 
In 1992 Mineral Resources Ltd was granted a waste disposal licence in respect of a 
landfill site by the local council under the Control of Pollution Act 1974.1226 With effect 
from May 1994,1227 the licence was treated as a waste management licence pursuant to 
section 35 of the EPA 1990.1228 The company in question ‘ceased trading’ on 5 
September 1997.1229 On 18 September a liquidator was appointed to deal with the 
remaining assets at a creditors’ meeting.1230 During the winding up of the company, the 
liquidator tried to transfer the company’s waste management licence.1231  It was hoped 
that someone ‘would take a fresh lease of the site’.1232 Upon the liquidator’s failure to 
transfer the licence, the liquidator then tried to disclaim the licence as onerous property 
on 3 November 1997.1233 On 25 November the Environment Agency, replacing the 
council as the waste regulatory authority,1234 issued a declaration that the liquidator had 
no power to disclaim the licence.1235 Further to this, the liquidator issued a declaration 
in January 1998 seeking directions.1236 
Neuberger J recognised that there were two primary legal issues that the court had to 
determine in this case.1237 The first issue concerned whether an environmental licence 
could be described as ‘property’.1238 The second issue for determination was whether a 
                                                 
1225 Mineral Resources (n 1203). 
1226 ibid, 424 (Neuberger J). 
1227 EPA 1990, s 77(2). 
1228 Mineral Resources (n 1203) 424 (Neuberger J). 
1229 ibid. 
1230 ibid. 
1231 ibid. 
1232 ibid. 
1233 ibid. 
1234 EPA 1990, s 30(1) and 77. 
1235 Mineral Resources (n 1203) 424 (Neuberger J). 
1236 ibid. 
1237 ibid, 423 and 427. 
1238 ibid. 
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licence could be held as ‘property’, such that it was capable of being disclaimed as 
‘onerous property’ in accordance with the relevant law.1239 In this case it was held that, 
while an environmental licence is ‘property’ pursuant to section 436 of the EPA,1240 if 
there is a ‘self-contained and exclusive code’ subjecting the licence to such conditions 
in which it may be transferred, revoked, or surrendered etc., either wholly or in part, 
and if that code is inconsistent with a code concerning the liquidator’s ability to 
disclaim a licence attached to property, then any liquidator attempting to rely on the 
code to distinguish the licence by disclaimer will have no recognisable power to do 
so.1241 He suggested that, ‘it is not particularly surprising, in the present climate, that 
the public interest in protecting the environment should rank ahead of their [the 
creditors] interests.’1242 
In Mineral Resources Neuberger J took a ‘purposive formalist’,1243 interpretative 
approach to the two opposing statutes. He favoured the argument submitted by R. Tedd 
QC, which suggested that specific provisions held within the EPA 1990 had, upon its 
creation, limited the liquidator’s powers in the Insolvency Act 1986.1244 While this 
judgment aims to strengthen the enforcement of environmental laws, the widespread 
use of environmental due diligence in banks means that onerous environmental licences 
are low risk for mortgagees. In the situation where an onerous licence remains attached 
to the property following the borrower’s insolvency the bank will simply abandon the 
                                                 
1239 ibid. 
1240 ibid, 429. 
1241 ibid, 438. Neuberger J applied the decision of Hindcastle Ltd. v Barbara Attenborough Associates 
Ltd [1996] 1 All ER 737. In his conclusion, Neuberger J, as he was then called, suggested that his 
judgment was consistent with the American and Canadian authorities, viz: Panamericana (1991) 81 DLR 
(4th) 534 BC; Re Lamford Forest Products Ltd (1991) 86 DLR (4th) 534 BC; and Midlantic National 
Bank v New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection (1986) 474 US 494.   
1242 ibid, 438. Brackets added. 
1243 See, J Adams and R Brownsword, Understanding Law (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006), ch 4. 
1244 Mineral Resources (n 1203) 422 (Neuberger J). See also, R v Secretary of State, ex p. Hickey [1995] 
1 All ER 479. 
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property where there is little value in the loan or the property or both. Neuberger J 
recognises that his judgment could affect ‘the orderly and expeditious’ liquidation of a 
company and, in despite of de Garr Robinson’s erudite defence, he believed that 
upholding the law that aimed to protect the environment was in the public interest,1245 
and so made an order to that effect. 
2. Re Wilmott Trading Co Ltd 1246  
Wilmott Trading (WT), a waste management company, and holder of a waste 
management licence permitting the processing and storage of scrap metal, ceased 
trading following a meeting of its creditors in 1997.1247 While still in creditors’ 
voluntary liquidation, the company’s liquidator was served, under the terms of the 
licence, with a notice to remediate the 1,600 tons of waste that the company created 
during its operations upon the site.1248 The company did not have the financial 
provisions to pay for the remediation costs. The facts of the case state, ‘The accounts 
of the company show that £35,739.57 has been realised from the winding up, that the 
costs of the liquidation (including legal fees) to date are £23,802.20, and that the total 
amount claimed by the creditors of the company exceeds £40,000. In these 
circumstances, Mr Henry considers that the company’s funds are effectively 
exhausted’.1249 After the regulator served a remediation notice, the liquidator tried to 
                                                 
1245 ibid, 438. 
1246 Re Wilmott Trading Co Ltd (No 1) [2000] BCC 321; Wilmott (No 2) (n 1192). 
1247 Wilmott (No 1) (n 1246) 323 (Neuberger J). 
1248 ibid. 
1249 ibid.  
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disclaim the company’s waste management licence in 1998, by the power conferred 
upon it under section 178.1250    
In Re Wilmott Trading Co Ltd (No. 1) [2000] BCC 321 (WT (No. 1)), Neuberger J had 
to determine, by taking into account the previous ratio that he laid down in Mineral 
Resources,1251 and in respect of the liquidator’s declarations submitted to the court, 
what the company’s obligations were under the waste management licence.1252 In so 
doing, he had to decide whether the liquidator could prepare the final accounts under 
section 106 of the Insolvency Act 1986,1253 in order to allow the company to be 
dissolved under section 201 of the same Act.1254 The liquidator also wanted directions 
as to the existence of the waste management licence prior to the company’s 
dissolution.1255 In relation to the legal issues, Neuberger J declared that, ‘The instant 
application is, in a sense, a sequel to Re Mineral Resources Ltd [1999] BCC 422.’,1256 
and conceded that a company can be fully wound up and dissolved, notwithstanding 
the continued presence of the licence.1257 He also suggested that, upon dissolution, the 
licence would cease to exist or remain in force.1258  
In Re Wilmott Trading Company Ltd (No. 2) [2000] BCC 321 (WT (No. 2)),1259 
Neuberger J, rejecting his previous decision in Mineral Resources, and in granting the 
declaration submitted to the court, allowed for the company to be dissolved, and ruled 
                                                 
1250 ibid. 
1251 Mineral Resources (n 1203) 422 (Neuberger J). 
1252 Wilmott (No 1) (n 1246) 321 (Neuberger J). 
1253 See, Insolvency Act 1986, s 106(1).  
1254 ibid, s 201(2) states, ‘The registrar on receiving the account and return shall forthwith register them; 
and on the expiration of 3 months from the registration of the return the company is deemed to be 
dissolved.’ 
1255 Willmott (No 1) (n 1240), 321. 
1256 ibid, 322. 
1257 ibid, 321.  
1258 ibid, 325. 
1259 Wilmott (No 2) (n 1192). 
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that upon its liquidation the waste management licence would cease to exist.1260 In his 
judgment, Neuberger J held that ‘in theory’ there are three possible options for the 
existing licence to take upon a company’s liquidation: (1) the licence ceases to exist; 
(2) the property is deemed ‘ownerless’ and thereafter vests in the Crown bona vacantia 
under section 654 of the Companies Act;1261 and (3) the licence continues to exist 
without an owner.1262 Neuberger J held that in the first two instances licences can be 
disposed of, since, following the ratio in Mineral Resources, a waste management 
licence does not meet the definition of ‘property’ as outlined in section 654.1263 Also, 
with regards to the waste management licence vesting in the Crown under section 654 
specifically, Neuberger J held:  
‘First, it appears to me that if a waste management licence was to vest in 
the Crown in such circumstances, then the machinery envisaged by s.654 
would effectively override the provisions of the 1990 Act governing the 
way in which licences can be transferred or granted… In effect, there would 
be a vesting of a waste management licence in a party, over whom the 
Environment Agency would have no control, and who would or might not 
be a fit and proper person within the meaning of s. 74 of the 1990 Act.’1264  
In the third instance, Neuberger J believed that this was conceptually problematic, 
stating that, ‘To my mind, the third of the three possibilities I have mentioned can be 
                                                 
1260 ibid, 322. 
1261 ibid, 331.  
1262 ibid, 330 (Neuberger J). 
1263 ibid, 331. 
1264 ibid. 
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dismissed without much difficulty. The idea of a waste management licence existing 
while being vested in nobody is virtually a contradiction in terms.’1265  
3.  Celtic Extraction Ltd and Bluestone Chemicals Ltd 1266  
This case concerned two companies in liquidation proceedings.1267 Prior to their 
insolvency, and during their operation, the companies had been granted waste 
management licences. The legal issues for the court to determine were synonymous to 
the case of Mineral Resources,1268 and Neuberger J applied the ratio of that case.1269 
On appeal by the Official Receiver, Morritt LJ gave the leading judgment in the Court 
of Appeal, with which Roch and Rattee LJJs unanimously agreed. Morritt LJ’s 
judgment partially overruled Neuberger J’s decision in Mineral Resources. Morritt LJ, 
taking a narrow approach of the relevant law, held that an environmental licence was 
transferable as marketable property,1270 even though it existed in a statutory framework. 
The waste management licences were thus capable, in certain circumstances, of being 
disclaimed as onerous property by a liquidator, and this will be the case even if the 
‘self-contained and exclusive code’ that permitted the licence to exist is inconsistent 
with the legislation which delegates upon the liquidator a power to disclaim onerous 
property.1271 
                                                 
1265 ibid. 
1266 Celtic Extraction (n 1201). For a good over of this case, see, D Case and P De Prez, ‘Case Comment: 
The power of disclaimer and environmental licences’ (2000) 2(Apr) Insol L 87; and JH Armour, ‘Who 
pays when the polluter goes bust?’ (2000) 116(Apr) LQR 204.  
1267 Celtic Extraction (n 1201), 480 (Morritt LJ). 
1268 Mineral Resources (n 1203) 422 (Neuberger J). 
1269 See, the interlocutory appeals by Neuberger J in Celtic Extraction (n 1201). 
1270 Celtic Extraction (n 1201) (Morrit LJ). See also, A Pickin, ‘Getting rid of waste management 
licences’ (1999) 12(10) Insolv Int 79. 
1271 This was later applied in Hillridge (n 1201) paras 37-38 (Blackburne J). 
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This case demonstrates a favourable approach for the creditors of an insolvent 
company. However, such a judgment is bitter-sweet, because, while lenders are 
protected by this decision, unfortunately environmental concerns do appear to come in 
at second place. In this case, Morrit LJ favoured the Official Solicitor’s argument, and 
allowed the appeal. He disagreed with the broad interpretation that the Agency 
submitted, and stated that his reason for doing so was because of: 
‘… the very considerable and oft-repeated public policy requirement that 
the property of insolvents should be divided equally amongst their 
unsecured creditors. An important aspect of the implementation of that 
policy is the ability to disclaim.’ 1272 
Morritt LJ expresses clearly throughout his judgment that the interests of creditors are 
the top priority. His decision emphasises a philosophy that endorses the minimisation 
of risks for creditors in insolvency situations, even though this means setting aside 
environmental protection during the process. Although this judgment is beneficial for 
lenders, it is difficult not to feel considerable regret for the loss that the environment 
suffered in this case. 
4. Hillridge Ltd  1273  
The case of Environment Agency v Hillridge Ltd [2003] EWHC 3023 (Ch)1274 
concerned a trust fund, which was expressly established by a licensed waste company 
                                                 
1272 Celtic Extraction (n 1201) 491, para f (Morrit LJ). 
1273 Hillridge (n 1201). 
1274 For a useful review of this case, see, J O’Keeffe and S Boileau, ‘Who gets to clean up after 
insolvency?’ (2004) WM 60. See also, Shelbourn, (n 1219) 697; and E de Wit, ‘Fate of trust funds on 
insolvency’ (2004) 92(Mar) EB Mag 13 
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and their regulatory body (the Environment Agency).1275 The fund would be used in 
order to provide financial provision for the undertaking of remedial works.1276 During 
the company’s insolvency the liquidators tried to disclaim the environmental licence 
under section 178 of the Insolvency Act 1986.1277 However, the regulatory body argued 
that the actions of the liquidators disclaimed the licensee’s interest in the fund.1278 
Under section 178(6) of the Insolvency Act, any person that sustains loss or damage 
because of the disclaimer is deemed to be a creditor to the company.1279 Thus, the 
regulator made an application to the court under section 112 of the 1986 Act,1280 in 
order to determine ownership of the fund after the winding up of the company.1281 The 
1986 Act states that a section 178 disclaimer operates to extinguish the rights, interests, 
and liabilities of a company or property being disclaimed.1282 This will come into effect 
from the date in which the disclaimer is implemented,1283 and will not affect the rights 
and liabilities of any other person.1284   
In answer to the issues surrounding this case, Blackburne J, sitting in the Chancery 
Division of the High Court, held that where a licence is granted to a relevant person, 
and a form of financial provision is established which is thereby dependent on that 
licence to exist, disclaimer of that licence and its liabilities will have the effect of 
disclaiming all rights and interests in the property.1285 Property will then be ‘ownerless 
                                                 
1275 Hillridge (n 1201), para 2 (Blackburne J). 
1276 ibid. 
1277 ibid, para 10. 
1278 ibid, para 43. 
1279 ibid, s 178(6). 
1280 Insolvency Act 1986, s 112. Section 112(1) states that, ‘The liquidator or any contributory or creditor 
may apply to the court to determine any question arising in the winding up of a company, or to exercise, 
as respects the enforcing of calls or any other matter, all or any of the powers which the court might 
exercise if the company were being wound up by the court.’ 
1281 Hillridge (n 1201) para 2 (Blackburne J). 
1282 Insolvency Act 1986, s 178. 
1283 ibid, s 178(4).  
1284 ibid. 
1285 Hillridge (n 1201) para 57 (Blackburne J). 
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property’ and revert back to the Crown as bona vacantia.1286 Bona vacantia is an 
avenue that may be taken where an insolvent company or an intestate estate is left with 
a piece of onerous property attached to it.1287 Translated into English, bona vacantia 
simply means, ‘empty goods’.1288 However, the Latin translation actually refers to the 
process whereby ownerless property from an intestate estate or defunct company is 
collected by the Treasury Solicitor, and thereafter reverts back to the Crown.1289 Section 
1012(1) of the Companies Act 2006 states that: 
‘When a company is dissolved, all property and rights whatsoever vested 
in or held on trust for the company immediately before its dissolution are 
deemed to be bona vacantia.’1290 
Upon a registered company’s liquidation, bona vacantia will be employed in order to 
deal with the remaining assets that are left ownerless. Any liabilities held within a 
particular property are extinguished, and are never deemed to pass into the Crown’s 
possession.1291 The Treasury Solicitor can disclaim title to the property, or sell it for 
full market value.1292 Thus, bona vacantia cannot be used as a clean-up tool for 
environmental pollution, or as a means of dealing with an onerous piece of property, 
like a waste management licence. Furthermore, Hillridge demonstrates an example of 
the workings of bona vacantia. In this case it was the EA that bore a significant loss 
                                                 
1286 ibid, para 58. 
1287 Wilmott (No 2) (n 1192) 54 (Neuberger J). 
1288 Martin (n 514) 49. 
1289 ibid. 
1290 Companies Act 2006, s 1012. See also section 654 of the Companies Act 1985 for properties vested 
before 1 October 2009. 
1291 Treasury Solicitor’s Department, Bona vacantia dissolved companies (BVC1) (gov.uk, 6 December 
2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bona-vacantia-dissolved-companies-bvc1/bona-
vacantia-dissolved-companies-bvc1> accessed 22 September 2014.  
1292 ibid. 
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but this could quite easily have been a private investor, like a bank or other financial 
institution, which had a joint interest in a fund.1293 
IV. Conclusion 
As well as outlining the definition ‘insolvency’, and the different approaches that banks 
can employ when taking possession of securities, this chapter also evaluated the issues 
that have emerged with two conflicting statutory regimes. In particular, this chapter has 
assessed the ‘collision’ that has occurred between the laws governing the power of a 
liquidator to disclaim onerous property when winding-up a dissolved estate, and the 
laws relating to the surrender of waste management licences by the waste regulatory 
authority. The case law in this area shows two judicial approaches. Neuberger J’s 
judgment in Mineral Resources provides evidence that laws for environmental 
protection, as a public policy consideration, should not be weakened by more traditional 
legal regimes. Following Mineral Resources, the case law generally acts in favour of 
insolvency law, by allowing the insolvency practitioner to disclaim an environmental 
licence as ‘onerous property’. However, further judicial interpretation is now needed, 
as it is yet uncertain how the judgments evaluated in this chapter apply to the new 
system of licensing under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) 
Regulations 2010.1294 Nevertheless, this chapter, by analysing the conflict, has 
portrayed some of the issues surrounding the relationship between the environment and 
the economy. It shows that, while repaying the secured debt and maximising creditors’ 
interests are the primary concerns for receivers, there are environmental considerations 
                                                 
1293 When dealing with Scottish or UK law see, Re Blair C Nimmo and Gerard A Friar, Joint Liquidators 
of The Scottish Coal Company Limited [2013] CSOH 124 (Lord Hodge). 
1294 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/657. 
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that must also be taken into account. The problem is that specific environmental 
provisions can sometimes be undermined by more established laws;1295 and this further 
explains why environmental legislation is perceived as a low risk by UK lenders.  
The next chapter (Chapter 5) outlines the findings that were made in relation to the 
environmental risks that may attach to a bank when lending to a commercial company.      
                                                 
1295 Refer to the economic overview in ch 1. This overview shows how the Coalition Government may 
have weakened environmental law in an effort to make short-term economic gains in a period of austerity.  
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Chapter 5: 
Environmental Risks 
This chapter provides an insight into the various environment-related risks that lenders 
can incur during their commercial loan financing. In so doing, the chapter links to the 
overarching research question by showing how lenders’ perceptions of the threat of the 
environmental risks have changed since the early 1990s. More specifically, it answers 
sub-question 1, ‘What are the more threatening environment-related risks for the UK 
lending community?’ and sub-question 2, point 2, ‘How do banks currently rank the 
environmental risks in relation to the threat that they pose to the bank?’ The interview 
data that have been analysed suggest that both the environmental risks, and the lenders’ 
environmental due diligence to manage such risks, have developed concurrently over 
the course of the last twenty-five years. The data also indicate that this development 
may have been a direct consequence of the increased enactment of specific 
environmental laws and regulations (e.g. Part IIA of the EPA 1990) which were created 
during the course of that time frame. This chapter argues that there are four 
environmental risks that may impact lenders. They include:  
 Lender Liability 
 The Indirect Risks  
 Reputational Risk  
 Market Risk  
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The semi-structured interviews focused specifically on the risks that lenders can incur 
from land pollution. However, that is not to say that these risks do not have a broader 
application, applying to other risks, like climate change and flooding. This chapter does 
two things to answer the key research question and relevant sub-questions: first, it 
evaluates the different environmental risks identified in the interview data (as above); 
and secondly, it ranks the risks in accordance with the unique perceptions of the 
banking respondents.  
I. The Environmental Risks 
‘Risk’ is defined as being ‘exposed to danger’,1296 and can be calculated by multiplying 
the likelihood of a threat occurring, with its severity if it does actually materialise. Risk 
for environmental damage must not be construed as anything but a real threat in modern 
business practices. If asked what activities are most damaging to the environment, it 
seems believable that most people in the street would not regard loan financing as an 
activity that directly affects the environment. It is much more likely that they would 
emphasis the harm that could be created by the day-to-day operations of heavy 
industrial sectors. Nevertheless, banks do, although indirectly, affect the protection of 
the environment; 1297 this is because banks are able to grant finance to clients working 
in high-risk sectors, and to unsustainable projects. As a consequence, Case suggests 
that, ‘Bankers can (and should) make the identification of environmental risk a positive 
                                                 
1296 JB Sykes (ed), The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English (6th edn, OUP, Clarendon Press 
1978) 779.   
1297 Hooley (n 52) 405. 
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aspect of their service to, and relationship with, their customers.’1298 The following 
section looks at lender liability for environmental damage. 
A. Lender Liability 
There are many different types of ‘lender liability’, which is also described as ‘direct 
risk’.1299 ‘Lender liability’ may be defined as: 
‘… a convenient rubric under which to group all cases in which banks and 
other financial institutions have incurred liability as a result of the lending 
process or ancillary activities. It is not so much a subject as an area of legal 
practice which draws upon principles from many different sources.’1300   
This thesis is concerned with lender liability for environmental damage. While much 
of the liability for environmental issues proceeds from being a mortgagee in possession 
under English common law, modern prospects of this form of lender liability can be 
traced back to the US during the 1980s.1301 In the UK, the risk of direct lender liability 
for environmental issues has developed since the early 1990s.1302 Environmental laws 
and regulations e.g. Part IIA of the EPA 1990, have created a lender liability threat in 
the UK; however, this is currently considered low risk.1303 For instance, O’Donovan 
states, ‘In most areas of lender liability the dire prediction of commentators are 
reinforced by actual cases in which lenders have incurred liabilities. This is not true for 
                                                 
1298 Case (n 48) 13. 
1299 ibid.  
1300 O’Donovan (n 63) 2. 
1301 Refer to ch 2. 
1302 ibid. 
1303 Case (n 48) 9. 
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environmental damage.’1304 Nevertheless, the application of lender liability for 
environmental damage is dependent upon ‘many finely balanced judgments’.1305 In 
relation to the liability threat under environmental law, there are numerous trigger terms 
that may give rise to banks’ accountability for environment damage, including: 
‘causing’; ‘knowingly causing’; ‘knowingly permitting’; ‘owning’; and 
‘occupying’.1306 It has already been shown that there are two groups of triggers for 
establishing liability for contaminated land clean-up under Part IIA of the EPA, i.e. 
Class A and Class B liability.1307 From a corporate point of view, one respondent said 
that lender liability for environmental damage might be incurred by a bank that either 
participates in the business affairs of a borrower, or has ownership of land, which is 
subject to regulatory attention or legal action. The respondent commented in answer to 
a question: 
I: Okay, so we’ve talked about risks. Could you describe the different risks 
that are out there for financial institutions? 
R4: Yes. I would say that, principally, from the corporate point of view, 
there are three or four, I will try to think them through. The obvious one is 
direct liability, which really only kicks in if you are going to be a controlling 
shareholder in a business, or, indeed, with real estate, actually owning the 
asset. 1308   
                                                 
1304 O’Donovan (n 63) 598. 
1305 Hood (n 71) 579.  
1306 The immediate examples relate not to all species of environmental risk but to contaminated land 
clean-up in particular. 
1307 Refer to ch 2, pp 97-117. 
1308 Interview with Respondent 4. 
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Liability may be civil or criminal in nature. Also, under specific environmental laws, 
like Part IIA of the EPA 1990, a person that causes or knowingly permits pollution may 
incur liability for remediation costs. However, if the person responsible for the pollution 
cannot be found, liability may attach to the current owner or occupier of the land.1309 
Thus, a mortgagee in possession of polluted land is particularly susceptible. While 
liability for clean-up costs may be viewed by many bankers as ‘inequitable’,1310 it is 
also unfair for a mortgagee to take its security, and profit from a polluted property, 
which is, or has the potential to be, significantly harmful. As Hood suggests:  
‘… if the legislation is too severe, then lenders may not lend to certain types 
of industries, as happened in the United States – so-called “dirty 
businesses”, such as, dry-cleaners, printers, big chemical plants, metal 
bashers, and farmers; on the other hand, if lenders contribute nothing to 
clean-up costs, and they retain their security, they are obtaining a windfall, 
at the taxpayer’s expense, when they enforce their security.’1311  
The types of liability are now outlined further below:  
Criminal Liability1312 – While unlikely, if a lender actually causes or knowingly 
permits pollution, the court may determine that a fine be imposed under the 
criminal law.1313 For instance, a person that is found guilty in the Crown Court of 
unlawfully depositing controlled waste in breach of section 33 of the EPA 1990 
                                                 
1309 Tromans (n 71) 434. 
1310 Case (n 48) 57. 
1311 Hood (n 71) 579.  
1312 Tromans (n 71) 434. 
1313 Summary conviction in the Magistrates’ court may, depending upon the specific legislative 
provision, lead to maximum fine of £20,000. See, for example, the analysis of s 33 of the EPA 1990 in 
Chapter 3. 
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risks incurring an unlimited fine, a term of five years imprisonment, or both.1314 
Even though there is a limit upon the maximum fine that may be issued in the 
Magistrates’ court,1315 Tromans still suggests that the imposition of such fines can, 
nevertheless, ‘start to mount up quite spectacularly’, as one fine for environmental 
issues does quite often lead to another and another.1316 
Civil Liability1317 – Environmental incidents can cause harm to an individual or a 
group as a nuisance or by breaching the common law duty of care1318 that is owed 
between parties.1319 If this happens, there are a number of remedies that can be 
used to offer recompense to injured claimants. The most widely used remedies are 
the award of damages or the issuance of injunctions.1320 As explained in the 
common law section earlier,1321 the award of damages for environmental harm is 
often difficult to calculate. Despite being difficult to determine, the legal process 
for gauging claimants’ injury in relation to the environmental damage that has 
occurred is becoming more robust.1322      
Clean-up Costs1323 – There are a number of environmental legal regimes that place 
upon a statutory regulatory body a legal duty to make the polluter pay for the 
remediation of any environmental harm. Under section 78E of the EPA 1990, the 
enforcing authority has a duty to require a Class A or Class B appropriate person 
                                                 
1314 EPA 1990, s 33.  
1315 ibid. 
1316 Tromans (n 71) 434. 
1317 ibid. 
1318 Donoghue (n 851) 580. 
1319 Refer to ch 3, pp 132-153. 
1320 Coventry (n 782). 
1321 Refer to ch 3, pp 132-153. 
1322 Anslow (n 781) 2610. 
1323 Tromans (n 71) 434. 
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to carry out the remediation of any contaminated land identified and determined 
within its area.1324 In some cases, Part IIA liability can lead to significant clean-
up costs, as was shown in the Sandridge case.1325    
B. The Indirect Risks 
This thesis suggests that, as the law relating to environmental protection in the UK has 
posed no real direct liability risk for lenders, one of the primary drivers for the financial 
institutions’ increased appetite for environmental risk management may be found in 
‘the indirect risks’.1326 Over the course of the last decade, regulatory pressures have 
increased greatly for many businesses;1327 and this is particularly true for the more 
environmentally sensitive sectors that are likely, through the course of their day-to day 
business operations, to cause environmental damage.1328 
The data collected in the empirical study show that there are two types of indirect risks: 
(1) credit risk and (2) security risk.1329 The reason for grouping these two risks together 
can be explained by the fact that the vast majority of the banking respondents referred 
to the two under one heading, so it was only logical to also follow that reasoning in this 
chapter.1330 The two risks are defined in more detail below. Respondent 3, who works 
for a large clearing bank operating in the UK, summed up the two indirect risks, saying: 
                                                 
1324 EPA 1990, s 78E(1)(a)-(b). 
1325 Crest Nicholson (n 510). 
1326 Tromans (n 71) 433. 
1327 Pitchford (n 49) 1171.  
1328 Egede and Lee (n 56) 868.   
1329 Tromans (n 71) 433. 
1330 However, there are many labels for these two risks e.g. ‘non-compliance risk’ and ‘opportunity risk’.   
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R3: The big one is, uhm, that the client or the borrower, uhm, 
attracting some sort of liability, which means that, in extremis, the 
business fails and the bank loses some money, or an environmental 
incident will impact on the value of the collateral. So, companies 
often put forward different types of collateral as security, you 
know, commonly a loan will be secured on the assets of the bank to 
enforce its security is also impaired. So, if the business goes bust, 
theoretically, the bank should assess that asset to get its money 
back. If that asset is worth less, or could be a negative value in 
some cases, then obviously that’s going to have an impact on the 
bank’s ability to cover its bad debt. So, they are the two main ones, 
which pose a risk. There’s (a) an issue which impacts on the 
business model and means that the company can’t service its debt; 
or (b) there’s an issue which impacts on the value of the asset, 
which are put on the table as collateral.1331 
The indirect risks are capable of arising as a consequence of land pollution. Davies uses 
the Merry Hill Shopping Centre in Dudley as an example of how land pollution can 
impact the lender-borrower relationship. He notes: 
‘It is widely believed that the American O’Connor Group, a potential 
purchaser of Merry Hill, pulled out of the transaction believing the land to 
be contaminated; the area had been used as a general waste tip as well as 
railway sidings. Within weeks of the O’Connor decision not to proceed, 
                                                 
1331 Interview with Respondent 3. 
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Mountleigh, the existing owner of the site, went into receivership. 
Mountleigh’s lenders found that the value of their security had substantially 
depreciated. Adverse publicity only succeeding in compounding the 
problem.’ 1332 
In cases where the contamination on a site is particularly severe, a borrower may 
become insolvent because the land’s liabilities outweigh the borrower’s net worth, 
thereby creating a negative equity. If a borrower is having difficulty with its cash flow, 
there is the risk that the loan owed to the bank may not be repaid. However, a borrower’s 
environmental issues may also impact upon the value of the bank’s collateral that is put 
forward as security against the mortgage. Although there are many different types of 
security, a piece of land that is identified under the Part IIA regime as ‘contaminated 
land’ will inevitably reduce in value.  
1. Credit Risk 
‘Credit risk’ is where a borrower, for whatever reason, fails to meet its credit obligations 
set within the loan agreement before the date of the mortgage’s maturity.1333 This risk 
can also be described as a ‘default risk’. In the environmental context, credit risk may 
be defined as, ‘the weakening of a borrower’s covenant to repay debt as a result of 
environmental costs or liabilities.’1334 Banks have attempted to manage default events 
by the use of credit risk modelling, which are alternatively called ‘firm-value 
models’.1335 Lévy, a world-renowned expert in credit risk modelling, states, ‘In general 
                                                 
1332 Davies (n 49) 16. 
1333 W Schoutens and J Cariboni (eds), Lévy – Processes in Credit Risk (1st edn, Wiley 2009), 4.1. 
1334 Case (n 48) 10 and 77. See also, Hooley (n 52) 406. 
1335 Schoutens and Cariboni (n 1333) 4.1. 
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terms, credit risk refers to the risk that a specified reference entity does not meet it credit 
obligations within a specified time horizon T.’1336 
Laws and regulations relating to environmental protection are capable of creating cash 
or supply pressures for businesses.1337 Environmental costs can ‘translate into indirect, 
or credit, risks for those banks funding the businesses affected.’1338 A borrower’s 
remediation costs for contaminated land clean-up are capable of creating credit risk for 
the bank, to which the mortgaged money is owed.  Respondent 5 identifies a number 
of questions that a bank must ask about its clients, before a loan is approved, in order 
to reduce this risk:  
R5: The credit risk is, really, the ability of a company to repay its loan. So, 
much like the homeowner, you do the due diligence to make sure that they 
have enough income to repay the mortgage. When we look at companies 
borrowing hundreds of millions of dollars, we look at the credit risk. And, 
of course, the specific part of the analysis would be: Are there material 
liabilities associated with this company or the products that they intend to 
purchase? Will it floor them?1339 
The data have provided evidence to suggest that the increasing environmental 
regulation, and the rising rate of insolvency during the age of austerity, have heightened 
the risk of a lender being left with a borrower in default because of material 
environmental liabilities. Thus, the prospect of having a non-recoverable loan because 
                                                 
1336 ibid, 1.1. 
1337 Case (n 48) 11. 
1338 ibid. 
1339 Interview with Respondent 5. 
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of environmental issues is something that lenders are taking more and more seriously. 
This finding concurs with the previous academic literature concerning environmental 
risks and bank lending.1340 As Hooley suggests:  
‘The cost of environmental compliance may affect the borrower’s 
profitability and hence its ability to service its debt. Strict licensing regimes 
control various areas of commercial activity where there is a recognised 
risk of pollution. The compliance costs of meeting the conditions attached 
to such licences can be high.’ 1341   
Nevertheless, the interview data portray that the banks’ ability to analyse credit risk for 
environmental concerns is becoming more and more fine-tuned. In order to reduce the 
threat of credit risk, it is crucial for banks to find good commercial clients whose 
operations are environmentally, socially, and ethically sound. Some banks are taking 
innovative steps to calculate the credit risk that may be caused by the environmental 
issues of their borrowers. One major clearing bank in the UK has, quite remarkably, 
created a screening tool that assesses an individual loan’s credit risk.1342 The tool 
analyses any future environmental liabilities that may prevent a borrower from repaying 
the loan.1343 Environmental risks that are identified by the screening tool are referred to 
the bank’s in-house environmental risk management team, which are experts in this 
specialised area of banking risk.1344 This modern way of processing may indicate an 
age where the entire environmental risk management of banks is conducted in-house, 
                                                 
1340 Refer to ch 1. 
1341 Hooley (n 52) 406. 
1342 Lloyds Banking Group, ‘20% By 2020 – Our Environmental Action Plan: one year on’ 
(LloydsBankingGroup, 2012) 18 <http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/globalassets/documents/our-
group/responsibility/reports/climate_magazine.pdf> accessed 15 December 2014. 
1343 ibid, 18. 
1344 ibid. 
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thus removing the current reliance on the externally commissioned, expertise of 
consultants and auditors. 
2. Security Risk 
Security risk is somewhat different to credit risk.1345 In order to protect their interests, 
lenders will often collateralise property, whether tangible or intangible, as a secured 
interest under the mortgage.1346 Where a borrower defaults on the repayment of the 
mortgage money, lenders may ‘exercise their security’1347 in order to recover any debt 
that is owed to the bank during the orderly winding up of a company who is a client of 
the bank.1348 However, land that is taken as a secured interest is capable of depreciating 
in value because of contamination. Tromans says that, ‘More specifically, the value of 
property as security may be affected by its physical condition, and specifically the 
problems of contaminated land.’1349 Further to this Case states, ‘Major financial 
institutions in the USA, Switzerland, Germany and the UK have each suffered losses 
counted in the tens of millions of dollars as a result of contaminated security.’1350 
Respondents 6 and 12 describe how lenders still fear the security risk that may occur 
because of a property being determined as contaminated land under the Part IIA regime: 
R6: There’s also the value of the collateral, as the property may be worth 
much less from the appraisal value, or it may be so contaminated that the 
                                                 
1345 Tromans (n 71) 433. 
1346 O’Donovan (n 63) 551. 
1347 Refer to ch 4, pg 197. 
1348 However, corporate insolvency represents a sufficiently risky period for lenders. 
1349 Tromans (n 71) 434. 
1350 Case (n 48). 
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collateral is worth nothing at all. We’ve seen that on a couple of 
occasions.1351    
And, 
R12: There’s also then, from contaminated land, the risk that, uhm, they will 
be left with something on their books, if a customer defaults on it, and the 
ability to sell on that land. 1352   
Land value is particularly sensitive to contamination and associated environmental 
liabilities and risks. Where contamination is identified upon land, the property will 
subsequently lose market value, and, depending upon the extent of the pollution that is 
present on the site, may even be blighted to such a degree that it is completely 
unsaleable. As one may imagine, a piece of land will be worth considerably less than 
the bank’s original valuation if, after the loan is approved,  it has been identified and 
determined as contaminated land by a local authority under Part IIA of the EPA 1990. 
Consequently, environmental liabilities are contributing to the increasing number of 
orphan sites that are situated around the UK.1353 
C. Reputational Risk  
For this thesis, reputational risk describes the threat that may be attributed to the bank 
because it has financed an environmentally contentious client or project. Reputational 
                                                 
1351 Interview with Respondent 6.  
1352 Interview with Respondent 12. 
1353 Egede and Lee (n 56) 868.   
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risk is, therefore, perceived as a form of guilt by association, as one banking respondent 
pointed out in interview:  
 R3: The other issue is, you know, a bank can be guilty by association. So, 
if, uhm, if a company is proven to have created some environmental 
problem, people will often look at the other organisations that support that 
company. So NGOs will often target the banks and say, “You’re financing 
these guys, so you have responsibility here!” 1354  
The data show that the bank’s reputation is its most important asset.1355 Newspaper 
headlines like, ‘Deutsche Bank refuses to bankroll Barrier Reef port expansion’,1356 
evidences the fact that banks are concerned about the potential reputational risk that 
may materialise from being associated with an environmentally harmful client or 
project. And, more significantly, the above headline shows that banks are actually 
refusing to finance projects that carry significant reputational implications for the bank.  
As a part of its overall corporate governance framework, the modern bank must now 
consider whether its lending will create environmental harm. Risk management teams 
must now ask whether the bank will appear on the front cover of The Financial Times 
or The Wall Street Journal because its lending is a subject of environmental contention. 
This certainly would not have been the case a little more than ten years ago. This may 
be because corporate governance, generally, is softening its policies. For instance, Case 
suggests that, ‘The subject of business ethics and mortality has been rising up 
                                                 
1354 Interview with Respondent 3. 
1355 infra ch 8. 
1356 J Smith, ‘Deutsche Bank refuses to bankroll Barrier Reef port expansion’ (FT.com, 23 May 2014) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c616fd0a-e249-11e3-89fd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz34vRtcdW9> accessed 
17 June 2014.  
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boardroom agendas for some time. Gone are the notions that companies are inanimate 
legal entities and therefore amoral, and making a healthy profit and behaving 
unethically are mutually exclusive aims.’1357  
However, the reputational risk relating to contaminated land is not usually that 
significant; of course, the reputational risk could be severe if the land affected by 
contamination causes significant harm to human health, for example. Therefore, when 
the banking respondents referred to ‘reputational risk’, they were talking generally 
about the reputational harm that banks can incur during project finance, which also 
covers redevelopment projects on contaminated land. However, it is noteworthy that 
the definition of ‘reputational risk’ for this thesis covers all types of reputational risk 
that can be incurred by banks, and not merely risk associated to project financing. 
Project financing is usually a risky business because information about such projects 
are normally easily accessible within the public domain. This gives non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and campaign groups a wide degree of scope to take stock of the 
banks’ present business activities, and initiate an assault upon any banks that are 
involved in a controversial project with which the NGOs disagree. This is why, as 
Respondent 3 suggested above, this risk is often viewed as a form of ‘guilt by 
association’.  
D. Market Risk 
Some of the interviewees spoke about a fourth risk that banks may incur because of 
environmental concerns during their lending activities, i.e. ‘market risk’. This section 
                                                 
1357 Case (n 48) 11.  
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of the chapter briefly describes this fourth risk, and, in so doing, outlines the author’s 
reasoning for not presenting the threat as a primary environmental risk in commercial 
bank lending. ‘Market risk’ may be defined as: 
‘… the risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet positions arising from 
adverse movements in market prices. From a regulatory perspective, market 
risk stems from all the positions included in banks’ trading book as well as 
from commodity and foreign exchange risk positions in the whole balance 
sheet.’1358  
This risk was depicted well by Respondent 13 in interview: 
R13: So, I would agree with those three categories. We as a company… you 
could also add market risk, because if we do not value environmental risks 
in our evaluations, when we bring companies to a market, and to the IPO 
[initial public offering], if we IPO a company, and we did not notice in our 
due diligence specific risks within that company, there might be other types 
of risks that will affect the valuation of the company on the stock market. 
1359       
In accordance with Respondent 13’s interview extract, market risk occurs where a bank 
is bringing a company to a particular market through an initial public offering or merger 
and acquisition etc., and the bank fails to identify environmental risks in its valuation 
of the company. Specifically, the issue here is one relating to the bank’s prospective 
                                                 
1358 European Banking Authority, ‘Market Risk’ (European Banking Authority, no date) 
<https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/market-risk> accessed 24 September 2014.  
1359 Interview with Respondent 13. Brackets added. 
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liability to investors if such risks are not disclosed. This is because environmental issues 
affects the company’s flotation, and the investors’ capital is lost as a consequence. It is 
important to note that only a small amount of data were collected on this type of risk. 
Consequently, market risk has been omitted from the ‘risk ranking’ in this chapter 
because it is, in the author’s personal opinion, very unlikely to occur as a result of land 
pollution.  
II. Ranking the Risks 
The interview data suggest that the greatest environmental risk is the reputational 
damage that can materialise for a bank because of their clients’ environmental issues. 
The data also show that, at the moment, the lowest risk is direct lender liability. This 
finding corresponds to the limited amount of case law that concerns direct lender 
liability for environmental issues. After completing a thematic analysis of the data, the 
‘risk ranking’ goes as follows: 
 Lender Liability – Low Risk 
 The Indirect Risks – Medium Risk 
 Reputational Risk – High Risk 
As noted above, market risk has been omitted from this risk ranking because it is a 
highly unlikely risk in the environmental context. This section begins by evaluating the 
threat of lender liability for environmental damage. By providing a contemporary 
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ranking of the threat of the environmental risks, the section responds to the overarching 
research question and sub-question 1.   
A. Lender Liability  
The data show that lender liability for environmental damage is perceived as low risk 
by financial institutions in the UK. Comparing the interview data with some of the older 
academic literature portrays how significantly perceptions of lender liability for 
environmental damage have changed over the last twenty-five years. For instance, in 
an article that he composed in 1990, Tromans suggested that: 
‘Perhaps the greatest fear of all for lenders is that of possible primary 
liability in the event that they seek to realise their security.’ 1360 
Similarly, in a paper written in 1993, Parker and Welch stated that: 
‘Of the many environmental-related issues facing the community, one of 
the most pressing is that of mitigating the effects of past pollution… It 
appears that the problem of being unable to make the polluter pay because 
the polluter cannot be found is to be solved with the theory that those in the 
community with the largest revenue base should be required by legislative 
means to take the original polluter’s place. Lenders seems to have been 
                                                 
1360 Tromans (n 71) 434. 
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universally identified as a group with sufficient capital to take on this role.’ 
1361 
While it has been previously established that the greatest threat of direct liability for 
lenders in the UK presently comes from Part IIA of the EPA 1990, Chapter 2 of this 
thesis shows that, due to the regime’s poor implementation and lack of enforceability, 
Part IIA liability is a decreasingly low risk.1362 Legal academics and practitioners are 
no longer likely to present Part IIA as ‘the greatest fear of all for lenders.’ The overall 
perception towards the threat of lender liability for environmental damage has changed; 
and this changing perception is supported by the response that one interviewee gave 
when asked about the present threat to banks for the payment of remediation costs under 
the Part IIA regime: 
I: What about direct lender liability risk, where the bank has to pay for the 
clean-up costs? 
R3: I’m not aware of any instance where a bank, uhm, has been forced to 
pay for clean-up. That just, as far as I know, hasn’t happened. I mean the, 
uhm, the contaminated land regime, which came in in 2000, you know, 
hasn’t driven a lot of legal cases, uh, the issues tend to be sorted out 
because everyone’s aware that there is a legal framework, but they try to 
do what they can to make sure that it doesn’t go down that route. Obviously, 
                                                 
1361 Parker and Welch (n 72) 217. 
1362 Refer to ch 2.  
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there is an indirect impact if the bank’s client suddenly has to pay for 
something that they weren’t expecting to pay for.1363 
A surprising result was that, when asked to categorise the various risks, some 
interviewees failed to mention direct liability altogether, which demonstrates just how 
insignificant the threat is for commercial lending practices. When assessing a particular 
risk, banks tend to analyse both the likelihood of a risk’s occurrence, alongside the 
severity of the damage that may be incurred if the risk does actually materialise, no 
matter how unlikely. When evaluating the likelihood of a lender being made liable 
under the Part IIA regime, it is possible to rank this category of environmental risk as 
low. However, direct lender liability does appear to be a more significant risk when one 
assesses it in relation to the severity of the harm that can be incurred. The following 
interview extracts may be used as examples to put emphasis on this point:  
R10: Liability risk, I guess, it depends how the deal is structured, right. If 
you end up having a client… well you may know more than me about this, 
uhm, if we take over a company that has significant liability due to land 
contamination, then we do end up having a liability risk, I guess. 1364 
Also, 
I: Excellent, and are there any risks that are more of a threat than others? 
                                                 
1363 Interview with Respondent 3. 
1364 Interview with Respondent 10. 
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R11: Sure, I would tend to say that, in terms of… in terms of the severity… 
contamination liability tends to be the largest because it can cause the most 
substantial single impact to the organisation. 1365   
And, 
R12: Well, I think contaminated land is probably the biggest threat, partly 
because it’s the biggest unknown, and because of the of the context in which 
contaminated land risk is assessed, uhm, results from all are site specific, 
even if you have those results, but, a lot of the time you don’t have very 
much to go on, so often it’s a very big question mark. 1366 
Even though lender liability for environmental damage is now considered low risk, the 
likelihood of a bank being made directly liable for environmental pollution should still 
remain as a ‘theoretically possibility’.1367  
B. The Indirect Risks  
There was a general consensus between the interviewees that lenders perceive the 
indirect risks (i.e. credit and security risks) to be more of a threat than lender liability. 
However, while the indirect risks are ranked higher than direct risk, the majority of the 
interviewees proposed that banks are less concerned about these risks than the threat 
posed to them by reputational risk, especially when lending on environmentally and 
socially contentious projects. Such a risk ranking should be expected, since, upon a 
                                                 
1365 Interview with Respondent 11. 
1366 Interview with Respondent 12. 
1367 Egede and Lee (n 56) 868.   
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portfolio basis, lenders would not suffer a huge financial injury from the indirect risks 
that may occur on individual loans. On the other hand, the reputational risk that may be 
created by being in association with a company that has created significant 
environmental damage may be much more harmful to the bank’s future profitability. 
When asked to rank the risks in order, two respondents commented:   
R10: Okay, well the risks are many. The two biggest ones are reputational 
risk and credit risk.1368 
And, 
R13: Currently, I would rate reputational risk higher than… well… first – 
reputational risk, secondly – credit risk, thirdly – liability and market 
risk.1369 
Even though the indirect risks are currently ranked lower than reputational damage, it 
is still a threat that banks need to consider during the implementation of their 
environmental due diligence functions. This must be done both before and after the 
grant of loan finance, as Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate.  
In the environmental context, the circumstances in which the indirect risks can occur 
for banks are numerous. For example, a borrower may incur criminal and/or civil 
liabilities for non-compliance with a regulatory regime, or a borrower may be served 
with a remediation notice, or a borrower may become insolvent and the bank is then 
                                                 
1368 Interview with Respondent 10. 
1369 Interview with Respondent 13. 
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left with a bad asset on its books. When determining the greatest threat between credit 
risk and security risk, the responses given by the interviewees were mixed. Some 
interviewees suggested that credit risk was the greater threat of the two: 
R5: Certainly, the credit risk would be the larger because that impacts, 
directly, a company’s ability to pay back a loan. 1370 
Conversely, some believed that security risk should be classed as the most problematic: 
R6: I think the biggest threat is probably the damage done to the value of 
the collateral, because most appraisals are done on the basis that the 
property is clean. That may, or may not, be the case; and if it’s not clean, 
then that value of the collateral may be much more diminished than we 
were thinking it is. So when you realise on property – say it’s worth $1 
million – realise on the property, and we can only get $700,000 back 
because that’s all we can sell the property for, then, typically, that’s not 
going to cover our loan. And that happens more often than not.1371 
Ultimately, when viewed upon a case-by-case basis, the two risks can be just as 
threatening. Fortunately, the likelihood and severity of both credit risk and security risk 
can be mitigated through the banks’ use of environmental due diligence, and this is 
especially so in relation to land affected by contamination. Indeed, with some types of 
lending practice (such as, syndicate loans, initial public offerings and mergers and 
acquisitions), the indirect risks caused by environmental concerns pose a very unlikely 
                                                 
1370 Interview with Respondent 5.  
1371 Interview with Respondent 6. 
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threat to bank lending. Certainly, it is only in the situation where a bank lends large 
sums of its own money that these two risks can become highly troublesome.         
C. Reputational Risk 
Reputational risk is presently viewed as the greatest environment-related risk to 
commercial loan financing activities. As mentioned above, the increasing threat of 
reputational damage within the financial world can be attributed to the rise in societal 
pressures, and concerns surrounding environmental and social welfare. With regards to 
reputational risk, Respondent 10 suggested that:  
R10: Because of society’s expectations – because of NGOs’ expectations 
keeping raising awareness – because banks also do not like to think of 
themselves as someone as an organisation that turns a blind eye – and 
because of that you have reputational risk. Environmental risk is probably, 
much often, triggered by reputational risk, if that makes any sense. Credit 
risk is happening as a result of environmental impacts from clients is very 
real; it can be very significant; but it is much rarer. Reputational risk is 
much more frequent in association with, uhm, environmental impacts. 1372   
One of the greatest problems with this type of environmental risk is that it is extremely 
difficult to calculate. This is because the risk of a bank receiving reputational damage 
for environmental issues is uncertain until it actually materialises. For large projects of 
                                                 
1372 Interview with Respondent 10. 
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$10 million or more, the Equator Principles (EP) may be used to reduce the severity of 
the threat posed to lenders by reputational risk.1373   
The EP are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.1374 The EP are a voluntary 
set of principles that aim to act as a ‘common baseline and framework’1375 for financial 
institutions that lend to major projects. Chapter 7 argues that the EP have acted as a 
primary driver for the financial institutions’ use of environmental risk management.1376 
However, despite all of its positive attributes, some view the EP as a potential source 
of primary liability for the Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs). This may 
be increasingly true under the new EP III framework, which sets out broader methods 
for categorising, auditing and assessing an EP project. Such reasoning is adopted by 
Torrance, who suggests: 
‘The reality is, wherever EPFI are auditing and assessing legal and 
regulatory compliance of their borrowers and even suggesting management 
approaches through the Action Plan and monitoring and review processes 
as “partners” with their borrowers, there will exist the possibility that an 
EPFI could be accused of a regulatory offence, along with their borrowers. 
That means that both the EPFI as corporations, as well as individual 
employees, officers or directors, could find themselves the subject of a 
regulatory prosecution in relation to an EP project.’ 1377  
                                                 
1373 The Equator Principles (EP, June 2013) 3  
<http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf>  accessed 12 August 2013.  
1374 infra, ch 7. 
1375 EP 2013 (n 1373) 3.  
1376 infra, ch 7. 
1377 M Torrance, ‘Managing Lender Liability in the Equator Principles Implementation – Regulatory 
Offences’ (Lex Sustineo, 30 May 2013)  
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Within twenty-first century banking, the ability to calculate and capture the reputational 
damage that might be incurred when lending has proven to be particularly troublesome. 
During the course of funding trans-national corporations, the qualitative data have 
shown that it is very difficult for a bank to ‘hypothecate’ the money that is lent to an 
individual project or cause; and this is particularly so in syndicated loans. Large 
corporates often operate on a global scale, and the projects that they are involved in at 
any one time can be many, and will vary considerably. Simply because a lender has lent 
money to a borrower that operates trans-nationally, does not mean that the bank 
endorses every project in which that borrower is involved. Even so, NGOs will often 
tar lenders with the same brush as their clients. In their interview, Respondent 11 spoke 
freely about the bank’s difficulty with the hypothecation of funds in this regard:  
R11: So you may lend money to the corporate body, say, based in London – 
headquartered in London. And that money is transferred into, you know, 
their London liquidity accounts. But then they may undertake activities 
globally, uhm, and, therefore, a favoured NGOs tactic is to hypothecate all 
of the financing that a financial institution provides to the one, particularly, 
contentious project. We saw this as an NGOs tactic with the tar sands in 
Alberta, in Canada, where there was a NGI report that was issued that 
listed all of the banks involved in financing, and then assumed that the gross 
financing sums – the gross lending sums – that were lent to corporate 
entities, like, say BP, who had operations there, were all going to support 
that. So you end up with multi-billion pound/dollar sums that were 
supposedly being lent to support tar sands, and the reality, of course, was 
                                                 
<http://lexsustineo.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/managing-lender-liability-in-equator_30.html> accessed 12 
August 2013.  
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that the money that was being lent was going to support BP’s global 
treasury, uhm, and very little, if any of it, was making its way to Canada. 
As a financial institution, you can’t track that. It is impossible to 
differentiate between which particular. It’s like taking a cup of water out of 
a stream: what portion of the money that goes in at this end is yours that 
comes out of the other end? 1378 
Because reputational harm is difficult to calculate, assess and evaluate, there is a great 
deal of uncertainty throughout the lending community as to the future of this form of 
environmental risk. This is why it is ranked as the greatest threat.  For example, some 
of the bankers that were interviewed have already began to question whether, in the 
future, lenders would be obliged to assess the environmental impacts that their 
individual loan financing activities have in relation to the environment. If this does 
actually materialise as a de facto requirement for social, ethical, and environmental 
disclosure,1379 it may be that the banks will have to evaluate things like the carbon 
exposure that their individual transactions generate. According to the interview data, 
reputational risk has replaced lender liability for environmental damage as both the 
most probable and significant environmental risk within commercial loan finance. As 
will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 on environmental due diligence, it can also be 
categorised as the most prominent driver for the banks’ continued use of environmental 
risk management in modern corporate banking.   
 
                                                 
1378 Interview with Respondent 11.  
1379 Egede and Lee (n 56) 868.   
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III. Conclusion 
This chapter of the thesis has portrayed the different types of environmental risks that 
lenders may experience in their commercial loan financing. Following a general 
description of the environment-related risks that were identified in the interview data, 
an account of the changing perceptions towards these risks was provided. The data 
show that lender liability is low risk, and lenders rank reputational risk as the greatest 
threat to their commercial loan financing activities.    
The next chapter (Chapter 6) evaluates the due diligence methods used by banks to 
characterise and assess environmental risks before and after the loan is contracted.  
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Chapter 6: 
Environmental Due Diligence 
The previous chapter (Chapter 5) presented an overview of the environmental risks that 
banks may incur during their loan financing to commercial customers. It seems 
necessary, therefore, to follow with a chapter on the different due diligence techniques 
that financial institutions use to manage and assess such risks. In accordance with the 
data analysed in the semi-structured interviews, this chapter of the thesis portrays the 
lenders’ present use of environmental due diligence when lending to commercial 
customers. The necessity and purpose of this chapter lies in its explanation of the 
different types of due diligence that are currently employed by bank lenders. The 
overarching research question asks, ‘…what are currently the primary drivers for the 
use of environmental due diligence’? This key question is supplemented by sub-
question 2 which relates specifically to the practise of environmental due diligence in 
banks. Accordingly, Chapter 6’s relevance to the overarching research question and 
sub-question 2 is in its demonstration that an environmental due diligence culture has 
developed within the risk management frameworks of the banks. The next chapter 
(Chapter 7) also concerns environmental due diligence; it outlines the interviewees’ 
opinions of what has driven this form of due diligence to develop over the last decade. 
The following section analyses the beginnings of environmental due diligence in banks. 
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I. The Beginnings of Environmental Due Diligence in 
Banks 
Lenders cannot afford to ignore the threat of ‘environmental liability’.1380 Thus, 
environmental due diligence is now an accepted feature within the world of commercial 
finance.1381 When contracting a loan or taking security, it is important that lenders 
understand the risks that may be incurred.1382 The Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) provides a general, but nevertheless useful, 
definition of due diligence in a Report that it published in 2013. The Report suggests 
that ‘due diligence’ is: 
‘the process through which enterprises can identify, prevent, mitigate and 
account for how they address their actual and potential adverse impacts as 
an integral part of business decision-making and risk management 
systems.’1383 
In the environmental context, due diligence describes the processes and mechanisms 
that are undertaken in order to avoid the materialisation of any future environmental 
risks or liabilities, which may arise out of a transaction.1384 It is a system of ‘due merit 
                                                 
1380 Hood (n 71) 631. 
1381 See, P Yeoh, ‘Socially responsible investing: legal and related challenges’ (2014) 35(2) Comp Law 
35; and T Slapper and T Hall, ‘The Triple Bottom Line: What is it and how does it work?’ (2011) Indiana 
Business Review 1. 
1382 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 165. 
1383 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘Environmental and Social Risk Due 
Diligence in the Financial Sector: current approaches and practices’ (OECD, May 2013) 14 
<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/globalforumonresponsiblebusinessconduct/2013_WS1_1.pdf> accessed 
6 October 2014.  See also, N Azimah Abdul Aziz, ‘Managing corporate risk and achieving internal 
control through statutory compliance’ (2013) 20 JFC 25, 26. 
1384 ibid. 
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or care’,1385 and is particularly important when dealing with clients that work in 
‘hazardous industries or operations’.1386 Such an observation is verified by Seiler, who 
suggests that, ‘In the last decade, potential liability for environmental contamination 
has grown tremendously, affecting parties not normally involved in the generation, 
treatment, storage, disposal, or transportation of hazardous wastes.’1387  
Environmental due diligence is a risk management tool that may be used by banks to 
improve their perceptions in the public eye, to better understand clients, and to comply 
with environmental supply chain management systems etc. As well as banks, 
environmental risk management has also become a necessary pre-requisite for many 
borrowers, and this is especially so for those operating in sectors that are considered to 
pose a high risk to the environment. Roulac suggests that, while environmental risks 
were once used as ‘a prime example’ for economists to demonstrate how market-pricing 
mechanisms are inadequate for calculating the external costs that may be present on 
financial transactions,1388 now the mechanisms are much improved, and, ‘have 
dramatically enhanced the significance of environmental considerations.’1389 The 
growing environmental threats have allowed a culture for environmental risk 
management to develop throughout business.1390 In relation to lenders, this has meant 
that it has become necessary for banks to assess any such risks that they may incur by 
virtue of their loan financing to commercial customers.1391 As lending institutions have 
                                                 
1385 C Corino, ‘Environmental Due Diligence’ (2000) 9(4) European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review 120. 
1386 O’Donovan (n 63) 625. 
1387 S Seiler, ‘The Environmental Due Diligence Defense and Contractual Protection Devices’ (1988) 
49(6) La L Rev 1405. 
1388 Roulac (n 68) 139. 
1389 ibid. 
1390 However, environmental legislation may no longer be perceived as a significant driver for 
environmental due diligence in banks. The Coalition Government is currently running a one in / one out 
system of regulation under the red tape initiative.  
1391 Seiler (n 1387) 1405.  
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evolved and developed over time, so have their techniques for managing and mitigating 
risks created during the course of their business operations.1392 Evans argues that, 
before the threat of the non-financial risks emerged, banking due diligence had been 
directly influenced by the concept of caveat emptor (‘let the buyer beware’),1393 and 
also the threat posed to lenders by the fraudulent behaviour of their clients.1394 In line 
with Evans’ reasoning, this chapter argues that, since 1990, environmental issues have 
also been influencing the growth and development of environmental due diligence as 
an essential condition of lending to commercial customers in the UK. 
The interview data suggest that environmental due diligence in commercial loan 
financing first emerged in the UK in the 1990s. Before the inception of specific 
environmental laws into the British legal system, it would have been increasingly 
unlikely to find this type of due diligence being carried out by a bank considering 
granting a loan to a commercial customer. Respondent 4 highlighted this point:  
R4: I started to remember that happening in the 1990s. Before that, I think 
it is probably increasingly unlikely that the banks did very much.1395  
And, Respondent 7 also suggested that: 
R7: Yeah, the 1990s was really the growth period for due diligence.
1396 
                                                 
1392 A Evans, ‘Due diligence: the English way’ (1995) 6(6) ICCLR 195. 
1393 Martin (n 514) 65. ‘Caveat emptor’ is defined as, ‘[let the buyer beware] A common-law maxim 
warning a purchaser that he could not claim that his purchases were defective unless he protected himself 
by obtaining express guarantees from the vendor.’ 
1394 Evans (n 1392) 195. See also, J O’Keeffe, ‘Environmental issues in corporate transactions in the 
United Kingdom’ (1999) 10(12) ICCLR 343, 347. 
1395 Interview with Respondent 4. 
1396 Interview with Respondent 7. 
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Although this will be discussed in more detail later on within the following chapter, the 
primary legislative driver for the origins and expansion of environmental due diligence 
in UK banks was Part IIA of the EPA 1990 (however, the other risks within 
environmental law have also contributed to this paradigm).1397 When Part IIA was first 
enacted, it created a fear which spread throughout the lending community; and it was 
the fear of incurring liabilities for pollution that forced financial institutions to develop 
due diligence methods. The empirical data show that, over the last ten years, lenders 
have become much more proactive in establishing methods that aim to assess the 
environmental issues that may either pose a direct risk to them, or affect the future 
creditworthiness of their commercial customers. Bellis and Deceleve portray the 
lenders’ function in relation to the environment. They ask: 
‘How do environmental issues affect the way bankers go about their 
profession? As organisations, banks are not really affected by operational 
problems directly related to the environment. As lenders, however, they are 
present in all sectors of the economy. The financial services industry 
certainly has a major role to play in environmental issues.’ 1398 
While legislative exposures made due diligence techniques for reducing environmental 
risks a necessary feature within bank lending to commercial clients, it is apparent that 
the legislative basis is no longer having the same effect now.1399 The following section 
                                                 
1397 Refer to ch 7.  
1398 M Bellis and X Decleve, ‘Banking services and the environment’ (1993) 4 IBLJ 391.  
1399 See the next chapter, which appraises the various drivers for the continued growth of environmental 
due diligence in modern financing activities. 
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looks at the different types of environmental due diligence that the banks’ 
environmental risk management teams use to manage risks.  
II. The Different Types of Environmental Due Diligence 
This section of the chapter evaluates the different stages at which environmental due 
diligence techniques may be deployed. It therefore provides an essential link to sub-
question 1, point 1, i.e. ‘What are the main due diligence techniques used by lenders to 
manage environmental risk?’  
There are two primary stages in which due diligence may be carried out.1400 The first 
occurs before the loan has been granted,1401 and, as a consequence, may be described 
as ‘pre-loan due diligence’. It is only once a loan has been approved that the next stage 
of due diligence kicks in;1402 this is referred to as ‘post-loan due diligence’. Even though 
different due diligence techniques are used at the two stages of risk management, the 
level of control that a lender has over its borrowers must be kept to a minimum at all 
times. A lender with a significant degree of control over the business affairs of its 
customers is much more likely to incur lender liability as a person that either caused or 
knowingly permitted environmentally damaging activities that resulted in pollution. 
 
                                                 
1400 E Bodson, ‘Prevention of lender liability risks for environmental damages’ (1993) 4 IBLJ 467, 473. 
1401 ibid. 
1402 ibid. 
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A. Pre-loan Due Diligence 
Pre-loan due diligence refers to the methods of risk mitigation used by banks when 
processing ‘new loan’ applications.1403 At this stage lenders determine whether a 
commercial customer is eligible to receive loan finance, allowing ‘full due diligence 
investigations to be undertaken.’1404  As this section shows, there are a number of ways 
that the threat of a future risk can be abated before a loan is finalised. These techniques 
will now be discussed in further detail below. 
1.  External Expertise  
The empirical data identify the use of ‘external expertise’ as an important pre-loan due 
diligence technique, and this is especially so with regards to identifying contamination 
issues on land. This section of the chapter looks at the lenders’ relationship with 
environmental consultants, as well as the environmental risk assessment that 
consultants carry out for the banks.  
1.1. Environmental Consultants 
Consultancy services are ‘multidisciplinary’,1405 and cover a number of professions.1406 
The main benefit of engaging external environmental consultancy services is that it 
allows a third party to help lenders evaluate and determine what can, more often than 
not, be highly complex situations.1407 The main problem for the lender is whether it, or 
                                                 
1403 Bryce (n 1187) 136. See also, Hood (n 71) 632. 
1404 ibid. 
1405 Case (n 48) 119. 
1406 Bryce (n 1187) 136. 
1407 Case (n 48) 118 – 119. 
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its borrower, should employ the consultancy service.1408 Also, a further issue arises if 
the lender obtains ‘key information’ regarding its client’s activities, as a result of the 
consultant’s report; consequently, acquiring such information may result in lender 
liability as a ‘knowingly permitter’.1409  
Nevertheless, commissioned professionals can assist banks in numerous ways. First, a 
specialist environmental auditor will be able to evaluate a contaminated property’s 
value, and also predict its future marketability.1410 This is particularly useful in today’s 
market, as it seems that some banks are holding contaminated land (almost as an asset 
management company) with the hope of selling on the land when redevelopment begins 
to regain its marketability. Secondly, environmental consultants are usually 
indemnified by their professional indemnity insurance (PII) policies, 1411 a form of third 
part liability insurance.1412 This means that where the consultant has a PII policy, its 
own liability (e.g. for professional negligence) is covered in respect to others.1413 
However, the fact that PII provides adequate coverage for contamination issues is often 
‘a mistaken belief’.1414 The limit of the indemnity can be for ‘each and every claim’,1415 
which means, ‘that the limit is payable in respect of each claim.’1416 However, this form 
of indemnity limit does not normally cover claims for environmental issues, like 
contamination.1417 Instead, the indemnity limit is based on aggregate cover, i.e. ‘the 
                                                 
1408 Bryce (n 1187) 136. cf Hood (n 71) 632.  
1409 Hood (n 71) 632. 
1410 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 172. 
1411 Sykes, ‘Environmental insurance solutions’ (n 97) 30. 
1412 Construction Industry Council, ‘Professional indemnity insurance for construction consultants’ (CIC 
website; Liability Briefing, 2008) 1 <http://www.cic.org.uk/admin/resources/pi-insurance-for-
construction-consultants.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014.  
1413 ibid, 1. 
1414 Sykes, ‘Environmental insurance solutions’ (n 97) 30.  
1415 Construction Industry Council (n 1412). 
1416 ibid. 
1417 ibid. 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
257 
limit is only available once, however many claims are made, in the policy period.’1418 
With regards to PII and contaminated land, Sykes suggests: 
‘PII is available on a year-by-year basis; hence, there is no guaranteed long-
term protection for the client. Moreover, if the consultant's PII is only 
available on an 'aggregate' basis, this means that the pot of available 
insurance money may be exhausted by other people's claims. Many 
environmental consultants carry no PII or significantly less than £2m 
cover.’1419 
In the 1990s and 2000s, Part IIA of the EPA 1990 refined the existing investigation 
expertise surrounding the contaminated land market.1420 During this time, bankers 
tracked the technical capacity for phase one investigation; they saw the phase one 
approach as an effective means of assessing their customers’ sites for the presence of 
contaminant linkages.1421 The instruction of external consultants became a crucial 
method for reducing the risks before some loans could be approved;1422 and this is still 
true today. Below, Respondent 11 presents an opinion of when the use of external 
environmental consultation is most important in the banking due diligence process:    
R11: Externally commissioned environmental due diligence, I think, is most 
important where we believe there to be some form of contamination on the 
site, and we wish to get a feel for the scale of that contamination. And what 
                                                 
1418 ibid. 
1419 Sykes, ‘Environmental insurance solutions’ (n 97) 30. 
1420 Case (n 48) 118.  
1421 ibid. 
1422 Bryce (n 1187) 136.  
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we try to do, from the bank’s perspective, is to assign an appropriate value 
to the site.1423 
As will be shown in the section on environmental risk assessment (below), the use of 
professional expertise from outside of the bank has become a necessity for the lenders’ 
environmental risk management.1424 However, this was not always the case; one 
interviewee said that, historically, most bankers’ viewed external environmental 
consultants as a hindrance to the profitability of their business ventures.1425 Now, the 
ability of the banks to sub-contract their work out to professionals is seen as an essential 
part of their pre- and post-loan due diligence. The use of external experts is mostly 
required to bridge the gaps in the bankers’ knowledge of environmental risk 
assessment, which is a process that relies heavily upon scientific and technical analysis. 
When employing environmental consultants to carry out a pre-transaction risk 
evaluation, banks must ensure that they seek reliable, professional advice.1426   
As environmental risk management continues to develop and expand in financial 
institutions, environmental expertise may be brought completely in-house in order to 
avoid the need to rely on third party advisers. Establishing a centre of environmental 
expertise within banks would reduce the inherent cost implications for lenders,1427 as 
well as lowering premiums paid by borrowers, which have inevitably increased because 
of the need to exercise environmental due diligence. Actually, the empirical data show 
that further developing in-house expertise is already beginning to happen within one or 
                                                 
1423 Interview with Respondent 11. 
1424 Hood (n 71) 632. See also, Case (n 48) 119. 
1425 Interview with Respondent 1. 
1426 See, Urban Regeneration Agency and English Partnerships (Medway) Ltd v Mott Macdonald [1999] 
EWCA Civ 1388. For a useful overview of this case, see, O’Keeffe (n 1394) 346.  
1427 Bryce (n 1187) 135. See also, Case (n 48) 118.  
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two of the most environmentally and socially conscious lenders.1428 For the time being, 
however, it seems that the majority of banks in the UK will continue to choose to 
outsource their work to externally commissioned professionals. For instance, one of the 
UK’s major clearing banks does not have an internal environmental manager, per se, 
and therefore chooses to use external consultants to conduct all of the necessary 
environmental due diligence for its corporate transactions. Outsourcing is preferred 
because environmental investigation is not a core task of a bank. 
1.2. Environmental Risk Assessment1429 
Environmental risk assessment (also known as auditing) is a process for determining 
the environmental risks on any given transaction.1430 Such an assessment is ‘an 
important component of any corporate initiative’,1431 and assists lenders when trying to 
identify prospective risks with a particular client, or a client’s property, or both. In 
relation to contaminated land, the assessment of any real property that is going to be 
used as security against the loan is crucial in order to reduce the threat of suffering 
credit or security risk after the drawdown of the loan.1432  
The practice of environmental risk assessment varies considerably.1433 However, the 
empirical data show that bank lenders have adopted similar methods for assessing 
environmental risk. The majority of banks will attempt to feed as much data as possible 
                                                 
1428 Refer to ch 5. 
1429 Bodson (n 1400) 475. 
1430 ibid. 
1431 J Lang, ‘Legislative, Regulatory and Judicial Dilemmas in Environmental Auditing’ (1999) 6(3) Eco-
Mgmt Aud 101. 
1432 Case (n 48) 109. 
1433 N Gunningham and N Prest, ‘Environmental Audit as a Regulatory Strategy: Prospects and Reform’ 
(1993) 15 Syd L Rev 492, 494 – 497. In this article, Gunningham and Prest show that there are numerous 
audits that can be employed to assess environmental risks, i.e. ‘operational audits’, ‘transactional audits’, 
and ‘environmental impact audits’. 
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into the risk assessment in order to come to an informed decision on whether to lend.1434 
Banks use external consultants to carry out environmental risk assessments, and provide 
a report (normally described as a ‘site-guard’ report) before the loan is approved. 
However, an environmental risk assessment may also be carried out before foreclosure, 
meaning that environmental risk assessment may also be regarded as a post-loan due 
diligence technique, which a lender can undertake on an individual site to assess any 
environmental risk that is caused by pollution. If, for instance, no contamination is 
found on the property, the bank can foreclose over the entirety of the mortgaged 
property in order to realise its securities. Below is interview data showing Respondent 
1’s experiences with the use of environmental risk assessments and external 
consultants:   
I: So, are the direct and indirect risks processed in a different way, then? 
R1: No, they are all processed through the same process, and the way we 
do it is through a land use questionnaire policy. Where we’re going to lose 
money on this area is normally single operators, single sites; it is very rare 
that a big multi-national goes bust and nobody buys anything … So, the 
way we deal with it is that whenever there’s an evaluation done we get 
something called a […] site guard report. 
I: So, this basically looks at all the different risks? 
                                                 
1434 O’Keeffe (n 1394) 347. 
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R1: So, we’ve talked to Landmark many years ago, data wasn’t really, 
wasn’t really there, and then in 2005/2006 we worked with AIG to produce 
a desktop report, which was a site-guard report with a company called 
GroundSure, and what that does is that it gives us the historical data, so we 
know what’s gone on before; but it also gives us the current data. 
I: So, the current use? 
R1: Yeah, the current use. It gives us information on licences, permits, 
prosecutions, and whether there’s petrol filling stations … all sorts of … 
and also the sensitivity; so, we get information on aquifers, abstractions, 
and this sort of thing. And that’s all fed into our risk-ranking model. So, 
they’ll have a risk; they’ll put the data in; and information will come out of 
the risk-ranking model; and then depending upon the outcome, if its further 
assessment, then those cases come to me, and I look at those cases to see 
whether there is a risk. A desktop report that says fail, or further action, 
doesn’t necessarily mean in practice a fail, or further action.  
I: So, in the second stage, when it comes to you, you do more of an in-depth 
study, then? 
R1: Yes, but it is all based on credit risk. The way that we approach this is 
like we approach any other credit risk, and if we need specialist reports 
then we’ll buy that in. 
I: So, you get in external expertise to help, then? 
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R1: To inform when we need to. So we do what we can in-house, and then 
if we need to, then we’ll look to our panel, and get somebody in; but we 
only do that when we really see that there’s a holistic risk. So you may have 
a risk, one that has failed and you are lending £500,000, and the valuation 
is £1.5 million; it could just have a Part, like a local authority Part B type 
permit, which would make the desktop report fail; so, for spraying a car, 
or something. You put that information together, and say that that’s still 
acceptable. And it’s my job to say whether those sites are acceptable, or 
not, as security.1435  
Respondent 1’s data are very interesting, since they provide a practical account of how 
UK banks conduct their environmental due diligence. Throughout this excerpt the 
interview participant, an experienced lending risk manager, shows how banks are not 
totally dependent upon the knowledge of external consultants, and are often willing to 
assess the data themselves in order to come to an informed decision on whether or not 
to act. From Respondent 1’s answer, it seems that banks will only employ outside 
professionals in a situation in which there is a particularly threatening site, which needs 
more expert eyes to view, and assess, the situation. Another interesting point made by 
Respondent 1 is the approach of the risk-ranking model for this particular bank, which 
is one based upon credit risk. This essentially means that environmental risk is 
processed through the same model of risk assessment that applies to all forms of credit 
risk. This accords to Weber, Fenchel and Scholz’s empirical analysis of the integration 
of environmental risks into banks’ credit risk management systems.1436 From the 
                                                 
1435 Interview with Respondent 1. 
1436 O Weber, M Fenchel and R Scholz, ‘Empirical Analysis of the Integration of Environmental Risks 
into the Credit Risk Management Process of European Banks’ (2008) 17 Bus Stat Env 149. 
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empirical findings of their study, Weber et al. state that, ‘About 15 years ago, banks 
started to integrate environmental risks into their credit risk management 
procedures.’1437 The fact that some banks have chosen to incorporate environmental 
risk management into their credit risk setting is unsurprising. Banks have been 
assessing credit risk for a very long time, and are therefore comfortable with 
recognising any events that may lead to credit risk on a loan. It seems only sensible that 
they should try to develop a system that offers the same degree of comfort with regards 
to their environmental risk management.   
1.2.1. Phase I Risk Assessment  
Although risk assessments differ between lenders, banks tend to implement a similar 
initial ‘scoping exercise’ at the very beginning of their risk assessment process.1438 
Some call this a ‘Phase I Risk Assessment’; on the other hand, others will introduce a 
lighter-touch ‘desktop’ assessment before they begin the Phase 1 Assessment 
process.1439 During this preliminary stage, a brief desktop study will be performed in 
order to analyse the potential risks that may lie with prospective clients and their 
properties.1440 O’Donovan states that, ‘A preliminary environmental audit does not 
always reveal the full extent of pollution or contamination, but it can alert the lender to 
the risk of environmental damage.’1441 Respondent 3 talked about the preliminary risk 
assessment in interview.  
                                                 
1437 ibid. 
1438 Bellis and Decleve (n 1398) 391.  
1439 Gunningham and Prest (n 1433) 494. 
1440 ibid. See also, O’Keeffe (n 1394) 347. 
1441 O’Donovan (n 63) 625. See also, Gunningham and Prest (n 1433) 526. 
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R3: So, they [the bank], internally, have, uhm, I think there’s only one guy 
I know, but they put together a process where they had established a panel 
of consultants and every time that someone applied for a loan, which 
involved securing the loan against property, they would have to go and pay 
for a consultant to come in to do a phase 1 survey, and that formed part of 
the loan application documentation, and that was fed into the credit 
decision making, the credit committee, or whatever they had there that 
would approve the loan, and that’s how they did it.  
I: And the Phase 1 is more or less a desktop study, then? 
R3: Yeah, it’s essentially a desktop, you know, it’s common to do a site visit 
as well, but, essentially, it’s a desktop where, you know, and I use to do 
these things, you’d get a report from a company called Landmark Enviro-
check, and they’d … they’re, basically, a data aggregator, and they buy 
data from the EA, and from various different sources, and they give you 
these maps with, sort of, red flags, and you see immediately if a site is more 
likely to have a problem or not. They have records of pollution incidents.1442  
Phase I Risk Assessment is, thus, a preliminary inquiry (a desktop study) of a client and 
the client’s property. While there is no universal method for implementing a Phase I 
audit,1443 it usually includes, inter alia:      
                                                 
1442 Interview with Respondent 3. Brackets added. 
1443 O’Keeffe and Boileau (n 1274) 348.  
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 A review of a client’s background in order to determine whether they have a 
history of environmental damage;1444 
 An appraisal of the relevant environmental laws and regulations that may 
impede a client’s creditworthiness;1445 
 An examination of a client’s site – this may include an analysis of Ordinance 
Survey Maps/Google Earth, a site walkover, local authority registers etc.;1446 
and finally 
 An environmental audit of a site’s marketability etc.1447 
In relation to contaminated land, a Phase 1 Risk Assessment aims to check a site’s 
historical and current use in order to gauge whether the land has been, or is susceptible 
to be, identified as ‘contaminated land’ by a local authority under section 78B of the 
EPA 1990.1448 During this inspection, the site will be scoped for contaminant linkages, 
and the threat that the land may pose to any relevant receptors that may be situated in 
close proximity to the property. The Phase 1 audit can also look at a prospective client’s 
history. If a client has created environmental damage in the past, the bank may then 
need to request more stringent terms and conditions of the loan agreement1449 before 
the borrower is deemed eligible to receive loan funding.  
                                                 
1444 O’Keeffe (n 1394) 347. 
1445 ibid. 
1446 ibid. 
1447 ibid. 
1448 EPA 1990, s 78B. 
1449 infra, pg 271. 
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1.2.2. Phase II Risk Assessment 
If, after the Phase 1 study has been completed, it is evident that a risk is still reasonably 
foreseeable prior to the completion of the transaction the bank may walk away if there 
is not a lot of value in the loan. However, if the loan is valuable, specialist consultants 
should be commissioned in order to conduct a Phase 2 Risk Assessment for the 
bank.1450 A Phase 2 Risk Assessment concerns a more intrusive site investigation.1451 
After describing the Phase 1 Risk Assessment in some detail, Respondent 3 then went 
on to outline the next stage of the environmental risk management process: 
R3: A Phase 1 will say something, like, “There has been some pollution. 
They’ve had a fuel tank that’s been leaking. The geology is such that it 
would permit any fuel in the ground that it would allow it to permeate 
through the ground, you know, the aquifer … whatever! There’s a sensitive 
receptor because somebody is using the ground water aquifer for drinking 
water supply.” So, putting these three things together, you know, that 
justifies an actual intrusive investigation where you would do soil sampling, 
or you would do ground water sampling, and actually test it for 
hydrocarbons, or whatever. So that’s the way it works.  
I: So, then you can either reject the loan, or move on? 
                                                 
1450 O’Keeffe (n 1394) 348. 
1451 Case (n 48) 121.  
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R3: Yeah, you know, typically, the bank would, if there’s a ground water 
situation, the bank would say, “Look, no way, it’s too complicated”, and 
the client would have to work very hard to go back from that point.1452  
In the case of assessing whether a property may be determined as contaminated land, 
the Phase 2 Risk Assessment may be made up of inter alia:  
 A site walkover;1453 
 Boring holes or digging trenches;1454 
 Geo-physical ground analysis;1455 and 
 Taking samples in order to assess the soil and groundwater for the presence of 
contaminants etc.1456  
While costly, complex, and lengthy,1457 this process is essential for land that is affected 
by pollution, as it may carry more liability than profit. However, the necessary conduct 
of a Phase II Risk Assessment can directly impact a transaction, as O’Keeffe notes: 
‘If a Phase II audit is required this could have a considerable impact on the 
transaction as it can take several weeks to complete. In some cases it is not 
possible to wait for this to be completed, and agreement needs to be reached 
                                                 
1452 Interview with Respondent 3. 
1453 O’Keeffe (n 1394) 348. 
1454 ibid. 
1455 ibid. 
1456 ibid. 
1457 Case (n 48) 121. 
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on who pays for the investigations and who takes the risk after completion.’ 
1458 
If the Phase 2 Risk Assessment shows a high degree of risk, the bank may request that 
the customer take remedial action before the loan is provided to them: making clean-
up an express agreement contingent to the receipt of the loan can enforce this type of 
action.  Or again, if the loan is not that valuable, the bank still has the option of walking 
away. 
1.2.3. Phase III Risk Assessment  
This phase of risk assessment is more for borrowers, as it relates to the actions that 
should be taken to avert risks. Borrowers should create a Phase 3 Risk Assessment 
protocol to reduce the risks that may be created by their operations. For example, if a 
borrower is found to be an appropriate person to bear the responsibility for remediation 
under Part IIA, they should, in accordance with the concept of ‘Best Practicable 
Technique’ (BPT), create a remediation plan for clean-up. Such endeavors can be aided 
by the advice and support of the enforcing authority and/or appropriate Agency 
overseeing the remediation. Prudent borrowers that have a plan for remediation are less 
likely to become insolvent because of high remediation costs, which may mean that 
they are subsequently less likely to default upon their loan repayments and create risks 
for the bank.      
 
                                                 
1458 O’Keeffe and Boileau (n 1274) 348. 
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1.2.4. Environmental Risk Assessment: a necessary hindrance for lenders? 
While risk assessment is important, it seems that it is not conclusive to the banks’ 
decision-making. This is because environmental risks are not viewed as a major threat 
to financial institutions; and, even though an environmental risk may be present after 
assessing a site or client, some banks may still be willing to provide that customer with 
funding. This is clear from the answer that Respondent 1 gave when asked this question 
during their interview:  
R1: Yes, because if you’re a customer… our job is to lend money, and we 
do like lending money, we are actually quite good at lending money. So, we 
want to lend money, so you can’t just say “No” just because a desktop has 
failed. Depending upon where you get them from, anything up to 50% of 
them fail. So, if you are saying that 50% of our customers can’t give that 
site a security because of environmental risk, then you’re not going to last 
too long because in reality that’s not… that’s not what practice tells us.1459 
Respondent 1 also suggested that, while the risk assessment process is necessary, weak 
enforcement of the various regimes concerning land and water pollution means that 
banks rarely fear liability: 
R1: We do environmental impairment liability insurance, typically, where 
there’s an issue on a site, like you have an old, unlicensed landfill. We did 
one in [xxx] not so long ago, couple of weeks ago! The history was terrible, 
                                                 
1459 Interview with Respondent 1. 
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but there was no redevelopment going on and you could phase 1 – phase 2 
– dig holes until the cows come home, and it would tell you that it was 
contaminated. But, in practice, is the regulator going to serve an 
enforcement notice on that site? Well do you know how many enforcement 
notices have been served in the last data that the EA produce in 2007? 
I: Determinations were very low! 
R1: Was it 10? I think in the whole of the UK? So, then, you know, rightly 
or wrongly, we look at the practical implementation of it, so … 
I: It’s not much of a risk at all, really, is it! 
R1: No!
1460 
Since lenders are in business to make money, it is difficult for them to simply reject 
loan applications because of prospective environmental issues. As the respondent’s 
excerpt (above) suggests, ‘anything up to 50% of them [site-guard reports] fail’. Thus, 
even the most prudent and reasonable banks would agree that it is not good business 
practice to turn down fifty per cent of your commercial lending opportunities because 
of, what is considered in the financial world, an insignificant risk that is highly unlikely 
to materialise. When asked, the bankers suggested that very few of their commercial 
borrowers fall into insolvency because of environmental issues, and, in some cases, 
they will provide loan finance with the hope that nothing will happen in the future. Such 
an attitude represents, what may be described as ‘a risk-based approach’ to 
                                                 
1460 ibid. 
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environmental risk management, which is typical of the method used by the majority 
of lenders situated in Europe. If a bank rejects a loan to a large commercial customer, 
it is highly likely that there would be many other banks that would be willing to take 
on the risk of lending to that client. In the somewhat ruthless world of banking, 
opportunities cannot be easily foregone, and this is especially so with regards to the 
rejection of loans relating to non-financial risks. Therefore, even though environmental 
risk assessment is a useful weapon in the bankers’ arsenal of pre-loan due diligence 
techniques, in some circumstances it is still perceived by the bankers as a process that 
can hinder the ordinary course of lending to important commercial clients. 
2. The Loan Agreement and Security Documentation 
The interview data suggest that a popular method for reducing environmental risks is 
to insert conditions precedent into the loan and security documentation. However, the 
data also portray that banks do not create specialised loans that offer ‘packaged 
solutions’ for environmental problems.   
I: Great! And do you tailor make loans with environmental clauses in them? 
R5: I haven’t come across any loan where a company will come specifically 
to us and say, “I need $100 million to clean-up a site.”1461  
Nonetheless, it is evident that conditions precedent are now being widely used within 
the banks’ loan and security documentation in order to protect the lenders from any 
environmental issues that may arise during the course of lending. Respondent 11 also 
                                                 
1461 Interview with Respondent 5. 
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stated some of the ways in which banks use the loan documentation to make the lending 
process safer and more manageable: 
I: Are there any loans which have been tailor made to deal with 
environmental issues? 
R11: Okay, so not as products that we will market, specifically. We don’t 
have a packaged solution, but we will, for example, where we feel that it is 
beneficial to protect the bank’s position, we might engage in a phased draw 
down; so, uhm, loan amounts, which are available at set milestones, which 
might a line, for example, with a remediation plan; or, more likely, with 
general steps within the construction process, which may include some 
remediation. We may apply specific loan covenants, conditions to the loan, 
where we require from the borrower, either, single point in time actions, 
such as: completion of a successful remediation plan; or, indeed, full 
remediation; or also just monitoring considerations – update reports on 
compliance with legislation and regulation, and discussion with regulatory 
bodies. I think it’s more of a case of tweaking the way that we apply a 
product.1462 
Conditions precedent are important. Their main function is to protect the bank from the 
drawdown of funding if a particular condition is not met.  The default triggers that are 
commonly used by banks to reduce environmental risks comprise of: 
                                                 
1462 Interview with Respondent 11. 
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Loan Covenants – covenants are quite useful because their application can compel a 
bank’s client to satisfy specified conditions relating to environmental protection.1463 A 
failure to show compliance with the covenants will result in a default under the loan 
agreement. Standard covenants that are currently being used within the loan and 
security documents includes, amongst other things:  
 To act in accordance with all necessary laws and regulations;1464 
 Prohibition against certain environmentally damaging activities, and the use of 
particular equipment, that is likely to create environmental risk or exempt the 
site’s insurance cover;1465 
 To notify the bank in the situation where an event (an unlawful spillage or 
discharge, authority’s inspection and determinations, prosecution etc.) has 
occurred during business operations, which may result in risk;1466  
 If environmental damage does occur, the borrower must conduct the appropriate 
level of remediation following the Best Practicable Technique;1467 
 If found liable, the bank is thereby absolved from any liability;1468  
 To keep the property insured. 
                                                 
1463 Bodson (n 1400) 477. 
1464 ibid, 478. 
1465 ibid. 
1466 ibid. 
1467 ibid. 
1468 ibid. 
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Environmental loan covenants can be productive because they can make borrowers 
carry out specific activities or comply with specific environmental regulation.1469 They 
can also restrict the activities of borrowers by preventing them from pursuing certain 
environmentally harmful conduct that may be in violation of specific environmental 
regulations, and, as a consequence, affect their ability to operate effectively.1470     
Representations and Warranties (R & Ws) – R & Ws are clauses that seek to ensure 
both the borrower’s ability to repay the loan, and the borrower’s express agreement that 
the bank has been provided with all of the necessary information requested prior to the 
loan being granted. R & Ws are highly useful for banks’ pre-loan environmental risk 
management, since they can draw out necessary information, such as:  
 Whether a site is subject to environmental issues because of its condition and 
the existence and validity of permits;1471  
 Whether a client is of a bona fide character and eligible to receive funding;1472 
and 
 For contaminated and suspect land, specifically, the bank can draft an R & W 
clause into the loan agreement that requires the removal of a significant, or a 
significant possibility of, harm that is created by a contaminant linkage which 
                                                 
1469 Hood (n 71) 631. 
1470 ibid. 
1471 Bodson, (n 1400) 478.  
1472 ibid. 
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is present in, on or under the land, or within a controlled water system, before 
the loan is approved.  
It is important to make it clear that R & Ws, in a loan agreement, are not a pre-contract 
device, but are repeated during the life time of the loan. 
Indemnity Clauses – the loan agreement can also be used to indemnify the lender from 
any environmental liability 1473   (i.e. criminal, civil, or clean-up) that may be reasonably 
incurred after the loan has been approved and provided to the borrower. Such a clause 
will often expressly state that, simply because of the provision of loan finance, the 
lender does not hold a ‘controlling relationship’ within the borrower’s commercial 
enterprise, and that any monitoring and reporting that does takes place is simply as a 
part of the lender’s ordinary post-loan due diligence.  
B. Post-loan Due Diligence 
The chapter on historic land contamination showed that the lenders’ control over their 
borrowers must be kept to a minimum at all times in order to avoid the materialisation 
of a Fleet Factors type scenario of lender liability for environmental damage.1474 Post-
loan due diligence may be used to avoid this type of risk from occurring. This stage of 
the due diligence process relates to the risk assessment methods that are invoked after 
the loan has been approved. Upon approval of the loan both parties are thereby 
contractually bound under the terms of the loan documentation. While this phase of 
environmental risk management may not be as important as pre-loan due diligence, it 
                                                 
1473 ibid. 
1474 Refer to ch 2. 
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is nevertheless a necessary feature when lending to commercial customers that operate 
in vulnerable sectors. Post-loan due diligence involves the stage of environmental risk 
management where banks seek to monitor, report on, and audit their clients’ compliance 
within the terms of their loan agreement. This is done in order to maintain the conditions 
that existed when the contract was first entered into; it also gives the lender and 
borrower a chance to reduce the likelihood and severity of any liabilities and risks that 
may develop after the loan has come into effect.  
Post-loan due diligence is not only used to maintain customers’ creditworthiness, it is 
also extremely useful in the event of insolvency. One insolvent borrower will ultimately 
impact upon a bank’s ability to make a viable profit upon their transactions. Thus, post-
loan due diligence is also being used to safeguard lenders from acquiring liability as a 
mortgagee in possession, when exercising security rights in insolvency.  
1. The Control Dilemma 
The control dilemma is an issue that banks have tried to resolve for many years. 
‘At this point the lender may be inclined to exert even more control over 
the borrower’s day-to-day operations. However, that action places the 
lender on the horns of a dilemma: the more control it exerts, the more 
potential responsibility it assumes for environmental countermeasures.’1475  
The main question for the bank to ask upon any transaction that it is a part of is: How 
much control can I have over the client before I adopt my client’s risks and liabilities? 
                                                 
1475 Fordyce, Kofman and Tay (n 80) 21. 
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At the introduction of the part on the legal basis for environmental liability and risk, it 
was shown that the American lenders’ experiences with CERCLA caused an uncertain 
relationship to emerge between banks and their borrowers. This resulted in a grey area, 
which was described as the ‘CERCLA Dilemma’.1476 During the time between 
CERCLA, and its later revisions under Superfund, lenders did not fully understand their 
relationship with their borrowers.1477 How much advice they should give? What types 
of activities could they undertake?1478  
While not as prominent as the American banks’ experiences of lender liability and risk 
for environmental issues, financial institutions in the UK must still be cautious about 
the degree of control that they exercise over their borrowers. Due to the lack of case 
law concerning lender liability for environmental damage, there remains uncertainty as 
to the exact amount of control that a lender can have over its borrowers before it 
becomes exposed to legal culpability. Nevertheless, for a court determining a lender’s 
position within proceedings, it is conceptually possible to establish a relationship of 
control, and transfer liability for either causing or knowingly permitting environmental 
harm onto a bank.1479 And the environmental risk managers in the banks are aware of 
the dangers of having too much control over their borrowers’ activities. For example, 
Respondent 9 suggested that lender liability could be incurred if the bank places one of 
its employees onto the board of directors of one of their borrowers:1480 
                                                 
1476 A Hoffman, D Seaman and R Jeffrey, ‘A Pragmatic Solution To A Complex Dilemma: A 
Fundamental Approach To Resolving The Conflict Between CERCLA And The Bankruptcy Code’ 
(1996) 4 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 243. 
1477 ibid. 
1478 ibid. 
1479 ibid. 
1480 See, a Company, ex p Copp (n 948) 13. 
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R9: They could be, I mean, sure if a company goes bankrupt, then they will 
lose their money. They don’t have any lender liability beyond that, unless, 
they are silly enough to put someone on the board of the company with 
executive responsibility. That’s the only way I think … I understand … that 
a bank could become liable; if they have one of their employees, as an 
executive director, on the board of the company that they have invested in, 
which is an executive responsibility.1481  
Control also becomes an issue when trying to determine the question of ownership of 
contaminated and suspect land. As noted earlier,1482 ‘ownership’ is an umbrella term 
covering being either an owner or occupier of property. Fortunately, the definition of 
owner in the EPA 1990 protects lenders (to some extent). As outlined several times 
before, under section 78A(9), an owner of contaminated land is a person, other than a 
mortgagee in possession, who is entitled to the rack rent of the land.1483 An act of 
foreclosure will constitute a position of ownership. Therefore, the safest way for lenders 
to avoid Part IIA liability as an appropriate person is to not take possession of any 
aspect of the land subject to contaminative liabilities, even if this means that the bank 
makes a substantial financial loss in the process. Unfortunately, the lack of judicial 
precedent on this topic means that a great deal of ambiguity surrounds the lender - 
borrower relationship in the UK. There are, however, a number of questions that must 
be asked in relation to the idea of control:  
                                                 
1481 Interview with Respondent 9. 
1482 Refer to ch 2. 
1483 EPA 1990, s 78A(9). 
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 What constitutes a ‘controlling relationship’?  
 What types of lending activities are most likely to place a bank in a position of 
control?  
 How can lenders reduce the amount of control that they have over their 
borrowers so that they are no longer at risk?  
With regards to the final question, it seems that there are a variety of control devices 
that lenders can, and do, use in order to limit the severity of their risk exposure during 
their commercial loan financing. The most popular examples include:  
 Monitoring, reporting and auditing;  
 Drafting conditions precedent into the loan agreement and security 
documentation; 
 Environmental insurance; 
 Financial assurances; and 
 The use of insolvency practitioners. 
The section below outlines the different methods that are used in the banks’ post-loan 
due diligence for reducing environmental risk. As corporate insolvency risk has been 
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outlined in some depth in Chapter 4,1484 the use of insolvency practitioners as a form of 
due diligence is not outlined in this section of the chapter.   
1.1. Monitoring, Reporting and Auditing 
The post-loan due diligence process may allow lenders to monitor, report on, and audit 
their customers’ progress. Lenders will often make it a condition of the loan for their 
borrowers to provide progress reports after the loan is granted; this way the bank’s risk 
teams will continue to evaluate whether a particular customer is sustaining the 
necessary state of eligibility. While this is not true for all banks, normally this process 
occurs every six months for a new client, and annually for their existing customers with 
a good track record.  
There is, however, a problem with this type of due diligence method. Monitoring, 
reporting, and auditing are the perfect ingredients for creating a controlling relationship 
between a lender and its borrowers. A bank that has too much control over a borrower 
that pollutes the mortgaged property may also incur Class A liability as a person that 
knowingly permitted the contamination to occur.1485 In response to this issue, Jarvis 
and Fordham stipulate that the ability for a bank to monitor its customers’ compliance 
is a necessary requisite that cannot be removed from bank lending.1486 With regards to 
the element of control, they suggest that lenders’ degree of control may be limited, ‘by 
making the borrower pay for, and facilitate, such investigations as a condition for 
obtaining the loan.’1487 By shifting the burden onto borrowers, lenders can essentially 
                                                 
1484 Refer to ch 4. 
1485 Refer to ch 2. 
1486 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 171. 
1487 ibid. 
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by-pass liability that may otherwise be owed by the bank to a person that is affected by 
environmental issues which have been created from the suspect land.   
1.2. The Loan Agreement and Security Documentation 
Conditions precedent (as described above) can be used to reduce the amount of control 
that exists between a lender and a borrower. Consequently, it is now standard practice 
for lenders to insert conditions into the loan and security documentation in order to 
reduce the threat posed to them by environmental risks.1488 This form of due diligence 
has already been discussed in the section on pre-loan due diligence methods.1489 Post-
loan the loan document must demand compliance so that it keeps the borrower in check 
with the necessary terms and conditions of the loan agreement, and any associated 
environmental regulation. It must also show that the post-loan monitoring and reporting 
is merely a part of the bank’s normal underwriting activities, and that the bank has no 
actual control over how its borrower carries out its business operations.   
1.3. Environmental Insurance 
Insurance may be used to protect lenders from environmental liabilities.1490 However, 
it was shown earlier in the chapter that, in relation to environmental issues, the use of 
general insurance policies may not be the most reliable remedy.1491 In order to be 
protected lenders will have to require that their borrowers obtain an environmental 
liability insurance policy negotiated, if necessary, to cover the requisite liabilities. 
                                                 
1488 ibid. 
1489 Refer to pg 255. 
1490 O’Donovan (n 63) 625. See also, Sykes, ‘Environmental insurance solutions’ (n 97) 27. 
1491 Refer to pg 255-259. 
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Environmental insurance is necessary because, like PII and the aggregate indemnity 
cover for environmental claims, ‘general public liability policies… often exclude 
environmental liability.’1492 In Bartoline Ltd v Royal Sun & Alliance Insurance plc 
[2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 10431493 the claimant carried on a manufacturing plant. 
Following a fire at the plant, polluting matter entered into an adjacent watercourse 
causing pollution. The Environment Agency carried out emergency works under 
section 161A of the Water Resources Act 1991,1494 later claiming for the recovery of 
costs which amounted to £750,000 under section 161(3) of the 1991 Act.1495 The 
claimant sought to claim for the losses under the public liability section of its insurance 
policy. Hegarty J ruled that the losses incurred did not ‘fall within the scope of the 
relevant indemnity.’1496 Considering the decision in Bartoline, it is important that the 
appropriate insurance policy is purchased.  
With regards to the use of environmental insurance, Respondent 1 said: 
I: What about insurance, then? Would you request for your clients to get 
the necessary insurance? 
R1: Yes … Maybe, maybe! I mean insurance has been an interesting one. 
We’ve looked at insurance many times. We’ve even developed a product as 
a bespoke product for our clients; that was a lot of work. The problem with 
insurance is that, when you wanted insurance, originally, there were only 
two or three insurance providers. If you had any sort of issue, they wouldn’t 
                                                 
1492 ibid. 
1493 Bartoline Ltd v Royal Sun & Alliance Insurance plc [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 1043. 
1494 Water Resources Act 1991, s 161A. 
1495 ibid, s 161(3). 
1496 Bartoline (n 1493), para 110 (Hegarty J). 
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insure: “Okay, so can you insure this?” … “Oh, No!” … Or, “Yes, that’ll 
cost £200,000 a year!” So it was an option, but only for those with the 
deepest pockets. So, then we tried to have a more site specific policy, which 
we developed with Marsh. We didn’t make it mandatory because we try to 
keep costs away for our customers. If I’m honest, we had a site specific 
policy – quite low cost – but it wasn’t mandatory, it was up to the customer 
to take it out. So it died there! Now you can, actually, get insurance quite 
easily and quite quickly and quite cost effective. So I’ve done quite a few 
deals this year where we’ve mandated insurance because it has actually 
been cheaper than actually doing the due diligence! 
Environmental risks may affect many stakeholders in corporate transactions. 
Environmental insurance needs to be considered more thoroughly by lenders as a means 
of protecting themselves from environmental risks. For example, if a borrower causes 
pollution, a claim can be made on the environmental insurance policy to cover any 
associated remediation costs. The use of insurance acts to decrease the likelihood of a 
borrower’s insolvency and increases the prospects of the full repayment of the loan, 
thereby reducing instances of credit risk. The data show that environmental insurance 
has become a more practicable tool in recent years as premiums have fallen: 
I: Is insurance difficult to obtain? 
R2: No, I think that the market … there’s a lot of insurance companies that 
have branched out to deal with environmental insurance, and I think there’s 
quite a lot available. Premiums have come down from what they used to be 
and they’re covering all sorts of things now, so third parties. I mean … uhm 
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… in terms of the properties I know, I think some banks just undertaken 
environmental assessments on more industrial companies and they’ll look 
at categorization. If it’s retail they probably won’t do anything; if it’s 
commercial they’ll think, “Do we need it or not?” Based on that we’re 
taking, uhm, on that process.1497 
In a paper written on environmental insurance solutions for reducing environmental 
risk in commercial transactions involving contaminated and suspect land, Sykes states: 
‘Environmental and financial risks for purchasers, vendors and lenders 
have jeopardised innumerable property deals over recent years. Buyers are 
concerned about acquiring environmental liabilities that have not yet been 
qualified. Sellers are anxious about the retention of liability after disposal 
of a site. Lenders worry about the credit risk presented by borrowers and 
about the value of their security.’1498      
As well as environmental due diligence in banks, CERCLA and Part IIA have also acted 
as the primary drivers for the growth of the environmental insurance market.1499 In his 
paper, Sykes presents an argument for the use of environmental insurance as a solution 
for analysing risk and instilling confidence into the buyers, sellers, and lenders of 
contaminated and suspect land. Since Sykes’ article was published in 1999 much has 
happened in relation to this field, and the UK’s financial and insurance markets have 
incorporated environmental insurance policies into their ambit. Surprisingly, some of 
                                                 
1497 Interview with Respondent 2. 
1498 Sykes, ‘Environmental insurance solutions’ (n 97) 27. 
1499 ibid. 
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the empirical data suggest that financial institutions are not particularly au fait with 
environmental insurance policies. The data also show that banks are often too lenient 
when it comes to their customers purchasing the necessary environmental insurance 
cover. In relation to environmental risks, this may turn out to be an Achilles’ heel for 
banks. Respondent 9 highlights a number of problems with the banks’ current attitude 
towards their customers possessing the necessary insurance to cover environmental 
issues that may arise during the course of the loan: 
R9: Now I do think that the banks are probably living a little bit in the past, 
personal opinion only, because the banks just want pieces of paper. They 
want you to say, “It is a good loan because I know my business”, or, “My 
business has got a good track record”. Fine, and you have paper work to 
show that. You have accounts and you have had your accounts properly 
audited as well. You then put up your business plan, so that can be audited 
by the usual guys and then they put up things like, “Are you adequately 
insured?” And you go, “Yes, we have a property policy that covers our 
property and we have a general liability policy for that risk and, of course, 
we have employees’ liability insurance; that we have to have etc.” Then the 
bank goes, “Oh fine, we’ll invest!” Mainly it used to be transactions, 
transactions insurance; but an environmental insurance policy is going to 
offer cover for future issues arising out of past actions. So, if the land has 
been contaminated by past activities and that contamination could become 
a problem in the future, unexpectedly, then that’s what the policy should 
cover… So the point that I am trying to get at here is that I don’t think the 
banks are doing enough because they are investing in companies, and if 
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you have a major fire and that fire of you chemical company pollutes all of 
the land, either the chemical company has got insurance for their property 
and can rebuild, or they don’t have any insurance to clean it up; and if they 
can’t afford to clean it up, then the investment goes down the toilet.1500 
In disagreement with Respondent 9’s reasoning, Respondent 3 suggested that banks do 
tend to have a good understanding of environmental insurance, and the reason why 
environmental insurance has not been used as a means of reducing environmental risk 
is not because the banks have not endorsed it, but, rather, because people have not 
developed enough confidence to use it effectively, since they are worried that the cover 
is insufficiently comprehensive: 
R3: The other common one is insurance, which is a bit of a, uh, well I think 
they’ve had a bit of a rough ride here, and it probably hasn’t been as 
successful as it should have been. I mean it is a sort of an attractive idea. 
In principle, you can use insurance to get everybody comfortable with land 
transactions. The buyer will say, “Dear seller, there’s obviously a big 
problem here, please provide the appropriate insurance in my favour, and 
I’ll go ahead with the deal.” That’s, typically, how it is used; they’ll either 
chip some money off the price to cover that, or the seller will give benefit 
of that to the purchaser to get through. People are a little bit nervous with 
insurance because they are always worried that they are going to pay out. 
There are lots of ways that you can weasel out of actually paying, so, I think 
my impression’s been, that people on transactions are a little bit worried 
                                                 
1500 Interview with Respondent 9. 
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about the utility of insurance, and whether, or not, it is actually going to do 
what people think it’s going to do. So, you tend to get a 10 year coverage, 
you know, it’s actually relatively cheap, around £25,000-50,000 will 
normally get you 5 or 10 years coverage up to a certain amount. The 
problem with insurance is that there’s an excess sort of a thing, you know, 
so, if the clean-up bill is up to £100,000, anything under that and the 
insurance won’t pay that first £ 100,000. It has to go over a certain amount 
before you start getting money and there’s lots of clauses, you know, and it 
doesn’t cover this, or it doesn’t cover that, and it only applies in certain 
situations. So, people see all of that, and I think that they are, sort of, 
reluctant to go down that road, you know, because I don’t think that people 
are confident that it’s going to give them the protection that they think it 
will.1501 
In contrast with the use of specific environmental insurance in the UK, the data show 
that insurance tends to be more readily used by banks and companies based in America: 
I: Do you ask your clients to get specific insurance, environmental 
insurance? 
R5: Yes, we do look at this as a part of the credit risk review, which includes 
an insurance policy and all of the liabilities and how those can affect their 
abilities. They [the credit risk review] are not focusing on environment, 
they will look at other things, all sorts of mishaps that may have happened 
                                                 
1501 Interview with Respondent 3. 
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in the past. If you have a listed company, a lot of these things have to be 
disclosed uh in the financial statements, so it’s easier to look at. When you 
have companies that are not listed, you really have to do a lot more 
research.1502 
And, 
I: And, what about environmental insurance? Do you use insurance much? 
R6: We use insurance quite often, it used to be mandatory for anybody that 
had a gas station operation, because normally all the money the individual 
has is invested in the gas station; so they will have to have their tanks 
insured in case they leaked.1503 
1.4. Financial Assurances 
Financial assurances can be a useful post-loan due diligence technique for 
remedying the credit and security risks caused by borrowers’ inability to pay for 
both liability for clean-up costs and the loan; it is especially beneficial for small 
companies with large liabilities. 
Some laws require, as an indicator of competency, a person’s capability of providing 
financial assurance in order to remedy any damage that is caused. Take, for example, 
regulation 13 of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 
                                                 
1502 Interview with Respondent 5. 
1503 Interview with Respondent 6. 
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(as amended) which states that the regulator may, before providing a person with an 
environmental permit made pursuant to the Regulations, consider the applicant’s 
financial competence as an indicator of a permit holder’s eligibility to receive a licence 
to operate.1504 A lender may, by an express condition of the loan, request a borrower to 
create a fund (i.e. a trust fund or an ESCROW account) that may be used as a source of 
revenue for remediation action in the case where environmental harm has 
materialised.1505 Finally, it is worth noting that Hillridge-type scenarios are easily cured 
by careful drafting, and should therefore be regarded as a low risk for prudent lenders. 
III. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a practical and up-to-date insight into the current 
environmental due diligence techniques that are being employed by lenders based in 
the UK. It has been shown that, while all banks may have slight differences in their due 
diligence processes (as one would suspect), the majority of banks mitigate for 
environmental risks in a similar way; and the easiest way to describe this process of 
risk reduction is to break it down into two primary stages: pre- and post-loan due 
diligence.  
The next chapter (Chapter 7) presents the findings that relate to the various drivers for 
environmental due diligence in banking. 
 
                                                 
1504 Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/675, reg 13. 
1505 Companies Act (CA) 2006, ss 1012-1023. See also, Hillridge (n 1201). 
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Chapter 7: 
The Drivers for, and Continued Growth of,  
Environmental Due Diligence in Banks 
Having a system in place that manages environmental risks is acquiring greater 
importance amongst financial institutions. The use of such a system creates a degree of 
safety for banks when entering into any commercial transaction (e.g. lending and debt 
collecting, investment and divestment, mergers and acquisitions and initial public 
offerings, purchasing and selling property, and asset management) that may be subject 
to inherent environmental issues. Following on from Chapter 6, which presented the 
different types of environmental due diligence, this chapter outlines the drivers for, and 
continued growth of, environmental due diligence in banks. It is therefore relevant to 
the overarching research question and sub-question 3 (i.e. ‘What are the main drivers 
for the use of environmental risk management in banks?’), because it shows what is 
presently driving lenders’ conduct of environmental due diligence, considering the fact 
that the environmental legal basis has been shown to present no real direct liability risk. 
The chapter also offers a glimpse into the future growth and direction of environmental 
due diligence in lending institutions. This chapter is thus different to Chapter 5, which 
looked at the different environmental risks, and the lenders’ ranking of the threat posed 
by the risks. It is also important to emphasise that more interview data are used in this 
chapter than anywhere else in the thesis. Consequently, this chapter is essential for 
displaying the thesis’ original contribution to the knowledge of the research field. The 
unique data from the banking respondents fill the knowledge gaps that reside in the 
research area. The categories that were used to code the data are outlined throughout. 
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I. The Drivers for Environmental Due Diligence 
Although there are a number of drivers that may help to explain the continued growth 
of environmental due diligence, the research data collected show that the primary 
drivers for the conduct of environmental due diligence can be summarised as follows:  
 The Need to Reduce the Threat of Legal Exposures; 
 Market Volatility; 
 Corporate Social Responsibility and Green Supply Chain Management; 
 Credit and Security Loss, and Clients’ Eligibility;  
 Credit Risk Management Frameworks for Managing and Limiting 
Environmental and Social Risks in Project Finance Transactions; and 
 Reputational Risk. 
The list above derives from the empirical data. In answering sub-question 3, i.e. ‘What 
are the main drivers for the use of environmental risk management in banks?’ this 
section presents an outlined view of these six drivers, evaluating the primary driver at 
this present time of writing. All data that were relevant to the section below were coded 
into the yellow coding category, and underlined accordingly (see Chapter 1). The 
purpose of this chapter is not only to isolate the primary driver for the lenders’ use of 
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environmental risk management, but also to demonstrate how the different drivers have 
contributed to influencing this form of due diligence.  
A. The Need to Reduce the Threat of Legal Exposures 
While the liability fear caused by the enactment of specific environmental laws a little 
over ten years ago initially drove the implementation of due diligence, it may now be 
argued that the threat of legal exposure is no longer the primary driving force for lenders 
today. However, even though the threat of this driver has decreased significantly, 
because the banks have learnt to adapt to compliance issues over the years, this is not 
to say that legal compliance risk no longer continues to drive environmental risk 
management in banks, as Respondent 12 pointed out: 
R12: Really the amount of environmental law, which is, potentially, 
therefore, an exposure to a financial institution, is just increasing by the 
day and by the month.1506 
The threat of environmental liability and risks for land and water pollution has posed 
increased legal exposure in many contractual relationships (e.g. landlord and tenant, 
seller and purchaser, and lender and borrower). It cannot be disputed that the 
supplementary pressure placed upon parties to such contracts has had the effect of 
heightening the need to develop techniques that aim to reasonably assess, and alleviate, 
any environmental issues that are likely to occur within such transactions. Despite the 
increased strain, parties to contracts that are likely to suffer from contamination 
                                                 
1506 Interview with Respondent 12.  
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liabilities under Part IIA have learnt to adapt to the threats that were created by the 
implementation, and use, of specific due diligence methods. This means that, 
nowadays, in the world of commercial lending, even the most polluting industries can 
still receive loan financing.  
R10: I don’t think we restrict our lending to any particular sectors. There 
are some sectors that we will be really restricted on them and don’t like to 
lend so much.1507 
It has already been established that Part IIA’s enforcement has led to the emergence of 
environmental due diligence in bank lending. When Part IIA was eventually brought 
into force in 2000, lenders based in Britain were concerned that they would be made 
liable for their borrowers’ environmental issues. This type of environmental liability 
had only previously been witnessed under the CERCLA regime in America during the 
1980s, as Respondent 1 stated:  
I: So, what was the main driver, do you think, in 1997/1998 before … uhm 
… was there a lot of environmental risk management in that time? 
R1: Before CERCLA came along, and before Part IIA – no, none, nothing 
at all. 
I: So it was, kinda, one of the drivers for this new way of thinking? 
                                                 
1507 Interview with Respondent 10. 
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R1: It was a new risk, nobody knew what it was, how to assess it. But, in 
terms of … I mean … So what we’ve done is we’ve taken an issue that was 
new, and we’ve made it business as usual; so we integrated it into our credit 
assessment.1508 
When enacted, Part IIA was viewed as a new legal risk. As Respondent 1 suggested, 
upon its inception, Part IIA created a fear of environmental liability which spread 
throughout the UK’s financial market. Part IIA’s enactment was significant because, 
for the first time in Britain’s history, a regime was created specifically for contaminated 
land clean-up. During that time, parties involved in the contaminated land market were 
uncertain as to the likelihood and severity of liability that Part IIA would create.1509 
After the lender liability in US financial institutions in the UK feared that they, like 
their counter-parts based across the Atlantic, would soon be held accountable for their 
clients’ contaminated land liabilities. The majority of respondents agreed that the fear 
of direct lender liability made many banks implement measures to ensure that the threat 
of environmental risk was significantly reduced. 
I: What do you think have been the main drivers behind this increased 
appetite for environmental risk management amongst financial 
institutions? 
R10: I mean, I think it’s fear, because while there is increasing law and some 
instances of real claims, or real, uhm, depreciation of value on an asset, 
there’s, uh, not a massive library of cases, which you can throw at clients 
                                                 
1508 Interview with Respondent 1. 
1509 Lawrence and Lee ‘Permitting Uncertainty’ (n 31) 261. 
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to show them exactly why they need to consider these things. What it is 
driven by is potential. And that potential then generates the fear factor, 
which is based on not being the one individual (what they call them at […] 
is ‘Relationship Managers’), which are the people who affectively agree 
the deals and sign them off. They don’t want to be the one that carries that 
risk, uhm, and as an organisation, they don’t want to be the one that the 
public finger, or the government finger, is pointed at.1510 
The UK and USA are, in many respects, the pioneers of environmental risk 
management in bank lending. This may be attributed to the fact that both nations have 
a fully functioning system for historic land remediation.  
I: What do you think environmental due diligence would be like if we didn’t 
have the regime? 
R7: Well, I’ve seen environmental due diligence in lots of places, where the 
environmental law is far less stringent than here in the UK. Indeed, in 
places where there is no specific contaminated land legislation, I would say 
that, in that scenario, people are a lot more blasé about environmental 
risk.1511  
This attitudinal difference may be credited to the fact that the enforceability of direct 
lender liability for environmental risk in such countries has been virtually non-existent, 
and, as a consequence, there has been no incentive, no driver, or demand for banks to 
                                                 
1510 Interview with Respondent 10. 
1511 Interview with Respondent 7. 
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implement a high level of due diligence in order to reduce the risks caused by the 
environmental issues that can be attributed to land and water contamination. Thus, 
countries with a lack of environmental legal exposure have taken on a different 
evolutionary spirit within their due diligence frameworks. 
Despite the impact of the Part IIA regime upon its enactment, the chapter on historic 
contaminated land risk has shown that the contaminated land regime did not generate 
the amount of liability as some first anticipated; in fact, not one case of lender liability 
has been generated under section 78F of the EPA 1990. However, it may be argued that 
making people liable is not a mark of success. Land remediation is a sign of success. 
And the introduction of Part IIA drove the clean up of historic contamination through 
voluntary remediation and the planning system. The absence of any lender liability 
from the contaminated land regime might be due to the fact that Part IIA has issued few 
remediation notices. Conversely, it could also be because the banks based in the UK 
have learnt from the mistakes of the American lenders, and have therefore implemented 
their own due diligence measures in order to reduce the risks posed by the Part IIA 
regime. Concurring with this reasoning, Respondent 1 suggested in their interview that: 
R1: It was different over here because we learnt from that experience 
[meaning CERCLA liability in America] and what we said was, “Look, 
you’re just going to dry up lending!” Banks are in business to assess risk 
and lend money. If we lend money and then we lend that badly for whatever 
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reason… environment or another… then we can lose that money. But we 
shouldn’t be held liable for any additional loses. 1512  
While legal controls have been an extremely important tool for shaping and molding 
the current system of environmental due diligence during banks’ commercial loan 
financing, the thematic analysis of the empirical data has demonstrated that the threat 
of legal exposures and compliance issues have been replaced as the most significant 
driver for the use of environmental due diligence in banks. This theme is aptly portrayed 
in Respondent 11’s answer to the question of which drivers have influenced, and are 
continuing to influence, the growth of environmental due diligence in banks: 
R11: I think that if we look back fifteen years, the main drivers would have 
been legislative, but now I think we mentioned this before the interview 
started, around … uhm … like we engage with investment bodies … so I 
think we see the expectations of society for the driving behaviours of 
financial services … 1513 
This respondent, whose view is shared by the majority of the interviewees, went on to 
suggest that, while the ‘expectations of society’ includes the society at large, the banks 
pay particular attention to the expectations of their primary stakeholders, e.g. investors 
(whether equity or debt investors) and a range of other third party bodies, such as green 
indices (FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index), ratings agencies, and 
the government and NGOs. This finding corresponds to Respondent 5’s observation 
                                                 
1512 Interview with Respondent 1. 
1513 Interview with Respondent 11. 
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which suggests that emerging environmental issues, like climate change, are beginning 
to shadow the environmental concerns relating to land: 
R5: Due diligence is getting more and more important; if anything it’s 
acquiring greater importance for a number of reasons; as far as I can tell: 
One, is that environmental risks are becoming greater. When I started, 
climate change was not even in the technical vocabulary of those in the 
field and only a few of us in the field really understood sustainability, for 
example. Now obviously, it is now something that many of the population 
are aware of, so if anything I think that due diligence is broadening its 
scope. It is not just looking at, “Is this site contaminated and what is their 
role in remediating it?” It also looks at how a company is performing and 
what is their role in climate change and combatting climate change – Are 
they a part of the solution or the problem?1514  
As suggested above, despite decreasing in significance, the threat of legal exposure 
continues to be a driver for the lenders’ use of environmental due diligence.  This is a 
point that was unanimously agreed upon by all of the respondents to the interview 
questions. Also, if a lender conducts due diligence, it can use the defence that it has, 
under specific legislation, acted reasonably during the provision of loan finance. Jarvis 
and Fordham highlight this point in their book on lender liability and environmental 
risk:  
                                                 
1514 Interview with Respondent 5. 
Banks and Secured Lending: An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
299 
‘…paradoxically, the lender’s “scrutiny” could earn it not only the status of 
potential defendant but an effective defence to any prosecution: for 
example, by showing “due diligence” under section 33 of the EPA.’ 1515  
It is unsurprising that lenders consider legal exposure to be a limited driver to their use 
of environmental due diligence. Decreasing public sector influence in recent years has 
weakened many of the UK’s environmental legal frameworks. This finding correlates 
with the data which suggest that lenders now consider direct lender liability to be a low 
risk in their business dealings. In order for legislation to become a primary driver for 
banks in the future, there would need to be a greater push from the regulators. 
Now that legal liability risk exposure has been evaluated as a driver, the next section 
assesses the impact that the financial crash, which occurred in 2008, had on banks and 
their use and implementation of risk mitigation techniques for managing environmental 
risks. 
B. Market Volatility  
Chapter 1 of this thesis showed that the global financial market has been in a state of 
volatility since the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008.1516 In that Chapter, the impact that 
the economic recession has had on the economic incentives for contaminated land 
clean-up were assessed. In this chapter, market volatility (which has been created by 
the economic recession) shall be evaluated as a driver for the implementation of 
environmental risk reduction tactics in banks. In an interview, Respondent 9 
                                                 
1515 Jarvis and Fordham (n 51) 167. 
1516 Refer to ch 1. 
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demonstrated how heightened market volatility has influenced the private equity firms’ 
appetite for purchasing and selling toxic assets, which, in turn, has greatly changed how 
finance deals are structured, requiring a higher level of due diligence from banks: 
R9: Basically, there is not so much money around! So if you go pre 2008 
and you look at private equity, then it was relatively easy to get a significant 
investment from the banks to enable the equity to be highly leveraged, i.e. 
less equity was needed. The private equity companies were there able to 
buy assets by putting very little equity in, so they were able to leverage their 
equity very, very highly. If they had £100 million, they’d have no problem 
using that to do a £2 to £3 billion deal. Now that’s changed because the 
banks ‘structured finance guys’, who were able to provide this high level of 
debt lending, whether it be primary debt, secondary, mezzanine, whatever, 
the structure since 2008 have not been able to do this at rates that are 
attractive. As we know, in 2008, the banks potentially collapsed. Lending 
therefore collapsed and so private equity firms literally stopped buying 
things, as they could not access these high levels of relatively cheap debt. 
They were also concerned about the value of these assets, as they began to 
see that some of the assets that were purchased in 2005, 2006 and 2007 
were quickly worth a fraction of what they paid for them, because they 
basically overpaid in a ‘bull’ market. 
I: Of course! Well that is a great summary of venture capitalists and why 
due diligence has increased since 2008. Why do you think it is still quite 
relaxed in commercial loan transactions, then? 
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R5: I think it’s because you don’t often see companies going bankrupt 
because of environmental issues!1517 
Although an increasingly significant part of the lending process, it is important to note 
that amongst the numerous concerns that banks have to take into account when lending, 
environmental due diligence does not take centre stage in every commercial transaction, 
as Respondent 9 points out above. Nonetheless, since 2008, this has slowly begun to 
change and the empirical research data provide evidence to suggest that the financial 
crash has directly affected the way in which the UK’s lenders conduct their 
environmental due diligence. The data illustrate that, before the financial crisis hit, 
property lending was extremely bullish and an altogether lucrative business. At this 
time, environmental due diligence, although being requested by some banks, was 
merely something on a list of things that the lenders needed to have approved before a 
loan was granted, and allocated, to a customer. With the onset of the financial collapse, 
however, environmental due diligence underwent a transformation. The fear of further 
economic loss and reputational damage meant that, during the economic crisis, 
environmental issues were referred upwards to higher authorities in the banks. When 
asked about what has driven environmental due diligence in bank lending, one 
respondent, who works for an external consultancy firm that carries out environmental 
due diligence for one of the UK’s major clearing banks, suggested that, before the crash, 
environmental due diligence was not taken as seriously as it should have been: 
R12: People were saying, ‘You need to get environmental due diligence’, 
and they would go to an environmental consultant to get the due diligence; 
                                                 
1517 Interview with Respondent 9.  
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but we felt that the findings were being used to prop open a door; or, you 
know, settle a wobbly table; and they weren’t being read or digested even. 
We thought that when the financial crisis hit everyone would become more 
astute on environmental risk because it was one of the exposures that 
needed to be considered. And what we saw was not necessarily a growing 
appreciation for that risk, but we saw an escalation – through the 
organisations – through the decision-making – and the people who would 
normally have made the call in relation to environmental risk, in particular, 
weren’t prepared to put their necks on the line anymore. And the smallest 
issues were escalated up and up and up within a bank, if they were lending. 
1518  
While the arrival of specific environmental legislation established the widespread use 
of environmental due diligence amongst lenders, as the above respondent suggests, the 
financial crisis had a different, albeit just as significant, effect on the lenders’ use of 
due diligence for alleviating environmental risks. For the first time since its initial 
development in the 1990s, environmental due diligence became more than a simple, 
tedious, tick box exercise; it developed into an important tool that was used to protect 
banks from a potentially severe risk exposure, i.e. the risks that environmental issues 
could cause.  
The financial crash, and subsequent age of austerity, may represent both the best of 
times and the worst of times for British lenders. During this period some banks suffered 
crippling financial losses. Such losses were made worse by a number of scandals that 
                                                 
1518 Interview with Respondent 12. 
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subsequently came to the fore (take, for instance, the PPI and Libor scandals), and 
further damaged the banks’ reputations in the public eye. In the years since the financial 
crash, banks have lost public faith. They have become institutions that make the 
reasonable man wary and uncertain. Trust in banks has diminished significantly. 
Nevertheless, in times of economic turmoil and uncertainty, banks have begun to slowly 
reconstruct their moral integrity by supporting investments that are environmentally 
and socially sustainable, and ethically sound. During this period, the threat of suffering 
further financial losses has meant that environmental risk management is no longer 
viewed as another layer of bureaucratic decision making; it is now seen as a necessary 
feature of bank lending, which is gradually permeating its way through the risk 
management structure amongst the majority of banks operating within the Western 
hemisphere.  
C. Corporate Social Responsibility and Green Supply Chain 
Management 
After the data had been collected and analysed, it became evident that environmental 
due diligence had been driven by much more than legal and financial concerns. The 
development of environmental risk management methods in banks has also been greatly 
influenced by the broad concept of corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’), and the 
growing demand for compliance with green supply chain management (‘GSCM’) 
systems, such as ISO 14001 (Environmental Management Systems).1519 The related 
obligation of having to ‘think green’ has influenced many supply chains; and, with a 
                                                 
1519 ISO 14001, ‘Environmental Management Systems’ (iso.org, July 2014) 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/iso14000> accessed 12 December 2014.  
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follow the leader, market herd instinct, lenders have also had to adapt to the changing 
business practices that have occurred over the last couple of years. Respondent 9, a 
supporter of ISO 14001, presents an argument which shows how CSR and GSCM have 
driven due diligence for environmental concerns in banks:     
R9: Where you are supplying someone else, and if that other person that 
you are supplying says, “Right you have to be environmentally friendly and 
you are required to operate ISO 14001 or equivalent systems”, a bit like it 
was in the earlier days of quality control ISO 9000 [Quality Management 
Systems],1520 which was originally driven by the supply chain, where the 
main manufactures would say to their suppliers, “You have to operate in 
the same way that we do, in terms of quality insurance, so apply ISO 9000!” 
The same thing is happening with ISO 14001.1521   
The extract from Respondent 9’s interview indicates that the banks’ relationships with 
their customers have undergone a greening, and, in particular, that ISO 14001 has 
changed the way that banks and their customers conduct business. In agreement with 
the respondent’s opinion, Arimura et al.’s research into GSCM assessed whether ISO 
14001 has been a driver for increased environmental performance and voluntary action 
in supply chains.1522 The results of their study show that the use of ISO 14001 
encouraged more advanced GSCM practices, and that facilities certified with ISO 
14001 were forty per cent more likely to evaluate the environmental performance of 
                                                 
1520 ISO 9001, ‘Quality Management Systems’ (iso.org, 2011) <http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_9000> 
accessed 12 December 2014.  
1521 Interview with Respondent 9. 
1522 TH Arimura, N Darnall and H Katayama, ‘Is ISO 14001 a gateway to more advanced voluntary 
action? The case of green supply chain management’ (2011) 61(2) J Environ Econ Manage 170. 
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suppliers.1523 As well as encouraging the assessment of performance throughout supply 
chains, there is also research which provides evidence of ISO 14001’s positive impact 
upon the environment. In their research, Potoski and Prakash evaluated the use of ISO 
14001 among three thousand facilities regulated under the US Clean Air. Their findings 
suggest that facilities that have adopted the ISO certificate are more likely to reduce 
their pollutant emissions than non-certified facilities.1524  
As well as ISO certificates, there is also evidence to suggest that the greening of supply 
chains has been driven by the need for Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) 
to comply with their Equator Principles (EP) commitments.1525 Watchman et al. suggest 
that, ‘Further, some banks have had a profound effect on “cleaning and greening” not 
only their own supply chains but, by using what influence they do exercise, also those 
of their own service providers and borrowers.’1526 Indeed a business that is not ‘green’ 
in its outlook may not be well respected in the business world of today. Having a poor 
environmental reputation will ultimately affect an enterprise’s ability to conduct 
business with banks and other commercial enterprises.  
On the other hand, it may also be suggested that ISO 14001, and other forms of 
institutional rules, are quite often embedded into the formal structures of organisations 
to increase legitimacy with stakeholders, and to further enhance companies’ 
competitiveness in the marketplace. Meyer and Brown stipulate that institutional rules 
are a source of ‘myth and ceremony’.1527 They purport that, ‘the formal structures of 
                                                 
1523 ibid. 
1524 M Potoski and A Prakash, ‘Covenants with Weak Swords: ISO 14001 and Facilities’ Environmental 
Performance’ (2005) 24(4) Journal of Policy Analysis and Performance 745. 
1525 Watchman, Delfino and Addison (n 92) 97. 
1526 ibid. 
1527 JW Meyer and B Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’ 
(1977) 83(2) American Journal of Sociology 340. 
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many organizations in postindustrial society dramatically reflect the myths of their 
institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities.’1528 
Following this line of argument, Boiral believes that ISO 14001’s effectiveness in 
greening corporate structures and supply chains is ‘a rational myth’.1529 After looking 
at Canadian organisations certified with ISO 14001, Boiral found that the companies 
that adopted the certificate tended to display superficial, ceremonial behavior, which 
was not focused on environmental performance.1530  
Now that GSCM has been evaluated as a driver of environmental due diligence in 
banks, the section immediately below assesses credit and security risks and clients’ 
eligibility as drivers for the banks’ conduct of environmental risk management. 
D. Credit and Security Risks and Clients’ Eligibility 
As with CSR and GSCM, the concept of ‘Knowing Your Customer’ (‘KYC’) 1531 is 
also becoming progressively important for modern banking practices. KYC helps banks 
to assess the potential liabilities of a future client and whether that client will be 
compliant with the law, and thereby able to repay its loan after it has been approved.1532 
Although it is sometimes difficult to imagine, the economy and environment overlap 
considerably, and the modern bank must now adopt a culture that considers the 
environment during its day-to-day business. A bank’s decision to lend to unscrupulous 
clients that operate in particularly vulnerable sectors could lead to significant 
                                                 
1528 ibid, 341. 
1529 O Boiral, ‘Corporate Greening through ISO 14001: A Rational Myth?’ (2007) 18(1) Organization 
Science 127. 
1530 ibid. 
1531 BIS, ‘Customer Due Diligence for Banks’ (2001) Basel Committee on Bank Supervision Working 
Paper <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf> accessed 24 June 2013. 
1532 ibid. 
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environmental damage, which may not have otherwise occurred without the loan being 
granted. Issues surrounding borrowers’ non-compliance could inevitably lead to credit 
and security losses for a lender. Lenders’ reputations may also be damaged if they are 
subjected to scrutiny from NGOs and campaign groups for lending to certain sectors 
and companies. The indirect risks caused by having a borrower with environmental 
problems can be quite severe, but this depends upon a number of factors, e.g. the size 
of the company, the geographical location of a site or business enterprise, the 
environmental harm created, and/or the size of the individual loan. The extract below 
shows Respondent 2’s opinion on the credit issues that can be caused by lending to 
environmentally sensitive clients:  
R2: But there are credit issues as well and there have been some banks that 
have been burnt by lending to a project, particularly… take a mine … and 
then all of the developments gone in the financing and there’s campaigners 
against it and the mine has closed down and lost all the money, uhm, and 
that applies on a smaller scale when you’ve lent to a company and, let’s 
say, when you go a mortgage on a, uhm, a scrap yard dealer, and they lose 
their licence because of the pollution of a river, and you end up being a 
mortgagee in possession. Yeah, so there’s also those cases on a smaller 
scale.1533 
As a result of the increasing indirect threats, and the need to better know one’s 
customers before and after the loan has been granted, the importance of environmental 
due diligence in commercial loan financing continues to take on a more significant role 
                                                 
1533 Interview with Respondent 2. 
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in the banks’ decision-making process. Consequently, because banks are requesting 
that their borrowers conduct their business with the environment in mind, due diligence 
for environmental concerns has begun to broaden itself both vertically and horizontally 
throughout both the banks and the businesses that they finance. 
1. The Eligibility of Particularly Risky Clients 
A common method to mitigate for particularly risky clients is to create a system for the 
categorisation of customers by the threat that they pose to the bank. Such categories are 
normally created by the development of internal threshold limits within each individual 
bank, which explains why every bank interviewed had nuanced differences for 
determining clients’ eligibility before the grant of a loan. Normally the risk thresholds 
are sector led, but banks do also factor in the size of the loan for which application is 
being made into their determination of eligibility, too. There are also universal 
frameworks that lenders can use to assess clients’ suitability: for example, the EP can 
be used as a method of safe lending during project finance transactions over $10 
million.1534  
Costing the involvement of some of the banks’ clients demonstrates that some are much 
more of a threat than others, especially when it comes to direct liability for suspect land.  
R5: We would look at how the company’s involvement is translated into 
costs … If a company has Superfund sites they must disclose that amount 
on their financial statements because they tend to be material. Unless you 
                                                 
1534 infra, pg 313. 
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have a .001 responsibility for a site that will take $100 million to clean up, 
it may not be a material amount. Generally companies in the US, especially 
the public companies, they do a 10K or 20F if their foreign filter will 
disclose. What we will usually ask companies to do if they are involved is 
to disclose because if an investor … if you are doing an IPO, for example, 
an investor has a right to know that this is something that you have on your 
balance sheet. It may not be that scary, for example – General Motors, 
General Electric, Exxon – they have a lot of Superfund sites that they are 
dealing with on a daily basis. Nobody would say that any one of those sites, 
or even all of those sites, would floor the company from a financial 
standpoint. So, we look at it that way. Smaller companies with a large 
liability, well, we’ll obviously take those into account, and that’s part of the 
due diligence process that the guys on the finance side do. 1535 
While environmental risk management practices are carried out on a case-by-case basis, 
the majority of banks have established a system for assessing the risks that may stem 
from certain ‘vulnerable operations’. A particularly risky customer is one likely to 
operate in, what the bank considers to be, an environmentally sensitive sector. Although 
this is not universally applied, the majority of banks normally divide the high-risk 
sectors into four primary categories: 
 Basic Materials, e.g. mining operations, oil and gas companies, deforestation; 
                                                 
1535 Interview with Respondent 5. 
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 Heavy Manufacturing, e.g. companies dealing with hazardous chemicals; 
 Agricultural Businesses, e.g. intensive farming practices; and 
 Power Plants, e.g. power stations producing nuclear energy.  
A company’s size is an extremely important determinant for a bank when evaluating 
eligibility. Depending upon whether a company is a large, mid-sized or a small 
enterprise will affect a bank’s appetite to lend. Financial institutions usually feel the 
most comfortable when lending to large corporates, since the majority of trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) often possess their own environmental risk management teams 
and have the financial provisions to pay for any clean-up costs that are brought about 
because of their business activities. While the magnitude of the risks to a bank could be 
far more harmful if environmental issues do arise from a TNC’s operations, the threat 
of the risk occurring is usually considerably lower. Small to medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), on the other hand, are much more of a risk, especially when uneducated in 
environmental risk management practices. This point is emphasised by Respondent 6: 
R6: The biggest risk clients aren’t, typically, the ones that people think of; 
they’re not, typically, the steel mills; they’re not, typically, the petrol 
chemical plant, because they do have environmental people on staff; they 
do have, especially if they are a private sector company… they are going 
to be aware of the regulations and will be aware of what their obligations 
are, they are much more in the public eye. The ones that really cause us 
more grief than any others are your dry cleaning sites and your typical 
service stations – gasoline. The reasons that they cause more problems than 
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the bigger sites are: (a) because there are more of them; and (b) because 
their liquids are everywhere and, at the same time, when they do 
contaminate something, they usually don’t have the money left over to do 
the clean-up.1536 
Therefore, in recent years, lenders have begun to educate and improve (especially with 
SMEs operating in vulnerable sectors) their clients’ personal application and use of 
good environmental risk management practices. Companies that are the most likely to 
create environmental liabilities must be educated in environmental risk management. 
For banks, the ability to educate their clients acts as a preventative measure, which 
reduces the long-term risks that may be posed to them. As Respondent 6 states, an 
uneducated SME with little financial assurances, working in an environmentally 
sensitive area, is a particularly onerous client for a bank. A common example that is 
typically used to denote such an onerous customer is presented in Respondent 1’s 
interview transcript, as:  
R1: … a £20,000 loan that is provided to a high-street dry cleaner or single-
site waste transfer facility.1537  
Even though a loan this size is not a great amount to a bank, if a borrower causes a 
£1,000,000 worth of damage in legal and remediation costs as a result of the pollution 
that was created during the course of its business operations, and the lender is then left 
to pay for the costs of remediation after the company’s dissolution, then the loan to 
                                                 
1536 Interview with Respondent 6. 
1537 Interview with Respondent 1. 
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damage ratio for such a mundane transaction suggests that a significantly high risk has 
actually materialised. 
2. The Effect of Environmental Risk on Lenders and Borrowers 
In relation to the interview data collected, it seems that the introduction of specific 
environmental regulations have greatly affected some of the lenders’ clients; such 
customers tend to work in dirty industries. While borrowers are required to put in place 
measures that comply with legally imposed improvements, lenders can simply refuse 
to lend money to particularly risky customers and, in so doing, are therefore absolved 
of any environmental risk. Respondent 10 shows how some borrowers are much more 
at risk than lenders:   
I: Has environmental regulation affected both borrowers and lenders? 
R10: Well, it would affect borrowers more than lenders, right – so, lenders 
would be affected as a result… indirectly… because their clients are 
affected. 1538 
The data also show that the growing regulatory pressures for the protection of the 
environment are believed to continue to be a burden for banks’ clients’ ability to repay 
their loans.  
                                                 
1538 Interview with Respondent 10. 
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I: Right, excellent, uhm, so has the implementation of environmental 
regulation affected both lenders and borrowers? 
R11: I think it has definitely affected borrowers because, and in a naïve 
sense, I would argue that the legislative burden is only increasing for 
borrowers. Especially, since we are seeing the government trying to meet 
sustainability and green requirements, as well. So, you see things, like, the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC), and it is not surprising in the sense 
that there’ll always be a certain level of non-compliance; but, nonetheless, 
given the sophistication of companies covered by the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment, it is, nonetheless, surprising that some companies fail to 
comply and therefore get substantial penalties for doing so.   
In order to make sure that these risks do not materialise, the bank will attempt to get to 
know their client during their pre-transaction due diligence. Lenders must establish a 
good client base, which will make them more money in the future because they can 
more or less guarantee good returns on their investments. It may not be far wrong to 
suggest that the whole life cycle of commercial loan financing is therefore underpinned 
by the banks retaining good clients, which are unlikely to become insolvent and default 
on their loan repayments.     
E. Credit Risk Management Frameworks for Managing and Limiting 
Environmental and Social Risks in Project Finance Transactions 
There is evidence to suggest that credit risk management frameworks for managing and 
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limiting environmental and social risks in project finance transactions have driven the 
use and development of environmental risk management in banks.1539 This is because, 
as Wright and Rwabizambuga propose:  
‘In recent years, changing public expectations have increasingly induced 
firms to publicly declare their commitments to integrating a wide variety of 
public interest concerns into their corporate practices.’1540  
The aim of voluntary environmental frameworks, like the EP, is to encourage 
sustainable project management, and financing by global self-regulation.1541 Socially 
responsible investing (SRI) for project finance is seen by the widespread use of the EP 
amongst the international lending community, which Hardenbrook describes as, ‘the 
private financial sector’s attempt at environmental responsibility.’1542 Since, ‘finance is 
the grease of the economy’,1543 financial institutions are capable of ‘greening’ the 
project finance transactions that they are involved in, and, in so doing, directly 
impacting upon the economic structure.  
From the above discussion it is clear that there has been a general change in attitude 
amongst the lending community towards environmental due diligence. It is clear from 
the data collected in the empirical study that the adoption of voluntary credit risk 
                                                 
1539 B Scholtens, ‘Finance as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2006) 68(1) Journal of 
Business Ethics 19.    
1540 Wright and Rwabizambuga (n 92) 89.  
1541 D Garvin, ‘Can Industry Self-Regulation Work?’ (1984) 25(4) California Management Review 37. 
See also, N Gunningham and R Joseph, ‘Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective’ (1997) 
19(4) Law & Policy 36; and Clayton (n 92) 173.  
1542 Hardenbrook (n 92) 197. See also, C Wright (2009) ‘Setting standards for responsible banking: 
examining the role of the International Finance Corporation in the emergence of the Equator Principles’ 
in F Biermann, B Siebenhüner, and A Schreyögg (eds), International organizations and global 
environmental governance. Routledge research in environmental politics. (Routledge, London 2009) 51-
70.  
1543 Scholtens, ‘Finance as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (n 1539) 19.  
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management frameworks by the bank lending community has contributed significantly, 
as a CSR driver, to the banks’ internal use and development of environmental due 
diligence. Respondent 8, for example, stated in interview that the EP are a ‘highlight’ 
of environmental due diligence in banks:  
I: So, how has it [environmental due diligence] evolved? Has it been 
recently that this appetite has come about? 
R8: Environmental due diligence is something that started a few years ago 
in banking. I think one of the highlights of it was the Equator Principles, 
which refers to managing environmental and social risks, but it had a bit 
of emphasis on environmental issues in the sense that consultancy and also 
engineers, technical engineers, yeah, they are more focused on the 
environmental side. It’s been a few years and the consultancy world has 
captured on that a lot, so we can find very good consultants that can help 
us to undertake the environmental due diligence that we need. 1544 
The above interview extract is significant because it follows the findings of previous 
empirical work on the EP. In a 2005 survey conducted by Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, the EP are described as ‘a shining beacon of responsible banking’.1545 Such 
a description emphasises the important impact and success that the EP have had upon 
the financial sector, generally. However, it is important to note that not all banks have 
adopted the Principles. Scholtens and Dam suggest that while there are significant 
                                                 
1544 Interview with Respondent 8. Brackets added. 
1545 See, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ‘Banking on Responsibility: Part I of Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer Equator Principles Survey 2005: The Banks’ (London, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005) 
1. 
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differences between the EPFIs and non-EPFIs’ environmental, social and ethical 
policies, the banks that adopt the EP tend to be large banks that have the resources to 
implement the EP;1546 therefore, the size of the bank plays an important role in the 
greening of its corporate governance structures.   
The EP, a set of voluntary principles, were first established by ten banks in 2003. At 
the beginning of the third edition of the EP document it says:  
‘Large infrastructure and industrial Projects can have adverse impacts on 
people and on the environment. As financiers and advisors, we work in 
partnership with our clients to identify, assess and manage environmental 
and social risks and impacts in a structured way, on an ongoing basis. Such 
collaboration promotes sustainable environmental and social performance 
and can lead to improved financial, environmental and social outcomes.’1547 
Since 4 June 2013 the document that outlines the scope and application of EP II has 
been updated; the latest version of the EP is now called EP III. To date, seventy-nine 
financial institutions throughout the globe have adopted the voluntary framework as an 
actual source for reducing environmental and social risk.1548 It must be noted, however, 
that the interviews for this thesis were held before EP III entered into force. 
Consequently, the term loans that were discussed in the interviews would not have been 
covered by EP III. Nevertheless, the importance of EP I and II in driving environmental 
                                                 
1546 Scholtens and Dam (n 92) 1307. See also, BankTrack, ‘Unproven principles. The Equator Principles 
at year two’ (Amsterdam; BankTrack, 2005) 
<file:///C:/Users/Lloyd/Downloads/050606_unproven_principles_the_equator_principles_at_year_two.
pdf> accessed 12 December 2014. 
1547 EP 2013 (n 1373) 2. 
1548 ibid.  
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due diligence in financial institutions means that it is still necessary to discuss the 
Principles in this chapter. 
EP III concerns project finance situations that are likely to cause environmental and/or 
social harm. The framework applies to four types of financial product: (1) Project 
Finance Advisory Services; (2) Project Finance; (3) Project-Related Corporate Loans; 
and (4) Bridge Loans.1549 It is the aim of the EPFIs to: ‘Ensure that the Projects we 
finance and advise on are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflects 
sound environmental management practices.’ 1550 From the range of financial products 
covered by EP III, along with the aim of the EPFIs, it would appear that the EP have a 
significant role to play in financial institutions’ project finance transactions, as well as 
the greening of their due diligence processes. 
The EP apply to all projects that have a capital expenditure of US$10 million and over. 
The financial threshold was originally set at US$50 million in EP I, but this was later 
amended by EP II. The lowering of the financial threshold is essential for the thesis’ 
analysis of the primary drivers of environmental due diligence in UK banks. The thesis 
is concerned with land redevelopment. However, the costs associated with 
redevelopment projects rarely exceed US$50 million. On the other hand, the lower 
financial threshold of US$10 million is much more likely to capture lending 
institutions’ financing for land redevelopment projects. It is therefore reasonable to 
suggest that the EP have had, and are continuing to have, a significant influence upon 
                                                 
1549 ibid 3.  
1550 ibid. 
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the lenders’ role in financing land redevelopment projects; and this is especially so 
throughout the EPFIs.  
The EP encourage better due diligence for environmental and social risks and impacts 
among the EPFIs. According to the EP, projects should be categorised by the EPFIs’ 
environmental and social due diligence. During the due diligence’s analysis, the level 
of environmental and social impacts should be reviewed.1551 Altogether there are three 
categories of project under the EP. While Category 1 includes projects ‘with potential 
significant adverse environmental and social risks and/or impacts’, Category 3 projects 
are described as presenting a ‘minimal or no adverse environmental and social risks 
and/or impacts.’1552 In between Categories 1 and 3, Category 2 projects pose ‘potential 
limited adverse environmental and social risks and/or impacts that are few in number, 
generally site-specific, largely reversible and readily addressed through mitigation 
measures.’1553 The EP’s project categorisation induces environmental and social due 
diligence amongst the EPFIs. However, while Categories 1 and 3 may be easily 
distinguishable, Category 2 projects may be much more difficult for EPFIs to assess 
through their conduct of reasonable due diligence. There is also the problem with 
‘categorisation-creep’, which refers to where projects are purposely downgraded ‘to 
reduce costs, time and effort.’1554 Categorisation-creep can be detrimental to the use of 
the EP, which, in turn, can heighten the risk of environmental and social issues arising 
throughout project financing. The adoption of the EP by financial institutions should 
be celebrated for the fact that it demonstrates, ‘the public’s ability to influence of 
                                                 
1551 ibid. 
1552 ibid 5. 
1553 ibid. 
1554 Watchman, Delfino and Addison (n 92) 89. 
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private action’.1555 The introduction and development of the EP have changed banking 
due diligence for both EPFIs and non-EPFIs. And the EP’s impact is clearly not limited 
to project finance. The data collected by this research show that EP-like due diligence 
techniques are being used by banks to assess the environment-related risks that may 
occur while lending to land redevelopment projects. It has already been shown, for 
instance, that financial institutions very often utilise the expertise of external 
environmental consultants to categorise the environmental risks that can materialise 
when lending to individual clients and/or land redevelopment projects.  
As well as the categorisation of activities, the EP have encouraged lenders’ 
environmental due diligence in other ways. For example, Principle 8 of the EP concerns 
‘covenants’ that are to be incorporated in the financing documentation; this 
documentation must comply with the host country’s environmental and social laws and 
regulations.1556 The previous chapter (Chapter 6) has already demonstrated that the 
insertion of conditions precedent in the loan and security documentation is an 
environmental due diligence technique that is widely used by banks in their day-to-day 
loans with commercial borrowers. This is significant because it demonstrates how the 
EP have had a positive influence on the banks’ risk management structure.  
On the other hand, the EP have been criticised for possessing a narrow scope and a lack 
of accountability and transparency.1557 And, from a stakeholder perspective, the 
legitimacy of the EP has been widely condemned.1558 O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer believe 
                                                 
1555 Hardenbrook (n 92) 231. 
1556 EP 2013 (n 1373) 3. 
1557 Watchman, Delfino and Addison (n 92) 89. See also, M Forster, PQ Watchman and C July, ‘The 
Equator Principles – Making A Difference? Part 2’ (2005) 7 JIBFL 253. 
1558 N O’Sullivan and B O’Dwyer, ‘Stakeholder perspectives on a financial sector legitimate process: 
The case of the NGOs and the Equator Principles’ (2007) 22(4) AAAJ 553. 
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that, from an institutional level, the EPFIs need to do more to ensure greater 
accountability to the EP.1559 Missbach has also discussed the EP from an NGO’s 
perspective.1560 He compares the EP with the Collevecchio Declaration (CD),1561 which 
he suggests is preferred as the ‘broader NGO vision of sustainable finance’.1562 Like 
the EP, the CD on Financial Institutions sets outs a number of Principles that banks 
should follow in order to advance environmental and social sustainability.1563 The main 
difference between the EP and the CD is that the Declaration was established by 
BankTrack, a ‘global network of civil society groups’.1564 Because the Principles in the 
CD were created by civil society groups, it may be argued that the Principles in the 
Declaration require signatories to adhere to stricter levels compliance and transparency 
than the EP. 
Some opponents to the EP argue that the framework presents banks with the 
opportunity to ‘greenwash’ their operations in developing countries.1565 With regards 
to the ‘greenwashing’ of corporate identities with the EP logo, Wright and 
Rwabizambuga argue that, ‘…codes of conduct are primarily adopted by firms as 
signaling devices for demonstrating positive credentials, with the aim of strengthening 
corporate reputation and organizational legitimacy more generally.’1566   
Research concerning why banks have refused to join the EP shows that non-EPFIs may 
                                                 
1559 ibid, 578. 
1560 A Missbach, ‘The Equator Principles: Drawing the line for socially responsible banks? An interim 
review from an NGO perspective’ (2004) 47(3) Development 78. 
1561 BankTrack, ‘Collevecchio Declaration’ (BankTrack, no date) 
<file:///C:/Users/Lloyd/Downloads/030401_collevecchio_declaration_with_signatories.pdf> accessed 
12 December 2014.  
1562 Missbach (n 1560) 78. 
1563 BankTrack (n 1561) 1. 
1564 BankTrack, ‘About Bank Track’ (BankTrack, no date) 
<http://www.banktrack.org/show/pages/about_banktrack> accessed 12 December 2014. 
1565 Scholtens and Dam (n 92) 1307. 
1566 Wright and Rwabizambuga (n 92) 90. 
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be just as well suited for managing environmental and social issues during project 
finance.1567 While some non-EPFIs have shown scepticism toward the EP, others have 
simply not adopted the framework because the EP are viewed as ‘business as usual’, 
and the non-Equator banks’ internal CSR functions are therefore adequately dealing 
with any environmental and social issues that may arise during their loan finance 
activities.1568  
Financial institutions that are a part of the EP appear, to outsiders, to have more concern 
for CSR commitments; in reality however, this may not be wholly true. Macve and 
Chen’s research into the success of the EP identifies the bank’s reputation in the public 
domain as the primary driver for the financial institutions’ adoption of the EP.1569 They 
state, ‘Some banks are more public relations focused than others because they are 
always in the press spotlight, so “Will this pass the Daily Mail (i.e. popular newspaper) 
test?” is always a relevant question.’1570 This may mean that the EP are a form of 
publicity, and that some of the EPFIs are more concerned with the bank’s reputational 
risk and relationship to the public at large, as opposed to advocating and furthering 
sustainable financing. Further to this, there are limited data on the EP’s success in 
protecting the environment; this is primarily because it has proven difficult to evaluate 
the impact that the EP have made in preventing environmental and social harm in 
project finance.1571  
                                                 
1567 M Forster, P Watchman and C July, ‘The Equator Principles – Towards Sustainable Banking? Part 
1’ (2005) 6 JIBFL 217.  
1568 ibid. 
1569 R Macve and X Chen, ‘The “equator principles”: a success for voluntary codes?’ (2010) 23(7) AAAJ 
890, 897. 
1570 ibid. 
1571 ibid, 898. 
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As discussed above, though some view the EP as a form of publicity for banks to build 
public relations and legitimise their internal corporate governance frameworks, after a 
number of years of use most banks now consider the EP to be both a binding 
international framework, and a universal indicator for good environmental and social 
risk management practice. This fact is evidenced by the findings of Scholtens and 
Dam’s study into the EP. The results of their study have shown how the EP are now 
‘used to signal responsible conduct’ amongst the modern banking world.1572 Thus, 
voluntary credit risk management frameworks can be described as being an important 
driver for the use, and continued growth of, environmental due diligence methods in 
banks.   
F. Reputational Risk  
Banks are now operating in an age of environmental responsibility and accountability. 
And financial institutions have an increasingly large role to play within the agenda for 
environmental protection. Although difficult to perceive, the provision of financial 
assistance can harm the environment. Notwithstanding the possibility of irreversible 
environmental damage, irresponsible lending could also cause serious harm to the 
reputation of the bank that provides the money to a polluting borrower in the first 
instance.  
The data in this section suggest that the threat of incurring reputational risk is presently 
the main driver for the banks’ use of environmental due diligence. Such data provide 
an answer to sub-question 3, point 2, and, during the analysis, were coded into the 
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yellow coding category and highlighted in red. The evident theme in the data is that 
pressure from the public and NGOs is currently driving due diligence for environmental 
risks. In interview, Respondent 5 spoke of how public campaigns against banks’ 
lending decisions have influenced their decisions of whether or not to finance 
environmentally contentious activities: 
R5: But in the past there have been campaigns against banks. I remember 
one TV commercial with the actress Susan Sarandon, for example, cutting 
up a credit card. I can’t remember if it was […] or […] because of the 
environmental issue and impact that the bank had. We are also seeing, and 
I am sure that all banks see this, we are seeing a lot of push from the NGOs 
directly. They are regularly contacting us and letting us know about the 
projects that they are concerned about, carrying out pre-empting strikes. 
Even before a client approaches us they are telling us that if a certain 
project were to be financed by the bank, uh, it would be held against us. So, 
I’m seeing a lot more activism. Again, not so much in the sense of people 
going down into the streets and protesting, but much more subtle, more 
professional, and a push in that direction. So the driver can definitely be 
contributed to the relationship that banks have with NGOs and certainly 
with the everyday investors who may be concerned about the environment. 
They may cycle, and do a lot of things at the community level, so they expect 
the companies that they invest in, and the companies that finance those 
companies, in turn, to be just as responsible. 
The banking respondent identifies reputational risk and public perception as a key 
driver for environmental due diligence in this section of the interview. They describe 
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the response of the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) to Citi Group’s financing of 
deforestation projects. In response to Citi’s lending decisions, RAN aired a television 
advertisement which showed celebrities, including Susan Saradon, cutting up Citi 
credit cards. The respondent’s description of NGOs is also interesting, since it seems 
that the NGOs’ approach to activism has changed over the years. From the respondent’s 
account, it seems that the NGOs have become more ‘professional’ in their approach to 
driving the banks’ decision-making. This finding is interesting because as the banks 
have developed more fine-tuned environmental and social risk management methods, 
the NGOs have also evolved better methods for holding the banks to account. 
Though inevitably linked with CSR, GSCM and KYC, the interview data suggest that 
the banks’ reputations have overtaken legislative compliance as the most important 
driver for the conduct of environmental due diligence within their risk management 
process. This may have something to do with the fact that reputational and project risk 
have become the greatest environmental threats for banks. Lenders are currently fearful 
of the reputational ramifications that their actions may bring; and this is especially so 
with regards to their relationships with NGOs and campaign groups. A general theme 
throughout the interview data was that the majority of bankers interviewed showed how 
NGOs have pressurised banks into adopting good environmental risk management 
functions within their ordinary risk management frameworks. The reputational 
repercussions that may emerge from lending to an environmentally or socially 
contentious project have made banks turn away some lucrative financing opportunities. 
The affect that NGOs have had upon lenders is summed up well in respondent 2’s 
interview transcript: 
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R2: Generally, a lot of it has been pushed from NGOs and campaigns. So 
we were campaigned over the lending to oil and gas companies, and the 
climate camp on lending to companies involved in the manufacture of 
highly controversial weapons… uhm… there’s been a lot about targeting 
banks in the US about mountain top removal; forestry companies and 
deforestation; animal welfare and animal testing. And the NGOs have got 
cleverer and cleverer at not only targeting the companies that have direct 
responsibility and operational responsibility to do things, but also their 
financiers.1573 
Over the last twenty years, compliance with environmental legislation and regulation 
has become second nature for some lenders, and this is also true for the majority of their 
commercial clients. The uncertainties that were initially created by legislation, like Part 
IIA, have been relinquished over time, and the due diligence that is necessary to remove 
the threat of such legislation has, in many ways, become deeply embedded within the 
risk management process of most (if not all) of the UK’s lending institutions. The 
general consensus amongst the interviewees was that banks are beginning to feel more 
comfortable with resolving compliance issues, and can therefore concentrate more on 
improving both their reputations and public image. Thus, when asked about the greatest 
driver for banks at the moment, one respondent said: 
R14: The single most important asset that banks have is their reputation. 
Managing that reputation and managing reputational risks comes in many 
different forms, and there are a lot of facets to it, but environmental and 
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social risks are a very important one; and one that banks have been, if I 
may say so, successful in the last few years in managing that, in comparison 
to their management of some other reputational risks 1574 
This extract from the interview data shows that times are changing. The banks’ previous 
obsession with direct lender liability for environmental risk under, inter alia, Part IIA 
and the other regimes that complement its operation, is beginning to fade. The more 
traditional environmental risks have been around for some time now, and the banks 
have become accustomed to assessing such risks within their credit due diligence 
functions. This finding corresponds to Chapter 5, which shows that direct lender 
liability is now perceived as the least likely risk to materialise within commercial loan 
financing. Banks’ reputational risk management and fear of bad PR and public scrutiny 
should, however, continue to drive the future application of environmental due 
diligence in commercial lending for some years to come. 
R5: I think one thing that is my challenge is when it comes to looking at 
companies’ reputation the information out there is not standardized. Money 
is money! It is easy enough to measure a company’s performance from a 
financial standpoint, but reputation is really hard to (a) define and (b) to 
quantify or even frame. So the push back that I get sometimes is – if I say 
that a company has a less than stellar reputation, then the question is, “So 
what? What is the impact? What is the tie between that reputation and how 
bad is the reputation on a scale of 1 – 10?” I don’t have that answer 
because there is no scale when it comes to reputation; there is a huge gap 
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for me. I know there are organisations that try to put information in there, 
they monitor the media, you know, and how many times has that company’s 
name appeared negatively in the press. That’s only one aspect of someone’s 
reputation; you really have to get behind the management and community 
issues, which may not be in the press regularly. That takes a lot of research. 
There’s a huge gap when it comes to putting a mark on an environmental 
reputational of a company. 
The importance of this section can be attributed to the conclusion which it draws in 
answer to the overarching research question and sub-question 3 – that the primary 
driver for environmental due diligence in banks has changed from legislative to 
reputational over the last twenty-five years. Now that the drivers for environmental risk 
management have been highlighted, the next section provides an insight into how 
lenders really conduct environmental due diligence and the types of approach they can 
take. 
II. How Do Lenders Manage Environmental Risks? 
This Chapter has established that, in relation to credit finance, the general purpose of 
environmental due diligence is to allow an enterprise to undertake an assessment of the 
risks that may be present within any given business venture. This chapter has also 
shown that, in many respects, legal due diligence is now becoming increasingly 
fashionable within many business sectors; and environmental risk management in 
contractual relationships may, after many years of being perfected, now be described 
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as a precise science1575 that has reduced the threat of environmental liability to a 
manageable level, with which the majority of banks are comfortable. But how is due 
diligence really practiced by banks? This section of the chapter seeks to assess the 
actual structure and use of due diligence for environmental risks in twenty-first century 
bank lending.     
Methods for calculating the different environmental liabilities that may be present upon 
land (especially, with regards to liability under the Part IIA regime) have now become 
a necessary part of the lenders’ risk management process.  This thesis argues that the 
direct liability that lenders can incur from land based pollution no longer poses a 
primary concern. This is why environmental risk management teams will often look at 
how much they can take before the bank is put at risk.  
R1: It centres more on how much you can take without incurring direct 
lender liability. 
I: You would take possession then, even though there may be a direct risk? 
R1: Yes, it depends what the risk is, but, if we get to taking possession we 
would have done something beyond the desktop; we probably would have 
had a site visit; we would have had a look at what was going on; what the 
market was like. Most sites you can sell, but we have had a lot of problems 
with waste transfer stations when they go bust, because when they go bust 
– for about the previous six months – they open their doors and everyone 
                                                 
1575 C Davis, ‘Is legal due diligence to become a science?’ (1997) 18(7) Comp Law 183.  
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comes in and they shut their doors. You can’t sell that site without removing 
the waste, so that has an impact, both, on the value and saleability – as well 
as – because you wouldn’t want to be taking possession of that sort of 
property. So, you know, we do make losses in this area, but they’re not 
significant losses, not on a portfolio basis. 1576   
Where environmental risks are present upon a site – and those risks pose a likely and 
severe threat – rather than taking on the liabilities and risks that are attached to the land 
by taking possession of the property, banks can simply ‘walk away’ and abandon its 
customer’s site. In that situation it is highly likely that the bank will experience financial 
loss (it may even incur reputational harm); however, the threat of direct lender liability 
will not be incurred. Despite being a prominent issue when lending to real estate, 
abandonment tends not to happen too often in commercial banking, as Respondent 6 
demonstrates: 
R6: The only one that we’ve walked away from, and we have done this a 
couple of times, was actually residential properties. Because the property 
wasn’t worth that much to begin and the contamination issues were fairly 
huge in terms of what we would gain on it. In those instances, we have said, 
“Here’s the keys, it’s yours and do what you like with it!” For commercial 
properties, it doesn’t tend to be the case, we tend to realise what we can 
out of it. There was only one instance where we handed the keys back to a 
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company of a contaminated property, and they sent them straight back and 
said, “It’s still your problem!”1577  
As exhibited in Chapter 2, the likelihood of a bank ending up with a piece of 
contaminated real estate is, gradually, becoming increasingly rare. While a great deal 
of uncertainty still exists as to the exact amount of contaminated land that is situated 
throughout England, the historic legacy is inevitably beginning to shrink. The 
decreasing amount of contaminated and suspect land around the UK can be attributed 
to voluntary remediation and the use of the planning system, which have both been 
responsible for generating a significant amount of contaminated land remediation since 
the regime’s initial inception in 2000.  
Some banks are much more environmentally and socially astute than others. Simply 
clicking on the different banks’ websites and looking at their environmental, social and 
ethical policies will verify this fact. Throughout the empirical study it became clear that 
all of the major banks now have environmental risk management teams, which develop 
environmental policy for the bank. The members of these teams hold managerial 
positions within the bank, and have either transferred into the area from the credit / 
reputational risk management side of the bank, or have specialised in this field of 
banking. The bankers that were interviewed from the UK, Europe, the USA and Canada 
showed that the banks’ environmental risk management frameworks are all set out in a 
similar way, i.e. using a system of credit risk assessment to determine environmental 
threats on a loan. However, upon closer inspection, it is apparent that each institution 
will tweak the due diligence process in order to suit the bank’s individual business 
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ventures. For example, one of the risk management teams that were interviewed worked 
for the finance department (essentially the bank) of a blue chip company. Amongst 
many other business ventures, the company, for which the finance team creates 
environmental policy, rents specialist equipment, such as: medical equipment to 
hospitals, industrial equipment to major manufacturing operations. Renting equipment 
is an activity that traditional banking institutions would not participate in. Nevertheless, 
this is a business activity that is susceptible to environmental risks and the finance team 
for that company, who had a very good knowledge of environmental risks in banking, 
had to design an environmental due diligence strategy, which would protect the 
company from the environmental risks that may impact upon their individual 
transactions during the renting of equipment.  
Despite the fact that each individual bank will customise an environmental risk 
management strategy to tailor its own form of banking activity, the data have found that 
there are two primary approaches that can be used to categorise the position that banks 
can take when exercising environmental due diligence to manage environmental risks. 
Some banks use, what may be described as, ‘a risk-based approach’ to the assessment 
of environmental issues. Others tend to adopt ‘a liability-based approach’. Respondent 
2 describes these two approaches further:  
I: How do you think direct lender liability has impacted upon the banks’ 
approach to lending money? 
R7: I think it’s made banks, and I am answering this from my time at […] 
[…], I think it made us much more cautious about lending or purchasing 
assets; it made us less likely to lend money; but, the honest truth, is that it 
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depends on the tolerance to risk of each individual organisation. There are 
lending organisations out there that play it very fast and loose, and are 
quite happy to say, “Well, look, these are the odds that this liability will 
never materialise, and therefore we’ll go ahead with it, and we think we’ll 
be okay!” then there are people like […] who follow the American legal 
model, which is that you want to make sure that you are water tight in every 
respect, so you don’t end up being sued into non-existence, which is the 
kind of world that […] lives in, in the States; and their focus is exclusively 
on the potential liability for them, rather on the risk for them. So, it depends, 
one takes a risk-based approach, and one is a liability-based approach, 
which determines the attitude of the overall company to lending. 1578 
Although this is somewhat a generalisation, the liability-based approach is normally 
associated with American and Canadian lenders; this could be related to the fact that 
the American banks have witnessed a period of lenders’ liability for environmental 
pollution issues. Such an experience has consequently resulted in stricter methods of 
environmental due diligence for the banks based there. With the liability based 
approach the bank essentially assesses the threat of a risk on the basis of the liability 
that may be created from a particular transaction. Conversely, banks operating in the 
UK and Europe tend to take more of a risk-based approach when evaluating the issues 
that may be created from environmental concerns in loan financing. Banks based in 
such countries are therefore more willing than the American banks to take chances, but 
are still stricter in their application of environmental risk management when compared 
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to the environmental risk management methods that are being used in the emerging 
markets.  
In commercial lending, environmental risk management normally sits somewhere in 
between banks’ credit and reputation risk management functions; this is because 
environmental issues may directly affect credit finance (i.e. loan repayment and assets 
given as security), and/or a bank’s reputation and public image. As Chapter 5 
demonstrates, the latter is increasingly becoming the greatest concern for lenders. 
Nowadays, a majority of banks will make a conscious effort to understand and evaluate 
environmental and social risks. The increasing threats from these new sources of risk 
have forced banks to increase the size of their environmental risk management teams, 
and employ people with a professional expertise in the area of environmental liability. 
One banker interviewed said: 
R2: I used to be an environmental consultant [and] because such issues 
increased a lot… there are teams of generally 4 – 6 people in the bigger 
banks, uhm, across the board. 1579  
Another respondent believed that the main purpose of environmental due diligence in 
bank lending was to protect the bank’s reputation, as well as identifying particularly 
risky clients. This is a process that the interview participant described as, ‘separating 
the wheat from the chaff’: 
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I: Well, okay, my first question is quite an easy, general question, I suppose. 
I just want to ask whether environmental due diligence is important within 
21st century banking? 
R3: Yeah, I would say, yes, and certainly I would say that the fact that we 
have a team here of six people, who do environmental and social risk due 
diligence on […] transactions is evidence of that fact. And all the big banks 
have teams, uhm, not quite as big as we have here, but definitely teams that 
are equivalent to us, and what we do. So all the banks that you can see here: 
HSBC, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Standard Chartered, uhm, BNP 
Paribas, Santander, Goldman Sachs, RBS, you know, all the sort of big 
banks, have got a team of people that look at environmental and social 
risks, uh, mostly from a reputation protection point of view; the idea being 
that, uhm, you know, the banks don’t support industries that are, you know, 
too damaging to environment or social capital, uh, you know, so our job is 
to advise […] as to, uhm, the merits, or demerits, of what it is proposing to 
support. I mean, it doesn’t necessarily mean that we avoid to support 
certain industries; it’s more a question of separating the wheat from the 
chaff, as it were, and trying to identify the best operators to work with.1580 
Respondent 3 suggests that the majority of large commercial lenders now have an 
environmental risk management team of four to six people. While a team of four to six 
people seems small, it wholly reflects the type of risk that is being managed. The growth 
of environmental, social and ethical considerations within banks is rather unimaginable, 
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bearing in mind that a little less than twenty years ago such issues were viewed as a 
separate sphere of concern to the anthropocentric, financial world. Even though the 
banks’ previous attitude towards non-financial concerns has softened, considerably, the 
extent to which environmental due diligence will continue to grow in the future is 
merely a subject of speculation. Nonetheless, it seems that as long as environmental 
regulation and risks expands and develops, so too will the lenders’ use of due diligence 
to reduce environmental risk.    
III. When is the Use of Due Diligence Most Important? 
This section helps to understand ‘when’ in the lending process banks fear the threat of 
the environment risks the most. Assessing the most important time at which to conduct 
environmental due diligence answers sub-question 2, point 3 of the research questions. 
The data that are displayed in this section were highlighted in blue and underlined in 
black during the analysis stage.   
The fallibility of environmental risk management is summed up well by Respondent 9, 
who, in their interview, likens financial institutions’ management of environmental 
issues to an old S.E.A.T. television advertisement:        
I: And, like you said, one of the biggest problems with due diligence is that 
you cannot prepare fully for the things that may happen. 
R9: Yes, that’s right. I am an engineer, and if man designed it, it will fail. 
The question is – When and how? 
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I: Yes, that’s true. 
R9: And if man is managing it, it will fail. Sometimes, in my talks, I mention 
the… do you know about the old Seat advert? 
I: No, I can’t remember it, no. 
R9: Well, basically, it said: ‘Designed by computers – Built by robots – 
Driven by Italians.’ 
I: Yeah, that’s good [laughs]! 
R9: And, I think that that sums up environmental risk management. 
1581  
Despite being difficult to manage, this chapter has shown that environmental due 
diligence is now prominent throughout the whole life of a loan, and the data provide 
evidence that the use of environmental due diligence in banks is particularly important 
when dealing with certain operational sectors. The use of due diligence is also important 
in the situation where a client is no longer able to repay the loan, or where 
environmental issues threaten the asset that has been secured against the loan by the 
bank. The application of due diligence during a borrower’s insolvency also helps the 
bank to decide whether foreclosure is a feasible option.   
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So, ‘when’ in the lending process is the conduct of environmental due diligence most 
important? Fordyce, Kofman and Tay believe that the use of due diligence is most 
important before the loan has been contracted out:  
‘Environmental liability is only one of many considerations which a lender 
should consider in making credit determinations. The easiest time for the 
lender to protect itself is before the funds are advanced or a commitment is 
made to lend.’ 1582 
As with the above quote, the majority of interviewees agreed that the conduct of 
environmental due diligence is of the utmost importance before the loan has been 
created. This viewpoint is demonstrated well by the answer that Respondent 6 gave 
when asked this question in interview: 
I: So, when is the use of environmental due diligence most important, you 
know, at what stage of the lending process do you think?  
R6: I think it’s most important to do it right up front because once you have 
the property, and once they have the money in hand, it is much harder to 
get the client to do what you want them to do, because the carrot, so to 
speak, is that you’ll get the loan if you do all of these things. That’s more 
effective that the stick would be if they have already had the loan already 
invested, or already spent the money. 1583 
                                                 
1582 Fordyce, Kofman and Tay (n 80) 21.  
1583 Interview with Respondent 6. 
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The threat of being made directly liable for historic land contamination has cemented 
the caveat of ‘the buyer beware’ into the minds of the UK’s lenders. This is why most 
environmental risk teams are still concerned about the threat posed to the bank by 
environmental issues emulating from the pollution of land and controlled water 
systems. Screening contaminated land at the preliminary stages of a loan helps lenders 
to get a feel for the scale and significance of the contamination situated upon a site. It 
also helps bankers to decide whether they should assign property value and security to 
such sites. Accordingly, ‘getting it right from the start’, is an important proviso for 
banks to follow.  
While the interview data show that the use of environmental due diligence is most 
important prior to the loan being permitted, the thesis has also attempted to portray why 
post-loan due diligence is also essential for resolving the ‘control dilemma’, and other 
issues which tend to emerge after the loan has been approved. During the pre-loan due 
diligence stage, banks are always trying to ascertain whether a loan is financially viable, 
and free from risk. However, lender liability is most likely to occur in the situation 
where there is a significant material change in the borrower’s operations after the grant 
of the loan. Hence, managing the risks after the loan has been allowed is, in many ways, 
just as important.    
IV. The Continued Growth of Due Diligence 
This section uses empirical data to answer sub-question 3, point 3, i.e. ‘What is the 
future of environmental due diligence in UK banks?’ During the analysis stage, the data 
that were necessary for this section were highlighted in yellow and underlined in black. 
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Although a necessary part of the lending process, environmental due diligence still 
remains only a minor feature of the overall risk management functions within banks. 
Presenting the interviewees’ perceptions of the continued growth of due diligence in 
the environmental context helps to explain why direct lender liability risk is currently 
perceived as the least likely threat. It also helps to understand how environmental risk 
management will evolve in banks over the next few years. 
 Respondent 11, for instance, believes that environmental risk management is only a 
small part of banks’ due diligence functions, and cleverly compares its application to 
the role of a canary in a coalmine: 
R11: Environmental risk may be the canary in the coalmine. It’s one of a 
range of risk factors that a bank might want to consider and monitor, which 
will demonstrate the customer’s broader governance and business 
viability.1584 
After analysing the interview data, it appears that the majority of the banking 
respondents believed that environmental due diligence has an essential role to play in 
banks’ overall risk management functions. However, while important, this role is only 
small, like the canary in the coalmine. Despite its small role in bank lending, the 
majority of interviewees suggested that environmental due diligence is set to continue 
growing in importance in banks for some time to come. The main question that lenders 
are asking themselves now is: To what extent will environmental due diligence continue 
to grow? In relation to questions concerning the continued growth of environmental 
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due diligence, Respondent 10 asked whether, in the future, environmental risk 
management in commercial banks would ever become as developed as the project 
lending banks, whose environmental risk management is particularly well established 
because of the nature of their lending practices: 
R10: So, the question is whether commercial banks will ever get to a stage 
where they develop the scale and coverage in their teams … in their 
environmental teams … to the likes of development banks?1585  
Obviously, this chapter will be unable to answer these questions here, but it can 
nevertheless provide data in order to depict what the interviewees, the people working 
with environmental due diligence methods on a day-to-day basis, think may happen in 
a couple of years’ time. While the interview data merely capture a moment in time, 
there is a sense of unity between the interviewees’ ideas concerning the future 
application of environmental risk management and bank lending. The following 
examples illustrate what the majority of the interviewees think may happen to 
environmental risk management in banks in some years to come: 
R1: You never know! You never know! And that’s why environmental risk is 
here to stay. Because, if the regulatory framework changes, then, suddenly, 
they give the local authorities the ability to investigate special sites, then 
the whole ball game could change in a year or so. So, what you got to have 
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is a system in place that manages and mitigates that risk, but is able to 
adapt to that risk. 1586  
Furthermore, Respondent 5 said that, because the threat of the environmental risks is 
growing, so too is the importance of the reasonable use of environmental due diligence 
in banks: 
R5: Due diligence is getting more and more important. If anything, it is 
acquiring greater importance for a number of reasons, as far as I can tell: 
one is that environmental risks are becoming greater. When I started, 
“climate change” was not even in the technical vocabulary of those in the 
field, and only a few of us in the field really understood “sustainability”, 
for example… So, if anything, I think that due diligence is broadening its 
scope; it is not just looking at, “Is this site contaminated, and what will it 
take to remediate it?” It also looks at how a company is performing and 
what is their role in climate change and combating climate change: Are 
they a part of the solution or the problem? 1587            
Respondent 9 suggested that environmental due diligence has ‘a big future’:    
R9: I think that there is a big future for it. But what I did think is that we 
have to go with the times and that we have to go with the risks: the due 
diligence has to go with the risks. 1588 
                                                 
1586 Interview with Respondent 1. 
1587 Interview with Respondent 5. 
1588 Interview with Respondent 9. 
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And, finally, Respondent 10 emphasised: 
R10: Well the future is that it is certainly here to stay; it is also here to grow. 
The question is: To what level will it grow? ... I think the future is safe for 
environmental due diligence. It is here to stay, it is here to grow, and it is 
here to become more important. Although, it also has to become more 
professional amongst banks, and it will become more professional and 
professionalised as well. But, I don’t think it will be a mainstream business 
for the bank, to do environmental due diligence; it will always be a side 
activity to mitigate risks. 1589 
After analysis, a universal theme concerning environmental due diligence’s future in 
banking could be established throughout the whole of the interview data. This theme 
suggests that environmental due diligence is no longer being primarily driven by the 
threat of incurring legal exposure as a result of contaminated and suspect land; however, 
this may change if the hanging sword that is Part IIA is dangled more effectively in the 
future.  
Despite the decreasing threat posed to banks by legislation, due diligence for 
environmental issues is progressively beginning to broaden itself in order to 
accommodate for the emerging environmental risks. Although it is questionable 
whether the impact of climate change will have a significant effect upon banks’ loan 
financing activities, over the course of the next twenty to thirty years there will be a 
tipping point where business viability will be affected by such things as the rise in sea 
                                                 
1589 Interview with Respondent 10. 
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levels, or the atmospheric effects caused by air pollution, etc. Accordingly, one must 
look at environmental due diligence in lending practices as a moving agenda that needs 
to constantly adapt, and update itself, in order to respond to growing environmental 
risks. In terms of environmental due diligence’s function in the banking system, it is 
unlikely that the size of the environmental risk management teams will greatly increase 
at any point in the near future, however. What is more likely to happen, is that the 
banks’ environmental risk teams will become more refined and have a wider 
application.  
After looking at the beginnings and development of environmental due diligence in 
banks, since the 1990s, it will be interesting to see in future research how environmental 
due diligence, and the bankers’ perceptions of environmental risk, will change: for 
example, will environmental risk still be described as the ‘canary in a coal mine’ in 
twenty years’ time?   
V. Conclusion 
This chapter holds a lot of data in comparison to the other chapters of the thesis. It is, 
therefore, where the empirical study’s main findings are presented. Displaying the data 
in such a way was necessary, since the originality of the thesis may be claimed as a 
result of the insights of the banking respondents. The chapter began by assessing the 
when, why and how environmental due diligence had emerged within financial 
institutions. It attempted to answer the question of, what drove and continues to drive 
the paradigm shift in the lenders’ due diligence functions? The interview data have 
demonstrated that the primary driver for change came from the enactment of specific 
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legislative exposures, like Part IIA, during the 1990s and early 2000s. Nowadays, 
however, the banks’ reputations and image in the public eye have become the primary 
drivers for the continued use of environmental due diligence. The financial crash, which 
caused significant financial loss for banks, also damaged the banks’ standing in the 
public eye; this may have caused greater harm in the long run, as the public at large has 
lost much faith in banks.  
When asked about the importance of environmental due diligence, the interviewees 
unanimously agreed that, albeit it is only a small part of banks’ risk management 
functions, environmental risk management is going to continue to grow because banks 
will need to respond to, what was described in Chapter 3 as, the emerging 
environmental liabilities such as climate change and flooding.1590 The interviewees also 
agreed that environmental due diligence is most important before the loan is approved. 
The chapter showed that post loan due diligence is also essential for reducing the banks’ 
exposure to environmental liability and risk. After a loan is granted, lenders must 
always be cautious about the amount of control that they may have over their borrowers.  
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It discusses both the primary and supplementary 
research findings. Following this, a possible solution for increasing the lenders’ role in 
land redevelopment is presented.  
  
                                                 
1590 Refer to ch 3, pp 181-191. 
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Chapter 8: 
Discussion and Conclusion  
This thesis contributes original data to the research area. In light of the knowledge gaps 
that existed in the research field, and the Coalition Government’s ‘reduce red tape’ 
strategy in the period of austerity, it was decided to conduct empirical research to assess 
the lenders’ current perceptions toward environmental risks and due diligence. The 
direct lender liability threat arising out of the law relating to land pollution is considered 
an unlikely risk for banks. In contrast, reputational harm by virtue of being in 
association with a polluting borrower or project is viewed as the greatest environmental 
risk to lenders, in terms of its likelihood of occurring and the severity of harm that the 
bank could incur.  
Lenders must not lose touch with the inherent problems that will always remain with 
possessing, or having a borrower in possession of, an environmentally suspect site. 
Banks are currently holding ‘toxic assets’ within property portfolios;1591 these assets 
have either been left over by insolvent borrowers, or purchased by the bank as an 
investment during a bull market. As the economy starts to regain some momentum 
banks will have to sell off their distressed assets; and some of these assets will include 
land that is subject to environmental risks. Already there is evidence to show that banks 
                                                 
1591 K Allen, ‘RBS sells first distressed UK commercial property assets’ Financial Times (London, Friday 
6 December 2013) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c2d4a4ca-5d9d-11e3-b3e8-
00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0
%2Fc2d4a4ca-5d9d-11e3-b3e8-
00144feabdc0.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&siteedition=uk&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fjournalisted.c
om%2Fkate-allen-2%3Fallarticles%3Dyes#axzz3FRjlm2By> accessed 7 October 2014.  
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divest themselves of such property. For example, in an article for the Financial Times 
Allen suggests that:  
‘The Royal Bank of Scotland’s property portfolio of distressed UK 
commercial property assets, in a sign that the bank is managing to unwind 
its troubled investments. The 28 industrial distribution units in the 2m sq. 
ft. “Sapphire” portfolio were previously owned by various RBS borrowers 
and had a guide price of £63m.’1592  
On the one hand, this research provides the most up-to-date account of UK lender 
liability and environmental risk in the period of austerity; on the other, the research is 
likely to be even more pertinent if and when the financial market regains its strength. 
This is because the thesis shows how direct lender liability for land pollution, although 
considered low risk, still remains a threat to lenders. Because of this existing threat, 
banks need to remain vigilant in their environmental due diligence. Also, while the 
potential solution, outlined at the end of this chapter, is meant to help to encourage land 
redevelopment during the economic downturn, it should similarly be applied to a 
bullish market with renewed activity in brownfield land development.  
This chapter provides a discussion of the thesis’ main research findings as well as its 
implications to theory, practice and future research. Following this, a more nuanced 
solution for increasing the lenders’ role in land redevelopment is outlined.        
                                                 
1592 ibid, 27. 
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I. A Summary of the Research Findings 
The principal research finding can be summarised simply: while the environmental 
legal basis has created an insufficient direct lender liability threat for bank lenders over 
the last decade, there has inevitably been an increased focus on environmental risk 
management within banks. This is evidenced by the pre- and post-loan due diligence 
techniques which are now deeply entrenched within banking practices. Whereas 
previous literature found that environmental due diligence in banks was originally 
driven by the threat of direct lender liability from environmental legislation, data 
collected by this research show that this is no longer true, and that the creation of 
environmental policy in banks is now being pushed by: (1) the indirect risks, i.e. credit 
and security risks; and (2) the threat of reputational harm. Chapter 7 provides the richest 
source of empirical data.  
The research’s primary and secondary findings are summarised and discussed further 
below. The research questions from Chapter 1 are incorporated into the text. Clear 
reference is made to the way in which each chapter has answered the overarching 
research question along with the individual sub-questions. 
A.  Environmental Risks 
The research findings displayed in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are essential for answering 
the key research question and sub-question 1, which both ask what the most threatening 
environmental risks for banks are today. The relevant interview data concerning the 
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environmental risks were placed into the green coding category during the analysis 
stage; the individual bullet points were underlined accordingly (see Chapter 1). 
Section II of Chapter 1 outlines the literature basis surrounding this research area. The 
early literature reveals that the greatest environmental risk for banks was lender 
liability, and, in particular, the liability threat from Part IIA of the EPA. In contrast 
however, the modern writings suggest that lender liability for land pollution has now 
been replaced by reputational risk as the most likely and severe environmental risk. The 
literature explains that the legal basis concerning environmental protection has created 
no real legal liability risk for lenders in the UK; banks have now become accustomed 
to assessing legislative non-compliance risk within their day-to-day dealings. Although 
Part IIA was never designed to replicate CERCLA’s direct approach, many law 
practitioners and academics have nonetheless questioned the successfulness of the 
regime. The literature makes it clear that other things must now be driving 
environmental risk management (see below).  
Section III of Chapter 1 concerns the affect that the Coalition Government’s public 
sector cuts have had to the enforcement of the contaminated land regime. Due to the 
nature of the Coalition’s austerity agenda, widespread public sector cuts have been 
made for the identification and remediation of contaminated land. The ability of the 
regulators to enforce their statutory duties under Part IIA has been weakened 
significantly as a consequence. Therefore, the economic overview in Chapter 1 delivers 
an economic account for why Part IIA is now considered low risk by lenders, and 
replies to the key research question and to sub-question 1, specifically.   
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4 offer an important procedural component for the research. Any data 
concerning the environmental legal basis and its risk to commercial lending were placed 
into the green coding category and underlined in blue pen. The detailed overview of the 
contaminated land regime in Chapter 2 is necessary for answering the element of the 
key research question which concerns whether environmental law is a real direct risk 
for banks. Will a lender ever attract liability under Part IIA of the EPA? Building on 
from the literature review and economic overview in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 delivers a 
legal analysis for why this is an increasingly unlikely possibility. The contaminated 
land regime was not designed to allocate direct liability to a large number of appropriate 
persons, as it applies to only the most significantly contaminated sites. Also, in an effort 
to cut the red tape, the revisions that have been made to the Part IIA regime have placed 
the regulators in a weak position to exercise their statutory duties. For these reasons, 
the Part IIA regime is viewed as a highly unlikely risk. And such a research finding 
provides an answer to the overarching research question and sub-question 1.  
 Additionally, in answering the overarching question and sub-question 1, Chapters 3 
and 4 support the research findings in Chapter 2. These chapters portray that the threat 
posed by the other, national environmental laws relating to land pollution is (like Part 
IIA) a sufficiently low risk for lenders. In practice, banks are most at risk if they take 
possession of contaminated property by foreclosing their securities. But this is a very 
unlikely possibility in the present day, given the widespread use of environmental due 
diligence in banks. Indeed, the prudent bank would simply abandon the property where 
the environmental risk assessment suggests on-going contamination.  
Sub-question 1, point 2 tests how lenders currently rank the environmental risks in 
terms of their likelihood of occurring and severity of harm. Chapter 5, section II 
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answers this sub-question by presenting data which rank the current threat of the 
environmental risks. The risk ranking model outlined in Chapter 5 is as follows: first, 
lender liability – low risk; second, the indirect risks – medium risk(s); third, reputational 
risk – high risk. Even before the qualitative study was undertaken, a review of the 
literature meant that these results were to be expected. Though the risk ranking model 
is largely associated with point 2 of sub-question 1, it also bears relevance to points 1 
and 3, and was coded accordingly. The contemporary risk ranking presented in this 
research provides evidence to show that environmental legislation is no longer deemed 
to pose a real risk to lenders, and that there are other risks that can threaten commercial 
lending transactions. What is more, the data that are held in Chapter 5 have illustrated 
how the lenders’ perceptions have changed over the last twenty-five years, thereby 
answering the overarching research question and sub-question 1. Depending on 
relevance, some of the data were coded green and red (sub-question 1, point 2); and 
others were coded green and black (sub-question 1, point 3). 
There were a number of unexpected research findings in Chapter 5 concerning 
environmental risks which were both interesting and exciting. First, the interviewees’ 
perceptions of the ‘emerging liabilities’ are a vital finding for answering the 
overarching research question. Not only does such data clarify where future research 
opportunities in this socio-legal field lie, but it also captures the direction that 
environmental risk management may take in years to come. Such data also answer the 
research question concerning the more threatening environmental risks (sub-question 
1), as well as the present drivers for the use of environmental due diligence in banks 
(sub-question 3).  
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However, it must be noted that environmental risk management may develop in a way 
that is unexpected, and totally different from, the opinions expressed by the research 
subjects. Without being able to predict the future, this research has – through the 
qualitative data that has been collected – captured a moment in time, and has presented 
the findings in order to contribute to the knowledge of this particular area. The banking 
respondents’ insights offer a unique and original contribution to the research field. 
Secondly, another unexpected finding with regards to the description and categorisation 
of environmental risks, was the recurring inclusion of ‘market risk’ as an environmental 
threat. The interview data show that, when mentioned, many of the interviewees ranked 
this as the least likely environmental threat in bank lending. Reasons for not including 
this risk are presented at the end of Chapter 5.          
B. Environmental Due Diligence 
The applicable chapters for answering the part of the overarching research question and 
relevant sub-questions concerning environmental due diligence are Chapters 6 and 7. 
The thesis shows that environmental liability is, today, considered low risk to 
commercial lenders. The overarching research question asks, ‘… what are currently the 
primary drivers for the use and development of environmental due diligence in loan 
finance transactions?’ Chapters 6 and 7 answer the overarching question and sub-
questions 2 and 3 by defining how lenders currently use environmental due diligence 
to manage environmental risks. Unique interview data are used to evaluate the various 
drivers for the continued practise and development of environmental due diligence in 
banks, and to identify the main driver at the current time of writing. 
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In order to provide an overview of the drivers of environmental due diligence, it is first 
necessary to outline the various due diligence techniques that are used by banks to 
manage environmental risks. Data which were relevant to this topic were coded into the 
blue and blue coding category (see Chapter 1). Chapter 6 describes the main due 
diligence techniques that are used by lenders to process environmental risks, as well as 
the different stages of environmental due diligence in banks. The chapter identifies that 
banks use a range of due diligence methods to manage environmental risks. While this 
finding may be a predictable and, in many ways, self-evident truth for people with 
knowledge and understanding of banking risk management and due diligence, it is 
nevertheless interesting to see how this specific due diligence culture has evolved since 
the 1990s / early 2000s. Indeed this research finding acts as an important source of 
information for answering sub-question 2, i.e. ‘How do lenders exercise and shape their 
due diligence functions to manage and assess the environment-related risks?’ 
Another important research finding concerns ‘when’ in the lending process 
environmental risks are assessed. In answering sub-question 2, point 2 the data show 
that environmental due diligence is deployed both before and after the grant of loan 
finance. At the analysis stage, all of the data that were necessary for answering this sub-
question were coded in the blue and red category, and are held in Chapter 7, section I.  
This section of the chapter is relevant to the overarching research question. It 
demonstrates how environmental risk management has evolved in banks in response to 
the threat from legislative non-compliance risk. Throughout the analysis data were 
highlighted in blue and underlined in black, and respond to sub-question 2, point 3. All 
of the banking respondents acknowledged that the most important time to conduct due 
diligence was before the loan is contracted out; but the ability to employ post-loan due 
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diligence techniques continues to remain an important feature in the management of 
environmental risks.  
Both the overarching question and sub-question 3 ask, ‘what are the primary drivers for 
the use of environmental due diligence?’ Chapter 7 presents the core data that offer 
original and unique insights into what has driven the increased environmental risk 
management culture in banks based in the UK. The data held in Chapter 7, section I fall 
into the yellow and blue coding category, and show that legislative non-compliance 
was initially considered to be the primary driver for environmental due diligence in 
banks in the 1990s. The data go on to illustrate, however, that the ability of legislation 
to drive environmental risk management in banks is decreasing in significance. 
Incidentally, legislative non-compliance has now been largely replaced by reputational 
risk as the primary driver. The data in Chapter 7 are thus important for answering the 
overarching research question and sub-question 3, points 1 and 2. It is noteworthy that 
data specifically relating to the present drivers of the lenders’ use of environmental due 
diligence were highlighted in yellow and underlined in red. 
The final coding category (yellow and black) relates to sub-question 3, point 3, i.e. 
‘What is the future of environmental due diligence in banks?’ and the answer is 
presented by data found in Chapter 7, section IV. The interviewees unanimously agreed 
that there is a future for environmental due diligence in banks, and that this form of risk 
management is highly likely to grow in significance in years to come. Nowadays, 
however, the lender liability risk from land pollution is giving way to the potential 
threat that may exist from other, emerging, environmental liabilities, i.e. climate change 
and flooding. By concluding that lender liability for land pollution is no longer the 
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primary driver for the future expansion of environmental due diligence, this research 
finding is vital for answering the key research question. 
Nevertheless, despite the changes in the lenders’ perceptions of environmental risk and 
due diligence over the last decade, new environmental problems are emerging all of the 
time, and the laws that are in place may be unsuited to regulating emerging particular 
problems.1593 Thus, environmental regulation will always remain a risk to banks, no 
matter how much the environmental risk teams think that they have a handle on issues 
surrounding legislative compliance.        
C. Lenders, Environmental Law and Insolvency 
A supplementary – and somewhat unexpected – finding to this research project was the 
environmental risks that could emerge for lenders because of their borrowers’ corporate 
insolvency. This chapter displays how environmental law can sometimes be 
undermined by more established regimes. Chapter 4 supplements Chapter 2 and is 
relevant for answering the overarching research question and sub-question 1. This is 
because it shows that environmental legislation is presently conceding ground against 
more established legal regimes, and presents lender liability as low risk. The data 
relevant to this topic were highlighted in green and underlined in blue during the 
analysis stage.   
                                                 
1593 See, L Frater, E Stokes, R Lee and T Oriola, ‘An Overview of the Framework of Current Regulation 
affecting the Development and Marketing of Nanomaterials: A Report for the DTI’ (2006) ESRC Centre 
for Business Relationships Accountability Sustainability and Society (BRASS), URN 06/2220 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090609003228/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file36167.p
df> accessed 21 August 2014.  
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Only one interview participant (Respondent 3) spoke about the environmental threats 
that may emerge because of their borrower’s insolvency, which may suggest that this 
issue is not being considered in any amount of depth by banks. The interview with 
Respondent 3, who had previously worked as an insolvency practitioner, led to an entire 
chapter (Chapter 4) on the material uncovered in that interview. The conversation that 
took place demonstrated that there is a significant overlap between the relevant laws 
surrounding insolvency, and the environmental licensing regime for regulating 
activities relating to the management of waste. It also exposed the fact that lenders are 
aware of the problems that may stem from the conflicting legal regimes. However, in 
an age that encourages the recovery of companies that fall into insolvency, another 
surprising result came from Respondent 3’s opinion about the lenders’ preferred 
insolvency procedure, which consists of liquidating the company’s assets and allowing 
the winding-up of the debtor company. Although a surprising result, such an attitude 
does make sense from the lenders’ point of view, because, even though the liquidation 
procedure does not aim to rescue the company (as advocated by Enterprise Act 2002), 
it does provide a quick, clear-cut return for the company’s secured creditors.  
II. Implications of the Findings to the Research Area 
This research has generated a number of implications for theory, research, and practice 
in the research area covering lender liability and risk for environmental damage. This 
section provides an account of this impact.      
‘Theory’ – Through the insights of the interviewees, this research provides an original 
contribution to the knowledge of this research field. As previously mentioned, the 
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theoretical basis concerning environmental risk and due diligence comes from a body 
of writing that is now largely out-dated. More recent work is more reflective of the 
current situation, although findings on the lenders’ perceptions of environmental risk 
and due diligence are still in need of more up-to-date empirical analysis. This research 
project confirms, by using the qualitative data collected and analysed, that the older 
literature’s assessment of environmental risk (e.g. regarding direct liability as the most 
threatening environmental risk for lenders) is no longer an accurate portrayal of the 
lenders’ present risk ranking. Nowadays, reputational risk is perceived as the greatest 
threat to corporate bank lending. This work has also shown how banking due diligence 
is slowly beginning to change in order to adapt to emerging environmental threats. 
 
‘Practice’ – It is hoped this research will have practical implications for a number of 
different fields. With regards to the political-legal field, Chapter 1 shows how the Part 
IIA regime has been severely impacted by the economic recession, and the political 
decisions of the Coalition Government. The reduced support of the public sector for 
contaminated land identification and remediation is significantly detrimental for the 
regulators of the Part IIA regime, who will now find it increasingly difficult to fulfil 
their statutory duties. Furthermore, private sector investment in the funding of the 
redevelopment of environmentally suspect land is also likely to decrease, since lending 
to such projects has become increasingly risky (in terms of the indirect and reputational 
risk that could be incurred). Thus, there is need for a nuanced solution that encourages 
the lenders’ role in land redevelopment. This is outlined in the next section.  
 
‘For Future Research’ – There are a number of future research opportunities that may 
stem from this study. First, it is evident that similar research needs to be conducted in 
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the US, and in emerging markets. A comparative piece on the USA and China, for 
example, would be valuable in advancing the insights provided by this thesis. This is 
because these two countries have very different approaches to environmental risk 
management in banks. While the US bank lenders take more of a ‘liability’ based 
approach to environmental due diligence, Chinese banks have looser policies towards 
environmental risk. It would be interesting therefore to compare the research findings 
in this thesis with the perceptions of risk in these countries. Secondly, this research 
could provide a springboard for research investigating how ethical and social impacts 
have affected the banking structure. Finally, the insights presented by the data within 
this research could be revisited in a number of years’ time. Such a project could show 
how environmental risk and due diligence has changed since 2014, and the impact that 
the ‘emerging risks’ (which are outlined in this project) have had upon lenders since 
this current time of writing.  
 
Now that the implications of this empirical study have been assessed, the next section 
provides a nuanced solution for increasing the lenders’ role in land redevelopment.  
III. In Search of a Solution 
This thesis has established that brownfield land redevelopment is presently facing a 
number of challenges. Such challenges have been intensified as a result of, inter alia, 
decreased public sector support in funding economic incentives for suspect land clean-
up, and the weak enforcement of the environmental laws relating to land pollution. 
Currently, there is no encouragement for redevelopers to remediate suspect land. In 
Chapter 1, it was shown that brownfield land remediation is important for the UK, 
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which has a high population density, and a shortage of housing. The lenders’ role in 
land redevelopment (i.e. as the funders of regeneration projects) could provide the 
answer for increasing the redevelopment of brownfield land. Accordingly, this section 
outlines a possible solution for encouraging future land redevelopment. It does this by 
focusing on two primary elements: (1) the law’s future application; and, (2) a move 
towards a more symbiotic approach between the private and public sectors.  
 
In the law’s application, it actually makes sense for direct lender liability to remain low 
risk. If, in the near future, the law relating to land and water pollution is applied too 
strictly, this may hinder some borrowers (e.g. the high-street dry cleaners, or the single-
site petrol fuelling stations) when applying for loan financing. Future politics must not 
seek to encourage land redevelopment through a regime that commands compliance by 
making direct liability exposure a likely, and severe, occurrence. One that has learnt 
from the trans-Atlantic mistakes of the past would suggest that the direct approach to 
the remediation of polluted land is, in fact, counterintuitive. Ideally, Part IIA’s 
thresholds should remain high, and the polluter pays principle should be followed at all 
times. Therefore, in answer to the first question, it seems that imposing the remediation 
of environmentally suspect land through a regime of direct lender liability could be 
extremely damaging to the banks’ role in funding land redevelopment projects. In 
consequence, this research neither supports, nor encourages, a strict, direct lender 
liability approach towards environmental clean-up. The reason for adopting this stance 
was explained in Chapter 2, where a chronological account of the development of the 
law relating to historic land contamination is provided. By analysing the development 
of this area, the origins of lender liability and environmental risks occurred in the USA, 
in the 1980s, with the bringing into force of CERCLA. As previously outlined, under 
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CERCLA a number of lenders were found directly liable for the environmental 
pollution of their borrowers’ hazardous waste sites. During the 1980s and 1990s, US 
lenders became fearful of lending their money in case they became subjected to 
CERCLA liability, the remediation and reputational costs of which could be substantial.  
 
Following this, the question still remains as to how it might be possible to circumvent 
the use of direct lender liability, while effectively enforcing contaminated land 
remediation? As an alternative to direct lender liability, a more nuanced approach needs 
to be taken when dealing with environmental risk and remediation. This approach 
should not make banks fearful when lending to certain clients, nor should it prevent 
borrowers from receiving loan financing because of environmental issues. In so doing, 
it should also seek to regain public sector confidence in the remediation of land affected 
by contamination. Without doubt, the decreasing financial support for contaminated 
land identification and remediation from the public sector has significantly impacted 
the local authorities’ enforcement of the Part IIA regime. After the first bout of cuts 
were made to the economic relief that was provided for the developers and owners of 
contaminated land, local authorities have had little incentive to pursue their statutory 
duties. For example, since 2010, twenty three per cent of local authorities did not 
receive any funding, and fifty-three per cent were given less than £5,000.1594 Also, in 
relation to the regime’s enforcement, eighty-three per cent of local authorities have not 
carried out any intrusive site investigations since April 2012, when the new statutory 
guidance was released.1595 The reduction of funding to England will inevitably mean 
that even fewer determinations will now be made by local authorities, who are 
                                                 
1594 ‘Part 2A contaminated land regime – has the dragon lost its fire?’ (ELM Law, 22 July 2013) 
<http://www.elmlaw.co.uk/post.php?s=2013-07-22-part-2a-contaminated-land-regime---has-the-
dragon-lost-its-fire> accessed 10 February 2014. 
1595 ibid.  
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becoming increasingly reluctant of paying for the remediation costs of the contaminated 
land that is situated within their areas.1596     
 
In the move towards a symbiotic approach, perhaps the answer for driving the continued 
commitment to suspect land remediation lies not in direct governmental intervention 
through legal regulation and administration, but, rather, through a state which 
encourages environmental governance between the private and public sectors.1597 The 
literature concerning the ‘greening of finance’ (i.e. that the environment and economy 
are ‘interrelated’), in Chapter 1, supports the need for a co-operative approach between 
the government and private sector investors. Following Gunningham et al.’s notion of 
‘Smart Regulation’,1598 Richardson suggests that, ‘Since environmental protection is 
not a self-contained policy issue but permeates many sectors, then the concentration of 
responsibilities within a single specialist agency is not necessarily desirable.’1599 While 
there are a number of limitations to this symbiotic approach (e.g. retaining coherency 
between the state, law and markets may become an issue at times),1600 it is nonetheless 
a much more pragmatic mode for reducing environmental problems in the twenty-first 
century than more traditional methods. With regards to regulating contaminated land, 
specifically, it seems likely that the creation of a ‘shared space of governance’1601 would 
provide the necessary stimulus for driving clean-up efforts. Further to greater co-
operation, lenders should soften their policies so as to encourage brownfield 
                                                 
1596 ibid. 
1597 Richardson (n 324) 3. See also, inter alia, I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: 
Transcending the Deregulation Debate (OUP 1992); DF Kettl, Sharing Power: Governance and Private 
Markets (The Brookings Institute 1993); P Self, Government by the Market? The Politics of Public 
Choice (Macmillan Press 1993); G Stoker, ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’ 
(1996) 44(4) Political Studies 652. 
1598 N Gunningham, P Grabosky and D Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy 
(Clarendon Press, OUP 1998). 
1599 Richardson (n 324) 14. 
1600 ibid, 11. 
1601 ibid. 
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development. They could, for instance, reduce loan interest rates for developers aiming 
to remediate contaminated properties as a means of incentivising suspect land 
redevelopment. The problem, however, is that there is no reason for the banks to do this 
at the moment. This thesis therefore argues that the government must work towards 
rebuilding the confidence of the banks, developers and landowners operating within the 
contaminated land market.  
IV. Conclusion 
In conclusion, contaminated land pollution should not be neglected simply because new 
risks are emerging, and the laws relating to land and water pollution have created an 
insufficient direct liability threat. Public policy would suggest that redeveloping land is 
beneficial for a number of reasons, e.g. reducing development on the greenfield, 
minimising prospective environmental risks, and creating jobs and economic growth. 
Given this time of financial hardship for local government, this thesis proposes that 
future politics must continue to prioritise brownfield land redevelopment. This links 
back to the section in Chapter 1 which discusses how land availability may become an 
issue in the near future. A middle ground must be established between the government 
and private sector banks, otherwise forthcoming property development will continue to 
bear heavily upon the UK’s green spaces. It is hoped that a co-operative approach to 
land redevelopment would mean that the risks that can occur when redeveloping 
suspect land are not only shared, but are also significantly reduced in the process.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: 
Copy of Email Circulated to Interviewees 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
My name is Lloyd Brown and I am a PhD student based at Cardiff Law School. My 
doctoral thesis is entitled, “The Lenders Role in Land Re-development”, and aims to 
assess the lenders use of environmental due diligence within their loan financing. 
 
My purpose of writing, therefore, is to ask whether you would be willing to participate 
in an interview for the project. I am aware that you have knowledge of environmental 
risk management that would be of great use during the formulation of my written thesis. 
 
As only a limited amount of information can be obtained through the surrounding 
literature; a more in-depth study is needed to give the written thesis substance and 
originality. The information obtained from the interviews will bestow upon the work a 
practical edge that will make it useful to the financial community upon completion. 
 
The empirical study is going to consist of the qualitative methodological technique, 
known as “semi-structured” interviewing. Semi-structured interviewing is the chosen 
methodological technique, because of its open and relaxed style; the interview will later 
be transcribed and used within the thesis. 
 
The study has been given ethical approval by Cardiff University, so any information 
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produced within the interview will be made anonymous and its storage will be 
conducted in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
So far, I have completed a literature review on lender liability, under the supervision of 
Professor Robert Lee. The literature review has allowed me to read widely about lender 
liability and the environmental risk management techniques that are being used by 
lenders to assess the eligibility of their commercial clients. 
 
I am now moving into the second year of the PhD, which is where the empirical study 
will take centre stage. Many research projects do not have the benefit of gaining the 
practical understanding that is necessary to make them useful within their subject area. 
Your participation within this study would be of a great benefit to my thesis and to the 
furtherance of knowledge within the area of lender liability. 
 
If you would like further information concerning the project please do not hesitate to 
contact me by any of the means displayed below. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
Lloyd Brown 
KESS Scholar 
69 Park Place 
Cardiff Law School 
Cardiff University 
Tel: 07411 787575 
Personal email: lagwynfa@yahoo.co.uk 
Work email: BrownLA2@cardiff.ac.uk 
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Appendix 2: 
Pro Forma Documentation 
 
1. Information Form 
 
*Please read this information carefully before you sign the consent form (below) 
 
Thesis Title: “The Lenders Role in Land Redevelopment” 
 
1. The research is being conducted by Lloyd Brown (a PhD student at Cardiff University) 
and concerns the potential risks (both direct and indirect) that may attach to lenders 
when dealing in commercial land transactions on contaminated and brownfield sites. 
The purpose of this empirical study is to gain an understanding of the financial 
institutions due diligence methods with regards to environmental risk transfer. 
 
2. The project is funded through the Knowledge Economy Skills Scholarship (backed by 
European Structural Funding) and is conducted by Cardiff University with Ashfield 
Solutions as a collaborative enterprise. This funding expires after a period of three 
years, so there is urgency for its completion.  
 
3. The empirical basis of the study consists of semi-structured interviews (i.e. an 
interview based on a broad topic list of relevant topics). 
 
4. It is estimated that the interview will last around 45 minutes. The interviewee may 
choose not to respond to certain questions. The participant’s contribution to the project 
is unpaid and voluntary; the participant may opt-out at any time before and during the 
interview. The student would like the interviews to be recorded by an electronic device 
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to aid in the transcribing process. You may decline the use of any recording equipment 
in the interview. 
 
5. The qualitative study is designed to ensure that the information given by participants 
will remain confidential post-interview. Participants can be assured that all the 
information will be anonymised and that the handling of the “personal data” during the 
analysis phase will be done in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. The 
student assures participants that it will not be possible to know who engaged in the 
interviews on reading any part of the thesis, or associated publication 
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2. Consent Form 
 
*Please read the information form before signing 
 
I (Participant’s Name) have read the information form and understand that my 
participation in the research project is on a voluntary basis. By signing this consent 
form I have expressly agreed to participate in the interview out of my own free will on 
the basis of the assurances of confidentiality given to me. 
 
Name (printed): 
Signature:                                                                   
 
I have agreed to allow this interview to be recorded. 
 
Signature: 
Date: 
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3. Contact Information Form 
 
If you have any questions regarding your participation in this study please contact: 
 
Name: 
Mr Lloyd A. Brown 
 
Address:  
Cardiff University, 
Cardiff Law School, 
Museum Avenue,  
Cardiff, 
CF10 3AX. 
 
Numbers: 
+44 7915 502*** 
01443 406*** 
 
Email: 
Personal – lagwynfa@yahoo.co.uk 
Work – brownla2@cardiff.ac.uk  
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Appendix 3: 
Topic List 
 
Introduction 
 Preliminary proceedings: 
 Introductions; 
 Confidentiality issues & the use of electronic recording etc… 
 Environmental DD and Drivers… 
 
Risks 
 The Risks? 
 Are some risks more of a threat than others? 
 Direct – Mortgagee in Possession 
 Indirect – credit; security; & reputational risks 
 
Lenders DD & Assessment of Eligibility 
 Implementation of environmental laws and regulations? 
 How does one mitigate for risks? 
 Different types of commercial clients? 
 High risk Clients? 
 Mechanisms for allocating environmental risks: 
 
1. Pre-foreclosure 
 
 Analysis of client’s eligibility; 
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 Use of internal committees; 
 Conditions precedent in loan documentation -Warranties; Indemnities; 
Environmental Insurance etc. 
 Environmental reporting; 
 Use of external expertise. 
 
2. Post-foreclosure 
 
 “Control”; 
 Administrator; 
 Assessment of risk; 
 
Future for Environmental DD 
 What is the future? 
 
 
 
 
